THE UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS
LIBRARY

940.913
H84m

A MILITARY HISTORY *of* THE WORLD WAR

BY

COLONEL C. R. HOWLAND
INFANTRY, U. S. ARMY

WITH PREFACE BY
MAJOR GENERAL HANSON E. ELY,
U. S. ARMY

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

THIS HISTORY IS IN TWO VOLUMES

Volume I Contains the Narrative
Volume II Contains the Maps

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1923

Copyright applied for
in name of
C. R. HOWLAND

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Table of Contents

Page

PREFACE iii

DEDICATION iv

INTRODUCTION v

BIBLIOGRAPHY vii

LIST OF COMPLIANCES WITH OR VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR xi

LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME II (ATLAS) xiii

Narrative

CHAPTERS	SUBJECT	Page
I	Events leading up to the World War	1
II	Plans and operations to include the defeat of Belgium	20
III	Western front to include the Battle of the Marne	37
IV	All fronts to include 1914	58
V	All fronts to include 1915	88
VI	Operations on Western and Russian fronts in 1916	113
VII	Operations in 1916, continued	132
VIII	Operations in 1917 preceding the entry of America	152
IX	Events leading up to America's participation in the War	171
X	German and American plans	187
XI	Plans for use of American forces in Europe	203
XII	All fronts to end of 1917	218
XIII	Western front to include German offensive, March 21, 1918	240
XIV	Western front March to June, 1918	259
XV	German offensive at the Second Battle of the Marne	285
XVI	All fronts except the Western front to the end of the war	305
XVII	Allied and American counter offensive at the Second Battle of the Marne	328
XVIII	Allied and American offensive to September 25, 1918	348
XIX	Allied and American general offensive to the end of the war	369

113. Italian Decisive Operation against Austria, 1918.
114. Post War European States.
115. Russian Railroad to Kola.
116. Trans-Siberian Railroad.
117. 1st Division's Attack, July 18, 1918.
118. 2d Division's Attack, July 18, 1918.
119. Americans at Second Battle of the Marne, 1918.
120. Allied Plans after Second Battle of the Marne, 1918.
121. Allied Plan for Reduction Amiens Salient, 1918.
122. Reduction of Amiens Salient, 1918.
123. Allied plan for Exploitation of Success in Reducing Amiens Salient, 1918.
124. Exploitation of Success in Reducing Amiens Salient to August 29, 1918.
125. Allied Offensive to September 8, 1918.
126. Situation, September 8, 1918.
127. Germans Forced Back to Siegfried Line.
128. German Defenses at St. Mihiel.
129. Order of Battle at St. Mihiel.
130. American First Army Reduces St. Mihiel Salient, 1918.
131. Territory recaptured by Marshal Foch's Offensive (First Period), 1918.
132. Order of Battle Western Front, September 25, 1918.
133. German Lines of Defense, 1918.
134. Marshal Foch's Plan for General Offensive, 1918.
135. American Order of Battle September 26, 1918, October 1, October 13 and November 4, 1918.
136. German Order of Battle, American Front on September 25, October 11, October 31, and November 6, 1918.
137. German Postitions American Front.
138. Relation between American Army and French Fourth Army.
139. General Pershing's Plan for Attack west of the Meuse, September 26, 1918.
140. General Offensive from September 26 to October 13, 1918.
141. 2d Division Captures Blanc Mont, 1918.
142. 36th Division Pursues after Blanc Mont Operation, 1918.
143. II American Corps Penetrates German First Line of Defense, 1918.
144. General Offensive from October 13 to 20.
145. General Offensive from October 20 to November 4.
146. General Pershing's Plan for November 1 Attack.
147. Order of Battle November 11, on American First Army Front.
148. General Offensive from November 4 to 11, 1918.
149. Allied and American Bridgeheads on the Rhine.
150. Similarity of Offensives of Exhaustion in World War and in American Civil War.

940.913
H84m

Preface

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

7 May 1923.

This work is a summary, in book form, of lectures delivered to the General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by Colonel CHARLES R. HOWLAND, U. S. Army, during the period of my command here.

These lectures were so well received, not only as a most carefully prepared history of the World War, but as showing the military principles involved in the various campaigns—how their observance made toward victory and their non-observance toward defeat—that it was decided to publish this volume in order that the great number of officers who are unable to attend these schools, might profit thereby.

It will place at the disposal of military men a most valuable and authoritative statement of facts written in an orderly fashion and at a sufficient time since the conclusion of the war to give access to information unobtainable at an earlier date.

The immense research involved is evidenced by the Bibliography enumerating the 220 sources considered, and the appendix of 151 maps showing graphically the various plans, operations, and results:—the most valuable collection of maps I have ever seen.

This is the only history of the World War that I have seen, which, while setting forth fairly the doings of all other participants involved, gives proper emphasis to the most important and critical part taken by the United States of America.

H. E. Ely

Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

575899

This Military History of The World War

is dedicated to

General Pershing

Who saw clear through the "Fog of War,"
And undeterred by Friend or Foe,
Organized the Force—And delivered the Blow—
That gained the Victory.

Introduction

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

September 15, 1923.

This work represents extensive examination and close study of information on the World War as it is available at the present time.

The subject matter as given herein is, in substance, the same as has been presented by the author in the form of lectures to the classes at the General Service Schools for the past two years. It has been well received generally by the experienced officers composing those classes and by the instructional staff as well.

The information available at this time is considered sufficient to present a true outline of the major operations of the World War, and the matters of fact as presented in the following pages may be accepted with a high degree of confidence as a basis for the study of the stratgey of the war and also as a means of exemplification of the comprehensive principles of war in general, and of certain operations in particular.

The deductions and conclusions from the facts as presented are the individual work of the author, and are well worthy of serious and thoughful consideration by the student of military history and strategy.

R. H. ALLEN,
Assistant Commandant.

APPROVED:
H. A. SMITH,
Commandant.

Bibliography

1. America in France—Frederick Palmer.
2. American Army—Benedict Crowell.
3. American Army in Belgium.
4. American Army in the European Conflict—De Chambrun and De Marenches.
5. American Effort—Von Ludendorff.
6. American Guns in the War with Germany—E. S. Farrow.
7. American II Corps—K. T. Riggs.
8. Americans in the Great War—Micheler & Co.
9. American Soldiers Won the War—Interviews with German Crown Prince, von Ludendorff, von Gallwitz and von Einem.
10. America's Case against Germany—Lindsay Rodgers.
11. America's Race to Victory—Requien.
12. Another Legend of the Marne 1914—(No. 1, Vol. V, The Army Quarterly).
13. Army of 1918—R. R. McCormick.
14. Artilleryman—Jay M. Lee.
15. Balkan Problems and European Peace—Buxton and Teese.
16. Battle of the Marne—von Bulow.
17. Battle of the Piave—Issued by Supreme Command of Italy.
18. Battle of the Somme—John Buchan.
19. Battle of the Somme—Philip Gibbs.
20. Battle of Verdun—Henry Dugard.
21. Battle Participation of Organization of the A.E.F.
22. Behind the Scenes in the Reichstag—Wetterlee.
23. Breach between the German First and Second Armies at the Battle of the Marne, "Revue Militaire Francaise, 1922."
24. Brief History of Divisions U. S. Army (W.P.D. G.S.).
25. Brigade of the Old Army—1914, Sir Ayler Haldane.
26. British Campaigns in the Near East—E. Dane.
27. British on the Somme—W. B. Thomas.
28. British Opponents at the Battle of the Marne—Army Quarterly No. 2, Vol. IV.
29. Campaigns of Hindenburg—Ludendorff on the Eastern Front—General Buat.
30. Cannae—Von Schlieffen.
31. Causes and Consequences of the War—Ypes Guyot.
32. Causes and Pretexts of the World War—Ferrara.
33. Cavalry in 1915—Frederick Coleman.
34. Commendations of 2d Division.
35. Conduct of War—Von der Goltz.
36. Dardanelles—C. E. Callwell.
37. Day by Day with the Russian Army—Bernard Pares.
38. Deductions from the World War—Baron Freytag—Loringhoven.
39. Development of Tactics—World War—Balck.
40. Development of the German Plan of Campaign, August-September, 1914—Army Quarterly No. 2, Vol. II.
41. Development of the German Plan of Campaign, August-September, 1914—Capt. Wynne (in No. 2, Vol. II, The Army Quarterly).
42. Diplomacy and the War—Andrassy.
43. Diplomacy of the War in 1914—E. C. Stowell.
44. Direction of War—W. D. Bird.
45. Disclosures from Germany—Reprint of International Conciliation No. 127, June, 1918.
46. Discussion of National Defense—General John J. Pershing.
47. Eighty-sixth Division (History).

48. Elements of the Great War—Hillaire Belloc.
49. Encyclopedia Brittanica.
50. Ethnological Maps of Central southeastern Europe and Western Asia, April, 1919.
51. European War—General Information—Compilation G.S.S. Library.
52. European War—J. W. Burgess.
53. Evidence in the Case—J. M. Beck.
54. Evolution of the Unified Command—Tasker H. Bliss.
55. Face to Face with Kaiserism—Gerard.
56. Facts about France—E. Saillens.
57. Father Duffy's Story—Francis P. Duffy.
58. Field Orders First Army, A.E.F. (3 to 119) (Library G.S.S.).
59. Fifth Division (History).
60. Final Report of General John J. Pershing.
61. First Division (History).
62. First Reflections on Campaign of 1918—R. M. Johnston.
63. First Report of General John J. Pershing.
64. First World War—Colonel Repington.
65. Forty Days in 1914—Sir F. Maurice.
66. Fourth Division—Bach—Hall.
67. France Facing Germany—Clemenceau.
68. French High Command in 1916, "Revue Militaire Francaise, September, 1922."
69. Gas Warfare—E. S. Farrow.
70. General Sketch of the European War—Hillaire Belloc.
71. General Staff and its Problems—Ludendorff.
72. German Attack of July 15 to 17, 1918 between Dormans and Rheims —Hans von Zwehl.
73. German Campaign in the west 1914—Army Quarterly No. 1, Vol. II.
74. German Campaign in the West, August, 1914—(No. 1, Vol. II The Army Quarterly).
75. German General Staff—von Falkenhayn.
76. German Plan of Operations against France—1914, "Revue Militaire Francaise, 1922."
77. German War Book—J.H. Morgan, M.A.
78. Governments and Parties in Continental Europe—E.L. Lowell.
79. Guide to the Military History of the World War—T.G. Frothingham.
80. Guizot's History of France.
81. Handbook of Economic Agencies War of 1917—W. D. Doc. 908.
82. Handbook of Northern France—W. M. Davis.
83. Harper's Pictorial Library of the World War.
84. Heaven, Hell or Hoboken—R. N. Johnson.
85. Historical Development of Modern Europe—C. M. Andrews.
86. Historical Geography of Europe.—E A. Freeman.
87. Historical Report of the Chief Engineer, A.E.F.
88. History of England—Macauley.
89. History of Germany—E. F. Henderson.
90. History of the Great War—Briggs Davenport.
91. History of the Transport Service—Albert Gleaves.
92. History of the World War—F.A. March.
93. History of the World War—F. H. Simonds.
94. Ian Hamilton's Gallipoli Report—September 20, 1915.
95. Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue—Goricar and Stowe.
96. Inside Story of the A.E.F.—Pattulo.
97. International Law and the Great War—Coleman Phillipson.
98. In the World War—Count Czernin.
99. Invasion and the War in Belgium—L. Van Der Essen.
100. Iron Division (28th)—H. G. Proctor.
101. Journal of the Great War—Dawes.
102. Last Days of Fort Vaux—Henry Bordeaux.
103. Last Four Months—Sir F. Maurice.

104. Lectures First Army Staff, A.E.F. (Library G.S.S.).
105. Legend of the Marne—Army Quarterly, No. 1, Vol. IV.
106. Literary Digest History of World War.
107. (London) Times History of the War.
108. Lost Fruits of Waterloo—Bassett.
109. Louis the XIV—Julia Pardol.
110. Ludendorff's Own Story.
111. March on Paris—Von Kluck.
112. Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany.
113. Menzel's History of Germany.
114. Mesopotamia—H. W. Reynardson.
115. Monograph Blanc Mont (Library G.S.S.).
116. Monograph, 5th Division (Library G.S.S.).
117. Monograph, II Corps (Library G.S.S.).
118. Monographs, V Corps (Library G.S.S.).
119. Monograph, Soissons (Library G.S.S.).
120. My Campaigns—General Townsend.
121. My Memoirs—von Tirpitz.
122. Napoleon's Maxims of War.
123. National Service Magazine.
124. Nelson's History of the War—John Buchan.
125. New International Encyclopedia.
126. New International Yearbook.
127. New National Encyclopedia.
128. New World—Bowman.
129. New York Times Current History of the European War
130. Ninetieth Division (History).
131. Notes by J. R. Davis on 2d Division July 18, 1918.
132. Notes on Causes of the War—J. F. Morrison.
133. On War—Von Clausewitz.
134. Operations of the II U. S. Corps, W. D. Doc. 1016.
135. Organization of S. O. S., A.E.F.—W. D. Doc. 1009.
136. Organization of the Service of Supply (Monograph No. 7, W.P.D., G.S.).
137. Origin of the Macedonian 1918 Offensive—Revue Militaire Francaise, July, 1922.
138. Origin of the Triple Alliance—Coolidge.
139. Origin of the War—Federn.
140. Our Army in Flanders—G. V. Williams.
141. Our Army in Palestine—Antony Bluett.
142. Our Greatest Battle—Frederick Palmer.
143. Our 110 Days' Fighting—A. W. Page.
144. Our War with Germany—Bassett.
145. Outlines of European History—Robinson and Beard.
146. Out of my Life—Von Hindenburg.
147. Pan Americanism—Roland G. Usher.
148. Pan German Plot Unmasked—Cheradame.
149. Peace Negotiations—Robert Lansing.
150. Pomp of Power—G. H. Doran Co.
151. Principles of Maritime Strategy—Corbett.
152. Principles of Strategy—W. K. Naylor.
153. Principles of War—Foch.
154. Prisoners of the Great War—Carl P. Dennett.
155. Provocation of France—Bracq.
156. Psychology of the Great War—Gustave Le Bon.
157. Recollection of a Chief of Staff—von Moltke (Junior).
158. Records of the World War—Field Orders of the II Army Corps.
159. Reference History of the War—I. S. Guernsey, M. A.
160. Role of Physiography in Military Operation—Kirk Bryan.
161. Roots of the War—Federn.
162. Russia and the Great War—George Alexinsky.

163. Russian Army—Sir Alfred Knox.
164. Saloniki and After—M. G. Owen.
165. Scapegoat of the Battle of the Marne—Army Quarterly No. 2, Vol.I.
166. Second Battle of the Marne—C. H. Lanza.
167. Second Division (History).
168. Second Field Signal Battalion.
169. Short History of the Great War—A. F. Pollard.
170. Sir Archibald Murray's Despatches.
171. Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches—J. H. Boraston.
172. Six Months on the Italian Front—J. M. Price.
173. Strategy of Ludendorff—"Revue Militaire Suisse"—March, 1923.
174. Story of the British Fourth Army, General Montgomery.
175. Strategy on the Western Front—H. H. Sargent.
176. Summary of Air Information (Library G.S.S.).
177. Summary of Information A.E.F. (Library G.S.S.).
178. Summary of Operations First Army, E.A.F. (Library G.S.S.).
179. Tabular Views of Universal History—G. F. Putnam—L. E. Jones.
180. Tactics—A Handbook Based on Lessons of the World War—Rohrbeck.
181. The First Seven Divisions—E. W. Hamilton.
182. The Great War—Allen.
183. The Irrevocable Moment—Ferrere in L'Illustration, August, 1922.
184. The Kaiser's Memoirs—Wilhelm II.
185. The Reckoning—J. M. Beck.
186. The United States and Pan Germania—Andre Oberadame.
187. The United States in the World War—McMaster.
188. The World War—H. A. Drum.
189. The World War—T. W. Darrah.
190. Third Division (History).
191. Thirty-second Division (History).
192. Thirty Years' War—Grindely.
193. Three hundred and sixty-first Infantry.
194. Three hundred and thirty-second Infantry on the Italian Front.
195. Three Years of War in East Africa—A. Buchanan.
196. Topography and Strategy in the War—W. D. Johnson.
197. Truth about Germany—Facts about the War.
198. Turks in Palestine—Alexander Aaronsohn.
199. Turn of the Tide—J. C. Wise.
200. Twelfth Engineers (History).
201. Twenty-ninth Division (History).
202. Twenty-ninth Division at Gallipoli—O. Creighton.
203. Twenty-seventh Division—John P. O'Ryan.
204. Upton to the Meuse with the 307th Infantry—W. Kerr Rainsford.
205. Vauquois Hill to Exermont—Clair Kenmare.
206. Verdun to the Vosges—Gerald Campbell.
207. Volume I Official History of British Army of the War 1914-1918.
208. Von Ludendorff on the German 1914 Plan of Campaign, Army Quarterly No. 1, Vol. III.
209. War and Humanity—J. M. Beck.
210. War Minister and his Work—Von Stein.
211. War of 1914-1918—Lt. Col. Dufour.
212. War of the Future—Von Bernhardi.
213. War with Germany—L. F. Ayers.
214. What every American should know about the War—Montville Flowers.
215. Why Wars Come—Niblack.
216. Why we went to War—Gauss.
217. World's Work, November, 1918 to November, 1919.
218. World War—Lt. Col. Corda.
219. World War—W. H. Howell
220. Yankee Division in France—Frank P. Sibley.

List of Compliances with or Violations of the Principles of War, that Appear at the End of Chapters

1. The Principle of the Objective:
   Chapters II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XVI.
2. The Principle of the Offensive:
   Chapters III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX
3. The Principle of Mass:
   Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX.
4. The Principle of Economy of Force:
   Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, XII, XIV, XV, XVI.
5. The Principle of Movement:
   Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XIX.
6. The Principle of Surprise:
   Chapters I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX.
7. The Principle of Security:
   Chapters II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, XVIII.
8. The Principle of Simplicity:
   Chapters III, IV, VI, VII, XIII, XV, XVI.
9. The Principle of Cooperation:
   Chapters II, III, IV, VI, VII, XIII.

List of Maps in Volume II (Atlas)

No.	Description
1.	The World.
2.	Main Theater of Operations.
3.	Balkan Theater of Operations.
4.	Italian Front.
5.	Western Theater of Operations (large scale).
6.	Western Theater of Operations (reduced scale).
7.	German Plan of Operations against France 1914.
8.	German and Allied Plans, 1914.
9.	Defeat of Belgium.
10.	Battle of the French Frontier.
11.	Allied Defeat at Second Line.
12.	Allied Retreat to the Marne.
13.	Battle of the Marne.
14.	Situation September 5, in front of Paris.
15.	Situation September 9, in front of Paris.
16.	Concentrations on Russian Front.
17.	Railroad net of Northern Europe.
18.	Russian offensive against Germany, 1914.
19.	Battle of Tannenberg.
20.	Battle of Masurian Lakes.
21.	Battle of the Jadar.
22.	Battle of the Drina.
23.	Battle of Mt. Roudnik.
24.	Battle of Lemberg.
25.	Battle of the Aisne.
26.	Battle of Picardy.
27.	Battle of Artois.
28.	Central Powers' 1914 Offensive against Russia.
29.	Central Powers' Second Offensive against Russia, 1914.
30.	Battle of Flanders, 1914.
31.	Turkish Concentration 1914.
32.	Operations in Turkey 1914.
33.	Winter Operations on Russian Front, 1914-15.
34.	Winter Battle in Masuria, 1914-15.
35.	Western Front before Italy joined the Allies, 1915.
36.	Italian Front, 1915.
37.	Railroads in Italian Theater.
38.	Central Powers' offensive against Russia, 1915.
39.	Order of Battle, July 1, 1915—Western Front.
40.	Operations Western Front, Fall 1915.
41.	Defeat of Serbia, 1915.
42.	Situation, January 1, 1916.
43.	Caucasus Operations, 1916.
44.	The Verdun Salient.
45.	Battle of Verdun, 1916.
46.	Battle of the Somme, 1916.
47.	Russian offensive, 1916.
47-A.	Turkish capture of Kut, 1916.
48.	Defense of Suez Canal, 1916.
49.	Italian Front, 1916.
50.	Second Battle of Verdun, 1916.
51.	Balkan Railroads.
52.	Balkan 1916 Concentration.

53. Defeat of Roumania, 1916.
54. Capture of German East Africa, 1917.
55. Recapture of Kut-el-Amara, 1917.
56. First Battle of Gaza, 1917.
57. Situation, January 1, 1917.
58. Plans for 1917 Spring Offensive, Western Front.
59. Nivelle's offensive, 1917.
60. Pan German plan of 1911.
61. American Front in Lorraine.
62. American Service of Supply.
63. Location of French Industries.
64. A.E.F. Lines of Communication on Map of U. S.
65. Italian Offensive, 1917.
66. Capture of Messines Ridge, 1917.
67. British Offensive against Ostend and Zeebrugge, 1917.
68. Russian Galician Disaster, 1917.
69. German Capture of Riga, 1917.
70. Third Battle of Verdun, 1917.
71. Capture of Malmaison, 1917.
72. Battle of Caporetto, 1917.
73. Battle of Cambrai, 1917.
74. Capture of Jerusalem, 1917.
75. Situation, January 1, 1918.
76. Building the A.E.F.—March 20, 1918.
77. Order of Battle Western Front, March 20, 1918.
78. Railroad Map Western Front, 1918.
79. Von Hindenburg's Plan 1918, First Phase.
80. Von Hindenburg's Plan 1918, Second Phase.
81. German Offensive of March 21, 1918.
82. German Offensive of April 9, on the Lys, 1918.
83. Building the A.E.F.—May 27, 1918.
84. Battle line near Cantigny.
85. 1st Division captures Cantigny, 1918.
86. Artillery Barrage Chart, Cantigny.
87. Theater of Operations in Asia Minor.
88. Eastern Theater of Operations.
89. Von Hindenburg's Plan for May 27 Offensive, 1918.
90. Order of Battle Western Front, May 25, 1918.
91. German May 27 Offensive, 1918.
92. Building the A.E.F. June 3, 1918.
93. 3d Division prevents German crossing of the Marne, May 31-June 3, 1918.
94. 2d Division stops German advance on Paris, June 1–June 3, 1918.
95. 2d Division captures Vaux, July 1, 1918.
96. German Offensive against Compeigne, June 9, 1918.
97. The Second Battle of the Marne, 1918.
98. German Plan for Second Battle of the Marne.
99. The Railroad Situation in the Marne Salient.
100. 3d Division Infantry Dispositions, July 15, 1918.
101. 3d Division Machine Gun Dispositions, July 15, 1918.
102. 3d Division Artillery Dispositions, July 15, 1918.
103. German Plan of Attack on 3d Division Front.
104. A.E.F. Situation, July 15, 1918.
105. Italian Front. Plans for 1918 Operations.
106. Austrian Offensive against Italy, 1918.
107. Surrender of Turkish Mesopotamian Army, 1918.
108. Syrian Situation, 1918.
109. General Allenby's Decisive Victory in Syria, 1918.
110. Balkan Situation, 1918.
111. General d'Esperey's Decisive Balkan Victory, 1918.
112. Allies threaten Central Powers from the Balkans, 1918.

CHAPTER I

Events Leading Up to the World War

Page

1. Remote Causes 1
2. Policies 1
   a. Policies of individual states in the Triple Alliance 2
   b. Triple Alliance Policies 5
   c. Policies of states that later joined the Triple Entente 8
   d. Policy of the Triple Entente 10
   e. Policies of states not in either group 11
      (1) Turkish policies 11
      (2) Serbian policies 11
      (3) Luxemburg's policies 12
      (4) Belgian policies 12
3. Conflict of Policies 12
   a. The Kaiser's first threat of war—The Boer War 13
   b. The Kaiser's second threat of war—Algeciras 13
   c. The Kaiser's third threat of war—Annexation of Bosnia—Herzegovina 13
   d. The Kaiser's fourth threat of war—Agadir 14
   e. Italo-Turkish War 14
   f. First Balkan War 14
   g. Second Balkan War 15
   h. Assassination of Austrian Crown Prince 15
4. The Dual Alliance Launches War 16
   a. The First Potsdam Conference 16
   b. Austria declares war on Serbia 17
   c. The Second Potsdam Conference 17
   d. The Kaiser declares war on Russia and France 18
5. Principles of War. The principle of surprise 19

1. Remote Causes. A simple explanation of the causes of the World War is impossible. Some of the causes have their roots so far back in the mazes of racial, dynastic, religious and territorial complications, that they are too remote for consideration here. We do know, however, that the World War was a war between states and between groups of states, and that it was initiated by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, July 28, 1914, and extended to a world war by Germany against Russia August 1 and against France and Belgium August 3, 1914.

2. Policies. In the international relation, war is the maintenance of policies by other means after diplomacy fails.

An examination of the policies of the states engaged in the war brings out their differences.

a. Policies of individual states in the Triple Alliance. The policies of the states that later composed the Triple Alliance will be considered in the following order:

Policies of Germany.
Policies of Austro-Hungary.
Policies of Italy.

(1) *German policies.* (a) Preceding and during the Napoleonic Wars the Hohenzollern Kings of Prussia initiated and fixed certain national policies, the most important of which were:

First: The King rules by Divine Right.
Second: War is the National Industry.
Third: National territory must be continually extended.
Fourth: International obligations or pledges fall before the national interest under the "Frederician Tradition."

A good illustration of the execution of these policies is given by the actions of Bismarck who became prime minister of Prussia in 1862 (Map 2). Realizing the great value to Germany of a strategic canal through Schleswig-Holstein, connecting the Baltic and the North Seas, he brought on a war in 1864 between Prussia and Austria on one side and Denmark on the other; defeated Denmark and seized Schleswig-Holstein for Austria and Prussia. He soon quarreled with Austria over the disposition of Schleswig-Holstein, defeated her in 1866, annexed all of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, and forced Austria to recognize the new Prussianized North German Confederation, from which Austria was excluded.

He recognized that hatred of France engendered by the extreme hardships and devastation imposed by France in the Thirty Years War, the wars of Louis XIV, and the Napoleonic Wars, was the only attitude in which he could unite the German states. Accordingly, he provoked the Franco-Prussian War on a question of the eligibility of a Hohenzollern prince to selection for the vacant Spanish throne. He accomplished the defeat of France in 1871; forced her to give the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, and to pay Germany an indemnity of $1,000,000,000.00. He accomplished his end as planned by uniting all the German states into a German Empire, under Prussia's King as Imperial Kaiser, and with himself, Bismarck, as the first Chancellor. When France promptly paid

the indemnity, Bismarck sought an opportunity to provoke another war with the design of advancing the German frontier still farther to the west and of imposing an indemnity of $2,000,000,000.00 on France. He made the attempt in 1875, on the excuse that the construction of French fortifications along the frontier was a hostile act. However, England and Russia came to the aid of France and he desisted.

His greatest success was in mollifying Austria-Hungary and in making an alliance with her, October 7, 1879, which united the two as allies in any war with Russia. He thus brought all Germans together again as close partners. The immediate effect of this alliance was considered to be that Panslavism in Europe had been stopped, and that France had been made to feel her isolation.

(b) The further policy of the German Empire in foreign affairs was merged in the policy of the Dual (and later Triple) Alliance, and will be considered under that heading.

(2) *Austro-Hungarian policies.* (a) Austria-Hungary was a dual empire, consisting of the two independent states, Austria and Hungary, which were united into the Empire in the person of the Emperor. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was a state but not a nation. Its population was made up of five different races that ranked in point of members in the following order:

Slavs, Magyars, Germans, Italians and Roumanians.

(b) Austria proper included the northern Slavs, Germans, and Italians, and was ruled by the German family of Hapsburg as Emperors.

(c) Hungary proper is peopled by the Magyars, the descendents of the followers of Attila the Hun, who founded his capital at Buda (now Budapest) 445 A.D., and the descendents of another branch of the Hun and Turkish tribes, i.e. the Magyars under Arpad who conquered Hungary, 889 A. D. It also included some of the Jugo-Slavs and some Roumanians; all of whom the Magyars dominated. Hungary was ruled by the German family of Hapsburg as Kings.

(d) The Slavs in the Empire were separated by the Magyars and the Germans, who had been friendly with each other during and since the time of Attila the Hun. In fact, some of the German tribes were allies of Attila until his defeat at Chalons. The result was that the Slavs, who were the most numerous race in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, were held politically as a subject race and found no way of

satisfying their intense national aspirations as the Magyars had done in securing the recognition of Hungary as an independent state in the Dual Empire.

(e) The Slavs were a subject race in Austria proper where they were dominated by the less numerous Germans. The Slavs to the north of the Magyar-German wedge included: Slovaks, Czechs (Bohemians), Poles, and Ruthenians.

The Slavs to the south of the Magyar-German wedge, including Croatia and Slavonia in Hungary proper, were dominated by the Magyars. The southern Slavs in the Dual Monarchy together with those outside of the empire were called Jugo (or southern) Slavs. From the beginning, there had existed a racial feud between the Jugo-Slavs and the Magyars. The Jugo-Slavs extended their dislike to the German friends of the Magyars.

(f) Each race in the empire, except the Magyars, was tied to some external state by sympathy, as follows:

The Germans to Germany.
The Roumanians to Roumania.
The Italians to Italy.
The Slavs in general to Russia; the
Jugo-Slavs (i.e. Southern Slavs) to the independent Jugo-Slav State, Serbia.

(g) The original Jugo-Slavs outside of the Dual Monarchy (with exceptions) were:

The independent states of Serbia and Montenegro.
The provinces of: (Map 3) Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar.

The Slavs in and south of the Dual Monarchy were exceedingly nationalistic, and the Austro-Hungarian government was greatly perturbed over the fact that it could not control the Jugo-Slavs who were not in the empire.

(h) It was agreed, generally, that the situation in Austria-Hungary was not stable and that, unless the Slav question could be settled, the Dual Monarchy would probably break up at the death of the aged Emperor Francis Joseph.

(i) Briefly, the policies of the Dual Monarchy were:

First: To suppress in every way the national aspirations of the Slavs within the empire.
Second: By diplomacy or war, to control the Jugo-Slavs not in the empire, and, if possible, to add them to the empire.
Third: To reach the Mediterranean Sea at Saloniki and to extend the Dual Monarchy's coast line on the Adriatic Sea.

These policies were approved by Bismarck who aided the Dual Monarchy in their attainment, by assigning to the Dual Monarchy, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the duty of occupying and administering the two autonomous Slav states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of garrisoning strategic places in the Turkish Sanjak of Novibazar. She thus acquired control, militarily, of all the Jugo-Slavs except the two independent states of Serbia and Montenegro. However, by the occupation of strategical places in the Sanjak of Novibazar, she held a powerful wedge between Serbia and Montenegro and, also, by these dispositions, secured free passage to the south.

(j) The further consideration of the policy of Austro-Hungary will be under the Dual (or Triple) Alliance.

(3) *Italian policy.* (Maps 2 and 4.) (a) The prevailing policies of Italy, after her consolidation into a single state, were to secure the transfer to her, from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of Italian Trent and Trieste, and to establish a colony in Tunis which was only one hundred miles from Sicily.

(b) France, secure in Algeria, responding to the suggestion of Bismarck, who desired to attract her attention away from Alsace-Lorraine, invaded and made herself secure in Tunis in 1881.

(c) Italy, failing to secure the friendship of any European power, was deeply humiliated and, finding herself isolated and not yet quite sure of her new status, became obsessed with the fear that her ancient racial friend, France, would take further action against her and, for protection, rushed into the waiting arms of the Dual Alliance. Placing her policies in abeyance, she signed a treaty May 22, 1882, at Vienna, and as a member of the Triple Alliance accepted a guaranty of the integrity of her homeland, and in return assumed an obligation to maintain a large army and to assist the Dual Alliance if it should be attacked by two powers (i.e. Russia and France).

(d) Although this temporary policy controlled the government while in the Triple Alliance, the national aspiration to regain Trent and Trieste was really the national policy.

(e) The further consideration of Italian policy will be under the head of the Triple Alliance.

b. Triple Alliance policies. (Map 2.) (1) Bismarck desiring to isolate France, took advantage of Italy's chagrin over being crowded out of Tunis by France and succeeded in

bringing Italy into an Alliance in 1882, thus changing the Alliance from the "Dual" to the "Triple Alliance."

William II was crowned King of Prussia and German Emperor in 1888. When told that Bismarck had so constructed the German Empire that the chancellor could control policies, he announced that he would be his own chancellor and dismissed Bismarck. He continued the Hohenzollern polices in his administration of Germany. He promptly dominated Austria-Hungary and Italy, and controlled the international policy of the Triple Alliance. He considered the Triple Alliance a sufficient force with which to dominate strictly continental European questions.

That did not satisfy him. He, himself, in 1900, stated his policy as follows: "I hope to Germany it will be granted * * to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as was once the Roman Empire." That was the dream that had previously lured Xerxes, Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon to attempt world empire.

As Asia Minor (Map 1) was almost the only territory of the world that had not already been monopolized by a great power, and was considered the finest field for colonization, he planned a great German-dominated empire that should extend from the North and Baltic Seas to the Indian Ocean at the Persian Gulf. He called it "Mittel Europa," extended into Asia. That Empire would rend Europe asunder, control passage from Asia to Africa, dominate the Suez Canal, threaten India, and dominate Russia's passage to the Mediterranean Sea.

(2) To build such an empire it was necessary for the Kaiser to win Turkey and the Balkan states to his plan. He began at once.

(a) *Winning of Turkey.* He selected the Sultan of Turkey as the first ruler to whom he would pay a visit of ceremony, and November 1, 1889, with his Empress, made an official and ceremonial call on the Sultan of Turkey—the Kalif of Islam. He established friendly relations with the Sultan, and opened the way for German commercial expansion into Turkey, and the exploitation of Turkey's raw materials by the Triple Alliance. He loaned the celebrated General von der Goltz (with many officers as assistants), who reorganized the Turkish Army on Prussian lines. He made a second visit to the Sultan in 1897, and at Damascus, proclaimed himself the protector of

Turkey and of Mohammedans, although he did not have a single Moslem subject, the great majority of Mohammedans being subjects of Great Britain and France. The campaign of winning Turkey by peaceful means was a great success, and Turkey, August 4, 1914 (the day that Germany crossed the Belgian frontier) signed a secret alliance with Germany under which she agreed to advance the Kaiser's "Mittel Europa" project, and to enter the war as an ally of the Kaiser when he should direct.

(b) *Winning of the Balkans.* (Map 2.) He relied upon the tie of royal blood to win the Balkans. Under that plan, Germany filled vacant Balkan thrones with German princes and supplied royal princesses to marriageable Balkan rulers. Thus the reigning family in Bulgaria was from the royal family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha; in Roumania, from the royal family of Hohenzollern; and in Greece from the royal family of Bavaria, but the Queen, who really ruled, was a sister of the Kaiser. The Kaiser was not able to win the Slav states of Serbia and Montenegro, so he approved the Austrian policy of bringing them under subjection by any means at hand.

(c) *Berlin-Bagdad Railway.* To knit together that great empire, he secured the necessary concessions for the construction of a railroad; and for harbors, dockage and steamboat rights on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. The Deutch Bank financed the construction of that great strategic railroad which would connect Hamburg with the Persian Gulf, via Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople, Bagdad, and Bashra on the Persian Gulf. It was called the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad.

(d) *Other Colonies.* (Map 1.) To strengthen the growing German-dominated world empire, he sought colonies wherever they could be acquired.

(i) Taking advantage of China's weakness after her defeat by Japan in 1894, and as compensation for the murder of a German missionary in the Chinese Province of Shantung, he forced China to grant a lease of Kiao-Chou for ninety-nine years and built there a great German naval base.

(ii) His effort to acquire the Philippine Islands in 1898 was frustrated by Admiral Dewey with the assistance of the British in Manila Bay. He, however, promptly purchased

from Spain all her Pacific island colonial possessions that had not been transferred to the United States.

(iii) In 1899, he seized a part of New Guinea and named it Kaiser William's Land, and the adjoining group of islands which he named "The Bismarck Archipelago."

(iv) He organized and extended German commercial holdings in Africa into colonies and, in his eagerness to extend African colonization, nearly caused war before 1914.

(3) *The 1911 German ultimate plan.* (Map 60.) In short. the ultimate plan whose final form is known to history as the *Plan of 1911,* in addition to "Mittel Europa" included domination of the Straits of Gibraltar by control of Morocco, control of the Suez Canal, control of the waterway passages between Australia and Asia, control of central and southern Africa, control of southern South America, and, in addition, it involved the placing of the industrial central and eastern part of the United States under "Kultur."

(4) Briefly, the German-dominated policy of The Triple Alliance was:

To create a great German-dominated world empire.

c. Policy of the states that later joined the Triple Entente. (Map 2.)

(1) *French policy.* (a) After her defeat in 1871, France accepted the continental situation, and, fearing another German attack, fortified her side of the Franco-German frontier and stood strictly on the defensive. However, she sought and gained a great colonial empire. After she had partially recovered from the effects of the War of 1871, the people greatly desired the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. The Government, however, did not act on that national aspiration.

(b) The policy of France may be described as that of building a colonial empire; with a national aspiration which may be called a national policy of taking advantage of victory in a German-initiated war (which was always expected) to secure the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

(c) The further consideration of French policy will be under the head of the Triple Entente.

(2) *Russian policies.* (a) Russia, a great inland state, was given by Peter the Great the mission of winning a way to the sea so that she could trade with other peoples unhampered by any foreign restrictions.

(b) The fixed direction to the sea from which she never wavered was through the Bosphorus, but her several attempts to capture Constantinople and the Bosphorus were blocked by Turkey and other European Powers.

(c) Her attempt (Map 1) to establish an open port at Port Arthur was defeated in 1905 by Japan.

(d) Her attempt (Map 2) to reach the sea via the Arctic Ocean gave her the port of Archangel which, however, during a large part of the year, is ice bound.

(e) The other direction to the sea was through the Balkans to the Mediterranean or to the Adriatic or to both seas. Slav people of her own race, and who were friendly and loyal to her as the mother Slav state, extended from her borders via the west coast of the Black Sea, and via Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia to the Adriatic Sea.

(f) So Russia, blocked on the west from the sea via the Baltic by Germany and Great Britain, via the Bosphorus by Turkey, via the Balkans by Austria-Hungary (later the Triple Alliance) had the two policies:

First: Of conducting her foreign affairs so as to reach the sea unhampered, primarily, through the Bosphorus; secondarily, across the Balkans.

Second: Of protecting the independence of the Slav states, Serbia and Montenegro.

(g) As her further policy is included in that of the Triple Entente it will be considered therewith.

(3) *British policies.* (Map 1.) (a) Great Britain had a great colonial empire, located on all of the continents, and including many of the islands of the sea. It was the greatest colonial empire in the world. In connection with her maintenance of that empire, she won the decisive naval victory of Trafalgar October 21, 1805, since which time she had control of the sea.

In 1906, Great Britain in the interest of peace, proposed a holiday in naval construction to Germany. The Kaiser, believing that Great Britain was becoming exhausted in the naval race, refused and speeded up his naval building program and preparations for war.

(b) Great Britain's fixed policies which are well known were:

First: To maintain control of the sea.

Second: To protect Belgian neutrality, as a proper defense of the southern coast line of England.

Third: Since Germany challenged her sea control by an ambitious naval building program, to preserve friendly relations with France as a proper defense of the southern coast line of England.

Fourth: To defend the straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal in order to guarantee her short route to her great colony—India.

(c) The further consideration of British polices will be under the head of the Entente Cordial or Triple Entente.

d. Policy of the Triple Entente. (1) (a) After the fall of General Boulanger in 1889, Europe accepted the stability of the third French Republic and Russia, who was menaced by the Triple Alliance, approached France in a friendly way. France reciprocated, and, in 1896, it was announced that France and Russia had signed a treaty of alliance. That occasioned no surprise as the world had known for several years that the treaty was an accomplished fact.

(b) The exact terms of the treaty were not published. But it was generally and authoritatively known that the policies of the "Entente Cordial" between France and Russia were:

First: Russia would assist France if the latter should be attacked by Germany.

Second: France would assist Russia if the latter were attacked by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Third: The treaty was a strictly defensive alliance and did not contemplate any action toward the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

(2) (a) Great Britain then realized that in the management of European affairs she was isolated. The naval program of Germany was a menace to her sea power. The Triple Alliance, and the growing "Mittel Europa" was a menace to her Suez route to India and, after the Kaiser threatened to intervene in the Boer War, to India herself. So Great Britain assumed a more friendly attitude toward her ancient enemy—France.

(b) In 1898, Colonel Marchand, a French explorer, marched from the French possessions on the west coast of Africa across the Sahara Desert, reached the Nile region and raised the French flag at Fashoda in the Sudan, over lands claimed by the British. A British force compelled Colonel Marchand to lower the French flag. War between France and Great Britain seemed probable but the two nations came to an agreement under which France withdrew from Egypt and the Sudan, and Great Britain withdrew from Morocco, and each recognized the other's right in those respective areas.

(c) Under the skillful statesmanship of King Edward VII of England, an understanding that was the basis of a "Cordial Entente," between France and Great Britain was reached. The terms of that understanding were, that if either state had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it would at once discuss with the other whether both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures should be prepared in common. As a result, the necessary defensive plans for use of land and naval forces were prepared.

(3) By 1907, Great Britain and Russia under the threat of the Triple Alliance, recognized the fact that they had a defensive community of interest. As a consequence, they moved toward each other in a friendly way and adjusted all their disputes over Asiatic boundaries, agreeing to a division of Persia into two spheres of influence, Russia to control the northern sphere and Great Britain the southern.

(4) The agreement between Russia and Great Britain completed an understanding between France, Russia and Great Britain. It was called *The Triple Entente.* Its policies were to preserve the peace in general, and, specifically, to defend its members if attacked by the Triple Alliance.

e. Polices of states not in either group. (1) *Turkish policies.* (a) The Turkish Empire was at the height of its power about 1672 A. D. when it occupied all of Asia Minor, the northern coast of Africa, and extended across the Bosphorus up the Balkans to the frontier of Germany. Since that date, the nations of Europe have made such successful war against the Turk that just before the World War the Turkish Empire was limited practically to Asia Minor, with a national bridgehead on the European side of the Bosphorus.

(b) The Turkish policies were: to dominate the great waterway passage of the Dardanelles—thereby making the Black Sea a closed sea; to regain her ancient territory; and, since 1889, to utilize the Triple Alliance as a means to that end.

(2) *Serbian policies.* (Map 2.) (a) Serbia, a small, inland, Jugo-Slav state, attained her independence under Stephen Dushan in 1330 at Velbuzhd, lost it when defeated by the Turks at Kossova in 1389, and regained it in 1878, under Article 34 of the Treaty of Berlin. Before The World War, she was separated from the other original Jugo-Slavs (except Montene-

gro) by the Austro-Hungarian frontier; from the northern Slavs (Czechs) who were a part of Austria, by the Magyars in Hungary; and from the mother state, Russia, by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. She had no seaport in her own territory but her right of passage to the sea was guaranteed by treaty with Greece who gave her corridor rights to and at Saloniki.

(b) Her policies were to maintain her national independence, her friendship with the other Jugo-Slav peoples, with the Czechs, with Russia the mother Slav state, and to gain a national seaport, preferably on the Mediterranean Sea.

(3) *Luxemburg's policy.* (a) The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a small inland state which was a buffer state, as it were, between France, Germany, and Belgium. She acquired independence by the treaty of London, May 11, 1867. She had an area of 999 square miles and a population of about 250,000. She maintained a so-called army of 150 volunteers and a gendarmerie of 150 men.

(b) Her policy was that of fixed neutrality, as a pacifist nation, trusting the honor of larger states not to violate her neutrality.

(4) *Belgian policies.* (a) Belgium, to the north of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, although much larger than Luxemburg, was a small state. She, also, was a buffer state between France, Luxemburg, Germany and Holland and had an extremely valuable coast line on the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. She acquired independence of Holland April 19, 1839, by another treaty of London which provided that "Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality." To insure that neutrality, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria and Russia signed a treaty the same date in which those nations guaranteed that "perpetual neutrality."

(b) Resting secure in the terms of that guaranty, Belgium's policy was that of strict neutrality, to defend which, in contradistinction to Luxemburg, she was willing to fight.

3. Conflict of Policies. It is thus seen that preceding The World War the great states of Europe were grouped into two rival groups: The Triple Alliance composed of Germany, the Dual Monarchy, and Italy on the one hand; and the Triple Entente composed of France, Russia, and Great Britain on the other. The terms of the alliance in each case were defensive in character but it was understood that Germany and Austria

would act together in any event. Here, we have a perfect illustration by the Triple Entente of an effort to maintain the peace of Europe by reliance on the "Doctrine of the Balance of Power" in the adjustment of critical situations created by the conflict of policies. The balancing of power developed critical situations as follows:

a. The Kaiser's first threat of war—The Boer War. (Map 1.) When the Jameson raid failed in South Africa, in 1896, the Kaiser made his first war gesture against British power, by preparing Germany for intervention in favor of the Boers, and by personally sending a telegram to President Kruger congratulating him on the fact that the Boers had overcome Jameson without appealing to the help of a friendly power. However, he did not dare to follow up the gesture with a blow as the British Empire was united against him and France and Russia refused to antagonize Great Britain.

b. The Kaiser's second threat of war—Algeciras. The Entente Cordial between France and Great Britain that recognized French interests as supreme in Morocco had been negotiated without reference to the Kaiser or The Triple Alliance. So, taking advantage of the fact that Russia (France's ally) was being defeated by Japan, the Kaiser, March 31, 1905, landed at Tangier in Morocco, nearly opposite Gibraltar, and threatening war, challenged the whole force of The Entente Cordial by stating in reply to the official greetings that he regarded the Sultan as an independent sovereign, and that he had come to safeguard the interests of Germany in Morocco. As a result, a conference of the powers was called at Algeciras, a little Spanish town near Gibraltar. Russia and Great Britain supported France, and the conference recognized French interests as paramount in Morocco. The Kaiser had failed, and Italy began the attempt to resume friendly relations with France.

c. The Kaiser's third threat of war—Annexation of Bosnia—Herzegovina. (Map 3.) In 1908, the Kaiser taking advantage of the young Turk movement, threatened war with Russia, who had not yet recovered from the Japanese War, by having Austria convert her protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina into annexation. England and France were not willing to declare war on that issue. Hence, it resulted that Serbia and Montenegro were the only Jugo-Slav states remaining outside of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The increase, thus, of Austrian

holdings on the east bank of the Adriatic Sea was exceedingly distasteful to Italy, who became still more friendly to France.

d. The Kaiser's fourth threat of war—Agadir. (Map 1). In 1911, the German Crown Prince was received so enthusiastically in England, by all classes, that the Kaiser believed that the tie of blood between the royal houses and the new friendships exhibited by the British people meant that he could resume a hostile attitude toward France. Making the false claim that it was necessary to prevent unrest near Agadir, a Moroccan seaport on the Atlantic Ocean, and to protect Germans there, the Kaiser in July, 1911, sent the German Cruiser *Panther* to Agadir. The Kaiser hoped for a land war in Europe with a view of inflicting on France the defeat that Great Britain had prevented in 1875 and again in 1906. This time, Mr. Lloyd George, in a public speech, made it clear that Great Britain would support France even in war if the Kaiser persisted. The Kaiser was not ready for war with Great Britain and retired from his threatening position with much loss of prestige in Italy.

e. Italo-Turkish War (Map 2.) Italy considered Austria's extension of her Adriatic Sea coast line, by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a sacrifice of Italian interests by the other two members of the Triple Alliance. She was humiliated because the Kaiser had not consulted her before he threatened war over Morocco. So, fearing that the Kaiser might treat her claims in Tripoli as he had tried to treat the French claims in Morocco, she decided to act alone and on September 27, 1911, notified the Sultan of Turkey that he must consent within forty-eight hours to an Italian occupation of Tripoli. The Turkish reply was not satisfactory and Italy declared war on Turkey two days later, i.e., September 29, 1911. Italy defeated Turkey and by the treaty of Lausanne October 15, 1912, Turkey evacuated Tripoli in favor of Italy. That action by Italy without consulting the other two members of The Triple Alliance widened the line of cleavage between Italy and her allies.

f. First Balkan War. M. Venizelos, the Grecian prime minister, succeeded in uniting Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro into a Balkan Confederacy, August 26, 1912, which demanded a Christian governor and a local legislature and militia for Macedonia. Turkey was defeated and practically driven out of Europe (Treaty of London, May 1, 1913). In

the settlement, the Kaiser kept Serbia off the Adriatic by menacing Russia with war.

g. Second Balkan War 1913. (1) After the First Balkan War, there seemed to be bright prospects of the settlement of the ancient differences in the Balkans through the permanent uniting of the Balkan states into a greater state to be called "Balkania."

(2) Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, were opposed to the proposed new state, because in a new Balkania, the Jugo-Slavs of Serbia would have a seaport on the Adriatic Sea. Hence, they fanned Bulgaria's dissatisfaction with her accretion of territory under the treaty of London and furnished her with every means to make war. As a result, on the night of June 29, 1913, when the Balkan allies were fraternizing and not suspicious, the Bulgarian General Savoff ordered a surprise attack on the Greek and Serbian lines. As a result of Bulgaria's action, Roumania declared war on Bulgaria July 10, 1913.

(3) While the Balkan Allies were fighting, Turkey reoccupied Thrace to include her sacred city of Adrianople. Bulgaria was defeated.

(4) The following peace of Bucharest allowed Turkey to retain so much of Thrace as she occupied. The rest of Turkey in Europe was divided between Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, except that, in order to prevent the Jugo-Slavs from securing a port on the Adriatic Sea, the Kaiser succeeded in having Albania declared to be an independent state with the German Prince, William of Weid as sovereign. To compensate Serbia for the loss of a port on the Adriatic, Greece guaranteed her corridor rights to and at the Grecian seaport of Saloniki, and also agreed to go to Serbia's assistance if Serbia should be again attacked by Bulgaria.

h. Assassination of Austrian Crown Prince. (1) Crown Prince Ferdinand became heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary in 1896. Because he had married beneath his royal rank, he had been forced by the Emperor to renounce his children's right of succession to the throne. He was hated by the court party both at Vienna and at Budapest. He was the leader of the party in favor of Austrian annexation of Serbia and Montenegro in order to solve the Slav question within the empire.

(2) June 12, 1914, the Kaiser secretly visited the Austrian Crown Prince at the latter's castle at Konopisht, in Bohemia. The Kaiser proposed a plan known as the pact of Konopisht

under which the Crown Prince's sons could rule, as follows: The formation of one kingdom composed of Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine (most of which was in Russian territory) for the inheritance of the eldest son; the formation of another kingdom to be composed of Bohemia, Hungary, the Slav districts of Austria, Serbia and the Slav coast of the Adriatic as an inheritance for the second son. The Kaiser required, however, that German Austria with Trieste should be annexed to the German Empire; and that there should be a perpetual military and economic alliance between the German Empire and the two kingdoms. That pact of course could not have been carried out, as planned, even after the death of Francis Joseph, without breaking the peace of Europe.

(3) (a) Shortly after, the conference with the Kaiser, the Crown Prince of Austria was requested to attend some corps maneuvers and then to inspect the troops at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, one of the discontented Slav provinces in the Empire. The police of Serajevo had received orders from the military authorities to make no special preparations for the visit of the Crown Prince so there were only one hundred and twenty police agents on a route of three and one-half miles.

(b) June 28, 1914, when riding with his wife to the inspection field, a bomb was thrown into the Crown Prince's car by a young Bosnian named Gabrinovics. The Crown Prince picked it up, threw it out and when it exploded, wounding many people, exclaimed: "That fellow will be decorated for this."

(c) A little later both the Crown Prince and his wife were shot to death by a young Bosnian student named Favrile Prinzip.

(d) Whether the Austrian Crown Prince was "wantonly sent to his death," or not, the news of the assassination was reported to have produced signs of relief in both Vienna and Budapest.

4. The Dual Alliance Launches War. *a. The First Potsdam Conference.* (1) The Emperor Francis Joseph, immediately after the assassination of the Crown Prince, secretly sent special representatatives to his ally, the Kaiser, for conference. The Kaiser called a secret conference, July 5 at Potsdam, of the German Ambassadors, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Navy, the great bankers, railroad directors and the captains of industry. The Kaiser solemnly put the question to each one "Are you ready for war?" All replied in the affir-

mative except the bankers. They said that they must have about two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans.

(2) The conference decided on war and to give the bankers time to readjust their finances for the coming war.

(3) After the conference, the various members went quietly back to their work, and the Kaiser went on vacation. The record of the international stock market shows that the German bankers at once began to turn their securities into gold. Thus, between July 5 and July 22, 1914, Union Pacific, dropped from 155½ to 127½; Baltimore and Ohio, from 91½ to 81; U. S. Steel, from 61 to 50½, Canadian Pacific, from 194 to 185½ and Northern Pacific, from 111⅜ to 108.

(4) The Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria consumed the time needed for that financial mobilization in secretly preparing, with the Kaiser's approval, a note to Serbia, although the assassin and the bomb thrower were both Austrian subjects and the crime was committed on Austrian soil. During that time, the rest of Europe was told by Austria that the situation was not grave.

b. Austria declares war on Serbia. (1) On July 21, Germany secretly notified all her troops subject to mobilization, to hold themselves in readiness.

(2) On July 23d, an Austrian note was delivered to Serbia as an ultimatum with only forty-eight hours allowed for reply. The terms of the ultimatum were exceedingly severe and infringed the sovereignty of Serbia. The situation was exceedingly grave. The Kaiser had taken Europe by surprise in producing a situation which required that Serbia either should yield to his overlordship (through Austrian agency) or accept war. Serbia accepted the demands of the Austrian ultimatum in the main, and declared her readiness to negotiate the rest. The time limit for the reception of Serbia's reply by the Austro-Hungarian Government at Vienna was set at 6:00 PM, July 25. At 6:30 PM, July 25, the Austrian Minister to Serbia at Belgrade presented a note to the Serbian Government informing it that the Serbian reply was not satisfactory and that Austria severed her diplomatic relations with Serbia.

(3) Austria-Hungary at once mobilized her army, and declared war on Serbia, July 28.

c. The Second Potsdam Conference. (1) All attempts to secure a concert of powers to preserve the peace of Europe were

prevented by the Kaiser who insisted that the affair was local to Austria and Serbia.

(2) As Austria had mobilized on the Russian frontier, Russia mobilized her army, but the Czar informed the Kaiser that it was only to meet the Austrian mobilization on Russia's frontier and gave his solemn word that as long as negotiations on the Serbian reply should continue, the Russian troops would undertake no provocative action.

(3) On the night of July 29, the Kaiser presided at a second secret conference at Potsdam with practically the same officials present who had attended the first conference. It was then and there decided to launch the war against France and Russia for which preparations were complete. After the conference, the Kaiser wired a personal demand to the Czar of Russia that the Russian mobilization against Austria be suspended. The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, later in the night, called on the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared if Russia did not yield, it would mean a universal war. That same night, the German Chancellor, Bethman Hollweg, returning to Berlin from the conference at Potsdam, called on the British Ambassador, at midnight, and asked bluntly that England agree to remain neutral in the European war, and gave him the conditions which Germany offered to England, i.e., that if England would remain neutral Germany would agree not to crush France too severely and would not annex any of her home territories.

d. The Kaiser declares war on Russia and France. (1) On July 31st, Austria, yielding to an aroused international public opinion, for the first time, agreed to discuss the merits of the Serbian note with the Russian government. At this moment, however, the Kaiser, apparently carrying out the decision made at Potsdam, seized the initiative, took charge of the European situation and, disregarding the Austrian mobilization on the Russian frontier, sent an ultimatum to Russia requiring her to give assurances to the Kaiser's government, within twelve hours, that Russia had ceased her mobilization even on the Austrian frontier. Simultaneously, the Kaiser sent an ultimatum to France requiring her to state in eighteen hours whether she would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

(2) Russia not replying, the Kaiser declared war on Russia August 1, 1914.

(3) France replied that she "would do that which her interests dictated." The Kaiser declared war on France, August 3, 1914, and advanced against her at once.

5. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *e. The principle of surprise.* After the Dual Alliance decided, on July 5, that war should be made on Serbia, and on July 29, that war should be made on Russia and France, the measures taken to secure secrecy and rapidity of action illustrate compliance with the *principle of surprise.*

CHAPTER II

Plans and Operations to Include the Defeat of Belgium

1. THEATER OF OPERATIONS 20
   a. Theater for naval operations 21
   b. Theater for land operations 21
      (1) Central Powers 21
         (a) Location 21
         (b) Advantages 21
         (c) Disadvantages 21
      (2) The Allies 22
         (a) Advantages 22
         (b) Disadvantages 22
2. OBJECTIVES 22
   a. Central Powers 22
   b. The Allies 23
3. PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 23
   a. Central Powers 23
   b. Allies 23
4. MOBILIZATION 24
   a. Central Powers 24
   b. The Allies 25
   c. Preparedness of the combatants 26
5. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1914 27
   a. Naval operations 27
   b. Land operations on western front 28
      (1) Theater of operations 28
      (2) Plans of operations 30
         (a) German plan 30
         (b) French plan 30
         (c) Belgian plan 31
         (d) Allied plan 31
      (3) Operations 32
         (a) Defeat of Belgium 32
         (b) The French counter offensive 34
6. PRINCIPLES OF WAR 35
   a. The principle of the objective 35
   b. The principle of security 36
   c. The principle of cooperation 36

1. THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Maps 1 and 2.)

Due to colonial empires on land, and the great question of sea control, the theater of war included nearly all of the surface of the earth. However, Europe and Asia Minor constituted the main theater of operations. This theater will be considered

from the point of view that by August 4 the Allied Powers had control of the sea, and that the Central Powers had assumed a strategical and tactical offensive policy for land warfare.

a. Theater for naval operations. The North Sea was the theater for any German naval attempt to reach the Atlantic. The Baltic Sea was the theater for any Russian naval attempt to engage the Germans or to reach the Atlantic, or for any British naval attempt against the north shore of Germany, east of Denmark. The Mediterranean Sea was the theater for any Austrian naval attempt to pass out from the Adriatic Sea. Of course, small engagements could occur in the waters outside of those named as long as Central Powers' ships could keep the sea.

b. Theater for land operations.

(1) *Central Powers.* (a) *Location.* The northern coast was protected by the German fleet, and the neutral states of Denmark and Holland. On land, the western neighbors of the Central Powers were Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland and Italy. The southern neighbors were Switzerland, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania. The eastern neighbors were Montenegro, Serbia, Roumania, and Russia.

Without violating the sovereignty of a neutral power, the Central Powers could attack France only on that portion of her frontier which extends from Luxemburg to Switzerland—in short, through Alsace-Lorraine.

(b) *Advantages.* The territories of the Central Powers were contiguous, which gave them the great advantage of interior lines. Furthermore, from the fact that the people of the Central Powers were partly of similar race and, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for over a hundred years had been intimately acquainted with each other and had lived under similar conditions, they understood each other. It was of the greatest advantage to the Central Powers that the governing body throughout was German.

(c) *Disadvantages.* (i) One of the disadvantages was, that although commercial relations could still be maintained with countries beyond the sea through contiguous neutral nations, and occasionally by means of ships that could escape the Allied sea control, still, due to the restrictions of the Central Powers' passage to the high seas, and due to the high prices of supplies arriving via neutral countries, the Central Powers were at a disadvantage during the war in trading with countries

beyond the sea. It also was a disadvantage to the Central Powers that the population of the salient extending into Russia should be Slavonian in race whose sympathy was with Russia rather than with Germany.

(ii) Including Belgium in Germany, as of August 24, it is seen that the four corners of Germany were extremely sensitive areas, and required troops for their guarding. Belgium at the northwest corner gave a German coast line on the North Sea with control of the great overseas commerce to Antwerp. Its occupation required the guarding of the northern line of communications through Liege. Alsace-Lorraine, at the southwest corner, was the symbol of the old victory, and contained the two great fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz, which protected Germany's bastioned bridgehead west of the Rhine. East Prussia was the original source of Prussian sovereignty. Silesia was not enthusiastically German and commanded the divergent roads to Berlin and Vienna.

(2) *The Allies.* (a) *Advantages.* The Allies had the advantage of marine transport. They also had an advantage in the fact that the Russian front was sufficiently long to permit of maneuver.

(3) *Disadvantages.* The separation of the territories of the Allies by the Central Powers was a serious disadvantage, and necessitated communication on exterior lines. Due to Great Britain's insular position and reliance on naval protection, she was not ready to send a large army at once to the battle front. The whole communication system of France centered in Paris, involving circuitous routes and unnecessary loss of time in transportation between points. Russia was greatly handicapped in not having an ice free ocean port. As a result, her overseas imports reached the line only after long single track hauls from Archangel and from Vladivostock, both ports being open only about half of the year.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. Central Powers. The objectives of the Central Powers were those of the "German 1911 Pan-German Plan" which was as follows: (Map 60.)

First: To defeat France and then Russia.

Second: To organize a vast German-dominated empire to consist of:

A great middle European German-dominated empire described as "Mittel Europa" with Germany as the governing body and confederate states as follows:

In the West: Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland. A broad strip from France bounded on the west by a line from just south of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme River.

In the East: Russian Poland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Kovno, Vilna and Grodno.

In the Southeast: Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States. An extension of that "Mittel Europa" into Asia to include Turkey.

Third: To extend the "Mittel Europa" (already extended into Asia) into a World Empire with control of the sea.

b. The Allies. The objectives of the Allies in the threatened war were as follows:

(1) To defend their respective territories.

(2) After the entrance of Great Britain as an ally, to retain the control of the sea.

(3) The following special objectives were held in abeyance against a possible winning of the war:

(a) France: To regain Alsace-Lorraine.

(b) Serbia: To release the Jugo-Slavs from the rule of Austria-Hungary.

(c) Russia: (i) To reconstitute Poland.

(ii) To win a way to the Mediterranean Sea.

3. PLANS OF CAMPAIGN.

a. Central Powers. (Map 2.) The Central Powers' plan was:

(1) That Germany should seize and maintain control of the sea.

(2) That in land warfare, with the assistance of Austria-Hungary, the following plans were to be executed:

(a) A strategical and tactical offensive against France by Germany.

(b) A strategical and tactical offensive against Serbia and Russia by Austria-Hungary.

(c) A strategical and tactical defensive toward Russia by Germany until after the defeat of France, when Germany would also assume the strategical and tactical offensive against Russia.

(3) The only change made in that plan of campaign after Great Britain joined the Allies, August 4, was to abandon the naval offensive and to assume the naval defensive. The German navy, however, was to conduct guerilla naval warfare against the British fleet with the idea of wearing it down to a point where the German fleet would have a chance of victory.

b. The Allies. (1) (a) France and England had agreed secretly, November 23, 1912, that in case either should be

attacked by a third party, without provocation, that they would then discuss the necessary military cooperation, and that the military and naval eventual plans should be drawn.

(b) The French plan of campaign was to assume the strategical and tactical defensive in rear of her frontier in order to be sure of complying with the understanding with Great Britain. If attacked by Germany, to reoccupy and hold Alsace-Lorraine, then, after recovering those provinces to resume the strategical and tactical defensive.

(2) Serbia's plan of campaign was to assume the strategical and tactical defensive, on the line of the Austrian boundary.

(3) Russia's plan of campaign was to assume the strategical and tactical defensive toward Germany and the strategical offensive against Austria-Hungary.

(4) When attacked, Belgium also assumed the strategical and tactical defensive with a view of defending her great seaport Antwerp and of delaying the German advance.

(5) Great Britain's plan of campaign was to maintain control of the seas for the Allies, by a naval strategical and tactical offensive, and to reinforce the French army with a view of defending the continental shore of the British Channel.

4. MOBILIZATION. *a. Central Powers.* (1) Germany: (a) On July 21 (two days before Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia), Germany notified all her troops subject to mobilization to hold themselves in readiness. On July 31, one day before she declared war on Russia and four days before she declared war on France, Germany closed her frontier and began the secret mobilization of her Army.

(b) For her first line, she called out 2,500,000 men, organized into:

25 active army corps,
21 reserve army corps,
11 cavalry divisions.

(c) Of the force mobilized she sent to the western front:

21 active army corps,
13 reserve army corps,
10 cavalry divisions.

(d) The troops mobilized for use against France were organized into:

7 armies,
2 cavalry corps,
1 Army Detachment (upper Alsace).

(e) Each division had 72 pieces of light artillery. Each corps had 160 pieces of heavy artillery, of which 16 were howitzers. The reserve corps had complete and trained staffs and their troops were from 26 to 30 years of age. With the exception of having less artillery, the reserve corps were as well armed as the active corps and nearly as efficient.

(f) The mobilization on the Western Front (Map 5) was carried out behind the following covering corps: VIII at Coblenz, XVI at Metz, XXI at Sarrebruck, XV at Strasbourg and XIV at Carlsruhe.

The Army of the Meuse (General Emmich), made up of fractions of the corps of the First and Second Armies, covered the mobilization in front of Belgium and had the mission of opening the way through Belgium.

(2) Austria-Hungary: (Map 2.) Under the instruction of Germany before the war, Austria had increased and modernized her army and increased its materiel. She called about 1,500,000 men to the colors at the beginning of the war for use against Serbia and Russia.

b. The Allies. (1) (a) France mobilized at the beginning of the war 2,689,000 men for use in fortresses and by the Commander in Chief. These troops were formed into:

46 active infantry divisions,
25 reserve divisions,
12 territorial divisions,
10 cavalry divisions.

The infantry divisions were formed into 21 army corps Five armies and a cavalry corps were formed.

(b) The French forces, beginning August 1, mobilized behind a covering detachment, i.e., of the 2d, 4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Cavalry Divisions and the V Army Corps.

(2) (a) Belgium mobilized at once about 118,000 men and organized them into six infantry divisions. Each division consisted of 14,000 rifles, 500 sabers and 48 cannon.

(b) She also organized one division of cavalry and some fortification troops. Later the field force was increased by 19,000 men.

(3) Serbia mobilized about 250,000 men, most of whom were veterans of the Balkan wars.

(4) The Russian army had recovered somewhat from the Japanese War. The officers had been given some instruction, the men had been partially trained, and new materiel had been secured. Under French instruction, the roads and railroads had been repaired with a view to improving their military value. The troops of Warsaw and Vilna, and 16 cavalry divisions covered the mobilization of the Russian forces that were quickly formed and marched to the frontier.

(5) The British mobilization of the first 100,000 men was rapid.

c. Preparedness of combatants. (1) (a) The Central Powers had prepared a large quantity of arms, ammunition, equipment, transportation, and supplies of all kinds for a very large force in an offensive war. Germany was better prepared for the war than the other combatants. She had been preparing for war for a long time.

(b) The Kaiser, on ascending the throne, promptly announced that "Germany's future lies on the sea." Soon, Germans began to drink to "Der Tag," i.e: "The day" when the British fleet should be defeated. The Kaiser's naval building program was completed in 1914, before the war. He inaugurated the strategic Kiel Canal which gave his fleet a second entrance to the North Sea, June 24, 1914, just four days before the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria, at Serejevo. That improved considerably his strategical position with regard to both Russia and Great Britain.

(c) Similarly, he had prepared the most powerful army known to history up to that time, and had introduced new means of combat, for offensive use, such as poison gas and fortress reducing artillery.

(d) The taxpayers in Germany, from time to time, protested against carrying such a war burden in peace. In 1913, they were told that one more effort would complete the preparations for war. As a consequence, the army bill was voted, under which an extraordinary war tax of $250,000,000.00 was levied on capital as a special effort for an immediate purpose.

(2) Of the Allies, France had prepared sufficient stores of all kinds to defend her frontier. Russia did not have even enough arms for her first line troops and lacked much material for war. Serbia, having come out of the Balkan war a victor,

had nearly everything required for her army for a defensive war, but her transportation was very inadequate; for instance, her cannon were drawn by oxen.

(3) (a) The officers of the Central Powers had been highly trained for the very war in which they were entering. Germany had prepared a very large class of reserve officers for all grades.

(b) The French officers were equally well trained but not in such great numbers as those of Germany. The Russian officers, except those of the highest grades, were not well prepared for the war. The Serbian officers had nearly all been trained in war and although not highly educated, were excellent field commanders.

(4) The First British Army was well equipped, trained, and commanded.

5. CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1914. *a. Naval operations.* (1) *The Central Powers.* (a) By 1914, the Kaiser had succeeded in raising the strength of the German navy to second place among the nations of the world.

(b) Germany had secretly established a naval peace policy of stationing single fast cruisers in various parts of the world. When war was declared, the *Emden* and *Karlsruhe* of that class preyed on allied commerce. Also, the effort of these commerce destroyers was aided by auxiliary fast cruisers which succeeded in passing through the British fleet to the Atlantic.

(c) The German Navy at once began sowing the North Sea with mines and operated against the British fleet with submarines. The German fleet had no difficulty in retaining control in the Baltic Sea. Not having control however of the sea, commerce carriers of the Central Powers were, in general, soon tied up at home or interned in neutral countries. The Austrian fleet, based on Pola, controlled the Adriatic Sea.

(d) The German battle cruiser *Goeben* and light cruiser *Breslau* were in the Mediterranean when the war started. Avoiding the French fleet, they broke through to Constantinople and operated against Russia from the Black Sea.

(e) (Map 1.) Due to Japan's entrance as an ally August 23, 1914, the German Pacific fleet at Kiao-Chau was menaced and started for Germany.

(f) On November 1, the German squadron under Admiral Spee, consisting of two armored cruisers, one protected cruiser, and two scout cruisers, defeated a British squadron of two

armored cruisers and one scout cruiser under Admiral Craddock, off the coast of Chile.

(g) On December 8, Admiral Spee was defeated by Admiral Sturdee with two battle crusiers, three armored cruisers and one scout cruiser, off the Falkland Islands.

(2) *The Allies.* (a) Great Britain had not overlooked the Kaiser's developing plan for sea control, and had assembled, in July, 1914, the greatest fleet ever mustered in British waters, to pass in review before the King. That fleet consisting of 216 men of war, one-half of the British navy, was kept in formation and ready for battle. August 4, the whole British navy, easily the most powerful in the world, was ready for action, and took its battle position to prevent the passage of the German fleet through the English Channel or the North Sea into the Atlantic Ocean. The great High Seas Fleet was held in readiness at Scapa Flow to the north of Scotland. The English Channel was protected by patrols and by mines.

(b) The French fleet, reinforced by a British squadron after the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau,* carefully policed the Mediterranean Sea.

(c) The Allies maintained control of the sea during 1914.

b. Land operations, Western front. (1) *Theater of operation.* (Map 2). (a) (i) The Western front theater of operations included France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine. This area is somewhat larger than that of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa, combined and is in about the same latitude. In form, the Western front theater of operations is roughly a square with most of the upper half of one side as German frontier. (Map 5). The terrain limited the routes of German invasion to the Belfort Gap between the Jura Alps and the Vosges Mountains; along the Moselle Valley between the Vosges Mountains and the Ardennes Forest; along the valley of the Meuse and the Sambre; and along the coastal plain.

(ii) Immediately after the Franco-Prussian War, France began to solve the problem of defense against German attack. She constructed four fortified camps, the central position and detached forts in which were permanent fortifications. From right to left they were: Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun. Belfort guarded the gap between the Jura Alps and the Vosges Mountains and the route to Paris via Langres. Epinal, west of the Vosges Mountains, guarded all passes through those

mountains, the Valley of the Moselle River and the route to Paris via the Charmes Gap or Nancy. Toul, also, guarded the Moselle Valley, and the route to Paris via Nancy and the Meuse River. Verdun guarded the Meuse Valley and the route to Paris via Metz. Belfort and Epinal with detached forts constituted a large fortified area. Also, Toul and Verdun constituted a fortified area. A gap was left intentionally, between Epinal and Toul, called the Charmes Gap, in order that armies pivoting on Epinal and Toul might strike the Germans in flank if they should attempt to penetrate that gap. The fortified camp at Belfort was generally believed to be strong enough to prevent an invasion through the gap between the Jura Alps and the Vosges Mountains. The Vosges Mountains were considered a sufficient obstacle to invasion. North of the Vosges Mountains, the Germans might try invasion from the Moselle Valley. Epinal, Toul, and Verdun were intended to block the way. All these fortified camps were completed before 1914.

(iii) (Map 6.) The French realized that the Germans might violate the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, and planned a series of fortified camps, i.e., Lille—Maubeuge—Mezieres, to prevent it. However, the expense involved and the increase in efficiency of the offense against fortifications, coupled with reliance on the strength of Belgium's position as a neutral, stopped the work and that series of fortified camps was not completed.

The Ardennes Forest, a heavily wooded, very difficult terrain, with no railroads or main routes leading to Paris, extended from near Thionville to near Namur.

(b) Belgium stands directly across the main route from Berlin to Paris. It had provided two fortified camps on that route, both of the Brialmont type, one at Liege, which controlled the crossings of the Meuse River, and another at Namur, which also controlled the cross route from Brussels to Metz. An older fortified camp, also of the Brialmont type, was located at Antwerp. This was a flank position to the route Liege-Namur.

(c) The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg had no army and no fortifications. Its importance lay in the fact that the main railroad line from Coblenz, and indirect lines from other places on the Rhine, passed through Luxemburg to France.

(d) (Map 5.) Alsace-Lorraine, it will be noted, extends from Switzerland to Luxemburg, so any offensive by the French with a view of recovering Alsace-Lorraine would involve the whole Franco-German Frontier.

(2) *Plans of operation.* (a) *The German plan of operation.* (i) The original German plan of operations against France (Map 7) was formulated in 1906 by Count von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff. He planned to defend the fortified line: Switzerland—Luxemburg, and, pivoting on Metz, to envelop the French left by a strong hammer head right flank that, marching through Belgium, would defeat the French, force them back to Paris, and decisively defeat them by whipping the German right flank army around Paris and against the left flank of the French field forces. The fortified camp of Paris was to be contained by a special force. Von Moltke (junior), Chief of the German General Staff, at the beginning of the World War was apprehensive of French operations against the German left and strengthened the German left wing at the expense of the right wing, but adhered to the von Schlieffen plan.

(ii) (Map 8.) The German concentration from north to south to carry out that plan was as follows:

First Army (von Kluck): 4 active and 3 reserve corps, north of Aix-la-Chapelle.
Second Army (von Bulow): 3 active and 3 reserve corps, vicinity of Eupen.
Third Army (von Hausen): 3 active and 1 reserve corps, vicinity of St. Vith.
Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemberg): 3 active and 2 reserve corps, vicinity of Bitburg.
Fifth Army (German Crown Prince): 3 active and 2½ reserve corps, vicinity of Treves.
Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria): 3 active and 1 reserve corps, vicinity of Bernstraff.
Seventh Army (von Hefringen): 3 active and 1 reserve corps, west of Strasbourg.
Detachment of Alsace (von Deimling): 2 active and 1 reserve corps, south of Colmar.
I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen): 2 cavalry divisions, in front of Second Army.
II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz): 3 cavalry divisions, in front of First Army.

(b) *The French plan of operations.* (i) (Map 6.) After France became aware that she would not be required to defend her Italian frontier, her plan of operations was based upon the theory that she would be attacked on the Franco-German frontier, i.e., that part of her boundary which extends from

Switzerland to Luxemburg. The plan was, if attacked by Germany, to envelop the German left from the direction of Belfort, and drive the Germans out of Alsace-Lorraine.

(ii) The French concentration to carry out that Plan of Operations was as follows:

To dispose the French troops in front of the German frontier with the right flank resting on Switzerland and the left flank resting on Luxemburg and Belgium, in the following order from south to north:

First Army (General Dubail): 5 corps, vicinity of Belfort-Epinal.
Second Army (General Castelnau): 5 corps, vicinity of Toul-Nancy.
Third Army (General Ruffey): 3 corps, vicinity of Verdun.
Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary): 3 corps in reserve west of the Verdun-Toul area.
Fifth Army (General Lanrezac): 5 corps, vicinity of Sedan.
I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet): 3 cavalry divisions, on left flank, vicinity of Mezieres.

The flanks were protected by a group of reserve divisions in rear of each flank. The Commander-in-Chief directed that a strategical reserve of at least four divisions be assembled later, upon arrival from the Alps, from Algeria, etc.

(iii) When the neutrality of Belgium was violated by Germany, the French plan was changed as follows: (Map 8.)

The Fourth Army advanced to the front line, taking its place between the Third and Fifth Armies. To accomplish that, the Fifth Army was moved to its left.

The British Army was to take its place on the left of the French line in the vicinity of Maubeuge.

(c) *Belgian plan of operations.* Belgium's plan of operations was to base her defense on Antwerp with the idea of covering Brussels. To do that, she purposed to hold Antwerp, Liege and Namur as fortified camps, and, with her field force, to defend the area between those fortified camps. Under cover of her cavalry and two mixed brigades of infantry, the 3d and 4th Infantry Divisions were thrown quickly into Liege and Namur, repectively, on August 4 and 5. The rest of the field force was assembled on August 6th, in the form of a quadrilateral on the line Antwerp—Namur.

(d) *Allied plan of operations.* The rapid march of events in the first days of August affected the plans of operations. The final hurriedly prepared coordinated plan was a consolidation of the French plan, the Belgian plan and the plan to use the British reinforcement on the French left flank.

In brief, the Allies' plan was for Belgium and Great Britain to hold the line of the Sambre, while France was to hold to Switzerland, while awaiting a chance to strike at the German left.

(3) *Operations.* (a) *The defeat of Belgium.* (Map 9.) (i) The first objective of the German plan of operations was to insure free passage past Liege, as the fortified camp at that place controlled the Meuse and (with Holland neutral) all direct railroad traffic from Germany into France, north of the line Luxemburg—Paris. The fortified camp of Liege was of the Brialmont type and consisted of circles of major and minor forts, each constructed with masonry and armed with turreted guns. The garrison consisted of fortress troops and of a reinforced division. King Albert placed General Leman in command with orders to prevent the passage of the German troops.

(ii) The German supreme command assembled a strategical advance guard from the troops of the First and Second Armies, called it the army of the Meuse, and placed General von Emmich in command with the mission of covering the concentration in front of Belgium and of clearing the way through Belgium by taking the fortified camp of Liege by surprise. He moved instantly. The advanced element of his force crossed the bridge at Vise, at 8:45 AM, August 4, and when the Belgian sentinel called "Halt, Belgian Frontier," the commander halted, dismounted and said "I know that," and read a proclamation in which General von Emmich demanded a free road through Belgian for attack on France. The Governor of Liege refused to let him pass.

The next day, General von Emmich assaulted the fortified camp of Liege and was repusled. The German soldiers were much disheartened, but General von Ludendorff, present as a staff officer for coordination, pursuaded him to renew the attack the next day, by penetration between the forts. That attack was successful. The field troops were forced to fall back to the main Belgian force, August 6. The city of Liege was captured August 7.

General Leman, the Belgian commander, remained with the garrison of Fort Loncin, kept the fortification troops in the forts and continued the defense until reduced by siege guns that were sent up from the rear for that purpose. The last fort fell August 17. General von Emmich's force was then

broken up and its elements returned to their proper commands.

(iii) While General von Emmich was clearing the way at Liege, the right enveloping force was assembling for passage through Belgium.

It was composed of the following troops:

First Army (von Kluck), right.
Second Army (von Bulow), left.
II Cavalry Corps (General von Marwitz), to screen the First Army.
I Cavalry Corps (General von Richtoffen), to screen the Second Army.

(iv) The two cavalry corps, operating under orders from supreme headquarters, skillfully screened the invasion of Belgium by the First and Second Armies. The cavalry screen maneuver began August 10 when the leading cavalry elements crossed the Belgian boundary. The cavalry travelled without supply wagons and used emergency rations only. To secure the necessary supplies from the country, the leading scout elements, frequently in armored cars, would enter a town, seize prominent citizens as hostages, lower the Belgian flag, and demand supplies.

Under cover of the cavalry screen, the First Army on the right, and the Second Army on the left, began the advance August 13 to an area in the vicinity of Liege, where in a massed formation it held itself in readiness for offensive operations.

(v) The supreme command then placed General von Bulow of the Second Army in command of that group and ordered him to advance August 18 with the mission of penetrating between the Belgian field army and Antwerp; of covering Antwerp and of capturing Namur. He advanced on the 18th but failed in his mission of preventing the Belgian retreat, which reached Antwerp August 20.

(vi) The First Army reached Brussels August 20 and imposed a war indemnity of about $40,000,000.00 on that city at once, detailed a corps from the First Army to contain Antwerp, and changed the direction of its march to the southwest toward France.

(vii) The Second Army, General von Bulow, on the left of the line, reached the front of Namur August 19. Namur was believed by the Allies to be so strong that it could not be taken except by siege. General von Bulow opened fire with heavy guns on the forts August 21 with such effect that the fortified camp was no longer tenable by the 22d. The Belgian

garrison withdrew to the west in great confusion. General von Bulow entered Namur August 23 and prepared to continue the advance to the southwest to France. The reduction of Namur caused the detachment of one corps from the Second and one corps from the Third Army.

(b) *The French counter offensive.* (i) The Germans having violated Belgian neutrality, the French high command prepared at once (Map 8) to defend by extending the line.

Responding at once to the Belgian call for help, General Joffre sent the I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet) from the vicinity of Mezieres, August 6, with the mission of establishing contact with the Belgian army and of reconnoitering the German forces. The corps moved to the northeast and was badly treated by patrols and organizations of the German Third Army. It was forced to keep pretty close to the woods, and, after turning back over half the distance gained, it turned north and, after running into the German Second Army, joined the Belgians at Namur, August 14, with horses nearly ruined and the men over-ridden. It then marched by the north bank of the Sambre and covered the concentration of the British near Maubeuge.

(ii) *First offensive in Alsace.* (Map 5.) For moral effect, as much as to secure the flank of the approaching French offensive in Lorraine, General Joffre, August 4, ordered as a secondary offensive with limited objectives, a detachment from the First Army, consisting of the VII Corps reinforced by one infantry division from the reserve and a cavalry division, to march into Alsace. The detachment reached Mulhouse August 8. The next day, receiving a converging attack by two German corps from Strasbourg, the commander believed that he was being attacked by a greatly superior force and on August 10, retired to Belfort.

(iii) *The second offensive.* (Maps 5 and 8.) When the Germans invaded Belgium, General Joffre decided to meet the German attack (as then developed) by striking it in the flank. Accordingly, on August 8, in his General Instructions No. 1, he directed the assumption of a strategical and tactical offensive to the northeast. On August 12, before the offensive had been launched, General Joffre having lost some confidence in the Belgian strength, a corps was sent from the Fifth Army to guard the bridges across the Meuse south of Namur. At the same time, he reinforced the left wing by two new divisions

from Algeria and a corps from the right wing. As the French offensive was stopped and turned back in the Battle of the French Frontier, we will follow the further progress of events from the German side, as the German offensive was successful in penetrating French territory.

6. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. The principle of the objective.* (Maps 2 and 6.) (1) (a) The frontier between France and Germany was one hundred and fifty miles long. On the German side it was heavily fortified from south to north, as follows: From Switzerland to Strasbourg, inclusive, the line of the River Rhine, easily defendable, was strenthened by fortifications at Istein and Neuf Brisach, and by the fortified area at Strasbourg. The line from Strasbourg to Luxemburg, on wooded and easily defendable terrain, was strengthened by the exceedingly strong fortified area: Metz—Thionville and the new fortified area at Mohrange. The resulting line from Switzerland to Luxemburg was exceedingly strong, and, since it could not be turned by France without violating the neutrality of Switzerland or Belgium or both, that line could have been held by a comparatively small part of Germany's combatant forces. Von Schlieffen estimated that it could be held by nine divisions and certain auxiliary troops.

(b) Neither Germany nor Austria had fully fortified their Russian frontier. The Russo-German frontier was about five hundred miles long; the Austro-Russian frontier was about four hundred miles long. Germany knew that the Russian armies could not be mobilized as quickly as the German armies but that, finally, Russia would put armies of a total strength of several million men into the field.

The situation, then, was that, while Germany could defend against the French from behind a fortified line, she could defend against Russia only by war of maneuver.

(c) Under the *principle of the objective,* when there is more than one hostile army, the main hostile army is the army that can do the most damage.

In the situation which existed before Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium, Germany could have defended against the French army with a much smaller force than against the Russian army. Hence, it followed that the Russian army could be expected to do more damage to Germany on the eastern frontier than the French army could on the Franco-German frontier.

(d) The Russian army was the main hostile army, and by not operating against it Germany violated the *principle of the objective* which requires that the main hostile army must be the first objective. Had Germany complied with the *principle of the objective* and operated offensively against Russia while defending her French frontier, as planned by the elder von Moltke, neither Belgium nor Great Britain would have had any cause for entering the war as enemies of Germany.

(2) (Map 7.) The von Schlieffen plan of operations against France sought the destruction of the French field forces, while Paris was merely to be contained or invested. The plan, accordingly, illustrated the *principle of the objective* which requires the hostile army rather than a locality to be the first objective.

b. The principle of security. The strength of the French fortifications on the line: Switzerland—Luxemburg, decided Germany to avoid that line and to strike at France through the neutral state of Belgium. Contact with the French forces was thus delayed, and Great Britain as Belgium's defender was forced to the side of France. So when France fortified her German boundary she complied with the *principle of security.*

c. The principle of cooperation. (Map 9.) The King of Belgium of course knew that his little army could not defeat the German armies. When he defended his fortresses to the utmost of his ability and then took up a flank position at Antwerp, he delayed the German advance and attracted detachments of the German armies. By this attitude toward his new allies, he illustrated the *principle of cooperation.* If he had also destroyed the railroad bridge at Liege, the illustration would have been still better, as it would have taken twenty days to repair it sufficiently to carry heavy artillery; and without heavy artillery Namur could not be taken. Also, until the Sedan—Carignan line of communications was captured, all supplies for the German armies in Belgium and in the north of France passed over that railroad bridge.

CHAPTER III

Western Front to Include the Battle of the Marne

	Page
1. Battle of the French Frontier	37
a. French dispositions and plans	37
b. The operations	38
2. Allied Defeat at Second Line	40
a. French plan	40
b. German plan	41
c. Operations of the British Army	41
d. Operations of the German First and Second Armies	41
e. Operations on the Meuse	42
f. General Foch's Army Detachment	42
3. The Battle of the Marne	42
a. French plans	42
b. German plans	43
c. Narrative of events on French right, September 4 to 8	44
d. Narrative of events on French left, September 3 to 10	46
4. Principles of War	51
a. The principle of surprise	51
b. The principle of mass	51
c. The principle of economy of force	53
d. The principle of simplicity	54
e. The principle of security	55
f. The principle of movement	55
g. The principle of the offensive	56
h. The principle of the objective	56
i. The principle of cooperation	57

1. Battle of the French Frontier (Maps 5 and 10). *a. French dispositions and plans.* (1) When General Joffre understood that Germany was striking her main blow at France through the neutral state of Belgium, he moved the Fifth Army to the left and advanced the Fourth Army from reserve to the line between the Third and Fifth Armies. In addition to the troops originally concentrated, he created an Alsatian army detachment (General Pau) of the equivalent of three corps, with the mission of protecting the right by holding the Belfort fortified camp; a Lorraine army detachment (General Manoury) of the equivalent of two corps, with the mission of holding the Verdun fortified camp; and a left flank detachment (Gen-

eral d'Amade) of the equivalent of one corps (but soon after increased to the equivalent of two corps), with the mission of protecting the left of the allied line.

(2) General Joffre's general plan to meet the German offensive was as follows:

> "With our right resting on the Rhine, we will deliver an attack along the whole front against the flank of the enemy who is marching from the east to the west in order to outflank us by the north."

b. The operations. Under that plan "The Battle of the French Frontier" was fought as follows:

(1) (a) The Alsatian Army (General Pau) advanced and, by August 19, held the crossings of the Rhine from Switzerland to Colmar.

(b) The First Army (General Dubail) advanced, was defeated by the German Seventh Army (General von Herringen) in the Battle of Saarburg, August 20, and retreated to the Vosges Mountains.

(c) The Second Army (General Castelnau), covered Metz with its left but was repulsed and defeated, August 20, at the Battle of Mohrange, and retreated to the Grand Crown of Nancy.

(d) Under General Joffre's orders, and pursuant to the strategical plan of the location of the fortified areas on either side of the Charmes Gap, the retiring French First and Second Armies laid an ambuscade defensive for the pursuing German armies at the Charmes Gap. The maneuver was planned to be a double envelopment against the enemy troops attempting to force the Charmes Gap. The German Sixth and Seventh Armies did not make an aggressive pursuit, but, following the lead of the French retreat, they advanced toward the Charmes Gap. General Dubail defended in the Vosges with the First Army but retired his left under pressure toward the Charmes Gap. General Castelnau held the Second Army in concealment on the Grand Crown of Nancy. After the enemy was committed to the maneuver of penetrating the Gap, General Dubail and General Castlenau attacked the German armies in flank and defeated them in the Battle of Charmes Gap, August 25, forcing them to retire in considerable confusion.

(2) (a) The German Fifth and Fourth Armies (commanded respectively by the German Crown Prince and the Duke of Wurtemburg), after being held in strictest concealment in Luxemburg for more than two weeks, were marching

to the west through the Ardennes Forest when they met the French Third and Fourth Armies (commanded respectively by Generals Ruffey and Langle de Cary) in a great meeting engagement, August 22 and 23. The battle covered a front of seventy-five miles and is known as the Battle of the Ardennes.

(b) The Germans deployed first and defeated the French, but the pursuit was stopped by a surprise attack delivered, August 25, by General Manoury with the Army of Lorraine against the southern flank of the German Fifth Army. This is known as the Battle of Etain.

(3) (a) General Joffre repeated his order to General Lanrezac to attack the German Northern Group and desired him to launch the attack August 21, with his right resting on the fortified camp of Namur.

(b) General Lanrezac (Fifth Army) made an estimate of the situation in which he concluded that he did not yet have his troops well in hand and did not yet have good connection with the Fourth Army on his right and the British Army on his left, and decided not to attack until the 22d. He ordered the army to defend the south bank of the Sambre on August 21.

(c) While General Lanrezac was preparing his plan of attack for August 22, General von Bulow, marching to the west, turned the Second Army to the south and, at noon August 21, attacked General Lanrezac and bombarded the fortified camp of Namur with Austrian 42-centimeter howitzers. By night, General von Bulow held the crossings of the Sambre and threatened a penetration from the vicinity of Charleroi. On August 22, General von Bulow threatened an envelopment of General Lanrezac's left flank, and the latter fell back.

(d) On August 23, General Lanrezac planned to envelop the eastern flank of General von Bulow's Second Army with his I Corps from Dinant, while developing a holding attack along the rest of the line. Here, again, he was one day too late. On this day, August 23, General Lanrezac felt the contact on his right of the German Third Army (General von Hausen). He was threatened with a double envelopment, by the German Second Army (von Bulow) on his left and by the Third Army (General von Hausen) on his right. General Lanrezac retreated that night without informing his neighbors. This was the Battle of Charleroi. The next morning, General Joffre coordinated the retreat so that the Fifth Army would support itself in connection with the British army on the

fortress of Maubeuge and the left of the Fourth Army on the west bank of the Meuse.

(4) (a) The British Army (General French) consisting of two corps and a cavalry division, advancing under the general offensive desired by General Joffre, was on the line of Mons on the evening of August 22. The cavalry could not establish connection with the French Fifth Army but was meeting an increasing number of German patrols in front. General French ordered the line intrenched and defended.

(b) By August 23, General French, at Mons, was heavily attacked in front and an envelopment of both his flanks was threatened by the German Second and First Armies when he was informed by General Joffre that the French Fifth Army had retired, that the Germans held the Sambre River, and that the German cavalry was executing a wide turning movement around his left flank.

(c) General French ordered a retirement that night to the line: Valenciennes—Maubeuge. He reached that line August 24, but, avoiding the old and weak fortress of Maubeuge, decided to continue the retreat in the direction of St. Quentin, to the west bank of the Somme River.

(5) The old fortress of Maubeuge was not entered by any of the allied retreating troops. Its garrison of 35,000 men was left to block traffic on the trunk line railroad Liege—Paris, and to attract as many German troops as possible to its front. It held out until September 7, and kept one corps from the German Second Army out of the Battle of the Marne.

2. ALLIED DEFEAT AT SECOND LINE. (Maps 5 and 11.) *a. French plan.* (1) August 25, General Joffre decided that he could not defend the frontier north of Verdun, and gave the necessary instructions for retreat to the line: the Somme—the Oise—the Aisne—Verdun. He stated his general plan as follows:

> "Not being able to execute the offensive planned, our future operations will be based on the recreation of a mass of maneuver on the left wing to be composed of the French Fourth and Fifth Armies, the British Army, and new forces transferred from the southern wing, which mass will resume the offensive while the other armies hold the enemy forces in their front."

(2) To secure troops for the new mass of maneuver on the left, General Joffre discontinued the army detachments of Alsace and Lorraine and transferred their troops, respectively, to the French First and Third Armies (commanded by Generals

Dubail and Sarrail, respectively). The new mass was the Sixth Army (General Manoury) of an equivalent of about two corps, and was to be assembled near Amiens.

b. German plan. After the Battle of the Frontier, General von Moltke estimated that the French left was in full retreat toward Paris. He decided to pursue the French armies toward Paris so vigorously that they would have no time to reform. In publishing the orders, the German supreme command stated that:

> "The direction of march will be changed from the southwest to the south if the enemy should develop any serious resistance on the Aisne or on the Marne."

c. Operations of the British Army. (1) The small British army had fought very bravely at Mons and had stayed on the field too long, hence, its retreat began at night and was hurried. General French, for lack of roads the next day, August 24, was forced to send the Second Corps (General Smith-Dorrien) through the Mormal Forest and the I Corps to the east of that forest.

(2) General von Kluck quickly took advantage of General French's embarrassment and attacked the British II Corps vigorously. With the assistance of the reserves of the French Fifth Army, the British II Corps reached Le Cateau August 25, but was exhausted and unable to continue the retreat. Accordingly, General Smith-Dorrien the next day, August 26, without the support of the I Corps, stood and fought all day with the assistance of General Sordet's cavalry corps, and a division from General d'Amade's left flank group. That night (August 26-27), he continued the retreat and, on the 28th, the British army reunited on the line of the Oise.

d. Operations of the German First and Second Armies. (1) The withdrawal of the British Army behind the line made a gap between the French Fifth and Sixth Armies which the German right wing attempted at once to pass through. The French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) and Sixth Army (General Manoury) closed in and extended their inner flanks to cover the gap.

(2) On August 29, General von Bulow (Second Army) attempted to envelop the left flank of the French Fifth Army, and General von Kluck attempted to envelop the right flank of General Manoury's Army. The German attack was re-

pulsed and the morale of the troops of the German right enveloping force was noticeably affected.

e. Operations on the Meuse. (1) On August 26, the French Third and Fourth Armies (Generals Sarrail and Langle de Cary, respectively) held the line of the Meuse and had not begun the retreat ordered. However, the left of the French Fourth Army was refused in order to maintain connection with the French Fifth Army. On this day, the French Fourth Army was attacked by the German Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemberg) from the direction of Sedan; and by the German Third Army (von Hausen) from the direction of Dinant. The attacks, however, were not able to break or flank the line of the French Fourth Army.

(2) The next day, August 28, the battle along the front on the Meuse swayed forward and back according to attack and counter attack. That night, General Joffre ordered the French Third and Fourth Armies to comply with the orders of August 25 for the retirement to the second line.

(3) The French had remained on the line of the Meuse too long; on August 29, the turning of the French Fourth Army's left flank, by the German Third Army from Dinant, was prevented only by the greatest efforts.

b. General Foch's Army Detachment. The French Fourth Army, by not retiring to the Second Line as ordered on August 25, opened up a wide gap of about thirty-five miles between its left and the right of the French Fifth Army. To fill that gap and to prevent the German Third Army from cutting the communications of the French Fourth Army, General Joffre, August 29, created an Army Detachment (General Foch), of about 75,000 men with the mission of covering that gap and with a line of retreat toward Rheims.

3. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE. (Map 12.) *a. French plan.* When the maneuver of defending the Second Line (Somme—Oise—Aisne—Verdun) failed, General Joffre decided, September 1, to continue the retreat, and not to resume the offensive until the troops should be well in hand, when he proposed to fight a decisive battle. Accordingly, in order to make the troops of the fortified camp of Paris available for combat, he invited the government to leave Paris. His general plan was to defend with the least possible number of troops on the heavily fortified line from Switzerland to Verdun, then, pivoting on Verdun, to conduct the retreat between the forti-

fied camp of Verdun and the fortified camp of Paris, and with those fortified camps as points of support, to lay a concave ambuscade defensive on the line of the Marne or even on the line of the Seine if it should be necessary to retreat that far; and, when the German right wing should be well engulfed in that pocket or salient, to deliver a decisive convergent attack against it.

b. German plan. (1) General von Moltke accepted the reports of his army commanders in the right wing to the effect that they had won a great victory over the French, particularly the report of von Bulow, commanding the Second Army, that the French retreat was like a rout.

(2) (a) On August 30, he abandoned von Schlieffen's plan which called for a wide envelopment that would pass the German First Army to the west of Paris. Discounting the British army as defeated (and not knowing of the French mass of maneuver gathering near Paris) he announced, September 2, that it was his intention to push the French to the southeast of Paris, and ordered the change in the direction of the march.

(b) He directed the First Army (von Kluck) to follow the Second Army (von Bulow), in echelon, and charged it with the duty of covering the west flank of the armies. He directed von Kluck to destroy railroads leading from Paris and to contain Paris. He thus planned to commit the German right wing to the maneuver of forcing the French army away from Paris, of rupturing the allied line at the left of the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) and of enveloping the new French left. This was a reduction in plan from the wide von Schlieffen envelopment to a limited envelopment following a penetration, i.e., a dislocation of the line from Paris.

(3) (a) (Map 13.) Von Moltke did not consider the defeat at Charmes Gap, August 25, as a serious check. He estimated that the same method which reduced the Belgian fortifications would reduce the fortifications on the French eastern frontier. When he estimated, August 30, that the defeat of the French left called for in the von Schlieffen plan had already been accomplished, he believed that the opportunity had come to win a great "Cannae" and destroy the French armies.

(b) He then conceived the plan of replacing von Schlieffen's single envelopment by a great convergent attack that,

pivoting both ways around Verdun, would penetrate the French right south of Metz, and the French left east of Paris.

(c) He ordered the special force of six divisions and seventy heavy batteries that had been designated for the investment of Paris to go to the Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria) to participate in the southern converging blow south of Metz.

(4) On September 3, von Moltke learned that General Joffre was concentrating troops near Paris and estimated that the German right flank might be attacked. He then, September 4, changed the plan of operations again. The new plan was:

To defend in front of Paris with the First and Second Armies, from the Oise to the Marne, and from the Marne to the Seine respectively, with the assistance of the I and II Cavalry Corps. Then with the Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemburg), Fifth Army (German Crown Prince); Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria) and the Seventh Army (von Herringen) to deliver a double convergent attack, September 4, against the French forces in their front, while the Third Army (von Hausen) was to connect between the offensive and the defensive operations.

(5) Von Moltke's headquarters were at Luxemburg. The Kaiser expected a victory, and took his position on the heights of the Seille with a special body guard that was to escort him in triumph into Chalons, and from Chalons to Paris.

c. Narrative of events on French right, September 4 to 8.
(1) (a) From Verdun to Switzerland, the French line was heavily fortified and prepared for defense in position warfare. The great strength of the Grand Crown lay in its complete command of the Seille Valley.

(b) By way of diversion, von Moltke attacked September 4, astride the Moselle, the north and east slope of the Grand Crown. The Germans were not trained in position warfare, and did not have sufficient artillery preparation, consequently, the attack failed with extremely heavy casualties.

(2) On September 5, von Moltke tried to penetrate the Charmes Gap. He attacked with the Sixth Army (Bavarian Crown Prince) and the Seventh Army (von Herringen) along the northern and southern edge of the Charmes Gap, respectively. The attack failed for the same reason as that on the

4th, i.e., insufficient artillery preparation and lack of training in position warfare.

(3) On September 6, von Moltke delivered the double convergent attack: the Sixth and Seventh Armies attacked as on the 5th, but, on the 6th, the Fifth Army (German Crown Prince) and the Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemburg) attacked respectively in the direction of Bar-le-Duc and Vitry with great violence, while the V Corps, of the Fifth Army, attacked from the direction of Metz toward Fort Troyon, to take the French Third Army in reverse. As a result, the French Third Army was fighting to the front and to the rear.

(4) (a) On September 7, von Moltke continued the double convergent attack with great violence with all four armies, but was not able to break through. The German Sixth Army captured Pont-a-Mousson, and launched an attack down the Grand Crown to the south, with seven battalions of infantry in mass formation. The attack was repulsed by one battalion of infantry under Major Montlebert. The attack on Fort Troyon continued.

(b) On this day, the Commandant at Verdun, with the 72d Division, attacked the line of communications of the German Fifth Army as a diversion.

(5) (a) On September 8, von Moltke renewed the attack with fresh divisions and the battle reached its highest point of violence. Fort Troyon was bombarded with heavy artillery and practically destroyed, but the supporting troops, using the methods of position warfare, repulsed the German assaults. The main German effort on September 8 was to capture the southern position of the Grand Crown, i.e., Mont d'Amance, near Nancy, but that attack, as all others, failed for lack of sufficient artillery preparation and lack of training in position warfare.

(b) General Joffre authorized General Sarrail (Third Army) to fall back with his right, thus isolating Verdun, but ordered him to maintain contact with the Fourth Army. The bridges south of Verdun on the Meuse were prepared for destruction, but General Sarrail, fighting to the east and west, kept contact with Verdun. General Castelnau (Second Army) had the orders for a general retreat from Nancy before him for signature, but at the last moment did not sign and succeeded in holding his position.

(6) On the evening of September 8, von Moltke decided that the attack against the Nancy position was not practicable, discontinued it and gave emergency orders for immediate transfer of troops to the Paris front. The Crown Prince, however, west of Verdun continued his unsuccessful attack to isolate Verdun until the 12th.

d. Narrative of events on French left, September 3 to 10. (1) On September 3, General Joffre learned that the German right had changed direction so as to march to the southeast of Paris. He decided, at once, not to continue to the Seine but to hold and deliver on the morning of September 6, the enveloping attack on the German right, planned September 1, with the mass of maneuver in the vicinity of Paris.

(2) This mass consisted of the Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), the British Army, the French I and II Cavalry Corps (Generals Sordet and Conneau), and General Gallieni's Group in and north of Paris, consisting of the Sixth Army (General Manoury) and the garrison of Paris.

He designated General Foch's army detachment as the Ninth Army with a view of leading von Moltke to believe that he had a Seventh Army and an Eighth Army. He created a cavalry corps (General Espee) of two divisions, which had the mission of connecting the right of the Ninth Army (General Foch) with the left of the Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary).

He created the II Cavalry Corps of three divisions taken from the right wing, and gave it the mission of covering the left flank of the Fifth Army. General Joffre brought the IV Corps from Alsace, and other troops to Paris, and strengthened his left wing by troops from all available sources. He established his headquarters at Chatillon-sur-Seine.

(3) From the foregoing it is seen that while von Moltke was defending with his extreme right and attacking with his left to secure a penetration, General Joffre proposed to defend with his right and attack with his left, to envelop the German right. These two great offensives were synchronous and constitute a great battle that extended from Switzerland to Paris from September 4 to 9.

(4) (a) General von Kluck did not obey the order of September 2, to follow the Second Army, echeloned to the rear and right in the march to the southeast of Paris, but, being then in the lead and considering the British Army de-

feated, and, being intent on enveloping the left flank of the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), he continued to lead the Second Army.

(b) (Maps 13, 14 and 15.) Considering the French left defeated, he did not carry out von Moltke's order to protect the German right from the direction of Paris, as he left only the IV Reserve Corps and one cavalry division on that duty.

(c) Von Moltke's order of September 4 for the First Army (von Kluck) and the Second Army (von Bulow) to operate together on the front east of Paris, the First Army from the Oise to the Marne, the Second from the Marne to the Seine, reached General von Kluck on the morning of September 5, by radio. Von Bulow (Second Army) obeyed the order and halted. Von Kluck, not understanding the whole situation and being still intent on enveloping the left of the French Fifth Army, disobeyed the order and continued to march to the south of the Grand Morin, with the I and II Cavalry Corps in front.

(5) On September 5, the locations of the combatants were as follows:

The German Second Army was north of the Petit Morin and echeloned to the east and north.

The German First Army (von Kluck) at the end of September 5, instead of facing west between the Oise and the Marne, faced south and was more than thirty miles from its proper position, with headquarters at Rebais south of the Petit Morin.

The French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) faced the left and center of the German First Army.

The British Army, south of the Forest of Crecy, faced the right of the German First Army.

The II Cavalry Corps (General Conneau) connected the British Army with the French Fifth Army.

North of the Marne, the French Sixth Army (General Manoury) and the I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet), echeloned to the west from Meaux, faced the German IV Reserve Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division.

The Allied mass near Paris was under orders to attack on the morning of September 6, the next morning, with proper direction lines given. The French Sixth Army was to attack toward Chateau-Thierry, the British Army to the northeast, and the Fifth Army approximately north.

(6) (a) The IV Reserve Corps and the Sixth French Army established contact late on September 5, near Meaux. That night, a liaison officer from German General Headquarters in Luxemburg arrived and called von Kluck's attention to the menace to the whole German line of communications by an attack north of the Marne from the direction of Paris.

(b) In consequence, General von Kluck ordered for the 6th, that the II and IV Corps should march back to the line of the Ourcq, and that the III and IX Corps should refuse the right flank and protect the right of the Second Army. All baggage was sent north of the Marne, and headquarters moved to Charly on the Marne.

(7) (a) On September 6, General Joffre called on every man to die in his tracks rather than to retire another step. General Gallieni sent the Sixth Army (General Manoury) in to attack General von Kluck's First Army on the front of the Ourcq, north of the Marne, and began the extension of General von Kluck's right, by sending troops from the fortified camp of Paris as rapidly as possible and by all means of transport, including the taxicabs of the capital.

(b) The British Army (General French) attacked and easily drove General von Kluck's First Army rear guard to the north bank of the Grand Morin.

(c) The French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) attacked the German Second Army (von Bulow) and the III and IX Corps of the First Army (von Kluck).

(d) The German II Corps reached its place on the Ourcq. The IV Corps reached the north bank of the Marne, and by a night march it reached the line of the Ourcq. Von Kluck turned the III and IX Corps over to the Second Army (von Bulow) provisionally. Later in the night, he ordered them to retire to the north bank of the Petit Morin. At the same time, von Bulow (Second Army) ordered them into action on September 7 with the Second Army and directed the III Corps to protect the western flank of the Second Army.

(8) (a) On September 7, the French Sixth Army (General Manoury), with additional reinforcements, extended its left flank to Betz, and struck heavy blows against the German First Army north of the Marne.

(b) The British army crossed the Grand Morin driving the German rear guard before it.

(c) The French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), in a violent all day action, crossed the Grand Morin.

(d) Von Kluck, during the day, ordered the III and IX Corps to the line on the Ourcq and moved his headquarters further north.

(9) (a) On September 8, the French Sixth Army (General Manoury) continued its effort, but General von Kluck now had his troops in hand. His heavy artillery had come up and was supporting his counter attacks near Betz.

(b) General Gallieni called on every man to resist to capacity in order to help the French Fifth and British Armies to cross the Marne and crush the German right wing.

(c) The British advance reached the Marne at La Ferte.

(d) The French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), while supporting General Foch on the right, attempted to penetrate in the gap between the German First and Second Armies, crossed the Petit Morin, and defeated the right of the German Second Army.

(e) The Lepel Brigade arrived at Verberie, and von Kluck gave General Lepel orders to envelop the French left on the 9th.

Von Kluck moved his Headquarters to La Ferte Milon, where later, on the afternoon of September 8, the French 5th Cavalry Division raided an airplane station just as the line of cars of army headquarters came up. All the members of the staff seized rifles, carbines, and revolvers, formed extended order and, lying down in a long firing line, awaited the cavalry. However, the French cavalry did not discover them.

(f) Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, the representative of General von Moltke, reached headquarters Second Army on the evening of September 8. He and General von Bulow both agreed that the German Second Army could not maintain the front facing Paris between the Marne and the Seine; that General von Kluck's withdrawal of the III and IX Corps from the Marne to the Ourcq left such a gap between the two armies that the Second Army (von Bulow) must retreat to the north of the Marne; and that the line of the Marne could be held if General von Kluck would protect the right flank of the Second Army (von Bulow) and prevent the British Army from crossing the Marne.

(10) (a) On the morning of September 8, the defeated right of the German Second Army (von Bulow) was unable to

stop the advance of the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey).

(b) By withdrawing the III and IX Corps from the right of the German Second Army and throwing them in on the right of the line west of the Ourcq, von Kluck widened the gap already existing between his First Army and von Bulow's Second Army. The gap then was more than twenty-five miles wide with only the I and II Cavalry Corps (reinforced) covering it.

(c) The left of the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), the entire British Army and the II Cavalry Corps (General Conneau) all crossed the Marne and pushed north into that gap. This allied penetrating force on the 9th advanced ten miles as it had done also on the 8th.

(d) With the Allies crossing the Marne in rear of his left, von Kluck staked all on the chance of enveloping the left flank of the French Sixth Army (General Manoury) with the III and IX Corps and Lepel's Brigade. The attack made progress but was stopped on the line: Meaux—Nanteuil.

(e) In the forenoon of the 9th, all the reserves of the German First and Second Armies (von Kluck and von Bulow) and the I and II Cavalry Corps had been used, the German Second Army had been defeated, its right flank menaced and it was retreating to the north bank of the Marne. The First Army failed in its offensive action. There was a gap of more than twenty-five miles between the two armies and the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), the British Army (General French) and the French II Cavalry Corps (General Conneau) were rushing into that gap.

(b) General von Kluck decided, after the British crossed the Marne, that the First Army must retreat. General von Bulow already had arrived at that decision with respect to the Second Army.

Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, the representative of von Moltke, arrived at First Army Headquarters at noon, on the 9th, and gave the orders to retreat to the Aisne. The retreat began that afternoon and, by evening, the whole German right group that von Moltke had directed to hold in front of Paris, from the Oise to the Seine, was retreating to the Aisne.

(11) On September 10, the Third German Army (General von Hausen) and the French Ninth Army (General Foch) had the duty of connecting between the operations in Lorraine and those in front of Paris then in progress; and they

fought violently. The Ninth Army (General Foch) was nearly defeated several times but prevented a penetration of the line at the point of the salient. Responding to action on its left, the Ninth Army, on the 10th, succeeded in advancing.

(12) Von Moltke coordinated the retreat of all armies west of the Fifth Army (German Crown Prince). The German Crown Prince was the last to cease the offensive effort. He continued his attempts to isolate Verdun until the retreat of the armies on his right forced him to discontinue the attack, September 12.

4. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. (Maps 2 and 10.) *a. The principle of surprise.* (1) When Germany, by starting mobilization before France, by a more rapid mobilization than France, by concentration under cover of the neutral states of Luxemburg and Belgium and of the Ardennes Forest, and by inclusion of reserve corps in that concentration, marched through Belgium with a greatly preponderating force against the French left before General Joffre could prepare to defeat it at the Battle of the Frontier, she illustrated the *principle of surprise.*

(2) (Maps 13 and 14.) So, also, General Joffre, when he secretly concentrated a superior mass of maneuver in the vicinity of Paris, with which on September 6, he delivered a blow against the German right that forced it back to the Aisne, complied with the *principle of surprise.*

b. The principle of mass. (1) (Maps 7, 10 and 11.) Under the plan of operations against France, Germany concentrated for the hammer-head of her enveloping operation a preponderating force to defeat the French left and drive it back to Paris. This force did defeat the French and British at the Battle of the Frontier, August 23-25, and at the second line of defense, August 29, and did drive the allied left back to the vicinity of Paris. This force, at the Battle of the Frontier, was composed as follows:

First Army (von Kluck)	5 corps
Second Army (von Bulow)	5 corps
Third Army (von Hausen)	3 corps
I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen)	2 cavalry divisions
II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz)	3 cavalry divisions

Total: 13 corps and 5 cavalry divisions.

The Allies, not ready to receive an attack through Belgium, had hastily gathered the following troops to oppose that force:

Fifth Army (General Lanrezac).....5 corps
First British Army (General French).....2 corps
Left Flank Group (General d'Amade).....1 corps
I Cavalry Corps (General Sordet).....3 cavalry divisions
Total: 8 corps and 3 cavalry divisions.
German superiority: 5 corps and 2 cavalry divisions.

When General von Moltke succeeded in concentrating at the Battle of the Frontier, a preponderance of nearly two for one against the Allies' left, against which he was operating, he complied with the *principle of mass.*

(2) (a) (Map 14.) By September 6, the strength of the force in front of Paris, which von Moltke had ordered to conduct a defensive operation, was:

First Army.....5 corps
Second Army.....4 corps
I Cavalry Corps.....2 cavalry divisions
II Cavalry Corps.....3 cavalry divisions
Total: 9 corps and 5 cavalry divisions.

This force was reinforced by Lepel's Brigade, September 9.

(b) General Joffre, by inviting the French Government to leave Paris (thereby gaining the Paris garrison for maneuver), and by emergency transportation of troops to Paris, had succeeded in concentrating, by September 6, the following troops for use in a decisive blow against the exposed German right flank:

FRENCH

Army of Paris (General Gallieni).
Garrison of Paris.....2 corps (equivalent)
Sixth Army (Gen. Manoury).....3 corps (equivalent)

Fifth Army (Gen. d'Esperey).....4 corps
I Cavalry Corps.....3 cavalry divisions
II Cavalry Corps (Gen. Conneau).....3 cavalry divisions
Total French: 9 corps and 6 cavalry divisions.

BRITISH

First Army (Gen. French).....3 corps
Total: Allied Force: 12 corps and 6 cavalry divisions.

Allied Superiority: 3 corps and 1 cavalry division.

(c) Instead of assuming a defensive attitude in connection with the Second Army (General von Bulow) and the I and II Cavalry Corps as required by von Moltke's order of September 4, von Kluck assumed an offensive attitude and attempted to envelop the allied left (French Sixth Army—General Manoury), northeast of Paris, with the German First Army. By that action he opened a gap of twenty-five miles between the Ger-

man First and Second Armies, which he tried to hold with the I and II Cavalry Corps reinforced, against the British Army (General French), and the French II Cavalry Corps (General Conneau) and the left of the French Fifth Army. Both of his efforts, i.e., to envelop the allied left and to hold the gap, had failed definitely by September 9, and to save his army and to protect the German right, he was compelled to retreat to the Aisne. The German Second Army, threatened with envelopment of its right flank through the gap between it and the First Army, began its retreat to the Aisne, September 9. The Two German cavalry corps covered the retreat.

(d) When General Joffre succeeded in concentrating a preponderance of force over that of the German exposed right flank against which he began a successful operation September 6, he complied with the *principle of mass.*

c. The principle of economy of force. (1) (a) (Maps 7, 10, 11 and 13.) The von Schlieffen plan of operations against France required for its successful execution a strong hammer-head enveloping force on the marching flank that could easily defeat the French left at the frontier and force it back to Paris, whip around Paris and envelop the left of the French field forces. To insure this strength, General von Schlieffen limited the force that should hold the German fortified line from Switzerland to Luxemburg to nine divisions with certain auxiliary troops, and prescribed the strategical and tactical defensive on the Russian front. He estimated that France would be defeated in six weeks, and that Germany could then assume the strategical and tactical offensive against Russia.

(b) Between the retirement of General von Schlieffen in 1906 and the World War, the German Army was increased by nine divisions. His successor, the younger von Moltke, assigned eight of those divisions to the fortified front between Metz and Switzerland and only one to the enveloping force on the right of Metz.

(c) The hammer-head of the enveloping force was to consist of the following:

First Army (von Kluck)
Second Army (von Bulow)
Third Army (von Hausen)
I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen)
II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz)

General von Moltke withdrew from this force:

2 corps to besiege Antwerp
2 corps to besiege Namur
1 corps to besiege Maubeuge

Total 5 corps.

(d) By September 2, General von Moltke estimated that the Allied left had been decisively defeated at the Battle of the Frontier, August 23-25, and at the second line of defense, August 29, and that the British army had been so badly defeated that it could not appear on the battlefield again for a long time.

(e) He then decided to penetrate the French fortified line south of Metz, and, September 4 to 8, attacked that fortified line as part of a great double converging maneuver. Expecting that penetrating attack to succeed, he had assembled south of Metz the six divisions and seventy heavy batteries that had been designated to invest Paris, and which under the von Schlieffen plan should have followed the right wing.

(f) As a result, the German hammer-head on the morning of September 6, when General Joffre launched his counter offensive, was twenty-five divisions and seventy heavy batteries less that it might have been had von Schlieffen's admonition to keep it as strong as possible been followed. So when General von Moltke, by detachments and by conducting operations from the fortified line: Switzerland—Metz, against the French fortified line, reduced the strength of his right hammer-head below enveloping efficiency, he violated the *principle of economy of force.*

(2) (Maps 13, 14 and 15.) On the other hand, General Joffre, by defending the French fortified line from Switzerland to Verdun with a very thin force and by inviting the government to leave Paris, gained sufficient troops with which to successfully attack the German right and thus complied with the *principle of economy of force.*

d. The principle of simplicity. (1) (a) (Maps 7, 13 and 14.) At the beginning of the operation against France, General von Moltke began the execution of the von Schlieffen plan which required the line to bend around the pivot (Verdun), to extend to Paris, and the First Army, on the right flank, to whip around Paris and envelop the left of the French field forces.

(b) September 2, convinced that the Allied left had been decisively defeated, von Moltke changed the plan from a single envelopment to a great double converging operation that, isolating Paris, was intended to crush the Allied field forces.

(c) September 3, von Moltke learned that General Joffre was concentrating a mass of maneuver near Paris. September 4, he changed the plan again to provide for a defensive battle in front of Paris, by the German First and Second Armies and I and II Cavalry Corps, and a reduced converging operation by the German Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies, with the Third Army connecting the offensive operation and the defensive operation. The defensive operation in front of Paris was not successful and the German right was forced back to the Aisne.

(d) When General von Moltke changed the plan under which he was operating against France, and two days later changed it again, he violated the *principle of simplicity.*

e. The principle of security. (1) (a) (Maps 13, 14 and 15.) General von Moltke learned on September 3 that General Joffre was assembling a mass of maneuver near Paris, and gave orders for the First and Second Armies and the I and II Cavalry Corps to defend the German right flank, but did not reinforce that right flank until September 9 and then only with Lepel's Brigade. The right flank was defeated on September 9 and forced to retreat to the Aisne.

(b) When General von Moltke knew, on September 3, that his right flank was in the air and must change from the offensive to the defensive to meet an approaching hostile offensive and did not strengthen that exposed flank, he violated the *principle of security.*

(2) (Map 13.) On the other hand, when General Joffre attracted the enemy to the triangular front: Switzerland—Verdun—Paris for the decisive battle of the war, he complied with the *principle of security* by gaining security for his right flank on the neutral state of Switzerland, for his left flank on the fortified camp of Paris, for his center and pivot of maneuver on the fortified camp of Verdun, for his right wing on the fortified line: Belfort—Verdun, and for his left wing by favorable terrain, thus gaining freedom of action in the use of his interior lines.

f. The principle of movement. (1) (a) (Map 13.) The German First and Second Armies and I and II Cavalry Corps,

that had been designated September 4 to hold the Paris front, began the retreat to the Aisne on September 9. General Joffre did not order a pursuit until September 10 and an aggressive parallel pursuit until September 11.

(b) When General Joffre failed to initiate and maintain an aggressive pursuit against the Germans from the time they began to retreat, September 9, he violated the *principle of movement.*

(2) (Maps 7, 10, 11, 13 and 14.) The success of the von Schlieffen plan of operations against France depended upon securing a superiority of force against the French left flank, that could not be secured except through compliance with the *principle of movement.* As movement in a military sense, is approximately what we understand by MV (M=mass and V=velocity or motion), the operation against the French left at the Battle of the Frontier, August 23-25, and at the second line of defense was successful, but at the Battle of the Marne it was not successful, due to the relative and also actual decrease in the value of M—the mass.

g. The principle of the offensive. (1) (Map 13.) The allied forces west of Verdun were executing a step by step defensive when General Joffre learned, on September 3, that the German right had changed the direction of its march to the southeast and that the German right would pass to the east of Paris. General Joffre at once appreciated the fact that the German right flank was "in the air" and not secure and decided to envelop it. He then by a successful sortie defensive gave an illustration of compliance with the *principle of the offensive* when he stopped the retreat, and, attacking along the Verdun—Paris front, launched a decisive blow against the German right which forced it back to the Aisne.

(2) The offensive wins by delivery of a determining blow along the decisive strategical direction. Von Schlieffen understood that the decisive strategical direction, in an operation against the French, was around the French left flank. His plan of operations against France is a beautiful illustration of a plan for an offensive operation. The operation failed, due to the fact that offensive action was not maintained along the decisive direction but was frittered away on non-decisive lines.

h. The principle of the objective. (Maps 7 and 13.) By adopting von Schlieffen's objective of the French army rather than Paris, and by adhering to this objective throughout all

his changes of plans, von Moltke complied with the *principle of the objective* which, when there is a choice, requires that the hostile army shall be the objective rather than a geographical locality.

i. The principle of cooperation. (1) (Maps 10, 13 and 14.) When General Lanrezac, in command of the French Fifth Army, after his defeat at the Battle of Charleroi on August 23, retreated without informing the British Army (General French) on his left, at Mons, he violated the *principle of cooperation.*

(2) The British line of communications at the beginning of the war led back to the channel ports. When the British, after the Battle of Mons August 23, gave up their line of communications and cast their lot in with the French, they complied with the *principle of cooperation.*

CHAPTER IV

All Fronts to Include 1914

1. Russian Front Facing Germany 59
   a. Theater of operations 59
   b. Russian and German plans of operation 59
   c. The Battle of Tannenberg 60
   d. Battle of the Masurian Lakes 61
2. Serbian Front, 1914 62
   a. Theater of operations 62
   b. Plans of operation 62
   c. Battle of Jadar 62
   d. Battle of the Drina 63
   e. Battle of Mt. Roudnik 63
3. Russian Front Facing Austria 63
   a. Austrian and Russian plans of operation 63
   b. Battle of Lemberg 64
4. Western Front to October 15, 1914 65
   a. German retreat to the Aisne 65
   b. Battle of the Aisne 66
   c. Battle of Picardy 68
   d. Battle of Artois 69
5. Russian Front to End of 1914 70
   a. Central Powers' first offensive against Russia 70
      (1) Plans of Central Powers 70
      (2) Battle of Augustovo 70
      (3) Battle of Warsaw 70
   b. Central Powers' second offensive against Russia 72
      (1) Plans of Central Powers 72
      (2) Battle of Lodz 72
6. Western Front to End of 1914 73
   a. German and French plans 73
   b. Battle of Flanders 73
7. African Theater of Operations 74
   a. Togoland 74
   b. British and French operations 74
8. Asiatic and Pacific Theater of Operations 74
   a. Theater of operations 74
   b. Plans of operation 75
   c. Capture of Kiaou-Chau 75
   d. Capture of German Pacific possessions 76
9. Turkish Theater of Operations 77
   a. Theater of operations 77
   b. Turkish entry into the war 77
   c. Turkish objectives and plans 78
   d. Turkish mobilization 78
   e. Operations in Mesopotamia 79
   f. Operations in the Caucasus 80
   g. Operations at the Dardanelles 80
10. Principles of War 81
   a. The principle of the objective 81
   b. The principle of the offensive 82

c. The principle of the economy of force 83
d. The principle of mass 84
e. The principle of surprise 84
f. The principle of movement 85
g. The principle of security 85
h. The principle of simplicity 86
i. The principle of cooperation 87

1. RUSSIAN FRONT. *a. Theater of operations.* (1) (Maps 2 and 88.) The boundary between Russia and the Central Powers made a large salient, convex toward the Central Powers, with the northern face and the nose of the salient resting against Germany and the southern face of the salient resting against Austria-Hungary. (Map 16.) Along the northern face of the salient, on the German side, is the obstacle of the Masurian Lakes which extend between the Vistula and the Niemen Rivers. Parallel to and south of the southern face of the salient are the Carpathian Mountains. The Pinsk marshes and the rivers crossing the salient are serious obstacles. The Polish plateau along the southwestern boundary is fertile and thickly populated. It is well situated as a base for operations against Vienna.

(2) (Map 17.) The Central Powers had a strategic railroad paralleling the frontier from Roumania to the Baltic. Trunk lines from Vienna and Berlin meet at Warsaw. Other important railroad centers are Konigsberg, Dantzig, Thorn, Posen, Breslau, Cracow, and Lemberg. Only one of these, i.e., Warsaw, was in Russia.

(3) Troops in the salient were subject to a converging operation from East Prussia and from Hungary. On the other hand, troops in East Prussia could be cut off by a penetration from the salient to the Baltic. Similarly, a thrust from the Polish plateau toward Vienna or Budapest would isolate Hungarian troops operating east of those places.

b. Russian and German plans of operation. (1) (Map 2.) The Russian plan to defend against Germany and attack Austria was changed after Germany launched her offensive against France, so that it provided, as a diversion in favor of France, that an offensive should be launched at once against Germany with a view of cutting off the East Prussian German salient. The offensive against Austria was to be undertaken by troops assembled later.

(2) The Central Powers' plan was for Germany to carry on the strategical and tactical defensive until after the defeat of France, and for Austria-Hungary to assume the strategic and tactical offensive against Russia at once, as a diversion to draw Russian troops away from East Prussia.

c. The Battle of Tannenberg. (August 26-29.) (Map 16.) (1) (a) Germany concentrated in East Prussia about 200,000 men comprising four regular corps and a certain number of reserves. These forces were in two groups—one for the protection of Konigsberg, and the other for the protection of Dantzig. The whole force (called the Eighth Army) was under the command of General Priwitz.

(b) Russia concentrated two armies at once, i.e., the First Army (General Rennenkampf) in the region of Vilna-Kovno and the Second Army (General Samsonoff) in the region of Warsaw. Each army consisted of four or five corps. The group was under the command of General Jilinski, whose mission was to cut East Prussia off from Germany, and whose plan of maneuver was to deliver a converging attack astride the Masurian Lakes with the idea that the First Army (General Rennenkampf) would drive the Germans west, while the Second Army (General Samsonoff) would envelop the German southern flank.

(2) (a) (Map 18.) The Russian First Army (General Rennenkampf) that originally was to defend against Germany completed its concentration, and, crossing the frontier August 17, defeated General Priwitz's total field force (less the XX Corps) at Gumbinen August 19 and occupied Insterberg.

(b) The Russian Second Army (General Samsonoff) without waiting to complete its concentration crossed the frontier August 21, and advanced toward Allenstein.

(3) (a) General Priwitz reported to von Moltke that the country east of the Vistula must be abandoned. August 22, von Moltke detailed von Hindenburg to relieve von Priwitz on the Russian front.

(b) August 22, from his train, General Hindenburg sent orders for the retirement of the I Corps to Deutsch-Eylau behind the right wing of the XX Corps near Tannenberg.

(c) General Hindenburg arrived at Eighth Army Headquarters on the afternoon of August 23. He estimated that General Jilinski's force was greatly superior in numbers; but, as the Russian force was in two groups and divided by the

obstacle of the Masurian Lakes, he decided to assume the offensive and to operate on interior lines by containing the First Army while destroying the Second.

(d) Von Hindenburg contained the Russian First Army with the thinnest kind of a screen, i.e., one cavalry division, and from August 26, with only two brigades of that division. These two cavalry brigades were the only force that stood in front of General Rennenkampf's First Army of twenty-four infantry and several cavalry divisions.

(e) August 23 was designated as the day for the German concentration in front of the Second Russian Army. The plan of maneuver against that army called for a double envelopment by the troops arriving from in front of the Russian First Army, and from the fortresses Thorn and Graudenz, while the center was to be held lightly by the XX Corps then on the line.

(4) General Rennenkampf (First Army) estimated that the German main force was near Konigsberg and continued to push the thin German screen back in that direction.

(5) (Map 19.) General Hindenburg finished his concentration and attacked according to plan, at 4:00 AM, August 27. The attack succeeded and by the 29th, the Russian Second Army had lost two of its four corps, i.e., the XIII and XV, and most of its artillery and transport. The I and VI Corps and other remnants of the army escaped to vicinity of Ossovietz. General Samsonoff shot himself to escape capture.

d. Battle of the Masurian Lakes. (1) (Maps 18 and 20.) Von der Goltz's Landwehr Division that had been guarding the Kiel Canal arrived in time to participate in the Battle of Tannenberg. August 31, von Moltke informed von Hindenburg that the XI Corps, Guard Reserve Corps and the 8th Cavalry Division on the French front were being entrained and were at his disposal.

(2) Von Moltke ordered von Hindenburg to assume the offensive and to drive General Rennenkampf out of East Prussia. General Rennenkampf was then on the line of the Masurian Lakes and slowly approaching Konigsberg. General Hindenburg advanced September 4 in parallel columns with the plan of attacking Rennenkampf in front and enveloping his left flank. He launched the attack on the morning of September 8. The frontal attack was repulsed but the enveloping attack advanced through the Masurian Lakes country and

threatened General Rennenkampf's line of communications to Kovno.

General Rennenkampf began a retreat on the night of September 9-10, and crossed the Niemen River September 15, with a loss of more than 80,000 men.

2. THE SERBIAN FRONT. (Map 3.) *a. Theater of operations.* Austria-Hungary declared war against Montenegro also, August 9, 1914, so the theater of operations in the Balkans included the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, and the contiguous teritory of Austria-Hungary.

The rivers—Danube, Save and Drina—separated Serbia from Austria-Hungary on the north and west. The territory of both Serbia and Montenegro is mountainous with very few roads. Belgrade, on the Danube, is the capital of Serbia. The only bridge across the rivers to Austria-Hungary is at Belgrade.

b. Plans of operation. (1) (Map 21.) The Austrian plan of operation involved a fire attack across the Danube and a strategical and tactical offensive from Bosnia. To carry out that plan, Austria concentrated the Fifth and Sixth Armies under General Potiorek in Bosnia.

(2) The Serbian plan of operation was to assemble in the mountain regions south of Belgrade, in readiness to operate to the north or to the west. To carry out their plan, ten incomplete divisions, forming a skeleton of three small armies, were assembled under the command of General Putnik.

c. Battle of Jadar. (August 12-20.) (1) Austria, as soon as she had declared war on Serbia, July 28, began to bombard Belgrade. On August 12th, General Potiorek crossed the Serbian frontier, on a front of one hundred and forty miles in many columns from Chabatz on the north to Liombowia on the south, in a convergent advance.

(2) General Putnik, with the view of covering Belgrade, sent detachments out at once to delay the enemy, while, by forced marches, he moved the Serbian army forward to a strong position on the Tser mountain overlooking the Jadar Valley, with flanks protected by the Save River on the north and the Jadar River on the south.

(3) General Potiorek, before his army had fully concentrated, made a frontal attack on August 16 on a front of thirty-five miles against the Serbian center, and pushed it back.

(4) On August 20, General Putnik assumed the offensive, regained the lost ground and drove the Austrians in confusion

back into the Valley of the Jadar. General Putnik continued his offensive and, by penetration between the Austrian columns, prevented their junction, thereby cutting the Austrian forces into two parts.

(5) General Potiorek retreated to Austrian territory with a loss of more than 50,000 men.

d. Battle of the Drina. (September 7-November 7.) (Map 22.) (1) Stung by the defeat of the Jadar, Austria at once prepared a second offensive against Serbia. The Austrian plan was to attract the Serbian attention by a diversion, carried out by two corps invading from Mitrovitza, while the main forces crossed the Drina in the vicinity of Liombowia and threatened envelopment of the left flank and the communications of the Serbian Army.

(2) General Putnik occupied the strong position from Mitrovitza to Liombowia defending the line of the Drina River.

(3) In the operations which lasted until November 7, 1914, called the Battle of the Drina, the Austrians were not able to turn or force the Serbian position nor were the Serbians able to drive the Austrians across the Drina.

e. Battle of Mt. Roudnik. (December 3.) (1) The fighting along the Drina was a stalemate until November 7, when, due to shortage of ammunition, and to Austrian reinforcements, General Putnik was forced to retreat. He conducted a step by step defensive in good order. In a vain effort to save Belgrade, he defended the line of Valievo, November 15, and the line of the Kolubra, November 20 (Map 23.) Abandoning Belgrade November 29, he withdrew to the natural position Dreme—Kosmai—Mt. Roudnik, between the Danube and the Morawa Serbe, with the First Army on the left, the Second Army on the right and the Third Army in the center.

(2) December 3, in a heavy mist, the Serbian First Army descended from Mt. Roudnik, penetrated the Austrian center and drove off the southern wing to the southwest. At once, the Serbian Second and Third Armies attacked the Austrians and, pivoting to the north, drove the northern wing out of Serbia.

(3) The retreat of the Austrians was a rout. The operation cost them more than 60,000 men and 120 canonn.

3. RUSSIAN FRONT FACING AUSTRIA. (Map 16.) *a. Austrian and Russian plans of operation.* (1) (a) After Russia had sent General Jilinski into East Prussia as a diver-

sion in favor of France, she functioned on her plan of operations against Austria-Hungary, which was to pivot on the north boundary of Roumania and attack Austria-Hungary through the passes of the Carpathian Mountains, with the view of giving independence to the Czechs and Slovaks in Hungary.

(b) Russia concentrated two armies at once, i.e.: The Third Army (General Roussky), in the region of Doubno-Rowno and the Eighth Army (General Brussilloff) in the region of Podolie. Under their cover, two additional armies were concentrated as follows: The Fourth Army (General Everth) in the region of Brest-Litovsk, the Fifth Army (General Plehve) in the region of Cholm. These four armies were placed under the command of General Ivanoff.

(2) (a) The Austrians' plan of operations called for a penetrating blow west of the Pinsk Swamps from the heavily fortified camps of Lemberg and Przemysl, that would cut along the base of the Polish salient.

(b) Austria concentrated five armies as follows:

First Army (General Dankl), near the frontier in vicinity of the Vistula. Fourth Army (General Auffenberg), just north of Przemysl. These two armies were to deliver a blow in the direction of Warsaw and Lublin. They were covered to the east by two other armies, i.e.: Third Army (General Bunderman), to the north of Lemberg and the Second Army (General Boehm-Ermolli), toward Stanislau, facing to the east. The reserve army for this force, was under command of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

b. Battle of Lemberg. (August 25-September 12.) (Map 24.) (1) The Austrians did not begin their operation in Poland for nearly a month. On August 29, the First Army (General Dankl) and the Fourth Army (General Auffenberg) crossed the frontier, covered to the east by the Third Army (General Bunderman) and the Second Army (General Boehm-Ermolli) which also were protecting Lemberg.

(2) The First and Fourth Armies made headway as the Russian Fourth Army (General Everth) and the Fifth Army (General Plehve) were not yet ready to operate.

(3) However, the Third Russian Army (General Roussky) and the Eight Army (General Brussilloff) were ready and, August 28, attacked the Austrian Second and Third Armies. By a maneuver which took four days to execute, General Roussky penetrated between the Austrian Second and Third

Armies and General Brussilloff enveloped the right flank of the Austrian Second Army. The Austrian Second Army, threatened with a double envelopment, and the Austrian Third Army with its right threatened with envelopment, fell back in great disorder. The city of Lemburg was abandoned.

(4) As soon as the Russian Fourth and Fifth Armies heard of that victory, they took the offensive, and attacked the Austrian First and Fourth Armies. The battle became general and continued until September 12 when the Austrian armies, threatened with envelopment on the right by General Brussilloff, broke and retreated as rapidly as they could to the Carpathian Mountains, leaving more than 400 cannon and 100,000 prisoners in the hands of the Russians. The Russians reached the Carpathian Mountains and sent their cavalry toward Budapest. They besieged the Fortress of Przemsyl, and threatened Cracow. More than a million men were engaged in the Battle of Lemberg.

4. THE WESTERN FRONT TO OCTOBER 15, 1914. (Map 13.) *a. German retreat to the Aisne.* (1) *German retreat.* When von Moltke realized that he had been defeated at the Marne, September 9, he ordered a retreat, pivoting on Verdun, to a position in readiness on the heights of the Aisne.

(2) *Allied pursuit.* (a) (i) Although on September 9 there were local pursuits by the armies on the left, General Joffre did not issue instructions for a coordinated pursuit until the evening of the 10th. His general plan was merely for a "follow up" pursuit to the northeast, or, as he said, "The victory can now be gained by the feet of the infantry."

(ii) His detailed plan for that pursuit was as follows:

Sixth Army (General Manoury), with right along line of the Ourcq.

British Army (General French), with right on line through Chateau-Thierry.

Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), with right on line Rheims (inclusive).

Ninth Army (General Foch), with right through Chalons.

Fourth Army east of Ninth Army, to follow German Fourth Army.

(b) (i) The next day, September 11, General Joffre decided to make an aggressive strategic pursuit. His general plan was, by attack, to dislocate the German forces west of

Verdun from the rest of the German line, and to envelop both flanks of the dislocated German right.

(ii) His detailed plan was as follows:

The First and Second Army (Generals Dubail and Castelnau) were to hold from Switzerland to Verdun.

The Third Army (General Sarrail) was to penetrate the German line northwest of Verdun and operate against the line of communications of the dislocated German right wing.

The Sixth Army (General Manoury) and the British Army (General French) were to pursue the German right wing and envelop its western flank.

The Ninth Army (General Foch) and the Fourth Army (General Langley de Cary) were to drive the German center and left of the dislocated northern wing to the northeast.

The Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) was to operate with the right or left group according to the situation.

The XIII Corps was sent from Lorraine to reinforce the left flank. The pursuit was accelerated but no progress was made in the dislocation of the German line west of Verdun, or in enveloping it on the west, and, on September 12, the pursuit was stopped by the German line on the heights of the Aisne.

b. Battle of the Aisne. (Map 25.) (1) *German order of battle, September 13, from right to left:*

(a) First Army (General von Kluck), on the plateau between the Oise and the Aisne. After the Marne, von Kluck was placed under the orders of von Bulow.

(b) Second Army (General von Bulow), extended the line along the Chemin des Dames with two corps while with another corps and the Guard corps it closed the gap of Champagne between it and the Third Army.

(c) Third Army (General von Einem vice von Hausen), extended the line from Rheims to Suippe.

Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemburg) was retreating in the direction of Vouzieres and Buzancy.

(d) Fifth Army (German Crown Prince)—no change.

(e) Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria), reinforced with detachments, held the line from Metz to Switzerland.

(f) The gap that existed at the Battle of the Marne between the First and Second German Armies (von Kluck and von Bulow) was not closed on the retreat but was finally filled by the following units:

I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen).

II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz) (less one cavalry division).

VII Reserve Corps (arriving September 12, from investment of Maubeuge).

Seventh Army (von Herringen), from Lorraine.

(g) The IX Corps, reinforced by one cavalry division from II Cavalry Corps, and later reinforced by a reserve corps, covered the right flank.

(2) *Allied offensive (September 13-16).* (a) General Joffre, when stopped at the Aisne, decided to assume the offensive at once. Although he issued new instructions, the only change in previous plans for the strategical pursuit was that the Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) should operate with the Sixth Army, the British Army, and the XIII Corps as a group; while the Ninth, Fourth and Third Armies should operate as a group and penetrate the German line by rupture near Verdun.

(b) In the left group, the attack of the right of the British Army (General French) and the left of the French Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) reached the Chemin des Dames.

(c) The right group was not able to dislocate the German line near Verdun.

(d) No progress was made in enveloping the German right.

(e) The Germans used the methods of position warfare successfully in defending in these operations.

(3) *German offensive (September 17-21).* (a) *Von Falkenhayn's plan.*

(i) The new chief of the German General Staff, von Falkenhayn, estimated that the sensitive German right flank should be protected by extension to the sea, and that the extension should be on the line of the Somme. This would be the shortest line to the sea and would also cut the British line of communications via Calais.

(ii) Von Falkenhayn's plan of operations was to seize the initiative at once by a counter attack on the Aisne, to divert the attention of General Joffre from the German right by an attack in Lorraine, and to gain sufficient troops by withdrawals from the Eastern front, from reserves in Germany, and by the adoption of siege methods (position warfare) from the Oise to Switzerland, with which to extend the German line along the Somme River to the sea, and, later, to resume the envelopment of the western flank of the Allies' armies.

(b) *German counter offensive on the Aisne* (*September 17-21*). The plan of maneuver called for the capture of the Chemin des Dames with the view of securing the initiative, and also, that commanding position.

The attack was launched September 17 on a ninety mile front along the Aisne. The battle reached its height of violence September 19 and 20, in an effort to capture the Chemin des Dames.

The Allies, using the method of position warfare in defense, repulsed the German attacks, September 21.

(c) *German offensive in Lorraine* (*September 19-30*). (i) The plan of maneuver for the offensive in Lorraine called for a converging attack on the Verdun salient. That offensive had several objects. They were:

To divert attention from the exposed German right flank.

To secure better protection, for the German line of communications through Carignan and for the Briey mining area.

To shorten the line and gain troops with which to extend the line to the sea.

(ii) The attack was launched September 19. The northern attack by two corps of the German Fifth Army progressed in the direction Varennes-Clermont and threatened the Paris-Verdun railroad, but was stopped, September 24, by General Sarrail's Third Army.

(iii) The southern attack by an army detachment (von Strantz) was more successful, and, capturing St. Mihiel, crossed the Meuse on a foot bridge whose destruction had been overlooked. It was stopped, September 22, by a coordinated converging attack by the First Army (General Dubail), the Third Army (General Sarrail) and the 3d group of division reserves, before it had cut the Paris-Nancy railroad, but it did cut the Commercy-Verdun railroad. The line thus gained made the St. Mihiel salient which was held by the Germans for the next four years.

c. The Battle of Picardy (*September 20-30*). (1) *General Joffre's plan.* General Joffre, adhering to his plan of enveloping the German right, concentrated a mass of maneuver near Amiens, consisting of the Second Army (Map 26) brought from Lorraine, the I and II Cavalry Corps (Generals Sordet and Conneau) and reserves, all under the command of General Castelnau who was given the mission of enveloping the

German right and of cutting their line of communications with the idea of driving them from France.

(2) *Von Falkenhayn's plan.* Von Falkenhayn replaced the Second Army on the line by the Seventh Army (von Herringen), and placed von Bulow in command of a mass of maneuver consisting of the Second Army, the II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz) and the I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen) with the mission of extending the German right to the sea along the line of the Somme.

(3) *Operations (September 20-30).* The resulting battle, in which each side exercised initiative and acted offensively to envelop the hostile flank, was a terrific struggle from September 20 to 30. It consisted of a succession of meeting engagements as each new element under cavalry screen cover, took its place on the line and attempted envelopment of the hostile flank. General Joffre failed to cut the German line of communications but succeeding in bending the German line to the north and prevented its extension along the line of the Somme. The operation of the forces of General Castelnau and General von Bulow, September 20-30, is known as the Battle of Picardy. It extended the line to the Somme.

d. Battle of Artois (October 1-15). (Map 27.) (1) *Von Falkenhayn's plan.* When von Falkenhayn understood that he could not seize the line of the Somme, he limited the objective to the channel ports of France, to include Calais, and announced to the troops that the mission was to capture Calais.

(2) *General Joffre's plan.* (a) General Joffre interpreted the Battle of Picardy to mean that the Allies' mission was to defend the British bases on the north coast of France, and communication with England.

(b) His plan, which was successfully executed, was as follows:

The Allied line was to be extended to the River Lys via Lille by a new Tenth Army (General Maud'huy).

The Belgian Army to leave the fortified camp of Antwerp and march west and take over the sea end of the line. Light British troops under General Rawlinson, and French troops under General Brugere from Dunkirk and Ostend were to be pushed by motor transport to Ghent, as a covering force for the Belgian retreat. The British Army, relieved on the Aisne was to connect the French and Belgian armies.

(c) Marshal Joffre dissolved the Ninth Army and detailed General Foch as an assistant in charge of coordinating the efforts of the French, British, and Belgian Armies from the Oise River to the sea.

(3) *Operations (October 1-15).* (a) The German line was extended to the sea as planned, by the Sixth Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria), the Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemburg), and detachments. As in the battle of Picardy, so here, each extension of the line by a new unit met a hostile unit in a meeting engagement. Cavalry corps of each side, here, as in Picardy, screened the units that were extending the line. This series of meeting engagements is known as the Battle of Artois.

General Joffre was clearly the victor, as he successfully defended the coast to include Dunkirk and thus saved the British line of communications.

5. Russian Front. (Map 28.) *a. Central Powers' first offensive against Russia, 1914.* (1) *Plans of Central Powers.* General von Hindenburg was given the Marshal's baton for winning the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes and placed in command of the new Ninth Army to be organized in Silesia at once. He was given the mission of capturing Warsaw in order to defend Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia. The plan was to divert the Russian attention to the north by threatening an invasion of Russia along the Baltic by the Eighth Army (General Schubert), and then to advance to the capture of Warsaw with the new Ninth Army (Marshal von Hindenburg) from Silesia, in conjunction with a resumption of the offensive by the Austrian forces on his immediate right.

(2) *Battle of Augustova (September 29).* General Schubert commanding the Eighth Army in East Prussia, was unable to cross the Niemen and, September 29, General Rennenkampf took the offensive and severely defeated General Schubert at Augustova-Mariampol. The Germans retreated in disorder with a loss of about 60,000 men and much artillery. As the defeated army consisted of troops that had fought at the Battle of Tannenberg, the winning of the Battle of Augustova had an excellent effect on the morale of the Russian troops.

(3) *Battle of Warsaw (October 16-31).* (a) Marshal von Hindenburg concentrated the Ninth Army in Silesia and, planning the envelopment of the Russian right, advanced in five parallel columns, according to the von Schlieffen method:

Two columns were directed toward the north and south of Warsaw
One column was directed toward Ivangorod.
Two columns advanced astride the Austrian-German frontier toward Lublin.

Also, in cooperation, Austrian reorganized troops advanced to relieve Przemysl and to recapture Lemburg on the south flank.

(d) Grand Duke Nicholas, the commander of the Russian Armies, estimating that his right flank was threatened with envelopment, decided to fall back from the line: Cracow-Lodz, to the line of the Vistula and the San Rivers, in defense of Warsaw; to strengthen that position, await reinforcements, and, from a position defensive, to take advantage of any German mistakes by assuming the counter offensive.

(c) Marshal von Hindenburg maintained contact with Grand Duke Nicholas' force during the retreat.

(d) (i) The Grand Duke, learning that the German left flank was not well covered, planned to envelop Marshal von Hindenburg's left. On October 16, he sent three Russian armies to a frontal attack between Warsaw and Ivangorod, while he attempted to envelop Marshal von Hindenburg's left flank with a fourth army from the valley of the Bzoura River.

(ii) The two German columns on the left fell back at once and, October 24, carried back with them the columns on the right. On the 27th, the battle was being waged at maximum intensity.

(iii) The Grand Duke, with two armies, then attempted to penetrate between the German and Austrian forces and to envelop the German right by attacking in the direction of Tarnow.

(e) With both flanks threatened, Marshal von Hindenburg fell back at once, and, by November 1, the Grand Duke was approaching the German frontier with his right and Cracow with his center, and by November 15, had reoccupied the Carpathian Mountains.

(f) Marshal von Hindenburg, in the retreat, used the method of creating obstacles by devastation. He destroyed much property and damaged the railroads and highway bridges, as much as possible, on the theory that the best protection of the German frontier, in that situation, lay in the fact that the Russian armies could not operate more than seventy-five miles in advance of their railheads.

b. Central Powers' second offensive against Russia, 1914. (*1*) *Plans of Central Powers.* (Map 29.) (a) November 1, Marshal von Hindenburg was made Commander in Chief of the German forces on the Russian front, and was given the mission of protecting Silesia which was then threatened by Grand Duke Nicholas' pursuit.

(b) Von Hindenburg estimated that the Austrian offensive spirit was nearly spent, that the situation was serious, and that he must rely alone on German troops. Consequently, he asked for and received reinforcements to the extent of a new army corps and all available trained reserves from Germany and the I Cavalry Corps (von Richtoffen) from the French front.

(c) Learning that the right flank of the main Russian force protecting Warsaw was not well covered, von Hindenburg planned to envelop the right flank of that force with the Eighth Army (Otto von Below).

(2) *Battle of Lodz.* (a) The Eighth Army (Otto von Below) rapidly concentrated at Thorn and November 15, delivered a surprise attack against the Russian right. The attack failed to envelop the Russian flank but it forced the Grand Duke to withdraw his extreme right back to the Bzoura River where it was covered by the Vistula.

(b) The Ninth Army (General Mackensen), attacked, November 18, on the right of the Eighth, conforming its frontal attack to the new Russian line. The Russian line held but retreated to conform to the new line on the right.

(c) Von Woyrsch, with an army detachment (provisionally called the Tenth Army), attacked, November 20, toward Lodz. The attack forced the Russian line back. The right wing of the Russian army, by November 25, was engaged in a terrific battle. The Grand Duke was greatly embarrassed by lack of roads and railroads in getting reinforcements to the line, but succeeded in bringing enough forward to hold the line.

(d) Marshal von Hindenburg, then, not making headway against the Grand Duke, ordered General Mackensen to penetrate the center of the Russian right with his Ninth Army. The attack was successful, and General Mackensen pushed two army corps through the gap to exploit the penetration. The Grand Duke, however, succeeded in closing the gap to other German troops, and although the two corps, by desperate fighting, finally succeeded in cutting their way back to the German lines, it was at the price of terrible losses.

(e) The Grand Duke then retreated to the line of the four rivers: Bzoura—Rawa—Pilitza—Nida, a very strong natural position in front of Warsaw. Marshal von Hindenburg attacked this position in vain during the month of December, 1914. Gradually siege conditions obtained, not only in Poland, but along the whole line to the Roumanian boundary.

6. WESTERN FRONT TO END OF 1914. (Maps 27 and 30.) *a. German and French plans.* (1) After the Battle of Artois, the northern flank of the line rested on the sea west of Ostend.

(2) Von Falkenhayn estimated that, with the right flank secure, he could force the Allies' line back along the coast past Calais; thus cutting the British line of communications, and shortening the German line.

To carry out his project, he enlisted public interest in Germany and rapidly increased the German forces in Flanders. His plan was to dislocate the Allies' left from the sea and envelop it.

(3) General Joffre estimated that the German offensive toward Calais had not yet been defeated. He reinforced the left of the line, and on October 20 created a new army (the Eighth) called the Army of Belgium (General d'Urbal). To forestall the expected German offensive, he directed General d'Urbal, in cooperation with General French and the Belgians (who agreed), to attack October 23 with the cooperation of the British monitors in the English Channel.

b. Battle of Flanders (October 15-November 15, 1914). (1) During this battle, both General Joffre and von Falkenhayn attempted to exercise initiative and to conduct an offensive against the hostile flank on the sea.

(2) The Belgian attack in the north October 23 was not successful and they were driven back.

(3) The German attack nearly penetrated the line in the direction of Peroise and was stopped only by opening the dykes October 27 and inundating the country. Dixmude fell November 11. Some call this operation the Battle of the Yser. However, it was merely a part of the one great effort by the Germans in the Battle of Flanders.

(4) On October 29, von Falkenhayn attacked, farther south, the British salient of Ypres. By a converging maneuver he forced it back.

(5) General Joffre went to St. Omer, and from there as an advanced headquarters hurried reinforcements to General French.

(6) On October 31, the Germans delivered another powerful attack along the whole front, and nearly forced the British to fall back. However, a British counter attack, reinforced by French battalions, delivered that night on request of General Foch, was successful in checking the German advance. General Joffre sent division after division and corps after corps to General French and, as a result, the German attempt to penetrate the line failed. This was a great moral defeat to the Germans because their best troops were defeated and over 300,000 men were left on the battlefield.

(7) At the end of 1914, the method of position warfare obtained on the Western front from Switzerland to the sea.

7. AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Map 60.) *a. Togoland.* The German colony of Togoland was about the size of Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine. It was surrounded by colonies of the Allies' on three sides.

b. British and French operations. (1) As soon as war was declared, its only seaport, Lome, was blockaded by a British cruiser. The French invaded from one side and a British force in motor cars under Captain Bryant from another. The German force of about 3,000 native troops, under about 250 white officers, retreated 100 miles into the interior to defend one of the great German overseas wireless stations, at Atakpome.

(2) With Lome as a base, guarded by the British cruiser, Captain Bryant, with his own and the French detachments, quickly took over all southern Togoland, and by a rapid pursuit, forced the surrender of the German forces and destroyed the German wireless plant. He was in full control of Togoland by August 27.

8. ASIATIC AND PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Map 1.) *a. Theater of operations.* (1) The alliance between Great Britain and Japan required Japan to assist the former in keeping peace in the Far East, if the former should be attacked. Upon the request of Great Britain, Japan decided that British interests and the far eastern peace were menaced by Germany, and on August 15, 1914, sent an ultimatum to the Kaiser demanding the departure of German ships from Chinese waters and the transfer of Kiaou-Chau to Japan, as a first step in its return to Chinese control. The ultimatum gave until August 22 for

the reply. The language of this ultimatum is practically the same as in that used by the Kaiser which compelled Japan to abandon the fruits of victory at Port Arthur. Not receiving a reply, Japan declared war against Germany on August 23.

(2) The far eastern theater of operations included the German Caroline Islands, the Ladrone Islands (except Guam), the Marshall Islands, a portion of the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, a part of New Guinea called Kaiser Willhelm Land, and the German leased territory in China called Kiaou-Chau. Kiaou-Chau comprised a district of about two hundred square miles. It included the German naval station Tsing Tau, which had been fortified by land and sea at an expense of $100,000,000.00. The harbor was excellent, and was connected with Chinese railroad lines. It was near Port Arthur, Wei Hai Wei, and Manila, and was an ideal base for the German Pacific fleet.

b. Plans of operation. (1) The German plan of operations was based upon the theory that the war would not last long, and that the Pacific fleet should not permit itself to be shut up in Tsing Tau, or hold itself on duty defending the German islands in the Pacific but should take the sea as commerce destroyers except that Admiral Spee should keep a nucleus of a fleet in being. (The operations of Admiral Spee's fleet have been previously recorded, and its fate registered.) The plan also provided that the naval station should stand a siege, and the Kaiser ordered that it should hold out to the last breath of the last man. The garrison consisted of about 5,000 marines, artillery troops, and naval detachments. A small naval force of about three cruisers remained in the harbor. The whole was under the command of Admiral Waldeck. His heaviest artillery was of 8-inch caliber.

(2) Japan's plan of campaign was to conduct a strategic and tactical offensive campaign against Germany in the far eastern theater of operations, but not to participate in any other theater of operations.

c. Capture of Kiaou-Chau. (1) (a) The Japanese plan of operation was to seize nearby islands for use as a base, to blockade Tsing Tau, to invest it, and by siege operations and assault to capture it. Japan concentrated for that operation:

1 infantry division, reinforced by 3 infantry brigades.
A siege artillery corps, consisting of:
2 regiments heavy artillery.
2 battalions heavy artillery (including 6 and 8 inch guns and 11 inch howitzers).
A detachment of engineers.
A detachment of administrative troops.
2 railway battalions.
An aviation detachment.
A marine artillery detachment.

The command did not include any cavalry, or any horse, or light artillery. The total Japanese force was 23,000.

(b) A British detachment of 1,500 men from Wei Hai Wei, under command of Brigadier General Barnardeston, assisted. The Commander-in-Chief of the besieging force was Lieutenant General Kamio, Japanese Army.

(c) Also, a sufficient British and Japanese naval force to escort the expedition, execute the blockade, and to assist in the bombardment, participated in the maneuver under the command of Vice Admiral Kato.

(2) (a) August 27, four days after the declaration of war, Japan seized adjacent islands for use as a base, and began mine sweeping.

(b) Under cover of a naval bombardment, she landed her expedition on September 2. Because of torrential rains which flooded the whole country, the operations were much impeded. However, the fleet continued the bombardment, and hydroplanes bombed the German ships and forts and reconnoitered the position.

(c) On September 13, the railroad station at Kiaou-Chau was captured and the investment completed.

(d) On September 28, Prince Heinrich Hill, 1,000 feet high, was captured.

(e) On November 1, the British battleship *Triumph* silenced the Bismarck forts with seven shots.

(f) By November 4, the waterworks had been seized.

(g) Most of the forts had been silenced by November 6, and, to avoid a general assault, Admiral Waldeck surrendered the Naval Base and District and the remaining garrison of about 3,000 men on November 7.

d. Capture of German Pacific possessions. (1) (a) The Japanese operations against the German islands were rapid and effective. October 6, a part of the Japanese fleet blockaded Jaluit, the German capital of the German Pacific island empire. The Germans surrendered without resistance. A force of

marines landed and destroyed all military establishments and seized all munitions of war. The same procedure was followed at Yap, a local German headquarters.

(b) In two weeks, Japan had seized and occupied all the German Pacific islands north of the equator. The Japanese Navy Department at once announced, and conveyed the announcement especially to the United States, that the landings had been made for military purposes and not with a view to permanent occupation.

(2) Soon after war was declared, a New Zealand contingent, under direction of the Australian Navy, seized German Samoa without opposition.

(3) In September, the Australian Navy under direction of the British Admiralty, captured and occupied the remaining German possessions in the Pacific south of the equator.

9. TURKISH THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Maps 1 and 31.) *a. Theater of operations.* (1) (a) The Turkish theater of operations affords an interesting strategical study. It embraced all of Turkey in Asia and so much of Turkey in Europe as could be approached from the Black or Mediterranean Seas.

(b) The theater of operations, being on the immediate flank of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, threatened the route to India and the line of communication between Japan and her Allies in Europe. Lying south of Russia, it menaced the Russian forces on the Eastern front, the Anglo-Persian oil fields at the head of the Persian Gulf, and the oil fields in the Caucasus, which were controlled by England and Russia, respectively.

(c) The Black Sea—Dardanelles route, which was the quickest and most available line of communication between Russia and her Allies, lay through that theater of operations.

(d) The Bagdad railroad passed through it and made Mesopotamia (a most fertile portion of the earth) a base of supplies for the Central Powers.

b. Turkish entry into the war. (1) At the beginning of the war, the Young Turk party, with Enver Pasha at its head, was friendly with Germany and had control in Turkey. They believed in a German victory and expected that Turkey's part in the loot of the war would be the return of Egypt and Thrace, the rich oil fields of the Caucasus, and recognition of Turkey as a first-class power.

(2) Turkey signed an alliance with Germany, August 4, 1914, under which Turkey undertook to assist in the creation of the Greater German Empire.

(3) The Kaiser did not intend at that time to call Turkey to his side until after the defeat of France and Russia. However, after the failure of his operation in France, of the Austrian operations at Lemberg, and of von Hindenburg's first offensive in Poland, the Kaiser decided to create a new theater of operations to which allied troops would be attracted, and with this object called on Turkey.

(4) Turkey responded, October 29, 1914, by invading the British Egyptian peninsula of Sinai, and also by attacking the city of Odessa and the Russian naval forces on the Black Sea with a fleet made up of Turkish ships and the German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau.*

c. Turkish objectives and plans.

The Turkish plan of campaign was:

(1) To defend the Dardanelles.

(2) To stop all Russian Black Sea commerce.

(3) To assume the strategical and tactical offensive against Russia in operations to capture the Caucasus oil fields, with the object of reducing Russia's supply of oil, and of drawing Russian forces from the Austro-German front to the Turkish front.

(4) To assume the strategic and tactical offensive against England in two operations:

(a) The first operation to be against the British naval oil base at the head of the Persian Gulf, with the object of stopping that British supply of oil and of drawing British naval and land forces from the North Sea and the Western front, respectively, to the Turkish front.

(b) The second operation was to capture or destroy the Suez Canal and to occupy the valley of the Nile with the object of forcing the Allies' sea traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, and of drawing British naval and land forces from the North Sea and the Western front to the Turkish front.

d. Turkish mobilization. (1) (a) In the Turkish navy, the ships were obsolete, and discipline and seamanship were poor. The German squadron, consisting of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau,* however, were modern and efficient. The navy was assembled in the Sea of Marmora.

(b) The scheme for the defense of the Dardanelles had been worked out before the war by German officers, and modern coast defense artillery from Essen and Skoda had been installed. Soon after hostilities opened, a German mail ship ran the Allies' blockade with a cargo of German mines for the defense of the Dardanelles.

(2) Following General von der Goltz, General Liman von Sanders of the German army, with a numerous corps of assistants, was placed in command of the Turkish army and her coast defense. He had practically the powers of a dictator, after the beginning of the World War, as Enver Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief (or Secretary of War) did not assert his authority.

(3) General von Sanders mobilized about 800,000 men, organized them into fourteen army corps, and concentrated them as follows:

(a) Complete garrisons for all forts defending the Dardanelles.

(b) The Third Army of three corps (IX, X and XI), with strong reserves, at Erzerum, with the I Corps (under Enver Pasha himself) at Trebizond, to protect that left flank; a total of about 150,000 men under the command of Hasan Izzet Pasha, for operations against Russia, on the Caucasus front.

(c) One corps at Bagdad.

(d) The Second Army of three corps (IV, VIII and XII) at Damascus, a total of about 140,000 men, under command of Djemel Pasha, for operations against the Suez Canal and Egypt.

(e) A strong strategical reserve (the First Army), at Constantinople.

e. Operations in Mesopotamia. (1) The British however, were not taken by surprise. General Barrett, in India, had been given the mission of protecting the British oil base on the Island of Abadan in the Shatt-el-Arab at the head of the Persian Gulf. He sent a brigade under General Delemain in advance, which, after capturing the Turkish fort and force at Fao by bombardment, organized an intrenched camp at Saniyet, opposite Abadan, November 7, 1914. General Barrett followed with the rest of the 6th Division, reinforced by the 33d Cavalry, November 13.

(2) The Turkish division intrenched at Sahil, with the left flank resting on the Shatt-el-Arab and the right refused

and covered by groves of date palms. The artillery was in rear of the right flank.

(3) The terrain in front of the Turkish position was level. General Barrett defeated the Turkish division by the tactical maneuver of dislocation and envelopment of the Turkish left by gunboat fire from the river and by an infantry attack echeloned to the left, while the 33d Cavalry delivered a holding attack against the Turkish right.

(4) General Barrett pursued by river boats and by land, and occupied Bashra November 22. He organized Bashra at once as a base and protected the British naval oil base at Abadan.

f. Operations in the Caucasus. (1) The Caucasus, between the Black and the Caspian Seas, varies from 1,500 to 5,000 feet above sea level, with a mountain chain from sea to sea as a backbone. The winters are exceedingly cold. General von Sanders pushed the Third Army into that theater, after snowfall, in the hope of surprising Russia. His general plan was to envelop the Russian forces at Kars by a strategic von Moltke concentration by the army from Erzerum and the corps at Trebizond. The total force was about 200,000 men. His detailed plan was for the XI Corps to attract the attention of the Russian army at Kars, and draw it toward Erzerum, while the X and IX Corps via Olta would envelop the Russian right and the I Corps from Trebizond via Ardahan would cut its line of communications and retreat.

(2) The Russian army under General Wozonoff, advanced and engaged the XI Corps. When Wozonoff's flank was threatened by the X Corps, he defended against the XI Corps and, December 1, 1914, decisively defeated the X Corps. January 3, he decisively defeated the I Corps (Enver Pasha) at Ardahan. He returned then and defeated the IX Corps at Sarikamish.

g. Operations at the Dardanelles. As soon as Turkey joined the Central Powers, the Allies decided that the importance of communication with Russia required the opening of the Dardanelles. Pending the completion of plans, the combined British and French squadrons established an effective blockade of the passage, and on November 3 bombarded the entrance forts at long range. The only result of this bombardment was to put the Turks on the alert.

10. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. The principle of the objective.* (1) Under the von Schlieffen plan of campaign, Germany attempted the defeat of France as her first and main objective. In her operations against France, which, in the beginning under the von Schlieffen plan (Map 7) contemplated the envelopment of the left flank of the French forces by the troops of the German right flank which were to whip around the west of Paris for that purpose, while another designated force contained Paris; and which, later (Map 13) under von Moltke's plan, contemplated the dislocation of the Allies' left from Paris and its envelopment by the German right which was to drive southeast of Paris, while a detachment contained Paris, Germany selected the hostile French (Allied) army as her objective rather than Paris. In this, Germany complied with the *principle of the objective* which requires that the hostile army rather than a locality be made the objective. Her failure in the operations against France is sufficiently explained by errors of execution.

(2) (Map 2.) (a) The operations against France required the greater portion of the German forces and Germany did not have enough troops with which to attempt the decisive defeat of Russia. Her plan called for the strategical and tactical defensive against Russia.

Before the war, Russia's principal industry was agriculture. Russia lagged far behind the western European countries in manufacturing. In fact, she was practically dependent on the markets of Western Europe for all her arms and munitions, including all such modern implements of war as surface and aerial motor vehicles. Hence, as soon as Germany declared war on Russia, August 1, 1914, the resources of her allies and the markets of the neutral states in Western Europe became the Russian base of supplies for arms, munitions, and military equipment. Her line of communications to that base was via the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. So when Germany succeeded in cutting the Russian line of communications to her arms, munitions, and implement base in Western Europe, by closing the Dardanelles, August 4, 1914, through the diplomatic act of the neutral state Turkey (her secret ally) and changed that interruption to prohibition of Russian traffic through the Dardanelles by the armed act of her open ally, Turkey, October 29, she made Russian resources her objective.

(b) (Map 28.) Similarly, after successfully defending East Prussia against Russia's offensive of August, 1914, the decision by the German command to operate against Warsaw, the industrial and distributing center of Poland, was in continuation of the German policy of making war against Russia by destruction of her resources.

(c) (Map 31.) In pursuit of the same purpose, in her war with Russia, Germany gave Turkey the mission of capturing or destroying the Russian oil base in the Caucasus.

(3) Similarly she pursued the same purpose in her warfare against Great Britain, by giving Turkey the mission of capturing or destroying the British naval oil base in Mesopotamia, and the other mission of capturing, destroying or obstructing the Suez Canal, which was the British sea route from Europe to Asia.

b. The principle of the offensive. (1) The offensive is the normal expression of the waging of war. (Maps 18 and 19.) When General von Hindenburg was placed in command of the German Eighth Army in East Prussia, the German force was much inferior in numbers to the Russian forces in East Prussia. General von Hindenburg, noting that General Jilinski's forces were separated by the Masurian Lakes, assumed the offensive against the Russian Second Army which was the greater menace, and, after defeating it, assumed the offensive against and defeated the Russian First Army, thus successfully defending German East Prussia by the method of the sortie defensive.

He thus gave at Tannenburg and at the Masurain Lakes an illustration, as General Joffre had done at the Marne, that compliance with the *principle of the offensive* can be utilized for relief from a nearly hopeless defensive situation.

(2) (Maps 21 and 23.) At the Battles of the Jadar and of Mt. Roundnik, General Putnik, also by a similar compliance with the *principle of the offensive,* relieved a nearly hopeless defensive situation.

(3) (Map 32.) General Wozonoff's compliance with the *principle of the offensive* in the Caucasus, when he met the Turkish enveloping operation that threatened to destroy him, is an illustration of how great a demand can be made on the troops in sustaining an offensive, and its effectiveness in defeating a threatened envelopment.

(4) (Maps 25, 26 and 27.) In the race to the sea, after the German retreat to the Aisne, both the Germans and the

Allies assumed and maintained an offensive attitude toward each other, in the specific effort to envelop the other's flank. The result was a series of meeting engagements in which each protected his own line of communications but failed to cut the enemy line of communications. The effectiveness of the offensive in an enveloping maneuver against an enemy attempt at envelopment of the same flank was clearly illustrated.

c. The principle of economy of force. (1) (Map 2.) Before violating the neutrality of Belgium, Germany had the opportunity to economize troops by a defensive attitude on the Western front, and thus to gain a great mass of manuever with which she could wage war against Russia. She knew that German public opinion would not lightly tolerate a Russian invasion of East Prussia, and that the failure of the operation against France would probably immobilize the greater part of her forces in France, with Belgium and Great Britain hostile and international public opinion arrayed against her violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium. She cast all on the gambler's chance of defeating France in six weeks. By not defending on the French front in order to gain a "mass of maneuver" for offensive war against her other enemies, she violated the *principle of economy of force.* She dearly paid for that violation by the immobilization of a great part of her forces on the Western front, and by the consequent lack of sufficient troops with which to defeat Russia. In fact, her initial violation of that principle carried in its train, before the year was out, the necessity of conducting simultaneous offensive operations on both the French and Russian fronts.

(2) Austria-Hungary, also, by conducting simultaneous offensives against Serbia and Russia, violated the *principle of economy of force.* As a result, she, too, did not secure a decision against either enemy. She should have defended the Serbian frontier with the minimum force and have used the troops thus conserved against the Russian army which, to her, was the main hostile army.

(3) (Maps 18 and 19.) When General von Hindenburg contained the Russian First Army with two cavalry reinforced brigades, and concentrated the remainder of his force against the Russian Second Army and defeated it, he illustrated the *principle of economy of force.*

(4) (Map 32.) When General Wozonoff defended against all of the Turkish columns in the Caucasus except one, and used

the troops thus conserved in a vigorous offensive against each of those columns in succession, he illustrated the *principle of economy of force.*

d. The principle of mass. (Map 18.) (1) In August and September, 1914, General Jilinski had preponderating forces in East Prussia that were operating on converging lines. By August 23, they were within short concentrating distance of each other. When General Jilinski did not assemble them and operate them as a united force, he violated the *principle of mass* and paid the penalty by being defeated in detail.

(2) (Map 19.) When General von Hindenburg succeeded in concentrating, at the Battle of Tannenberg, a force superior to the Russian Second Army, and used it offensively, he illustrated the *principle of mass.*

e. The principle of surprise. (Map 24.) (1) When General Brussilloff, commanding the Russian Eighth Army, succeeded in attaining secretly a position on the right flank of the Austrian Second Army (General Boehm-Ermolli), at the Battle of Lemberg, that threatened its line of communications (Maps 18 and 19) and when General von Hindenburg succeeded in concentrating secretly a superior force that threatened both flanks of the Russian Second Army (General Samsonoff), at the Battle of Tannenberg (Map 20) and later in secretly concentrating a superior force that threatened the southern flank of the Russian First Army (General Rennenkampf), the *principle of surprise* was illustrated.

(2) Similarly (Map 28), when Marshal von Hindenburg secretely concentrated a superior force that threatened the right flank of the Russian forces in front of Warsaw, in October, 1914, and later the same month, when Grand Duke Nicholas in that same general situation secretely concentrated superior forces that threatened the left flank of the German forces, the *principle of surprise* was illustrated.

(3) So, also (Map 29), Marshal von Hindenburg illustrated the same principle at the Battle of Lodz, in November, when he concentrated a superior force opposite to the right of the Russian forces in front of Warsaw and delivered an attack before Grand Duke Nicholas could make adequate preparations to meet it.

(4) On the other hand, the Allies (Map 2) by bombarding the Dardanelles forts November 3, without following it up with

any other operations, violated the *principle of surprise* in connection with any future operations to open the Dardanelles.

f. The principle of movement. (1) Since the World War, the term *war of movement* is frequently used in contradistinction to *war of position.* While that idea, i.e., of free maneuver, is helpful in understanding the idea contained in the *principle of movement,* still, it is not an exact description. Movement under the principle is more than mere motion. With exceptions, it includes the securing of freedom of action and the advance of superior force along the decisive direction. Ordinarily, the force that illustrates the *principle of movement* may be roughly described as the MV of mechanics, in which M is the Mass and V the velocity. Accordingly, when the opposing masses are of the same kind, the striking force varies approximately with the change of the velocity.

(2) (Map 7.) The von Schlieffen plan of operations was largely built up around compliance with the *principle of movement.* The decisive direction in that operation was around the Allies' left flank. As long as the German advance continued along that decisive direction, the success of the operation seemed assured. However, by detachments made and by reason of the change of the direction of the march of the hammer-head force from the decisive line, General von Moltke lost freedom of action for his right wing, and, after September 2, when it turned to the southeast of Paris, its further advance ceased to be an illustration of movement and was nothing more than motion.

(3) (Maps 25, 26 and 27.) In the race to the sea, the mass on each side was practically the same, i.e., infantry units preceded by cavalry as they went into the line. The velocity or speed was the same, as the maneuvers were alike, i.e., attempts to envelop the hostile flank. The results were: no advantage to either side and extension of the flank along the line of least resistance, i.e., toward the sea, which was the free or exposed flank.

(4) (Map 29.) In Marshal von Hindenburg's second offensive against Russia, in November, 1914, the German mass was really less than the Russian resisting body, but the velocity of the German blow gave it sufficient momentum to drive the Russian line back to Warsaw.

g. The principle of security. (1) (Map 28.) By the diverting action at Augustova, September 29, Marshal von

Hindenburg complied with the *principle of security* by securing freedom of action for his major offensive against Warsaw, in October. However, by not securing his left flank, he was forced to retreat and to give up all the ground that had been gained in the advance.

(2) (Map 2.) By fortifying her German frontier in time of peace, France complied with the *principle of security*, in that she thereby could defend successfully against Germany along her German frontier, whereas, if Germany should attack through neutral countries, a shocked international public opinion would (and did) give her allies.

(3) (Map 30.) By opening the dykes and letting in the sea during the Battle of Flanders, the Allies stopped the German advance and complied with the *principle of security.*

(4) (Map 32.) The British navy was quite dependent on the Mesopotamian oil base, with the result that the British operations in Mesopotamia, in 1914, were to protect that base and were in compliance with the *principle of security.*

(5) (Map 2.) Great Britain's defense of Belgium and the north coast of France, under this principle, secured her southern shore.

h. The principle of simplicity. (1) The simplest conception of simplicity, in connection with command, is "Unity of Command." In a single operation by one nation, this principle is always illustrated when there is "Unity of Command." When there are allies, reliance is generally placed on that other principle—"Cooperation." However, it may be accepted as an axiom, from the point of view of military efficiency, that unity of command under the *principle of simplicity* should be applied to all military operations.

(2) (Map 2.) So, in the realm of command, the *principle of simplicity* required, in 1914, that in their war against the Allies, the Central Powers should have had one supreme commander of all operations, and under him, one commander in chief for each front or detached operation.

(3) Similarly, the Allies at the beginning of the war, should have selected a supreme commander of all allied military operations, and under him, a commander in chief for the Western front, one for the Russian front, and one for the Serbian front.

i. The principle of cooperation. (1) It takes two or more to cooperate, so unity of command, which means one, must be included under the *principle of simplicity.*

(2) In 1914, both the Central Powers and the Allies, from the command point of view, functioned under the *principle of cooperation.* Efficient command under this is much more difficult than under the *principle of simplicity.* No decisive result was secured during the year by cooperation.

(3) (Map 2.) When Russia changed her plan from defensive on the German front to offensive, in order to attract German troops away from the French front, she effectively illustrated the *principle of cooperation.*

(4) (Maps 18 and 19.) When General Rennenkampf did not go to the assistance of General Samsonoff, at the Battle of Tannenberg, he violated the *principle of cooperation.* General Samsonoff was decisively defeated by General von Hindenburg, who, later, defeated General Rennenkampf.

CHAPTER V

All Fronts to Include 1915

Page

1. Situation at End of 1914 88
   a. Military and naval conditions 88
   b. Economic conditions 89
2. Plans of Campaign for 1915 89
   a. Central Power's plan 89
   b. Allied plan 90
3. Naval Operations 90
4. African Theater of Operations 90
   a. German Cameroons 90
   b. German Southwest Africa 91
5. Turkish Theater of Operations 91
   a. Syrian operations 91
   b. Mesopotamian operations 91
6. Russian Front to End of April 93
   a. Situation January 1, 1915 93
   b. Central Powers' winter offensives 93
   c. Russian offensive (March-April) 94
7. Western Front Before Italy Joined the Allies 95
   a. Situation at the beginning of 1915 95
   b. Plans 95
   c. Allied operations with limited objectives 95
8. Italian Front to End of Year 96
   a. Italian objective 96
   b. Italian theater of operations 97
   c. Italian plan of campaign 98
   d. Italian concentrations 98
   e. Italian offensive 99
9. Russian Front to End of Year 99
   a. Situation at end of April, 1915 99
   b. Battle of Dunajec 100
   c. Capture of Warsaw 101
   d. Operations until the end of the year 101
10. Western Front to End of the Year 101
   a. Situation, July 1, 1915 101
   b. Order of battle, July 1, 1915 102
   c. Operations, fall 1915 103
11. Balkan Theater of Operations 105
   a. Dardanelles front 105
   b. Serbian front 107
12. Principles of War 109
   a. Principle of the objective 109
   b. Principle of economy of force 111
   c. Principles of surprise, mass, and movement 111

1. Situation at End of 1914. (Maps 1 and 2.) *a. Military and naval conditions.* (1) By the end of 1914, the

Allies had defeated Germany in the far eastern and in the Pacific theater of operations, on land and sea and had captured all her territory in those theaters.

(2) In the African theater, they had captured Togoland.

(3) In the Asia Minor theater, the British still held the Suez Canal and the oil base in Mesopotamia, and the Russians still held their oil base in the Caucasus.

(4) In the European theater, the German plan to defeat France in six weeks and then to turn on Russia with all her force had failed, with the result that Germany was maintaining on her east and west fronts, by the method of position warfare, a total frontage of about 1,000 miles, while Austria was maintaining against Russia, by the same methods, a frontage of about 500 miles.

(5) In the Balkan theater, Serbia and Montenegro were defending their frontier lines against Austria. The principal sea line of communications between Russia and her Allies had been cut by Turkey at the Dardanelles.

b. Economic conditions. (1) Russia, although she had 180,000,000 inhabitants, had practically no machinery, tools, or trained personnel for the manufacture of munitions. She had but one factory to each one hundred and fifty possessed by Great Britain. Without supplies from her Allies after war was declared, she could not have maintained war for more than one year.

(2) The Central Powers' access to neutral markets was much restricted by the strategical siege imposed by the Allies on the Western, Serbian, and Russian land fronts and on the Adriatic, North, and Baltic Sea fronts. The result was that the Central Powers' access to neutral markets was limited to those of Scandinavia, Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Roumania.

2. Plans of Campaign for 1915. Neither the Central Powers nor the Allies were ready for unity of command and their respective plans for combined action were evolved and executed through cooperation.

a. The Central Powers' plan. (1) On the sea, the German plan called for raids and submarine action with the view of wearing down the Allies' fleet to a point where the German fleet would have a fair chance in action.

(2) The three remaining German colonies in Africa were to defend with their own resources.

(3) Turkey was to assume the offensive in Syria and in Mesopotamia in order to attract Allies' detachments to those fronts.

(4) In Europe, the Central Powers were to defend on the Western and Serbian fronts and to deliver a strategical and tactical offensive against Russia, with the view of securing a decision.

b. The Allied plan. (1) The Allies planned to capture Germany's remaining three colonies in Africa, and to defend the Suez Canal and the oil bases in Mesopotamia and in the Caucasus.

(2) In the European theater, Serbia was to defend. Russia's other allies planned to assist a Russian offensive against Hungary by operations on the Western front that would attract German troops to that front and by operations to reestablish communication with her by forcing the sea route from the Mediterranean, through the Dardanelles, to the Black Sea.

(3) However, the Allies, taken by surprise, at the magnitude and possible length of the war, devoted their principal attention at the beginning of 1915 to the munition and supply situation, to organizing and training troops, and to the driving of German ships off the seas and the cutting of the Central Power contraband trade lines with neutral countries.

3. NAVAL OPERATIONS. The Allied Powers maintained control of the sea during 1915, and very considerably restricted Germany's receipt of contraband of war from overseas. Germany was not ready to risk a decisive naval action, but on February 18, announced unrestricted submarine warfare in British waters. The United States and many other neutral states protested. Among other ships sent to the bottom without warning was the *Lusitania,* with over one hundred Americans, including women and children, on board. The United States protested again and Germany promised that liners not resisting or trying to escape would not be sunk.

4. AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Maps 1, 54 and 60.) *a. German Cameroons.* Allied forces under command of the English General Dobell and the French Colonel Mayer invaded the Cameroons soon after war was declared. The German forces adopted the step by step defensive in a retreat to the interior by defending the river crossings. However, not being able to replace losses, they finally surrendered, June 30, 1915.

b. German Southwest Africa. (1) The outbreak of war found General Botha, a veteran of the Boer War, in control of British South Africa. He, at once, proclaimed the loyalty of the colony to the British Empire. An insurrection friendly to Germany having broken out, he proclaimed martial law and arrested the leader, Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Maritz. The Boer veterans, General Beyers and General De Wet, with a rebel army, took the field in cooperation with troops of German Southwest Africa. Several battles were fought. General Botha finally defeated General De Wet in the decisive battle of Marquard, November 12, 1914.

(2) General Botha then invaded German Southwest Africa, January 5, 1915. The Germans adopted a retreating defensive and guerilla warfare policy. Not having a replacement system for men or supplies, the German forces surrendered, July, 1915, and the colony was added to British South Africa.

5. TURKISH THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Map 31.) *a. Syrian operations.* February 2, Djemal Pasha with the Turkish Second Army reached the Suez Canal opposite Ismailia. The troops secretly took positions along the canal. After dark, they launched their small boats and rafts under cover of artillery fire. The Turkish attempt to cross was checked by rifle and machine gun fire. At dawn, the artillery of Egyptian batteries and of six gunboats, prevented any further attempts. The British pursued with Mohammedan troops only far enough to protect the canal. The British defensive attitude was dictated by the desire of not offending the Mohammedan population. Djemal Pasha, in a vain effort to preserve Turkish confidence, proclaimed that:

> "The canal has been reached, British men-of-war sunk, and the Englishmen routed, with a loss of only five men and two camels to the Turks, which were afterwards recovered; but a terrible sand storm having arisen, the glorious army takes it as the wish of Allah not to continue the attack and has, therefore, withdrawn in triumph."

b. Mesopotamian operations. (Map 32.) (1) (a) The British Expedition captured Basra November 22, 1914, organized it at once as a base port and covered it with advanced elements at Korna. The Turks began to harass the expedition and, in April, it was increased in strength to a corps. A strong Turkish attack down the Euphrates was defeated April 14, 1915, and thrown back to Nazrijeh.

(b) The British commander, General Nixon, then operating on interior lines, defeated a Turkish division at Ahwaz, northeast of Korna on the Kersha River, and secured protection for the oil pipe line.

(c) He then, by improvisation, prepared a river fleet of rafts and small boats and, effecting a strategical surprise by the audacity of the maneuver, moved up the River Tigris to Amara. There, twenty-two daring men, May 28, 1915, penetrated the town and demanded and received the surrender of the Turkish garrison of seven hundred men.

(d) The next day, the Turkish division retreating hurriedly from Ahwaz with visions of pursuing British (who were not pursuing) arrived, and found British troops in front. The vanguard surrendered, and the rest of the division dispersed.

(e) Still operating on interior lines, General Nixon, sent his improvised river flotilla against Nazrijeh, which was captured, July 25, with its garrison, seventeen cannon, and a great quantity of war material.

(2) (a) General Townsend relieved General Nixon, and also operating on interior lines, captured Kut, September 29, with its garrison, thirteen cannon, and a great quantity of war material. Asidejah was held by his cavalry.

(b) The British were now at the end of the radius of activity of the flotilla. General Townsend favored passing to the defensive. General Nixon remaining with the expedition as second in command, believed Bagdad could be captured. The authorities in India ordered an advance.

(3) (a) The Turks, reinforced and under command of German officers, were met at Ctesphon, November 22, in an organized defensive zone. The Indian soldiers attacked and effected a tactical penetration of the first and second lines, but when counter attacked by a superior force withdrew to the first line.

(b) General Townsend, then largely outnumbered, withdrew to Kut, November 25-December 3. This retreat, in the face of a much superior force, succeeded only because of the river craft and the superiority of the British cavalry, which, by charges, several times stopped the pursuing Turkish forces. The Turkish Army quickly began siege operations against Kut, which was held by General Townsend during the rest of the year.

6. Russian Front to the End of April. (Maps 2 and 33.) *a. Situation, January 1, 1915.* (1) The situation at the beginning of the year was about the same as after stabilization following the Battle of Lodz. Each side was using the method of siege warfare on the long line: from near Libau—west of Warsaw—east of Cracow—south of Przemysl—to the Roumanian boundary.

(2) During the winter, the Russians again advanced in the region of the Masurian Lakes. They also continued the advance in the Carpathians in spite of the rigors of weather and the resistance of the Austrians.

(3) The menace to East Prussia and Hungary was acute and there was more than a possiblity that if the Russians should debouch from the Carpathians in the spring, in an advance on Budapest, that the Czecho-Slovaks would desert the Central Powers and join Russia, the great Slav mother country. In view of these conditions, Austria requested the assistance of German troops. Germany agreed that the situation was acute and decided to relieve it for all time by a major offensive that would defeat Russia and force her to sue for peace.

b. Central Powers winter offensive. (1) *Plan of operations.* (a) The plan arranged by cooperation between Germany and Austria called for a converging maneuver. Marshal von Hindenburg was to deliver the northern converging blow with a group of German armies that would drive the Russians out of East Prussia and cut the Russian line of communications to Warsaw.

(b) General von Hotzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff, was to deliver the southern converging blow with a group of Austrian armies, reinforced by German detachments and corps, with the view of driving the Russians out of Hungary and of raising the siege of Przemysl.

(2) *The winter battle in Masuria.* (Maps 33 and 34.) (a) By a railroad concentration of troops from the Polish front, from Germany, and from the Western front, Marshal Hindenburg concentrated the Tenth Army (General von Eichorn) and reinforced the Eighth Army (General Otto von Below). His plan was to concentrate a strong force in East Prussia with the view of destroying by a converging maneuver the Russian Tenth Army (General Silvers) which was greatly dispersed

on a frontage of more than one hundred miles along the east frontier of East Prussia.

(b) The attack was launched February 7, 1915. The German plan was that while the center, opposite the Russian XX Corps attracted and held the Russians in its front, the left of the Tenth Army (General von Eichorn) was to dislocate the Russian right near Tilsit and envelop it by advancing on the direction line: Tilsit—Mariampol—Grodno, and the Eighth Army (General Otto von Below) was to penetrate the thin Russian line and envelop the left flank of the Russian Tenth Army (General Silvers) by advancing on the direction line: Johannisburg—Grodno.

(c) This double enveloping maneuver was executed brilliantly, in winter weather that included violent snow storms alternating with thaws. It was executed along the general lines of the Battle of Tannenberg and ended, February 21, by the practical destruction of the Russian Tenth Army in the vicinity of Augustova.

(d) However, Grand Duke Nicohlas sent the Twelfth Army (General Plehve) north from Warsaw to assist the Tenth Army (General Silvers). The Twelfth Army attacked the southern flank of the German Eighth Army (General Otto von Below), and in a bloody winter battle, February 26-27, defeated the German Eighth Army.

(3) *The southern winter battle.* General von Hotzendorf conducted the operation of the southern converging force. His mission was to raise the siege of Przemysl and to drive the Russians out of Hungary. Heavily reinforced with German troops, he launched the operation simultaneously with Marshal Hindenburg's winter battle in Masuria. He succeeded, in the east, in recapturing Czernowitz and Kolomea and pushing the Russians nearly to the Dniester River, but in the mountainous center and in the west, he lost many prisoners and made practically no progress.

c. Russian offensive (March-April). (1) Grand Duke Nicholas estimated that the Russian victory north of Warsaw and the spring thaws in Poland would protect the Russian right and decided to resume the major offensive against Hungary.

(2) Accordingly, he advanced against and captured the great fortified camp of Przemysl March 22, with more than 150,000 men and 1,050 cannon, of which 300 cannon were of large

caliber. This success released to him 200,000 men, made him master of the railroads of Galicia, and gave him maneuvering space for the advance across the Carpathian Mountains, a maneuver in which he had been engaged since October. This maneuver involved winter operations of the most difficult kind, but by the end of April he had defeated the Austrian armies, crossed the passes and was ready to debouch into Hungary.

7. Western Front Before Italy Joined the Allies. *a. Situation at the beginning of 1915.* (Map 35.) After the Battle of Flanders, the line on the Western front rested on the French fortified camps from Switzerland to include Verdun. From Verdun, it extended almost due west to near Compiegne, only ninety miles from Paris. From the latter point, it turned nearly due north and extended to the sea, north of Ypres. Thus the part west of Verdun composed a huge German salient in France, pointed towards Paris. Each side used the method of position warfare.

b. Plans. (1) *German.* General von Falkenhayn, in order to gain troops for the major offensive operations against Russia, prescribed a strategical and tactical defensive attitude for the German forces on the western front in 1915 and directed them to use methods of siege warfare.

(2) *Allies.* Immediately after the Battle of Flanders, General Joffre prescribed the policy of local offensives with limited objectives, by the Allied armies, in order to maintain the initiative and an offensive attitude, and in order to divert troops from the Russian front.

c. Allied operations with limited objectives. (1) *Winter 1914-1915.* The only success of the Allies in gaining territory was by the Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary) in Champagne, where the German line was pushed back nearly three miles, December 20-January 13. The operation was really a reconnaissance.

(2) *Spring, 1915.* (a) *Champagne.* From February 16 to March 17, the Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary) resumed the offensive after an artillery preparation, captured the enemy first line on a front of seven miles, and captured 2,000 prisoners. The German reserves counter attacked and restored the line. The operation was really a reconnaissance in force.

(b) *St. Mihiel (April 5-14).* The First Army (General Dubail) executed a surprise converging attack against the St. Mihiel salient, with three corps as the western force and one corps as the eastern force.

The maneuver was stopped by the violence of a sudden rain storm April 5, and when renewed, April 9, the element of surprise was gone and it failed because of insufficient artillery preparation and lack of previous knowledge of the depth of the organization of the German defenses.

(c) *Ypres Salient.* On April 22, the Germans attempted the reduction of the Ypres salient by use of asphyxiating gas. The Second British Army (General Smith-Dorrien) which had relieved the Tenth French Army (General d'Urbal) recoiled in terror, then counter attacked and saved Ypres, but with a smaller salient.

(3) *Summer, 1915. Artois (May-June 25).* (a) General Joffre next directed an attack by the Tenth Army (General d'Urbal) and the British First Army (General French), in the general direction of Lens.

(b) A six days' artillery preparation preceded the attack on the French front, which was launched at 10:00 AM, May 9. The attack advanced on a five mile front to Vimy Ridge, nearly four miles, in less than two hours, but the army commander, not expecting so rapid and deep an advance, did not have his reserves ready, and the German reserves by counter attack, closed the gap in the line.

(c) The British attack failed for lack of sufficient artillery preparation. The operation was practically a reconnaissance in force.

(4) There were other local attacks in the Argonne and in Alsace-Lorraine and along the whole line to secure better observation points, to correct the line and to secure information.

8. Italian Front to End of Year. (Maps 2 and 36.) *a.* (1) *Italian objective.* Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, but observing that the Central Powers were the aggressors in the war, Italy, under the terms of the Triple Alliance, declared her neutrality August 3, 1914, thus releasing French troops from the Alps.

(2) April 26, 1915, the Italian government signed a secret treaty with the Allies in London, under which, for the promise of sovereignty over the Trentino, Trieste, the littoral of Dalmatia south of Fiume, Valona, a sphere of influence on the south

side of Asia Minor, and financial support, she promised to join the Allies.

b. Italian theater of operations. (1) (a) The boundary between Italy and Austria was roughly a letter S, and extended from the Adriatic Sea, west of the Isonzo River to the Carnic Alps, along these mountains to and along the Dolomite Alps, and the loop to the south along mountains called the Trent Salient, making a line a little less than five hundred miles long.

(b) This front divides itself into three parts as follows:

The Isonzo front, from the sea to Plava.
The Alpine front, to include Cortina d'Ampezzo.
The Trent front, to Switzerland.

(c) The Isonzo front was along low ground of a width of about twenty miles, with the Isonzo River on the Austrian side, backed by high ground. Above Goritza, it was practically a ravine.

(d) The Alpine front, along the crest of the Carnic and Dolomite Alps, gave the high points with observation and control to the Austrians. On this front the main pass which was controlled by the Austrians, is near Pontebbe (altitude 2,615 feet). Through it runs the railroad to Vienna. Another important pass is the Cortina d'Ampezzo (altitude 5,000 feet), through which runs the road to Toblac. A pass of nearly equal importance pierces the mountains near Monte Croce. There are other passes important as foot paths.

(e) The Trent front was a great salient of which the sides are mountain buttresses extending down into Italy. The front of the salient is pierced by the rivers Brenta and Adige. The principal entrance to the Trent salient is via the Adige, along which runs a railroad. The fortified camp of Trent faced any possible invader from Italy. The frontier makes two great salients; the Trent salient extending into Italy, and the Udine salient extending into Austria.

(2) (a) (Map 37.) Italy had a double line of railroads paralleling the frontier, i.e., from Mantua to the head of the Gulf of Venice, and from Verona to Udine (with six cross lines connecting). From the latter line, she had spurs going up valleys to the foot of the Alps. The two main lines pierced the mountains at Pontebbe and along the Adige. The lines thus were so constructed that cutting them at any point would accomplish only a local result.

(b) The Austrians were not so well situated. Their railroad lines paralleled the frontier, also, but were in mountain valleys of the Alps.

There were several important sensitive railroad points on the Austrian side. Thus, the capture of the railroad junction southwest of Trieste would cut the Austrian line of communications to her naval base, Pola. The capture of the railroad junction east of Pontebbe would seriously cripple the whole Austrian operation. Also, the capture of the railroad junction at Franzenfeste would cut the Austrian line of communications to the Trent salient.

(3) (a) From a railroad point of view, Italy had a great advantage over Austria. However, considering the whole subject of military geography of the theater, the Austrian line was almost impregnable, and, in the Trent salient, she had a place of departure for operations against the rear of any Italian force threatening Trieste, Pola, or Vienna, and the distance from the frontier to Venice was only fifty miles.

(b) Thus the terrain lent itself to an Austrian defensive attitude. For an offensive attitude, the terrain and railroads fixed three places for the Austrian concentrations, i.e., Goritza, Villac, and Trent.

(c) Similarly it fixed those places with one other, i.e., Franzenfeste, as the Italian first objectives.

c. Italian plan of campaign. The Italian plan of campaign was to capture the mountain crests, thus obtaining the advantage of their good observation along the whole line; to reduce the Trent salient; to capture the Carso and the Istria, beyond the Isonzo River. There were to be three operations on the three fronts.

d. Italian concentration. (1) The Italian army had been trained under the Prussian system. Its infantry and cavalry were excellent. Its artillery was fair. It was equipped with the rapid fire 75s, but had practically no heavy artillery.

(2) Italy took advantage of the lessons of the war to equip and train her army before joining the Allies. Her army totaled 800,000 men, organized into twelve army corps of the first line, with three more lines of reserves ready to be called. The Commander-in-Chief, General Cadorna, organized the forces into four armies as follows:

First Army: Trent front.
Fourth Army: Alpine front.

Third Army: Isonzo front.
Second Army: Reserve near Venice.

e. Italian offensive. (1) (a) General Cadorna launched the attack along the whole frontier May 24.

(b) The operation against the Trent salient by the First Army was converging. The western blow was delivered near the Tonale Pass. The eastern blow was delivered along the Adige and the Brenta, but was not able to pass Roveredo or the fortified camp of Trent.

(c) The Fourth Army captured Monte Croce and Cortina d'Ampezzo. This opened up the pass to Toblac, and the operation against Tarvis reached the stage of bombarding the fort at Malborgetto which commands the pass from Pontebbe to Tarvis.

(d) The Third Army, with its right protected by an Italian fleet, had the mission of capturing Goritza. It reached Monfalcone—Plava—Monte Nero, but did not capture Goritza.

(2) (a) The Austrians intrenched at once, and promptly tranferred the equivalent of twenty divisions from the Russian front to the Italian front and organized them into three armies, i.e.:

Isonzo Front: General Boroevic's Army.
Alpine Front: General Rohr's Army.
Trent Front: General Dankl's Army.

(b) Thereafter, the operations on the Italian front were waged by the method of position warfare until the end of the year.

9. Russian Front to End of Year. (Map 38.) *a. Situation at end of April, 1915.* (1) The success of Russia's offensive against Austria in April, accentuated by the fact that the Central Powers were defending at the time on the Serbian and Western fronts, thoroughly alarmed the Central Powers. As a consequence, Austria-Hungary agreed that Germany should direct the operations.

(2) General von Falkenhayn estimated that Russia had expended most of her ammunition and equipment in 1914 and that, the Dardanelles being closed and the port of Archangel ice bound from early fall to late spring and with almost no manufacturing arsenals, Russia was practically dependent on the Siberian railroad as a means of supply for arms and equipment. He further estimated that, in this situation, Russia would have no way of defending against an offensive that

advanced at the rate of its heavy artillery. He decided, therefore, to shoot Russia out of Poland with heavy artillery.

(3) His general plan called for a preliminary operation that would drive the Russians out of Hungary, followed by a great converging maneuver against the Russian armies in the Polish salient.

(4) His detailed plan for the converging maneuver was for Marshal Hindenburg with a group of three armies to attack from the north, in the general direction: Ossovietz—Warsaw. Von Mackensen group of two armies and the Bavarian Crown Prince's group of three armies was to advance south of Warsaw to the line Brest Litovsk—Warsaw. Two armies on the right were to operate against the fortified camps of Przemysl and Lemberg. An army on the right and left, respectively, was for flank protection. General headquarters was to move from the Western front to Pless, west of Cracow on the Eastern front, from which the operations over a front of more than 1,000 miles were to be directed.

(5) The plans and concentrations of German troops for this great battle were prepared and executed so secretly that the opening of the operation was a surprise to Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, and the only information the Austrians had of German troop movements was by seeing their arrival at the designated destinations. The troops on the trains were in equal ignorance of their destination and of the reason for their movement.

b. Battle of Dunajec. (1) General Mackensen, in the preparatory operation, drove the Russians out of Hungary, and then advanced in the direction south of Tarnow, with a compact massed force of 200,000 men.

(2) An artillery preparation on May 2, for four hours, by pieces of all calibers, of an intensity theretofore unknown, opened the battle of Dunajec and destroyed many thousands of Russians. The Russians, taken by surprise, fought bravely, but, attacked also by the armies to the right and left, fell back from the line of the Dunajec to the line of the San, between Warsaw and Przemysl.

(3) Four million men fought on that line for more than a month. At last, battered by heavy artillery, the Grand Duke evacuated the fortified camp of Przemsyl on June 3, and, giving up Lemberg, continued the retreat to the line of the Vistula and the Bug, which was occupied July 30.

c. Capture of Warsaw. (1) Von Falkenhayn had driven the Russians out of Hungary by July 15. He then began the converging maneuver. The southern force turned north between Warsaw and the Bug River, and on July 30 attacked Lublin and Cholm.

(2) Marshal von Hindenburg on the north, driving to turn Warsaw, captured Prasnysz and forced the Russians across the Narew River. At the same time, exploiting the success with his left, he drove the Russians back along the Baltic.

(3) In the center, the group of armies commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria advanced, guiding on the group of armies commanded by General Mackensen, and on July 30, attacked Ivangorod. Grand Duke Nicholas evacuated Warsaw, on August 5, and began a general retreat to the interior of Russia.

(4) At the end of September, the Russians held, by siege methods, a line nearly straight, from the Gulf of Riga to the neutral country of Roumania.

(5) The major offensive of the Allies on the Italian and on the Western fronts, operating as a diversion, and the call of Turkey for immediate emergency assistance, stopped the operation against Russia.

d. Operations until the end of the year. (1) Siege operations obtained on the Russian front during the rest of the year except that General Ivanoff, on the left, counter attacked across the Styr and Stripa Rivers and recaptured Tarnopol, and General Roussky, on the north, successfully defended on the line of the Dwina against the many terrific German attacks that were intended to force the Russian right off the Gulf of Riga and into "the air." He was assisted in the defense of Riga by the Russian fleet which gave him fire superiority.

(2) September 7, 1915, the Czar assumed personal command of the armies at the front and sent Grand Duke Nicholas as Viceroy to command the Russian forces on the Caucasus front with a view of cooperating in the allied operations at Gallipoli.

10. Western Front to End of the Year. (Maps 2 and 39.) *a. Situation, July 1, 1915.* (1) The success of the Central Powers offensive, then advancing in Russia, alarmed the Allies and General Joffre called a conference of representatives of the allied powers at his headquarters at Chantilly, July 7, 1915.

(2) At this conference it was agreed that a general offensive should be launched on the French front as a diversion in favor of Russia and with the hope that it would be decisive.

b. Order of battle, July 1, 1915. (1) *Allies' order of battle from the north.* (a) *Belgian Army* (*General Willmans*), six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions from the sea to the Lys (exclusive), supported by the French XXXVI Corps, which held the right and left flanks of the Belgian Army.

(b) *British Armies.* The Second Army (General Smith-Dorrien), from the Lys (inclusive) to Armentieres (exclusive).

First Army (General Haig), from Armentieres (inclusive) to Vermelles (exclusive).

(c) *French Armies.* Tenth Army (General d'Urbal), from Vermelles (inclusive) to the Somme.

Second Army (General Petain), from the Somme to the Oise.

Sixth Army (General Dubois), from the Oise to the Vesle.

Fifth Army (General d'Esperey), from the Vesle to Rheims (inclusive).

Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary) in Champagne.

Third Army (General Sarrail), in the Argonne and north and south of Verdun.

First Army (General Roques), Heights of the Meuse and in the Woevre.

Detachment of Lorraine (General Humbert), in Lorraine.

Seventh Army (General Maud'huy), in the Vosges and in Alsace.

The French forces were disposed in three groups from north to south, as follows:

The Group of the North (General Foch), to the Oise.

The Group of the Center (General Castelnau), to the Fourth Army (inclusive).

The Group of the East (General Dubail), to Switzerland.

Thirty-six infantry divisions and six hundred pieces of heavy artillery were held in reserve. In July, the arrival of the Third British Army permitted the passing of the French Second Army to the Reserve.

General Headquarters: Chantilly.

(2) The German order of battle from the north was:

Fourth Army (Duke of Wurtemberg), region of the Yser and Ypres.

Sixth Army (General von Bulow), region of the Somme.

First Army (General von Kluck), region of the Aisne.

Seventh Army (General von Herringen), region of Rheims.

Third Army (General von Einem), region of Champagne.

Fifth Army (German Crown Prince), region of Argonne and Verdun.

Army Detachment (General von Strantz), region of heights of the Meuse.

Army Detachment (General von Falkenhausen), region of Lorraine.

Army Detachment (General von Gaede), region of Alsace.

General Headquarters, Pless, on Eastern front.

c. Operations, fall 1915. (Map 40.) (1) *Allied plan.* (a) General Joffre's general plan for the operation called for a great converging maneuver against the German salient in France with pivot near Compeigne and with the object of crushing the German armies west of Verdun.

(b) General Joffre's plan was: (i) The northern force, in Artois, consisting of the First British Army (General Haig) and the Tenth French Army (General d'Urbal), to attack in the d rection of Vimy Ridge, with the idea of breaking through and exploiting the success in the direction of Valenciennes. The First British Army to attack with 13 infantry divisions, 600 pieces of light and 270 pieces of heavy artillery. The Tenth French Army to attack with 17 divisions, 700 pieces of light and 380 pieces of heavy artillery.

(ii) The eastern force, in Champagne, consisting of the Second Army (General Petain) and the Fourth Army (General Langle de Cary), to attack on a front of twenty-two miles from the Aisne on the east, in the direction of Mezieres, with the object, after the penetration of all the German lines, of cutting the German line of communications.

(iii) The eastern force was to be assisted by two secondary attacks; the Third Army (General Sarrail) on the right attacking in the direction of Sedan; and the Fifth Army (General d'Esperey) attacking on the left), converging toward Mezieres.

(iv) The Second and Fourth Armies were to attack with 30 divisions and 1,200 pieces of 75s and 850 pieces of heavy artillery.

(v) The Fifth Army was to attack with 6 infantry divisions and 270 pieces of 75s and 250 pieces of heavy artillery. Seven cavalry divisions followed the eastern force. The total

of the two forces was 53 French and 13 English divisions, supported by 2,000 pieces of heavy artillery and 3,000 pieces of 75-mm. guns.

(2) *The attacks.* (a) (i) The Second and the Fourth Armies after an intensive artillery preparation, "jumped off" September 25, at 9:15 AM, during a violent rain storm. The center elements advanced rapidly, but the flanks were stopped by hostile flank fire.

(ii) The first German position was completely overrun on a front of twelve miles.

(iii) The second German position located, on a reverse slope, had escaped all observation and accordingly had not been marked for destruction by the artillery. Its wire was all in place, and the position stopped the attacking line.

(iv) The next day, September 26, a penetration one mile wide was effected in the second position, but the attempt to pass reserves through the lines to exploit the success was stopped by the prompt counter attack of German reserves. The operation was then stopped, pending the forward displacement of the artillery to prepare the attack on the German second position.

(v) The attack was resumed October 6 with some success but since the element of surprise had been lost, there seemed to be no chance of a decision and October 30 the action was stopped.

(vi) The Third and Fifth Armies did not advance.

(b) (i) The British First Army and the French Tenth Army "jumped off" together about noon, September 25.

(ii) The British First Army, after an intensive artillery preparation, advanced on a front of nine miles but soon met strong German counter attacks. It fought until the end of October, but could not advance.

(iii) The Tenth French Army reached Vimy Ridge where it fought until October 14. Its right however was thrown back to its line of departure.

(3) *Results of the operations.* (a) The operation came so nearly to success that it is probable that the failure can be charged to not having discovered the German second position on a reverse slope in front of the Second and Fourth French Armies. In fact, General von Falkenhayn sent all available reserves to the imperiled sectors at once.

(b) The German Third Army staff considered the advisability of withdrawing the Army from the front. The Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army advised holding until the arrival of General von Falkenhayn.

(c) General von Falkenhayn, with his staff, started from the Eastern front by emergency transportation, as soon as he learned of the bombardment, and arrived at noon, September 25.

(d) In the emergency General von Falkenhayn threw one of the last reserve divisions into the Champagne, and the X Corps and the Guard Corps against the northern converging force. The reserves of the Seventh Army on the Aisne were ordered at once to join the Third Army, and fresh divisions were drawn from quiet sectors to relieve exhausted divisions. In addition, he stopped the Central Powers offensive on the Eastern front and transferred troops therefrom to reinforce the western line.

11. Balkan Theater of Operations. (Maps 2 and 41.) *a. Dardanelles front.* (1) *The Situation.* Germany effected a strategical penetration between Russia and her European allies by the accretion of Turkey, and was able to operate against the Eastern and Western fronts in detail. Russia was short of everything required for major operations except men and horses. The Allies were in need of Russian cereals and oil. Communication between them for coordination of plans was greatly limited. We have seen that Germany equipped the forts on the Dardanelles with modern artillery and prepared plans for their defense. Von Sanders, after the Allies' naval demonstration November 3, 1914, against the head of the straits, estimated that the Allies would try to force the straits, and made great preparations to defend them.

(2) *Naval descent.* (a) As soon as Turkey entered the war, England and France decided that under the changed situation it would be necessary to reestablish communication with Russia in order to keep her in the war. Great Britain's plan to force the Dardanelles by a naval descent to be followed by exploitation with land troops accompanying in transports was adopted.

(b) An Allied fleet bombarded the forts February 19, and then swept the straits for mines. The results appeared to be satisfactory and, on March 18, the Allies' fleet entered the straits to force their way to Constantinople. However,

their losses were so great from floating mines that the operation was abandoned on March 22.

(3) *Land Operations.* (a) The Allies then, on the recommendation of General Hamilton, the British commander of the land forces, decided to reverse the plan and to reduce the forts by land operations on the Gallipoli peninsula.

(b) The troops and supplies had been loaded rapidly without regard to a possible landing against resistance, hence, under the new plan of landing them in face of opposition, General Hamilton found it necessary to return all the transports from Mudros to Alexandria for sorting and reloading men and supplies. By this delay, a month was lost during which time the Turks were busily preparing to defend Gallipoli.

(c) (i) The expedition comprising about 65,000 men made up of one French and four British divisions, after a thirty minute bombardment of the defenses, landed and established themselves with heavy loss on April 25; the French at Seddul-Bahr, and the British at Gaba Tepe. The heights Krithia (472 feet), Atchi Baba (709 feet), and Seri-Bair (1034 feet) which gave observation and control of the straits, became the objectives of the expedition.

(ii) The Turkish forces, under the direction of German officers, had prepared these heights and the peninsula for defense. The allied operation at first was a frontal attack against Krithia and Atchi Baba, but passed later to a slow and methodical siege operation, interspersed many times by courageous and costly assaults. As these methods were unsuccessful, General Hamilton altered the plan to include a northern envelopment of the Turkish line from Suvla. That plan also failed and the condition of siege warfare obtained all along the line, with the Turks in control of all good observation points and the allied line too short and too thin for maneuver.

(4) (a) When it was seen in October, that the German invasion of Russia had spent itself, and that the Central Powers had undertaken a major offensive against Serbia, the Allies decided that the great emergency requiring the forcing of the Dardanelles had for the moment passed, that their position was not secure, and that a base for operations against the Central Powers' southern flank should be located at Saloniki, where the new conditions could be met by extending a

friendly hand to Serbia and by laying a restraining hand on Greece.

(b) The Dardanelles expedition was accordingly abandoned. The final evacuation was successful as a surprise between December 20 and January 8, and a part of the expedition established an Allies' base at Saloniki.

b. Serbian front. (1) *Situation.* The Dardanelles operation practically exhausted Turkey's munitions. She was entirely dependent on Germany for munitions. Neutral Roumania, secretly very friendly to the Allies after Germany's failure in 1914, was opposed to the passage of German munitions through her territory to Turkey. Turkey appealed to Germany for help.

(2) *Plans.* (a) *The Central Powers' plan.* (i) Von Falkenhayn estimated that the prevention of Russian resupply would greatly simplify the defeat of Russia and decided that Germany must go to the assistance of Turkey in keeping the Dardanelles closed.

On July 17, Germany signed a treaty with Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria under which Bulgaria, in consideration of the promise of accretion of Serbian Macedonia, held herself in readiness to join the Central Powers on call.

General von Falkenhayn's plan was to execute a double envelopment against the Serbian armies, the northern envelopment (General Mackensen) to be by German and Austrian forces, while the eastern envelopment was to be by the Bulgarian forces.

(ii) He effected a railroad concentration of troops, mostly from the Russian front, for the northern envelopment as follows:

One Austrian corps, on the Drina front.
A German-Austrian Army (General Kowes), on the Save Front.
A German Army (General Gallwitz), on the Danube front.
A total of 250,000 men.

For the eastern envelopment, Bulgaria, early in September, ordered mobilization and concentration along the Serbian frontier, and on October 5, by refusing a reply to their ultimatum, informed the Allies that she had cast her lot in with the Central Powers. Her concentration was as follows:

First Army (General Bojadieff), south of Roumania.
Second Army (General Theodorof), astride the Bagdad railroad.
Third Army (General Jecoff), on the Vardar front.

The Bulgarian Army totaled about 300,000 men, organized into twelve divisions. Its arms were modern, and the cannon were rapid fire 75-mm. and Krupp batteries.

(b) *The Serbian plan.* (i) After the fall of Warsaw, August 5, General Putnik, Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian forces, estimated that Bulgaria was concentrating against Serbia and, accordingly, disposed a part of his troops on the Bulgarian front to meet that concentration.

General Putnik's general plan was to assume the strategic and tactical defensive on both fronts and to attempt to prevent the junction of the Central Powers and the Bulgarian forces, and to cover the railroad—Saloniki—Nish—Belgrade.

(ii) He disposed his forces from right to left as follows: To defend against Bulgaria:

A detachment, to establish connection with the Allied forces at Saloniki.
Second Army, to defend the line of the Morava.
Army of Timok, to defend against Bulgaria south of the Danube.
A detachment in the angle of the Timok and the Danube, to prevent junction of Bulgarian and German forces.

To defend against the Central Powers:

Third Army, on the Danube front to the Morava.
Belgrade Army, on the Danube front west of the Morava.
First Army, between the Save and the Drina.
On the left, the Montenegrin detachment.
A total of about 175,000 troops.

(c) *Plan of Saloniki detachment.* (i) Two divisions (20,000 men) from Gallipoli, one French and one British, landed at Saloniki the first week in October, under command of the French General, Sarrail.

(ii) This force moved north, October 14, with the double mission of guarding the Saloniki railroad and of establishing contact with the Serbians. The deployment was without incident and the first contact with the Bulgarians was favorable.

(3) *Operations. Battle of the Frontier.* (1) After an exceedingly effective artillery preparation by heavy artillery, the Central Powers' northern enveloping force, under cover of heavy artillery fire, crossed the Danube, the Save, and the Drina. Each invading army advanced covered by an advance guard.

(b) The Serbian resistance, by means of local counter attacks, was so effective that from the west, to include the Second Bulgarian Army, none of the advance guards covered ten miles in the first week.

(c) The Third Bulgarian Army, however, met little opposition on its right and crossed the Morava near Vrania, October 20. Its extreme left was held up by the Saloniki Army.

(d) The Third Bulgarian Army captured Uskub and Veles, October 25, thus cutting the line of communications of the Serbian armies which were already outnumbered three to one in their fronts. General Putnik's line of retreat to Saloniki thus being blocked, he decided on a general retreat to the Adriatic Sea.

(e) On November 10, General Mackensen's left joined Czar Ferdinand's right near Nish.

(f) The Serbians defended the passes and, assisted by the successful defense of the Saloniki position by General Sarrail, the pursuit was checked and several days were gained for the retreating Serbian army. At the end of November, the whole Serbian force was retreating clear to the Adriatic via Elbason, Dibra, Prizrend, and Ipek.

(4) *Salvage of the Serbian Army.* France and Italy sent a mission commanded by General Mondesir to receive, clothe, and feed the Serbian Army as it emerged from the mountains to the coast. They were collected and sent to the Italian port, Valona. From there, 120,000 were sent to Corfu where, under the wardship of France, they were reorganized, armed, equipped, and supplied.

(5) *Montenegrin Army.* The small Montenegrin Army, about 3,000 men, surrendered to the Austrians.

(6) *Saloniki force.* The Saloniki force, having no further mission to the north, retired early in December to Saloniki, where it held itself in readiness, as the Allies had decided to build up an army at that point for use at an appropriate time in resumption of the maneuver of penetration between Berlin and Constantinople. It attracted and held in its front, from east to west, the First Bulgarian Army (General Bojadieff), the Eleventh German Army (von Gallwitz), the Second Bulgarian Army (General Todorow), and the German Alpine Corps, in reserve.

12. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. Principle of the objective.* (Maps 2 and 41.) (1) It is well to approach the consideration of operations in 1915 from the point of view of the objective. Germany had failed in 1914 to force a separate peace from France and a very considerable part of her forces were immobilized on the French front. Russia, with a much larger man

power than Germany, began operations against Germany as early as August, 1914, and against Austria in September, 1914. The Russian supply of munitions was inadequate and continued effective operations by Russia were dependent on the receipt of munitions from her Allies and from the markets of Western Europe.

(2) (a) The German war plan made the defeat of France the first objective of the war, and to reach that objective, Germany operated against the French (allied) armies rather than against the city of Paris or other localities. It made the defeat of Russia the second objective with the expectation of using the whole German force against Russia after the estimated defeat of France, in six weeks.

(b) Pending the operations against France, the German objective in aggressive effort against Russia was to destroy her resources. In the pursuit of that objective, she succeeded by closing the Dardanelles at the beginning of the war, in cutting the Russian main line of munition supply. On the Russian front, she succeeded by August, 1915, in capturing the Russian main industrial area, with Warsaw, which was the Russian industrial and distributing center.

(c) After the capture of Warsaw and the defeat of the Russian forces, Germany did not continue the direct operations against the Russian armies to a decision, but, instead, she directed her effort through the Balkans to the insuring of the continued blocking of Russia's munition supply line through the Dardanelles which the Allies were trying to open.

(3) (a) Thus, preceding her initiation of operations in the World War, Germany decided that her first and main objective was to force a separate peace from France through defeat of her armies, and that, following the elimination of France as an enemy, her next objective was to force a separate peace from Russia, through defeat of the latter's armies, and that, pending the decisive operations against France, the objective of her operations against Russia was the reduction of Russian resources below battle efficiency.

(b) Because of Germany's failure to defeat France, a situation arose, unexpected by Germany, under which the greater part of her armed forces were immobilized in defending the long line from Switzerland to the sea on the Western front. As a result, Germany did not have a sufficient force with which to decisively defeat the Russian armies. Accordingly, she

retained the "reduction of Russian resources below battle efficiency" as the objective of her operations against Russia up to and including the end of 1915.

b. Principle of economy of force. (1) (Map 2.) When von Falkenhayn, with the cooperation of allies, defended on all other fronts, while he successfully operated first on the Russian front and then on the Balkan front, he complied with the *principle of economy of force.*

(2) At the beginning of 1915, the forces of the Central Powers comprised two groups; those of Germany and Austria composed the main group, while those of Turkey composed the second and minor group. The main Central Powers' army was the German-Austrian group. When Great Britain and France, in the pursuit of the objective of reopening communication with Russia, selected the direction line for the operation through the minor Central Powers' group, i.e., Turkey, there resulted a detachment of allied troops from the presence of the main hostile army, without any detachment whatever from that main hostile army, to the minor group. Thus the Dardanelles operation as executed by the Allies violated the *principle of economy of force.*

(3) In 1915, Roumania was so friendly with the Allies that Germany considered it not unlikely that she might join them at any tine and prepared plans for such a contingency. If, in pursuance of the objective of reestablishing communication with Russia, the Allies, after Italy joined, had reinforced the Serbian front, they would have insured rail communication through the Balkans with Russia, and, while keeping Bulgaria away from the Central Powers would probably have drawn Roumania to them. In this manner this would have completed the strategical investment of the main Central Powers group. Under such conditions, the detachment of allied troops from the Western front to the Balkan front would not have been taking troops away from the presence of the main hostile army, and, while accomplishing the same objective as the Dardanelles operation, i.e., resupply of Russia, it would not have violated the *principle of economy of force.*

c. Principles of surprise, mass, and movement. (Map 38.) When General von Falkenhayn concentrated General Mackensen's force on the Austrian front so secretly that neither the concentrating troops, the Austrians, not the Russians understood the event, and when, in that concentration, he secured a great

preponderance of numbers and of artillery fire, and when he launched that force against the unprepared Russians and advanced it at the rate of march of heavy artillery (of which the Russians had practically none) and won the great Battle of Dunajec, he illustrated the *principles of surprise, mass, and movement.*

CHAPTER VI

Operations on Western and Russian Fronts in 1916

	Page
1. General Situation at End of 1915	113
2. Naval Warfare	114
3. Aerial Warfare	114
4. General Plans for Land Warfare	114
a. The Allies	114
b. The Central Powers	115
5. Caucasus Front	115
a. The situation	115
b. Russian plan	115
c. Turkish dispositions	115
d. Operations	116
6. Western Front	117
a. Plans	117
b. Battle of Verdun	117
c. Battle of the Somme	122
7. Russian Front	126
a. Plans	126
b. Operations	127
8. Principles of War	129
a. Principle of the objective	129
b. Principle of the offensive	129
c. Principle of movement	129
d. Principle of security	130
e. Principle of simplicity	130
f. Principle of cooperation	131

1. The General Situation. (Map 42.) By January 1, 1916, Germany, cooperating with her associates, had failed to force a separate peace from any of the Allies except from the little state of Montenegro. By the accretion of Bulgaria and the defeat of Serbia, the Central Powers had completed a penetration between Russia and her Allies and had established direct communication with Turkey. The result was that, exclusive of colonial warfare, the Allies were conducting eight separate operations against the Central Powers, on the Western, Russian, Italian, Albanian, Grecian, Syrian, Mesopotamian and Caucasian fronts, while the Central Powers from the Bagdad railroad line were operating on interior lines against those various fronts.

2. Naval Warfare. *a.* The opening up of the Balkan and Mesopotamian sources of supply through the creation of "Mittel Europa" gave the Central Powers some relief from the blockade maintained by the Allies, but the people of Germany and Austria were still suffering from privations, and demanded that something be done to raise the blockade. Some, including General von Falkenhayn, demanded a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. This was overruled, as the submarine building program had not yet been completed.

b. Spurred on by the demands of public opinion, the German Government decided that, without waiting longer to wear down the British fleet, the High Seas fleet should seek an engagement near the coast of Denmark under the conditions of poor visibility in an afternoon, and, later, in a night action, for which it was prepared, lead the British fleet into the German mine fields.

c. The Kaiser relieved Admiral von Tirpitz and appointed Admiral Scheer to the command of the fleet. Under the new policy, Admiral Scheer frequently took the fleet to sea. On May 31, 1916, the desired conditions existed, and the great naval battle of Jutland was fought between the German and British fleets. The battle progressed as planned by the Germans except that Admiral Jellicoe, the British commander, whose ships were not equipped for night action, did not follow the retreating German fleet, after dark, into the German mine fields. The action did not raise the blockade. The Allies continued to control the sea during 1916.

3. Aerial Warfare. German aerial operations were not limited to efforts auxiliary to the land and naval forces, but were extended by Zeppelin and airplane raids on the London and Paris areas, with the view of holding Allied forces in those areas. These operations did not affect the result of the war.

4. General Plans for Land Operations. *a. The Allies.* At the First Interallied Council of War, held at General Joffre's headquarters on December 6, 1915, the Allies decided to operate against the enemy by simultaneous strategical and tactical offensive operations on all fronts, thereby neutralizing the advantage of interior lines possessed by the Central Powers. Due to the climate of Russia, this offensive was scheduled to begin in June or July. It was further decided that, should the Central Powers launch a major offensive against one of the

Allies before that time, all the Allies immediately would launch offensives by way of diversion.

b. The Central Powers. (Map 42.) General von Falkenhayn assigned missions in the main theater of operations as follows:

(1) Turkey was to operate in her own territory.

(2) Bulgaria was to operate between Turkey and the Danube.

(3) Germany and Austria were to operate north of the Danube. His general plan for German and Austrian operation was:

(a) To change to the strategical and tactical defensive on the Russian front.

(b) Austria to change to the strategical and tactical offensive against Italy.

(c) Germany, by a strategical defensive and tactical offensive, was to forestall and break the expected Allied major offensive on the Western front and then pass to the strategical and tactical offensive with a view to forcing a decision and a separate peace from France.

5. CAUCASUS FRONT. (Maps 32, 42 and 43.) *a. The situation.* On September 7, 1915, after the Central Powers' offensive had forced the Russians out of Poland, the Czar took personal command of the Russian forces, and sent Grand Duke Nicholas, as viceroy, to command on the Caucasus front, where the army totaled about 150,000 men. At that time, Russia believed that had she obtained the arms and ammunition that would have come to her through an open Dardanelles, she could have defeated the Central Powers. The Russian estimate of the situation led to the conclusion that the opening of the Dardanelles was essential to her efficient continuance in the war.

b. Russian plan. Grand Duke Nicholas planned to reach the coast by a surprise winter maneuver, and, from Trebizond as a base, to conduct a joint naval and land action westward toward Constantinople, connecting on the south with the British Mesopotamian Expedition.

c. Turkish dispositions. The Turkish Third Army was in the vicinity of the great fortified camp of Erzerum, and held a line to the Black Sea. This fortified camp was on a mountain 6,000 feet above the sea. Due to its natural strength, it had been held to be unapproachable in winter and impregnable in summer. During the war, the Germans had strengthened it

by a line of forts on the eastern hills, and by an armament of over four hundred modern Krupp guns. The Turkish Third Army and its commander, Kiamil Pasha, were under the instruction of German officers. The Germans estimated that the assignment of the Grand Duke to command the Russian forces on the Caucasus front meant a Russian offensive in Turkey in the spring, and they decided to forestall it at once by local action.

d. Operations. (1) Grand Duke Nicholas established his headquarters at Tiflis and placed General Yudinitch in command of the field operations along the southern shore of the Black Sea and General Baratoff in command of the detachment whose mission was to connect with the British in Mesopotamia.

(2) (a) (i) General Yudinitch's plan was to capture Erzerum by a surprise winter double enveloping maneuver. On January 16 (just one week after Gallipoli's evacuation), he advanced in three columns from Kars on a hundred mile front and effected a strategical surprise on Kiamil Pasha, the Turkish Third Army commander, and a tactical surprise, January 19, on the Turkish garrison of Keupri-Keni, which fled in rout to Erzerum.

(ii) The central column, on January 26, in intensely cold weather, began the ascent of the Kargabazar mountain ridge. They were required to drag their mountain and field guns. The ammunition and food was carried up by camels.

(iii) The northern column defeated the Turks in its front and connected with the central column at Fort Tafta on February 14.

(iv) The left (southern) column drove the Turks back on Moosh and forced the 10,000 foot ridge Palandoken on February 15. That day, nine of the inner forts were stormed and captured. The next day, the Turks evacuated Erzerum. The southern column captured Moosh on February 19, Bitlis on March 2, and thereafter crossed the Armenian Taurus Mountains and threatened the Berlin—Bagdad railroad.

(v) The right (northern) column, cooperating with the fleet, captured Trebizond April 16.

(vi) The central column captured Erzingan June 26.

(b) In the first part of August, the Turks under the command of General Gresman, a German officer, counter attacked with a view of cutting Erzerum's line of communications. They

recaptured Bitlis and Moosh on August 8, but lost Moosh the next day.

(3) Grand Duke Nicholas, in an unsuccessful effort to cooperate with General Townsend, sent a reinforced brigade under General Baratoff south in Persia to Hamadan. General Baratoff reached Kermansha and sent a sotnia of Cossacks to connect with the British column of General Lake's relieving forces, in the third week of May, after General Townsend had surrendered Kut. The sotnia reached the British lines and returned but the connection was not maintained. General Baratoff retired from Hamadan in August.

6. WESTERN FRONT. *a. Plans.* (Maps 39, 44 and 45.) (1) The Allied plan of operations on the Western front, which was adopted February 16, 1916, at the Second Interallied Council, was to launch a major Franco-British offensive July 1, 1916, with the idea of penetrating the German line on the Somme, cutting the German line of communications in the valley of the Sambre, and forcing the Germans out of France.

(2) Von Falkenhayn had been much alarmed by the major offensive launched by the allies in the fall of 1915 and the very narrow margin by which it failed of success. He was so apprehensive of the danger of the (then) coming 1916 Allied offensive, and the possiblility of not stopping it if he merely awaited it, that he decided to forestall it with an attack. A careful estimate showed that even by taking the last available man from other fronts, he could not reinforce his forces on the Western front with more than twenty-six divisions. Even with that reinforcement, the Allies would still have a preponderance and von Falkenhayn estimated that, in order to really seize and exercise the initiative, he must find a vulnerable place for delivery of the blow. He estimated that Verdun was such a place and was so sacred to the French that they would spend their last drop of blood in its defense. After a very careful estimate of the situation along the whole front, he decided to operate against the Verdun salient. The German Crown Prince was selected to carry out the execution of a first phase, which called for penetration of the French line at Verdun. The second phase called for exploitation of such a success by an attack on the north flank and in the rear of the presumed dislocated French east front.

b. Battle of Verdun. (1) *The situation.* (a) The Verdun salient was about forty-five miles wide across the neck. The

apex and the greater part of the salient was on the eastern side of the Meuse. It really formed a bridgehead from which an attack might be launched by the Allies against Metz or against the German line of communications, i.e., the Metz—Mezieres railroad line.

(b) Usually, the rainy season causes the Meuse to overflow its banks to a width of about one mile. It did so overflow in February, 1916. There were not more than seven bridges of all types crossing the Meuse between St. Mihiel and Verdun.

(c) For about eight miles to the north and to the east of Verdun there is a succession of hills about 400 feet high. Beyond those hills, to the east and extending to the south, are the plains of the Woevre, which in the spring are too soft for any operations. Excluding the impassable terrain, an attack east of the Meuse is limited to a frontage of about eight miles.

(d) (i) Before the war, Verdun had been served by two trunk line railroads. Traffic on the line Paris—Verdun had been interrupted by the Germans and the road was subject to interdiction fire at all times. The other trunk line from Paris, via Commercy, was unavailable as the Germans were astride of it at St. Mihiel.

Besides the two trunk line railroads to Verdun there was a one-meter, narrow gauge, single track road from Bar-le-Duc via Souilly. This road was wholly inadequate, in itself, to supply the troops in the Verdun salient.

(2) *Plans of maneuver.* (a) (i) *French plan.* The French Third Army (General Sarrail) held the Verdun salient, defensively, from north of St. Mihiel to the Argonne Forest, inclusive. Inside of the salient was the fortified camp of Verdun, consisting of the fortress at Verdun and a ring of forts of the Brialmont type, such as were the forts at Liege and Namur. At the beginning of the war, the forts were all reinforced with concrete and steel. Profiting by the lessons of Liege and Namur, the French organized the salient as a deep defensive zone.

The first position extended along the line: Avocourt—Malancourt—Forges—Brabant—the northen edge of the woods of Haumont—Caures—Ville-Herbevois—village of Ornes.

The second position ran along the line: north of Hesse Woods—hill 304—Dead Man's Hill—Goose Hill—Samogneaux—hill 344—north of Foss Woods—south of Ornes.

The third position extended along the line: Talou Hill—Pepper Hill—hill 378—north edge of Caurieres Woods—Bezon-Vaux.

The fourth position consisted of the line of forts from the woods of Bourrus to Moulainville.

(ii) The French government informed General Joffre, on December 16, 1915, that it understood that Verdun was not properly wired and trenched for defense. He replied, on December 18, that orders had been given for the organization of the defense as set forth above. General Joffre discovered in January, 1916, however, that the defensive measures at Verdun were wholly insufficient, and ordered a regiment of engineers there to do the necessary work, but it was too late.

(b) *German plan.* (i) Since the battle of the Marne, the German High Command had contemplated action against Verdun in order to gain greater security for Metz, the Briey mining basin, and the line of communications near Carignan. By February, 1916, it had built a railroad net that reached for Verdun like the arms of an octopus.

(ii) General von Falkenhayn estimated that the French salient east of the Meuse was unstable, because, with the Chalons railroad line interdicted, it could not be supplied. Hence, he believed an attack from the north, based on the slow movement of heavy artillery, like Mackensen's in Russia, in 1915, could not be stopped. Because of the limited number of bridges over the Meuse, and the possibility of destroying or interdicting them effectually, he estimated that such an attack from the north would push the French bridgehead salient south along the Meuse, like a loose knee cap, uncover Verdun, and destroy or capture the major portion of the French troops therein by driving them against the anvil of the St. Mihiel salient.

(iii) The German plan of maneuver for this first phase was to attract the attention of the Allies to other parts of the line in France by local army attacks with limited objectives, then, by means of superior artillery fire, to drive the forces of the Verdun bridgehead south, past Verdun and its bridges, to a surrender against the St. Mihiel salient. The operation was to occupy eight days. The right flank was to be protected by a later advance on the west bank of the Meuse, which was also to cut off the French retreat across that river. The local

success was to be exploited at once by penetration of the French line.

(iv) The German Crown Prince, commanding the Fifth Army, was placed in command of the operation by verbal secret orders, about Christmas.

For the whole operation the following troops were placed under his command:

The Fifth Army (his own command),
Von Strantz's detachment in Lorraine (Woevre),
Von Falkenhausen's detachment on the right bank of the Moselle in Lorraine and in Lower Alsace,
Von Gaede's detachment in Upper Alsace.

In addition to the foregoing troops, nine thoroughly rested and specially trained shock divisions were sent to the Crown Prince. Also, three other picked divisions were sent to the west bank of the Meuse for use there if necessity arose. Five other fresh divisions were added to the Crown Prince's reserve, and many other divisons of the general reserve on the Western front were held in readiness for immediate transportation to Verdun. His total available force was nearly half a million men.

(v) An extraordinary amount of heavy artillery, with an unlimited ammunition allowance, was located on the front of attack. This permitted the maintenance of an effective fire while a part of the batteries were moved forward following the attack. Every request for labor and equipment was complied with. D day was postponed because of impassable wet terrain and poor visibility.

(3) *Operations.* (a) The artillery preparation began with unprecedented violence, at 7:00 AM on February 21, and continued until 4:00 PM, when the infantry attack was launched upon a front of six kilometers from Haumont woods to Herbevois woods (both inclusive).

(b) (i) During the first period (February 22-March 4), the Germans, in a slow advance covering thirteen days, covered by tremendous artillery fire, captured the 1st, 2d, and 3d positions east of the Meuse by the 4th of March.

(ii) General Joffre relieved the Tenth Army at once from the Arras sector and sent it to Verdun, asking General Haig to take over the sector of that army.

He directed General Langle de Cary, commander of the Center Group, to hold his ground between the Meuse and the Woevre, and to advance to the north as opportunity presented.

He selected General Petain, of the Second Army, to command at Verdun and allowed him to take his staff.

(iii) General Petain arrived at Verdun, on February 26, and ordered a counter attack at once along the whole line.

General Petain at once divided the front into corps zones as follows:

General Bazelaire (VII Corps), west bank from Avocourt to the Meuse.
General Guillaumat (I Corps), east bank from the Meuse to Douamont.
General Balfournier (XX Corps), east bank from Douamont to Eix.
General Duchesne (II Corps), east bank from Eix to vicinity of St. Mihiel.

He assigned the artillery, which was arriving in great numbers, to the zones.

He ordered the occupied ground to be organized and held, and the forts to be reoccupied and re-armed.

He ordered the number of bridges between Verdun and St. Mihiel to be increased from seven to forty-one.

He saw, at once, that the railroad line of communications was insufficient and that unless the line of communication was improved, the salient would have to be evacuated.

He organized a truck line of communications from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. 3,000 auto trucks passed over this line every day. This truck line met the need, and, as it saved the supply situation, the French call the road "The Sacred Way."

As a result, on March 4, the French were holding the fourth position, i.e., the line of forts, except Fort Douamont, which had been reduced to a pile of dust.

(c) During the 2d period (March 5-22), the Germans attempted, without success, to advance their right wing west of the Meuse to hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill, and their left wing on the east bank of the river to Fort Vaux.

(d) During the 3d period (March 22-April 30), the German Crown Prince suffered such losses that, by March 22, fresh troops were required. On April 9-10, he delivered a general attack along the whole line and captured the crest of Dead Man's Hill. However, the French retook it April 20. During this period, there were many local attacks by both sides.

(e) (i) During the 4th period (May and June), General Nivelle, who, on May 2, had succeeded General Petain in command of the Second Army and of the defense of Verdun on the latter's assignment to the command of the Central Group of

Armies, carried out his predecessor's policy of counter attacking wherever possible. The violence of the German attacks and the stubbornness of the French defense may be judged by the fact that although the Germans attacked hill 304 from May 4-7, with more than one hundred batteries of heavy artillery, they captured only the north part of the hill. General Nivelle recaptured Douamont on May 22-23.

(ii) On May 23, the German Crown Prince captured Dead Man's Hill and retook Douamont. In June, he concentrated on the attempt to capture Forts Vaux and Souville. Between June 1 and 7, he destroyed Fort Vaux by the program of shooting 10,000 projectiles a day at it.

(iii) The struggle for Souville (the key to Verdun) then became most desperate. However, General Joffre ordered the east bank of the Meuse held at all costs and forbade any retreat. He ordered an offensive attitude to be taken by counter attack. The final crisis came on June 22 and 23 when, after an unparalleled bombardment, including asphyxiating gas, the German attack reached the edge of Fort Souville.

(iv) On June 24, General Nivelle began counter attacks and by June 30 had driven the Germans beyond Fleury. The next day, July 1, General Joffre and General Haig launched the battle of the Somme, with such force that General von Falkenhayn was forced to withdraw troops from Verdun for the Somme, and to abandon the idea of an immediate capture of Verdun.

c. The Battle of the Somme (July-November). (Maps 39 and 46.) (1) *Plans.* (a) *The German dispositions.* Under General von Falkenhayn's general plan for the defense of the Western front, that portion of the line which is under consideration (from the Ancre on the north to Chaulnes on the south) was organized as a deep defensive zone on the hills of Picardy which constitute the watershed between the Somme and the rivers of Belgium. The line was held by General Fritz von Below with a part of the Second Army. He held the first position with eight divisions, five north of the Somme and three south of it. Three divisions were held in reserve in the second position, and another division which had just arrived from Verdun occupied the third position. Other positions to the rear were organized and in process of organization. The zone was very strong. The first position was on the forward slope of high ground. The second position was from 3,000 to 5,000

yards behind the first position. Woods and villages had been organized for special defense and the whole zone had been intrenched, bomb proofed, and wired to perfection.

(b) *The Allies' dispositions and plans.* (i) The Allies' general plan for the maneuver, after changes because of Verdun, was that the British and French should attack side by side from the Ancre to Chaulnes, the British north and the French south of the line: Maricourt—Sailly—Sallisel, with the idea of penetrating the German line on the axis: Albert—Bapaume, and then, as a second phase, to pass a mass of maneuver through the breach and with it attack the German line of communications in the direction: Cambrai—Valenciennes—Maubeuge.

(ii) General Haig and General Joffre agreed on the maneuver with the following objects in view:

To relieve pressure on Verdun.
To assist Russia and Roumania by preventing transfer of German troops from the Western front.
To wear down the German strength.

(iii) The Allied dispositions and plans in detail were as follows:

British. The new British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson) occupied the front from Maricourt to Serre. The new British Third Army (General Allenby) was north of the Fourth Army. General Haig planned to deliver the main attack by the Fourth Army from the front: Maricourt—Ancre River; to support the main attack by an assisting attack, also by the Fourth Army (north flank) which, by a simultaneous attack from the Ancre to Serre, was to occupy the attention of the German artillery and to hold the German reserves. The British Third Army, at the same time, was to protect the north flank by an attack from Serre to Gommicourt.

French. The French Sixth Army (General Fayolle) occupied the front from Maricourt to Foucaucourt. The French Tenth Army (General Micheler) extended to the south. The French Sixth Army, astride the Somme, was to support the main British attack by attacking on its front. The French Tenth Army was to hold itself ready to protect the south flank and also for any eventuality.

(2) *Operations.* (a) *The 1st period—i.e., launching of the attack (July 1-10).*

(i) On the morning of July 1, after an intense preparation by heavy artillery which commenced June 24, the last hour of which was at the maximum rate, and immediately after the explosion of mines under the German front trenches on the British front, the troops advanced to attack. With the exception of the line north of the Albert—Bapaume road, they ran over the German first position in many places and made good headway all along the line.

(ii) That night, General Haig changed his plan of maneuver as follows:

The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), less two corps, was to continue the advance between the French on the south and the Albert—Bapaume road on the north.

A new British Fifth Army under General Gough composed of the two northern corps from the Fourth Army was to maintain pressure on the Germans north of the Albert—Bapaume road to Serre, and to act as a pivot on which the main attack would swing towards the north.

(iii) After the first day, the attack progressed more slowly, with local attacks, counter attacks, and much artillery bombardment. This continued until July 10, when there was a slight pause for tired troops to be relieved and artillery to be displaced forward. The attack had then reached the line: Foucaucourt—Estrees—Belloy—La Maisonette—Biache—the Somme—Longueval—Orvillers. The Germans had relied on artillery and machine gun fire to stop the advance and had taken a heavy toll from the British.

(iv) General von Falkenhayn at once sent troops from Verdun to the Somme and organized a new First Army, with General von Gallwitz in command. General von Gallwitz took over the sector of the Somme, and, as group commander, was placed in charge of the defense on the whole front of the Somme Battle.

(b) *The 2d period—Struggle for Picardy Ridge (July 11-September 28).* (i) The Allies' objective now became the Picardy ridge which gives observation over the plains beyond, even to the rivers flowing to Belgium. General Haig planned a night attack by the Fourth Army to capture the enemy position on the crest. He fixed the line of departure about 1,000 to 1,400 yards in front of his line, and only 300 to 500 yards from the German trenches. He required division, brigade, and subordinate commanders to reconnoiter the position before

issuing their orders. The deployment was made under cover of strong patrols after dark on the night of July 13-14. White tape was laid on the ground to enable troops to reach their proper places. The whole movement was carried out unobserved by the Germans and without touch being lost in any case. When it was just light enough to distinguish friend from foe, the Fourth Army, at 3:25 AM, advanced to the attack preceded by an effective artillery barrage, and swept right over the enemy trenches and into the defenses beyond.

(ii) From July 20 to 25, the attack was resumed along the whole line from Orvillers on the north to south of Foucaucourt. It made some progress on the north and on the south, but none toward Peronne.

(iii) The French in a severe struggle, between August 12 and 24, penetrated the German third line and captured Maurepas.

(iv) The foregoing attacks were really preparatory to the new offensive which was to begin early in September with the view not only of capturing Picardy Ridge but of preventing German troops from going to the Roumanian front. To secure the Picardy Ridge, the new objectives were: for the British, Martinpuich—Gueudecourt—Morval; for the French north of the Somme, they were Raucourt—Bouchavesnes. South of the Somme, a separate French operation had as its objective the ridge: Villiers—Carbonnel—Chaulnes.

(v) After an intense artillery preparation, the attack was launched, September 3, from the Ancre to the Somme. The British and the French Sixth Army captured the German second position for which they had been fighting for six weeks.

The French Tenth Army covered the southern flank and captured some ground.

(vi) The Germans counter attacked until September 10, but without effect.

(vii) The French Sixth Army, September 12, after a four days' artillery preparation, attacked and captured Bouchavesnes, on the 13th.

(viii) On September 15, the British attacked with tanks, a new and surprise weapon and captured Courcelete—Martinpuich—Fleurs.

(ix) On September 17, the French Tenth Army captured Vermandevillers and Berny.

(x) On September 25, the French and British attacked all along the line north of the Somme. By the 28th, the Allies' line had reached Thiepval—Gueudecourt—Bouchavesnes—La Maisonette—Berny—Vermandovillers—Chilly.

(c) *Third Period. Exploitation of success (October-December).* The Allies, by September 28, had complete control of Picardy Ridge except at two points, i.e., north of Thiepval and at Sailly-Sallisel. During the rest of the year until the weather stopped operations, the Allies organized the captured positions and by local attacks advanced the line to Serre-le San—Sailly-Sallise—Biache—Pressoir—Chilly and controlled the ridge between the Somme and the rivers flowing to Belgium.

7. RUSSIAN FRONT. (Maps 38, 42 and 47.) *a. Plans.* (1) *Russian plans.* (a) The defeat in 1915 did not injure the Czar's morale in the slightest, and instead of listening to intriguing plans for a separate peace, he held with the Allies and was loyal to the policy of all going to the help of the one attacked as adopted at the First Interallied Council of War.

(b) The Czar, as soon as possible after the 1915 defeat, set about the reorganization of the army, with the result that in the spring of 1916, he held the whole Central Powers' front of more than one thousand miles extent with three groups of armies as follows:

Northern Group: General Kuropatkin,
Central Group: General Evert,
Southern Group: General Brussilloff (Brussilov).

(c) The general plan of the Czar called for a divergent double penetration to be initiated about July 1. One thrust was to be made along the Neimen and the other south of the Pripet Swamps, with a view of folding the dislocated wings back, the northern one into Courland, and the southern one across the Carpathians, while the center should force the enemy's center straight back into Germany.

(d) The foregoing plan was not carried out as formulated, because, under the obligation assumed at the first Interallied Council of War, the Czar responded to the demand of the Allies to initiate operations immediately to cause a diversion to relieve the French situation at Verdun. Accordingly, the Czar decided to sacrifice the benefits of a cooordinated attack all along the line to take place in July, and to begin operations at once under almost impossible weather conditions. The plan as changed provided for the immediate delivery of the north-

ern penetrating operation, because, due to a better railroad net, the preparations were further advanced in the north. No change was made in the southern operation, which was held to be the main operation.

(2) *German plans.* (a) General von Falkenhayn believed that the Russians could not recover from the defeat of 1915 for a long time, and, as a result had called away a great number of men and nearly all of the heavy artillery from the Russian front for use in the German offensive at Verdun and the Austrian offensive from the Trent salient. He also had recalled all the arms and troops that he had lent to the Austrians on the front from the Pripet Swamps to Roumania.

(v) The total force of the Central Empires on this 1,000 mile front was 127 infantry divisions and twenty-one cavalry divisions, in four groups as follows:

North Group: Marshal von Hindenburg,
Central Group: Prince Leopold of Bavaria,
Between the Pripet and the Bug: General Linsingen,
Southern Group: Archduke Frederick.

b. Operations. (1) *Operation against Germany (March 16).* After a two days' artillery preparation, the Russian attack was launched March 18, in the general direction of Kovno, with a supporting attack on a broad front extending to the north of Dvinsk. The attack continued with great intensity until March 26, when Marshal von Hindenburg succeeded in stopping it. But it had accomplished its purpose, as it attracted attention again to Russia and troops and guns were sent to Marshal von Hindenburg's part of the line. It convinced Marshal von Hindenburg that a greater attack would be delivered against him later. The action of Russia was considered a serious menace and the Kaiser personally inspected Marshal von Hindenburg's part of the line at the end of May. The Germans were much alarmed by the operations along the line of the Niemen.

(2) *Operations against Austria (June 4).* (a) (i) After a thirty hour artillery preparation, General Brussilloff's four armies advanced against the Austrian lines on June 4, on a front of over three hundred miles between the Pripet Swamps and Roumania. The principal effort was made by the two wings, against Loutsk on the north by General Kaledine's army, and against Bukowina on the south by General Letchinsky's army.

(ii) The Austrian line was penetrated in many places and fell back on the north and south.

(iii) By June 7, General Kaledine crossed the Styr, and the Army of Letchinsky crossed the Dneister and the Pruth.

(iv) Violent supporting attacks were delivered by the two army groups to the north and strong reinforcements were sent south to General Brussilloff, who it was hoped would decisively defeat the Austrians. Austria stopped her offensive against Italy and sent all available troops to Russia. She demanded help from Germany.

(b) In June, Marshal von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff were called to General Headquarters to report to the Kaiser on the situation. They reported it as "very grave." As a result, many troops were sent east from the Western front.

(c) In July, the Russians attacked all along the line, and with great violence from the Riga region.

(d) In the south, however, the Austrian General Count von Bothmer stood like a rock and defended his zone.

(e) July 27, because of the loss of Brody, Marshal von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff were called again to General Headquarters to report to the Kaiser. Marshal von Hindenburg was placed in command of the line from the Baltic as far south as Brody. He established his headquarters at Brest-Litovsk. He immediately reorganized the Austrian commands, distributed German units among the Austrians, issued definite orders for the operations and prepared at once to counter attack with dependable troops. He organized army zones, service of supply, and installed an exceedingly comprehensive system of instruction and inspection by German officers over Austrian units.

(f) General Brussiloff's advance was retarded and by the end of August it had been stopped on the line: Stokod River—south to the crests of the Carpathians. He held the passes of Iablonica and Kalibaba and had uncovered the Roumanian frontier. Brussilloff tried to continue to Lemberg and Kovel, but without success, as the defense under von Hindenburg had been stiffened. Also, intrigue had begun at Petrograd and German socialistic propaganda had begun to affect the Russian soldiers' morale. As a result, Brussilloff was forced to halt and adopt siege methods of warfare.

(g) On August 27, Roumania declared war against Austria. On August 28, von Hindenburg reported to the Kaiser at

General Headquarters, was told that the whole situation was serious, and was informed that he would relieve General von Falkenhayn, at once, as chief of the German General Staff.

8. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. Principle of the objective.* (Maps 38, 41 42 and 47.) When the Czar sent Grand Duke Nicholas to the Caucasus to cooperate with the Allies in opening the Russian line of communications through the Dardanelles, he illustrated the *principle of the objective* with an objective other than the hostile main army, but when he continued that operation with 150,000 men after the Gallipoli operation had been abandoned, the possibility of the Grand Duke's opening the Dardanelles was so remote that it was no longer a possible objective. His further offensive operation in Turkey was without any proper objective and was a violation of the *principle of the objective.* When the Dardanelles operation was abandoned, the Caucasus army, with the exception of a small defending force, should have been sent north and used in the operations against the hostile main army.

b. Principle of the offensive. (Maps 45 and 46.) (1) The Battle of Verdun was finally won at the Somme. General von Falkenhayn did not have enough troops on the Western front with which to maintain two major operations, so when the Allies attacked on the Somme he, operating under the control of the *principle of security and of economy of force,* was forced to discontinue the offensive against Verdun in order to maintain a successful defense on the Somme.

(2) When General Joffre estimated that General von Falkenhayn had reduced his reserves too low on other parts of the line in order to conduct an offensive at Verdun, he obtained *security* at Verdun by launching a great major offensive on the Somme against a weakened portion of the German line.

c. Principle of movement. (1) When General von Falkenhayn estimated that the French could be "shot out" of the Verdun salient as von Mackensen had shot the Russians out of Hungary, in 1915, and told the infantry that all they would have "to do would be to mop-up and occupy the positions reduced by the artillery" and fixed a rate of advance accordingly, he violated the *principle of movement.*

(2) The artillery preparation at Verdun should have ended at dawn, and the infantry should have advanced at once as rapidly as the situation permitted, in order to reach the fur-

thermost point possible before French reserves could arrive. By not reaching the furthermost point before the French reserves came up, the German advance was slowed down and the chance of an almost certain victory was lost.

d. Principle of security. (1) When, at the Battle of the Somme, General Otto von Below with only eight divisions on a frontage of more than thirty miles organized his defense so effectively that he prevented the Allies' group of armies from penetrating the German lines, he illustrated the *principle of security.*

(2) On the other hand, when General Joffre did not keep the defenses at Verdun perfectly organized and in readiness to receive an attack, and was attacked and driven back there before those defenses were put in order, he violated the *principle of security.*

(3) Von Falkenhayn estimated that the French lines of communication to the Verdun salient could not supply a sufficient force in the Verdun salient to defend it against a major offensive attack, and that, being thus insecure, a slow movement offensive that would not cost so many lives, would be successful. The French promptly corrected that violation of *security* by the *surprise* introduction of a new weapon, i.e., a continuous truck train over the road from Bar-le-Duc, which by means of 3,000 trucks a day, furnished sufficient supplies to secure the defense of Verdun.

e. Principle of simplicity. (Maps 38, 41, 42 and 47.) When the Czar planned two divergent simultaneous operations on the Central Powers' front and a simultaneous operation on the Caucasus front, he violated the *principle of simplicity.* Under the control of the *principle of economy of force,* he should have left in the Caucasus only the troops necessary to protect the oil base. Then, in illustration of the *principle of the offensive,* he should have selected the direction line that was believed to be the decisive strategical direction, and while defending everywhere else, he should have launched his offensive on that line under the control of the *principle of mass, surprise, and movement.* By failing to do this, he failed to secure a decision.

f. Principle of cooperation. When the Czar advanced the date of the operation along the Niemen, in order to attract German troops from in front of Verdun to the Russian front and succeeded in doing so, he illustrated the *principle of cooperation.*

CHAPTER VII

Operations in 1916

Continued

	Page
1. Turkish Theater of Operations, 1916	132
a. Mesopotamian front	132
b. Syrian front	134
2. Italian Front	135
a. Plans	135
b. Austrian offensive, May, 1916	135
c. Italian offensive	136
3. Western Front—Second Battle of Verdun	136
a. Situation at end of August	136
b. Change of German attitude	136
c. Battle of attrition	137
d. French counter offensive	137
e. Results of the battle	138
4. Balkan Theater of Operations, 1916	138
a. Situation	138
b. The Roumanian theater	139
c. Plans and dispositions	141
d. Defeat of Roumania	143
e. Abdication of Greek King	145
5. Central Powers Seek Peace	145
a. General situation	145
b. Central Powers' proposals	146
c. Suggestions of "peace without victory"	146
6. Principles of War	146
a. Principle of security	146
b. Principle of mass	148
c. Principle of economy of force	148
d. Principle of the objective	149
e. Principle of simplicity	150

1. Turkish Theater of Operations. *a. Mesopotamian front.* (Maps 32, 43, 47A and 48.) (1) General Townsend was defeated at Ctesiphon, November 25, 1915, and retreated to Kut-el-Amara, a small town of about 7,000 people which is situated in a bend on the Tigris River, at the junction of that river with the Shat-el-Hai which connects the Euphrates River with the Tigris. He could have continued the retreat easily, but decided to hold Kut-el-Amara as a further withdrawal would endanger the British Mesopotamian oil base and

because of his estimate that the siege would be raised in a short time. He organized a shallow defensive zone at once across the narrow neck of land. He sent the cavalry brigade, the sick and wounded, and all but 3,000 of the transport animals down stream at once, but held all the heavy artillery transportation.

(2) (a) On December 5, General von der Goltz, the German Turkish commander, besieged Kut-el-Amara with four divisions. After a severe bombardment and after receiving a refusal to surrender, the Turkish forces assaulted unsuccessfully, on December 10 and 11. On December 24, the Turks, reinforced by another division, delivered another (and the last) determined but unsuccessful assault. Kut-el-Amara was completely invested and thereafter subjected to alomst continuous artillery bombardment, to airplane bombing from time to time, and to the starving out process. General von der Goltz organized a deep defensive zone from the Tigris to the Suweiki Marsh on the east, and on the west side of the Tigris, a long shallow defensive zone, strengthened with blockhouses and redoubts, to defend against the British relieving force then approaching.

(b) (i) General Townsend reduced the ration, conserved ammunition and held on. The Turks had removed all the millstones, and the grinding of cereals was impossible until airplanes from the relieving force dropped millstones into the inclosure.

(ii) The relieving force, under the command of General Lake, was made up of Indian troops from France, Egypt, and India. General Lake sent General Aylmer up the east bank of the Tigris with a hurriedly gathered relief expedition. General Aylmer defeated advanced Turkish forces in several delaying actions, and, on January 21, after an insufficient artillery preparation, delivered an unsuccessful attack against the front of the Turkish deep defensive zone at the Hanna position, east of the Tigris, and then intrenched in front of the Turkish line.

(iii) Reinforcements were then requested from Egypt. The second relief expedition, 20,000 strong, operated on the west bank of the Tigris. The plan of maneuver called for a fifteen mile night march and surprise attack from Sheik Saad against the Es-Sinn line at the redoubt Dujailah, with a converging penetrating attack between this redoubt and Shat-el-

Hai. The attack was delivered on March 9. The main attacking column under Major General Keary effected a surprise, but time consumed in deployment and waiting for the penetrating attack gave the Turks sufficient notice for a successful defense of the redoubt Dujailah. The penetrating force (including a brigade of cavalry) under General Kimball, did not reach its place of deployment until after broad daylight. That night, the attack was abandoned and the force withdrew to the position in front of the Hanna position.

(iv) A third relief attempt was made by General Maude, operating on both sides of the Tigris river. On April 5, he captured the Hanna position, and similar positions west of the river. By an attack that night, he captured an intermediate position between the Hanna and Sanna-i-yat positions. The next day, he was operating successfully against the Sanna-i-yat position when the Tigris overflowed its banks and swamped the trenches. On April 17, the attack was renewed on both sides of the river, with some success, but the Turks could not be dislodged.

(3) General Maude, lacking armored water craft, then made an unsuccessful attempt to send a fast steamer to Kut-el-Amara by night. After that failure, he began to drop sacks of flour within the besieged lines from airplanes, but could not furnish enough supplies in this manner.

(4) After all the food had been eaten and all the arms, equipment, and ammunition destroyed, General Townsend surrendered Kut-el-Amara, April 29, 1916.

(5) In August, General Maude was placed in command of the Mesopotamian force, and estimating that the Turks had assumed a defensive attitude in his front in order to exploit defenseless Persia, he decided to prepare and deliver a resolute offensive against Bagdad, the most sensitive Turkish area in Mesopotamia.

b. Syrian front. (1) (a) (Map 48.) After threatening for a long time from Arish, a specially organized expedition under the command of the German General von Kressenstein, with many German and Austrian officers and equipped for desert operations, moved along the Mediterranean coast line in July and established contact on August 4, with the British bridgehead east of the Suez Canal in the vicinity of Romani.

(b) The Turkish plan was to deliver a strong holding attack in front and envelop the southern flank of the British bridgehead force.

(2) (a) General Lawrence, the British commander, allowed the Turkish enveloping attack to spend its force against the front line of his organized bridgehead zone, and then delivered a counter enveloping attack against the left flank and rear of the Turkish attack. He followed up his counter attack with a cavalry charge and a pursuit which continued for three days and developed the repulse into a decisive victory.

(b) In these operations, monitors along the coast, cavalry and camel corps in the desert, and attack planes were all used to good advantage.

2. ITALIAN FRONT. (Maps 36, 37, 42 and 49). *a. Plans.* (1) The Central Powers' general plan for operations in 1916, called for an Austrian major offensive to be launched against Italy from the Trent salient.

(2) General Cadorna's general plan for 1916 was to continue the 1915 operations with the principal offensive blow on the Isonzo front.

b. The Austrian offensive (May 15-30). (1) General Conrad von Hotzendorf's plan of maneuver was to penetrate the Italian line between the Brenta and the Po Rivers, with a view of cutting off the Udine salient. The first objective was the plateau of Seven Communes which dominated the plain of Vicence. The Austrian Army, for this operation under the command of Archduke Eugene, was strengthened to about 400,000 men by divisions called from the Balkans and from Russia. It was well equipped with modern arms, including heavy artillery.

(2) The Austrians attacked on May 15, and, securing an initial success, advanced rapidly. By May 30, the Italian situation was critical. But the Italian line on either side of the salient held and allowed General Cadorna to move the reserve army from the vicinity of Vicence to the threatened front and confine the new Austrian sailent, June 20, to a depth of not over sixteen miles, where the lines were stabilized.

(3) The Allied offensives on the Somme and in Russia forced the Austrian General Headquarters to withdraw divisions and artillery from the Archduke's army. He decided at once to retreat, and pressed by General Cadorna, evacuated his positions progressively until, at the end of June, he had

fallen back about ten miles to a mountain defensive zone which he held by the method of position warfare.

c. Italian offensive. (1) General Cadorna did not permit the Archduke's offensive from the Trent salient to stop his offensive on the Isonzo, the object of which was the capture of Goritzia and the important heights north of Monfacone which mark the beginning of the Carso.

(2) The Duke of Aosta, commanding the Third Army, launched an attack, August 4, at the southern end of the line, against the heights of the Carso. Then General Cadorna began a powerful artillery preparation, August 6, against Goritzia and farther to the north. August 7, the assault captured the Austrian bridgehead west of Goritzia, and on August 9, the Italian troops entered Goritzia, from which only a part of the population had fled. Farther south, the advance reached and held the plateau of Doberdo, which was the first step in the Carso, on the route to Trieste.

(3) The Austrian resistance then stiffened and the attack slowed down. The Austrian line was organized as a deep defensive zone and was made exceptionally strong on the route to Trieste.

(4) The Duke of Aosta, after a fifteen days' rest and reorganization of the army resumed the attack, and by the middle of November, by the method of attrition and at heavy cost, had advanced his whole line about two miles.

3. WESTERN FRONT—SECOND BATTLE OF VERDUN. (Maps 42, 44, 45, and 50). *a. Situation to end of August.* (1) Although General von Falkenhayn withdrew troops from Verdun to defend at the Somme, he did not abandon his offensive attitude against that point and the German people still expected, daily, to hear of the capture of Verdun.

(2) General Nivelle, as soon as he observed that the German pressure had slackened, planned a local counter offensive to relieve Verdun of the Souville menace. He initiated that counter offensive by a system of local attacks and counter attacks with a view of recovering the Cold Ground and Fleury. These operations were in the sector of General Mangin and were executed brilliantly under the tactics of limited objectives. By the end of August, Fleury, all of Cold Ground, and Fort Thiaumont had been recaptured.

b. Change of German attitude. Marshal von Hindenburg relieved General von Falkenhayn as chief of staff on August 28.

He saw the futility of continuing the Verdun offensive and ordered that a defensive attitude be taken up in front of Verdun.

c. Battle of attrition. During September and the greater part of October, General Nivelle, taking full advantage of his opportunity to return the compliment of a battle of attrition to the Germans, used his artillery with such good effect as to make a slaughterhouse of the German advanced positions in front of Verdun.

d. French counter offensive. (1) On October 24, at 11:40 AM, the French launched a surprise attack with three divisions on a six mile front to take the limited objective: Hardaumont —Douamont. In this attack, General Nivelle introduced a new feature by not using the long continued artillery preparation that had preceded attacks up to that time. The artillery preparation was very short but was carried out by a great assemblage of guns, all of which fired at their maximum rate preceding the infantry attack. More than 400 pieces of heavy artillery, alone, were engaged. The infantry advanced under a dense smoke screen. At 4:00 PM, Douaumont had been captured. The seven front line German divisions in that sector broke and retreated in a rout. Full advantage, however, could not be taken of the opportunity as the Germans in Fort Vaux, by flank fire, were exacting a terrible toll from the French.

(2) General Nivelle treated the reduction of Fort Vaux as a separate local maneuver, and, after an artillery preparation, launched an attack against it on November 2. By November 5, the French had occupied the town and fort of Vaux.

(3) General Nivelle decided to take full advantage of the improved situation at Verdun and planned a new attack for December with its objective—the recapture of the line: Hardaumont—Bezonville—Pepper Hill. This line had been organized thoroughly by the Germans as a deep defensive zone. General Mangin, who was to command in the local attack, prepared for the maneuver for six weeks with four specially selected divisions. A tremendous amount of ammunition and material was accumulated and the troops, in back areas, rehearsed the part each unit was to play, down to the detail of the duty of each man. The artillery was brought as far forward as possible in order to increase the depth of its support.

(4) Although the weather was wintry and observation poor, the artillery preparation began on December 11 and continued to the 15th, when the four divisions advanced to the

attack on a front of eight miles. The battle was violent, particularly on the right, where the plan called for a deeper advance.

e. Results of the battle. On December 18, General Mangin held the line: Pepper Hill—Louvemont—Bezonvaux, which was practically the original French third position. It was also the line reached by the Crown Prince in the launching of his attack in February, 1916. Thus ended the struggle at Verdun, which consisted of the German offensive and the French counter offensive, with a total loss, including prisoners, dead, sick, and wounded of 350,000 for the French and 600,000 for the Germans.

4. BALKAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1916. (Maps 42, 51, 52 and 53). *a. Situation.* (1) At the beginning of the war, Serbia and Montenegro were on the side of the Allies. All the other Balkan states, i.e., Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Roumania were neutral.

(2) The Allies, in 1915, with the purpose of opening Russia's line of communications with her munitions base in Western Europe, selected the Dardanelles as the direction line for the operation. The Allies, however, were unable to defeat Turkey in that restricted theater and from it they were unable to help Serbia, which was threatened by a Central Powers' major offensive. If Serbia did not repulse this Central Powers' offensive, it would threaten the Allies' rear. Hence, the Allies, while still maintaining the objective of connecting with Russia, changed their line of direction from the Dardanelles to the railroad lines across the Balkans to Russia, and, with two divisions from Gallipoli, established a base at Saloniki, in October, 1915.

(3) The people of Bulgaria, as Slavs, were loyal to Russia and pro-Ally, but Czar Ferdinand was a German, and, on July 12, 1915, signed a secret treaty with the Central Powers under which, in consideration of the promise of Serbian Macedonia, Saloniki, and Epirus, he pledged Bulgaria to enter the war when called upon. The Central Powers, with their new ally, Bulgaria, defeated Serbia, and the Central Powers and Turkey established communication.

(4) When Roumania joined the Allies, in August, 1916, the Central Powers were defending against allied offensives on the French front at the Somme, on the Italian front, and on the Russian front. The situation was exceedingly grave for the Central Powers. By common consent, supreme command of

all the Central Powers' forces was given to the Emperor of Germany. In the great emergency then confronting the Central Powers, he authorized his new Chief of Staff, von Hindenburg to issue orders to all Central Powers' forces in all tactical and strategical situations "By order of his Majesty." The Central Powers thus secured the great advantage that comes from Unity of Command.

(5) The Greek situation was complicated and was as follows: (a) Under the treaty which assured Greek independence, France, Great Britain, and Russia were made the Guardian Powers of Greece's constitutional government. Under the constitution of Greece, in order to protect the liberties of the people, the King of Greece was required to follow the advice of the Prime Minister. When, due to the influence of Germany and Austria (who when Serbia was mentioned always saw Russia), Serbia was denied a port on the Adriatic Sea after the Balkan wars, Greece obligated herself by treaty to give Serbia a corridor to the sea at Saloniki and to go to Serbia's assistance as an ally if Serbia should be attacked by Bulgaria.

(b) In 1915, the Greek Prime Minister was M. Venizelos, who, observing that Bulgaria was mobilizing on the flank of Serbia, acted at once under the terms of the Serbian treaty, by calling on the Guardian Powers, September 21, 1915, to send a force of 150,000 men at once to the Serbian corridor at Saloniki. The Guardian Powers agreed September 24, and Greece, amid great enthusiasm (as the people were pro-Ally) began to mobilize at once. Under that authority and in their own right as Guardian Powers, Great Britain and France began to land troops at Saloniki, October 3, 1915. King Constantine who was hostile to the Allies soon dismissed M. Venizelos and concentrated the army in Thessaly, with strong detachments holding the northern frontier.

(6) The Allies, by promising Transylvania, won Roumania and she signed a secret treaty, August 17, pledging herself, as one of the Allies. Her army had been mobilized for some time, her crops had been harvested, and she could begin operations as soon as officers and men could be recalled from leave.

b. The Roumanian theater. (1) Roumania was bounded on the east by the Black Sea and Russia, on the north by Russia and Austria-Hungary, on the west by Austria-Hungary and on the south by Bulgaria. The boundary between Aus-

tria-Hungary and Roumania from the north followed the crests of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps. From Orsova, the boundary of Roumania coincided with the Danube, which separates that country for a short distance from Serbia, and then, turning eastward, from Bulgaria, as far as a point southeast of Bucharest. From that point the boundary line with Bulgaria runs across the Dobruja plain to the Black Sea. There are many passes through the mountains into Transylvania, but no bridges across the Danube into Bulgaria.

(2) The Dobruja is that part of Roumania which lies between the Danube and the Black Sea. It is a treeless, arid plateau, to which the rest of Roumania has access by crossings at Turtukai, at Silistria, and over the modern bridge at Cernavoda. It constitutes a bridgehead for operations to the south, and is a very sensitive area in Roumania, as the great railroad line from Bucharest to Constanza crosses it.

(3) That part of Roumania which is called Wallachia formed a great salient between Austria-Hungary on the north and Bulgaria on the south. The salient was about one hundred miles wide at the neck, and about two hundred miles deep from that line. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary, following the mountain line, dented a big salient into Roumania from the northern end of Moldavia to the western end of Wallachia. That salient was about one hundred and fifty miles across at the base and about one hundred miles deep.

(4) (a) The railroad situation greatly favored the Central Powers. Their roads were nearly all main line roads and cross-connected to expedite troop movements for concentration at any point on the Roumanian salient or for side movement. The railroads of Roumania, on the other hand, with one or two exceptions, were not main line roads, and did not provide for cross traffic. Also, their capacity was small and side movement difficult. The Bagdad railroad passed about sixty miles from Roumania, and about one hundred miles from the Saloniki army.

(b) Roumanian railroads touched the Danube at six places. Bulgarian railroads, branches of the Bagdad railroad, touched the Danube at three places. Neither were well supplied with strategical cross lines at the boundary. No railroads led from the Saloniki army line to Bulgaria, except by extending the east flank to Dedegatch, and on the left

flank by an advance to Kustendi. The best line of advance from Saloniki was along the Saloniki—Nish railroad.

(5) The people of Roumania and of Transylvania were largely of the same race and many, for a long time, had held the aspiration of coming together under the Roumanian Government. The people of Roumania were exceedingly pro-Ally and greatly desired to enter the war.

c. Plans and dispositions. (1) *Allies' plan.* (a) By August 17, the Allies had stopped the Central Powers' offensives on the Western and Italian fronts, and had forced the Central Powers to the defensive on all fronts; the Battle of the Somme was at its height; General Brussilloff's offensive had reached the crests of the Carpathians to the north of Roumania and was still advancing. The Allies believed that they were holding the Central Powers east and west and now had a chance to end the war by striking a decisive blow against the Central Powers' unprotected southern flank.

(b) Their general plan for operations in the Balkans was that Roumania, without uncovering her Bulgarian frontier, should conduct an offensive across Transylvania towards Budapest; that Russia, while continuing to act as energetically as possible on the Austrian front, should send two infantry divisions and one cavalry division into the Dobruja to cooperate with the Roumanians against the Bulgarians; and that the Saloniki army should deliver a determined offensive against Bulgaria not later than eight days before the launching of the Roumanian offensive, with the mission of cutting the Bagdad railroad and attracting Bulgaria's army from Roumania.

(2) *The Central Powers' plan.* (a) General von Falkenhayn had realized for more than a year that Roumania would eventually join the Allies and had been restrained from a surprise offensive against her only by the fact that the Central Powers were receiving great quantities of food supplies from her. However, to be ready for Roumania and to brace Bulgaria, he had left a German force under von Mackensen in Bulgaria after the Serbian defeat.

(b) His general plan for the operation, which was later adopted by von Hindenburg, was to cut the Roumanian line of communications with Russia in the Dobruja and then to destroy Roumania by a converging operation on the Roumanian troops in the Wallachian salient and by the capture of Bucharest. He also planned to destroy the Saloniki army by a con-

verging operation, associated, if possible, with a surprise offensive against its rear by the Greek army in Thessaly.

(3) *Dispositions.* (a) *Allies.* (i) *Roumanian force.* Roumania mobilized about 500,000 men, organized them, in the beginning, into four armies, and concentrated them as follows:

The First Army, from Orsova to the pass of the Red Tower.
The Second Army, from the Red Tower pass to the pass of Oitoz.
The Army of the North, from the pass of Oitoz to Dorna Watra.
The Army of the South (which was weak), to observe the Bulgarian frontier from Orsova to the Black Sea.

The enlisted personnel and the junior officers of the Roumanian army were excellent material but were not trained for modern war.

There were enough rapid fire 75-mm. guns for peace strength, but not enough for war. Practically no heavy artillery or mountain artillery, only six machine guns per regiment, and no air service, were on hand.

The stock of ammunition was very insufficient. The munitions and material of all kinds that France and England had sent by way of Vladivostock and Archangel were stored at those places, and their movement forbidden by the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sturmer, who was later discovered to have been a tool of Germany.

The Roumanian Armies were directed by the Chief of the General Staff, General Iliescu.

(ii) *Saloniki force.* By the end of 1915, General Sarrail had organized a very large intrenched camp in front of Saloniki, from the Vardar to the sea, and a base of sufficient capacity for the operations of a large force.

In April and May, the Serbian Army, which the French had salvaged, rearmed, re-equipped and reorganized, in strength 120,000, arrived. Soon, Italian, Greek, Russian, and British contigents arrived and carried the total force to more than 300,000 men, which General Sarrail organized into an army, and which he named the Army of the Orient. Its order of battle from right to left was: British—Italian—French—Serbian.

(b) *Central Powers.* (i) *Against Roumania.* Marshal von Hindenburg, now Chief of the German General Staff, conducted the Balkan operations from General Headquarters at Pless, on the Eastern front. He concentrated two groups for operation against Roumania as follows:

The southern group, consisting of German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, south of the Danube, in the Plevna area, was to strike the first blow in the Dobruja, and then to cross the Danube near Sistova, constituting the southern converging force against the Wallachian salient. This group was placed under von Mackensen who had remained in the Balkans after the defeat of Serbia as Germany's special representative in that theater.

The northern group, consisting of the German Ninth Army (General von Falkenhayn) opposite the Vulcan Pass and the Austrian Army of Archduke Francis Joseph farther north in Transylvania, were constituted the northern converging force which was to strike at Wallachia through the mountain passes. It was placed under command of the Austrian Archduke Charles.

(ii) *Against the Saloniki force.* The Bulgarian General Jekoff commanded the group of armies in front of General Sarrail's Army in Macedonia.

The order of battle from east to west was:

Bulgarian Second Army (General Teodorov),
German Eleventh Army (General von Winckler),
Bulgarian First Army (General Gneshov).

(c) *Greece.* The Greek Army, mobilized at war strength, had been concentrated in Thessaly, with detachments holding the frontier. It had been well trained and equipped under the Prussian system. Its action was completely controlled by King Constantine.

d. Defeat of Roumania. (1) (a) General Sarrail was prepared to advance August 19, which was eight days before Roumania declared war, but von Hindenburg forestalled him. General Jekoff, the Bulgarian commander, delivered a double enveloping attack against General Sarrail's two wings. The Greeks opened the passes and allowed the Bulgarians to enter. On the eastern flank, the Greek IV Corps merely looked on while the Bulgarian troops marched past, and, with their own consent, were interned by the German liaison officers.

(b) General Sarrail, fearful lest the Greek army in Thessaly should surprise him by a blow in the back, delayed his operations until the Allies, by an ultimatum and a naval economic blockade, forced a demobilization of the Greek army. As a result, General Sarrail did not advance until September 12, which was sixteen days too late.

(2) On August 28, General Iliescu, the Roumanian commander, sent the First, Second and North Armies through the passes. They surprised and easily pushed back the Austrian covering troops and by September 10 had reached the line: Dorna Watra—Sibin—Orsova, on a 550 mile front.

(3) On September 11, von Mackensen sent three divisions into the Dobruja. Although defeated, on September 16, by Russian and Roumanian forces, they held the line of the *Trajan Wall*, thus cutting the Roumanian line of sea communication with Russia and protecting von Mackensen's right flank.

(4) (a) On September 16, Archduke Charles began his counter offensive, by concentrating against the Roumanian First Army, which he defeated September 26-29, at the battle of Harmanstatt or Sibin. The Roumanian First Army retreated and carried the line back with it to the frontier along the mountain crests on which the armies stopped, October 15, with the intention of defending.

(b) Archduke Charles was not able to enter the Red Tower or the Tomos passes as planned. Accordingly, he demonstrated violently against the northen (Moldavian) part of the line, at the northern end of which the Roumanian Northern Army connected with General Brusilloff's armies, and then launched his principal offensive against the Vulcan pass.

(c) The Archduke Charles forced the Vulcan pass on November 14, and severely defeated the Roumanian First Army at Turgu-Jin on November 15-16. After marching more than seventy-five miles in four days, he occupied Craiova, November 21. On November 24, changing direction to the east, his cavalry established contact with von Mackensen's armies west of Bucharest.

(5) Von Mackensen waited south of the Danube until the northern force had passed the Alps, then on November 25, under the diversion of offensive action by his detachment in Dobruja, he crossed the Danube on numerous ponton bridges at Sistova and farther to the west. On the 27th, at Giorgevo, he established contact with his detachment in Dobruja.

(6) Marshal von Hindenburg then placed von Mackensen in charge of the whole operation to capture Bucharest. The latter planned a double envelopment with his own column to the south and von Falkenhayn's columns to the north. The columns from the Red Tower and the Tomos passes were to cut the Roumanian line of retreat to Moldavia. The Roumanian

ian General Averescu, tried to defend Bucharest for three days with five divisions, but his line of communications was threatened by von Mackensen's turning maneuver, and he abandoned the capital, December 6.

(7) The Roumanian armies, by retreating very rapidly, escaped from the von Mackensen enveloping maneuver and gained the line: Carpathains—Sereth—Danube, where they were met with Russian reinforcements and reorganized.

(8) Von Mackensen's new southern group then joined hands with Archduke Francis Joseph's army, which sent detachments through Oitoz pass, and, together, they captured Foscani, on January 7.

(9) The Bulgarian detachment in the Dobruja then advanced to the Danube and connected with the rest of the Central Powers' line at Braila.

(10) (a) General Sarrail in Macedonia attacked September 12, from the Vardar to Lake Ostrowo with Serbians as advance guards of all the columns. The Serbians on the left of the line, in steady mountain fighting, slowly captured hill after hill and reoccupied Monastir on November 19, and thereafter extended the line to Valona, on the Adriatic Sea.

(b) General Sarrail then decided that the operation could not be carried farther that year, and organized the line as a deep defensive zone from the Struma to Monastir, and as a shallow zone along the rest of the line.

e. Abdication of Greek King. (1) In the meantime, M. Venizelos had been dismissed as Premier of Greece. The northeastern provinces and the islands of Greece seceded, joined the Allies, elected M. Venizelos President of their Provisional Government, and organized a Greek Army of 80,000 men which reported to General Sarrail for duty with the Allies.

(2) In December, France, Great Britain, and Russia acting under the treaty of 1863 in their capacity as Guardians of Constitutional Government in Greece, forced Constantine to abdicate the throne. He was succeeded by his second son, Alexander, who shared the people's friendly attitude toward the Allies, and, complying with constitutional methods, recalled M. Venizelos to the control of the government as Prime Minister.

5. CENTRAL POWERS SEEK PEACE. (Map 57.) *a. General situation.* At the end of 1916, the Central Powers had failed

to force a separate peace from any of the Allies except Montenegro. They had overrun the little countries of Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania, and had attained the objective of a "Mittel Europa," extended to include Turkey. The status of all the Balkan States had been fixed by the end of 1916, with regard to the war and there was no prospect of any more allies for the Central Powers in that section. In fact, the Central Powers had reached their point of culmination from the point of view of accretion by allies in Europe, and were defending on a total frontage of about 2,640 miles. Apparently, the resources and strength of the Central Powers would thereafter decline. From the point of view of the Central Powers, who were being subjected to a strategical siege by the Allies, the psychological moment had arrived for peace. Austria-Hungary, after the Trent defeat, proposed negotiations for peace, but Germany was not then ready.

b. Central Powers' proposal. December 12, just six days after the fall of Bucharest, the Kaiser, representing all the Central Powers, communicated with the Allies, through the United States, and requested them to meet the Central Powers in conference with the view of formulating terms of peace. The Allies, having nothing to gain and everything to lose by a peace at that time, declined the offer.

c. Suggestion of "peace without victory." (1) On December 18, the President of the United States, Mr. Wilson, asked each of the belligerents for a statement of its objectives in the war, and, on January 22, 1917, suggested a "peace without victory."

(2) The Kaiser, in reply, suggested a peace conference.

(3) The Allies, in reply, declined to discuss peace until Germany should agree to make restitution and reparation, and to give guarantees.

6. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. Principle of security.* (Maps 1, 41, 42, 51, 52, 53 and 57.) (1) (a) When Roumania joined the Allies August 27, 1916, she was not properly prepared, from point of view of weapons and munitions to wage war. She had no air service, very few machine guns, no heavy artillery, and only enough light artillery for the peace strength of her army. Roumania was dependent on her Allies in Western Europe for all arms and munitions. The blockade which the Central Powers had established against the Russian supply line across the Balkans, after the defeat of Serbia, in 1915, became

effective against Roumania, also, as soon as the latter declared herself on the side of the Allies. Thereafter, the only supply line was the Russian supply line via Vladivostock on the Pacific Ocean and via Archangel on the Arctic Ocean. These supply lines were not sufficient for the needs of Russia alone, and their use to meet the needs of Roumania were entirely dependent on Russian courtesy in placing the supply of her own needs in abeyance while she met the necessities of her Ally.

(b) From the point of view of supply, Roumania was undertaking to make war without having first complied with the *principle of security*. Her insecurity was later proven by decisive defeat.

(2) (a) The Allies' plan called for an offensive operation by General Sarrail against the Central Powers' forces which were between his army and Roumania. This offensive was to be launched eight days before Roumania should declare war with the view of drawing the Central Powers' forces away from the southern boundary of Roumania.

(b) M. Venizelos, who was friendly to the Allies, had been dismissed from the position of Prime Minister of Greece, and the Greek forces that had been mobilized by M. Venizelos to help the Allies were under the direct command of King Constantine, who was hostile to the Allies. The Greek army, well equipped and trained, was concentrated in Thessaly in rear of General Sarrail's army. Greek detachments held the mountain passes on the boundary in front of General Sarrail's army and thus executed the duties that ordinarily would have been expected of covering detachments from General Sarrail's army. Greece insisted that she was neutral, but when General Sarrail was ready to advance under the plan, the Greek detachments opened the mountain passes to the Bulgarian forces, which, under the *principle of surprise,* forestalled General Sarrail's advance and prevented his compliance with the *principle of cooperation* in the combined Allied operation in the Balkans, as he was afraid to advance until the Greek army in his rear was immobilized.

(c) In the preparation for the 1916 campaign in the Balkans, when General Sarrail did not, in advance, take the necessary measures to protect his rear, his flanks, and the mountain passes to the front with troops under his own command, he violated the *principle of security,* which requires

that an independent commander shall take such measures as are necessary to insure his freedom of action.

b. Principle of mass. (1) Although the Central Powers, after their defeat at the Marne, had expected the final accretion of Roumania to the Allies, and had prepared plans for use in such a contingency, they were not actually ready to meet that contingency when Roumania effected a surprise declaration of war against them, August 27, 1916. On that day, the Central Powers were conducting a dubious defensive on all fronts and there were practically no Central Powers' troops on the Austro-Roumanian frontier.

(2) The Roumanian and Saloniki forces totaled more than 800,000 men which was a preponderance of more than two to one against the Central Powers' forces intervening between those Allied armies.

(3) The center of gravity of the mass of Central Powers' forces (excluding Turkey) was well north of Vienna. All Central Powers' forces to the north of Roumania were superior in training, equipment, and fire power to the Roumanian forces. Any advance by the Roumanian forces north along the decisive direction that threatened invasion of Austria and Hungary would necessarily attract to its front a force also superior in numbers.

(4) On the other hand, the Central Powers' troops in the Balkans were almost entirely Bulgarians, who were not superior to the Roumanians in training or morale, and whose superiority in fire power was not so pronounced as that of Central Powers' troops north of Roumania.

(5) The Allies had the advantage of mass for operations against the Bulgarians' forces between Roumania and the Saloniki army, but did not have that advantage for operations by Roumania against the Central Powers' forces to the north, with the result that the opportunity to take advantage of compliance with the *principle of mass* in opening a supply line through the Balkans under the *principle of security* was lost when Roumania frittered away her superiority in an unaided, hopeless, attack against the tremendously superior Central Powers' forces to the north.

c. Principle of economy of force. (1) The whole frontier between Roumania and Austria was buttressed in the strongest way by the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps. Roumania held the passes through those mountains.

The Transylvanians on the Hungarian side of those mountains were racially and in national point of view the friends of the Roumanians. Roumania could have held those passes with a comparatively small force. She thus could have gained for maneuver along her supply line to Saloniki, practically her total *mass*. Without regard to the direction of the Roumanian blow it would have taken a considerable time for the Central Powers to assemble a sufficient force in the Balkans to gain *mass*. If the Central Powers should have attempted to force the Roumanian mountain frontier, which is extremely unlikely, the advantage of *mass* would have continued with the Allies still longer in the operation against the Bulgarians.

(2) In an analysis of the situation existing on August 27, 1916, it must be concluded that the Allies did not appreciate the fact that by complying with the *principle of economy of force*, Roumania would have been able to illustrate the *principle of mass* in an operation that should have opened a supply line from Saloniki, and thus have produced a supply situation in Roumania that would have illustrated the *principle of security*.

d. Principle of the objective. (1) When Roumania decided to cast her lot with the Allies, her first duty was to select the first and main objective which she should endeavor to attain. Her supply situation was not satisfactory and rendered her insecure in the maintenance of war until she should secure a means of supply.

(2) If she had assumed a defensive attitude, her supplies would have become more and more attenuated and eventually she would have been forced to make peace because of inability to make war. If she had assumed an offensive attitude, she could have directed her operations against the main Central Powers' armies to the north. That, however, would not have helped her supply situation. In fact, her supplies would have been consumed more rapidly than if she had assumed the defensive attitude.

(3) In addition, if she had operated to the north, while in that insecure supply condition, she would have been further handicapped by the fact that her enemies, day by day, would have illustrated an increasing compliance with the *principle of mass*. This would have resulted, at no distant date, in the arrival of the point of culmination, when the enemy would

have had the ascendency and, in an aggressive offensive, would have defeated her. That is just what happened.

(4) On the other hand, if Roumania had launched her offensive on the decisive supply line toward Saloniki, she could have gained the advantage of compliance with the *principles of surprise and mass,* and if successful, as she probably would have been, she would have won compliance with the *principle of security.* Having become secure from a supply point of view, and having helped Russia to become secure from that same viewpoint, she could have undertaken operations with the cooperation of her Allies, Russia and the Saloniki force, against the unprotected southern flank of Austria-Hungary, with a greater hope of success.

(5) It thus appears that inasmuch as Roumania, from a supply point of view, was not secure when she entered the war against the Central Powers on August 27, 1916, her first and main objective should have been to win that security, which meant, in the then existing situation, defeating the Bulgarian army and opening a supply line from Saloniki.

e. Principle of simplicity. (1) (a) On August 27, 1916, the day that Roumania declared war against them, the Central Powers, under the *principle of cooperation* were defending on the Russian, the Italian, and the Western fronts. The Central Powers situation was exceedingly grave, and, saving mistakes by the Allies, had the elements of disaster in it.

(b) To meet that situation the Central Powers at once abandoned compliance with the *principle of cooperation* and turning to the great *principle of simplicity* as illustrated in *unity of command,* they conferred "Supreme Command" on the Emperor of Germany.

(c) In his new position of "All Supreme Commander" of all Central Powers' forces, the Kaiser conferred on von Hindenburg (whom he had just selected as Chief of the German General Staff) the power to make decisions and issue the necessary instructions in all strategical and tactical situations.

(2) (a) Von Hindenburg at once recognized the *principle of the offensive* as the controlling principle in that dangerous situation, and complying with the *principle of economy of force,* he stripped still further the already thin lines in front of the Allies and thus gained sufficient troops with which to illustrate *mass* on the Roumanian front.

(b) Then in an illustration of the *principle of surprise and movement,* he advanced along the strategically decisive direction around the Roumanian left and rear and defeated the Roumanian armies, giving thus an illustration of compliance with the *principle of the offensive* in meeting and defeating an insecure enemy offensive.

(c) Von Hindenburg gives here a good illustration of the fact that in the combined operations of allies, the controlling principle is not *cooperation* but *simplicity* as illustrated by *unity of command.*

CHAPTER VIII

Operations in 1917, Preceding Entry of America

Page

1. African Theater of Operations, 1917 152
   a. Situation 152
   b. Allied plans 153
   c. Operations 153
2. Turkish Theater of Operations 154
   a. Mesopotamian front 154
   b. Syrian front 155
3. Situation in European Theater, January 1, 1917 158
   a. Central Powers' growth 158
   b. Encircling policy of Allies 158
   c. Change in French High Command 158
4. Plans of Campaign 159
   a. Central Powers 159
   b. Allies 159
5. Submarine Warfare 159
   a. Method of waging 159
   b. Method of defense 160
   c. Effect on neutral world 160
6. Western Front 161
   a. Situation 161
   b. Order of battle, January 1, 1917 161
   c. Plans 162
   d. German retreat 163
   e. General Nivelle's spring offensive 163
      (1) Plans 163
      (2) Operations 164
         (a) Marshal Haig's operation 164
         (b) General Michler's operation 165
7. Principles of War 168
   a. Principle of the objective 168
   b. Principle of security 169
   c. Principle of the offensive 169

1. African Theater of Operations. (Maps 1 and 54.) *a. Situation.* (1) German East Africa was the most important of the German colonies and maintained its defense for three years. In extent, it was equal to Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark.

(2) The terrain rose in terraces from the eastern coastal plain to a central plateau which descended steeply towards the

central African lakes. The frontier on the north was a chain of mountains. The western border between the lakes was also mountainous and impassable. On the southwest, an impassable mountain range closed the gap between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa.

(3) The Germans had two railroads. One ran from Dar-es-Salaam, on the coast, across the colony to Lake Tanganyika. The other ran from Tanga, on the coast, to the base of Mt. Kilimanjaro. The Allies had one railroad that ran fron Mombasa, on the coast, up into the Uganda country. The terrain limited an Allied offensive practically to operations from Uganda.

(4) The German forces consisted of native troops, with many German officers, under the command of the General von Lettow-Vorbeck. The Allied troops were native Africans and East Indians.

(5) In November, 1914, General von Lettow-Vorbeck defeated the Allies under General Aitken at Tanga, and again, in January, 1915, at Jassin. From then until 1916, when General Smuts was made Commander-in-Chief of Allied operations in East Africa, General von Lettow-Vorbeck maintained his colony intact and raided Uganda. He had organized a deep defensive zone at all the northern passes.

b. Allied plans. (1) General Smuts arrived at Mombasa, February 19, 1916, and decided to assume the strategical and tactical offensive at once. His general plan for the operation was to conduct a major offensive from the north, and synchronous minor offensives from all the neighboring colonies and from the sea, i.e., a policy of encirclement.

(2) His detailed plan was for the major offensive to penetrate the frontier in the vicinity of Mt. Kilimanjaro, and, operating on the higher and cooler land, to penetrate the colony to the Rufiji River, cutting both German railroads. The minor offensives were to penetrate from Lake Victoria, from Lake Kivu, from Lake Tanganyika, and from Lake Nyasa.

c. Operations. (1) (a) The operations began at dusk, March 5, 1916. General Smuts captured the railroad terminus near Mt. Kilimanjaro, March 13. He then reorganized his force into three divisions, two composed of African troops, and one of Indian and British troops.

(b) He then, on April 3, started the minor offensives, and also sent the second division by a forced march to the high

ground at Kondoa Irangi. The detachment easily lived off the country and defeated a counter attack from Dodoma.

(2) Shortly thereafter, he moved down parallel to the Tanga railroad, and concentrated at Handeni, June 18. A detachment with assistance from the navy captured Tanga on July 7, and thus secured a closer base. The columns then advanced to the south and cut the central railroad and the minor offensives closed in.

(3) When, on September 3, with the assistance of the Navy, Dar-es-Salaam was captured, General Smuts had deprived his opponent of both railroads and had secured for himself a new base.

(4) On January 26, 1917, General Smuts left for the Imperial War Conference, and General Hoskens and, later, General Van Deventer continued the operations.

(5) On November 26, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, with his remaining troops, crossed into Portuguese East Africa. The control of German East Africa then passed to Breat Britain.

2. TURKISH THEATER OF OPERATIONS. (Maps 43, 47A, 48, 55 and 56.) *a. Mesopotamian front.* (1) (a) General Townsend surrendered Kut-el-Amara, April 29, 1916. The relieving columns remained in place and, in August, General Maude was placed in command. He reorganized the expedition, accumulated a large amount of supplies, increased the radius of activity of his land and river transportation sufficiently to reach Bagdad, and added river gunboats to his fleet of steamers. Functioning under the Allied plan of campaign, which required him to assume the offensive, he decided to recapture Kut-el-Amara.

(b) General von der Goltz had died of fever, but his successor, Ahmed Bey, had strengthened the Kut position. The deep defensive zone north of the Tigris had been made very strong and the bridgehead south of Kut had been organized into a very strong deep defensive zone. The Germans and Turks believed that the place could not be captured and had sent a reinforced corps into Persia to menace India.

(2) General Maude's general plan for the operation was to deliver a holding attack, very strong in artillery fire, north of the Tigris at Sanna-i-yat, and to turn the Kut position by an attack south of the Tigris with a view of cutting the enemy line of communications.

(3) (a) The holding attack was delivered December 13, 1916. The next day, the turning attack was delivered with infantry east of the Hai River and with cavalry west of it. A line was attained from which artillery fire could be delivered against Kut. Siege methods then were adopted.

(b) By maneuver, the attack was carried to the west and Dahra Bend captured, February 15, 1917.

(c) General Maude then, under cover of a successful attack at Sanna-i-yat, crossed the Tigris at Shumran Bend on the night of February 23-24. The enemy at once evacuated Kut. General Maude pursued with gunboats on the river and with cavalry north of the river.

(4) (a) On February 27, General Maude halted at Azidizeh to reorganize and to establish an advanced base. Then, using his cavalry as a screen, he resumed the advance on March 5. Orders were given for the return of all Turkish troops in Persia but it was too late.

(b) (i) General Maude arrived opposite Bagdad, on March 8, and decided to deliver a feint and holding attack by cavalry from the south and west, and to turn the city by the main attack which should cross the Diala River and cut the enemy line of communications.

(ii) The main attack attempted to cross at four places. Three of the attempts failed. A part of the northern column crossed before daylight, March 9, and maintained itself all day with the assistance of artillery fire from across the river.

(iii) The feint by the cavalry on March 9, under cover of a dust storm, advanced, and drove the enemy out of Bagdad to the north. On the night of March 9-10, the main body crossed the Diala, and entered Bagdad, March 11.

(c) General Maude then made his position secure by taking up advance positions on the Diala, the Tigris, and the Euphrates.

b. Syrian front. (1) *Situation.* (a) When the Sultan of Turkey joined the Central Powers in 1914, he, as the head of the Mohammedan faith, proclaimed a Holy War against the Allies and called on all true believers to make war against them. However, his proclamation lacked full effectiveness, inasmuch as the holy city of Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed and the depository of the Kaaba and other sacred relics of Islam, was in the actual possession of the Sherif of Mecca, over whom he had little control.

Great Britain met the Holy War proclamation by an announcement that she would not interfere with the Mussulman pilgrimages to Mecca as long as Turkey did not interfere.

(b) December 17, 1914, the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas II, cast in his lot with Turkey. Great Britain at once proclaimed Egypt a British protectorate, forced Abbas II to flee to Constantinople, and placed the eldest living male descendant of Mahomet Ali on the throne of Egypt with the title of Sultan. Mussulmen, other than Turks, approved of that action.

(c) Both the Turks and the Arabians are Mohammedans, but they have never affiliated except on the basis of "the conquerors" and "the conquered." At the beginning of the war, Turkey greatly strengthened the garrison in the vicinity of Mecca, an action which was interpreted by the Arabians to mean that the supremacy of Turkey and not of Islam was desired. On June 9, 1916, the Grand Sherif of Mecca declared the independence of Arabia from Turkey, was crowned King of Hedjaz, and assumed the title of "Commander of the Faithful," and "Keeper of the Holy Places." At once, he organized an army and began operations against the Turks.

(d) In the preliminary operation incident to ejection of the Turkish garrisons, the Turks committed the fatal mistake of firing on the Holy Places and thus furnished the King of Hedjaz with evidence that he was actually defending Islamism against the Sultan of Turkey. In pursuance of a broad strategical policy, the Allies did not send any troops or an Allied commander-in-chief to Mecca.

(2) *Theater of operations.* (a) *Physical features.* The district of Palestine, along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, is a long narrow plain, bounded on the east by a tableland, scored with defiles toward the coast which, with the exception of the Jaffa—Jerusalem route, are practically impassable after rains. To the east, is the valley of the Jordan and the Dead Sea, nearly 1,300 feet below sea level. The drop in some places is a 2,000-foot precipice. Farther to the east, is the great plateau of Moab. To the south, the valley continues to the Gulf of Akaba on the Red Sea, dividing the high ground of Arabia from that of Sinai. The coastal plain is narrowest at Gaza, which is the gateway to the north from the Sinai peninsula and from Egypt. The Germans built a modern road from Gaza to Beersheba. Rivers, streams, and oases in the desert were scarce. Troop movements were dependent on

the laying of water pipe lines and other methods of water carriage.

(b) *Railroads.* The Turkish railroad lines were based on Constantinople, 1,300 miles away. They were frequently single track and had two breaks, one at the Taurus Mountains, and one just north of Aleppo, where transfers by trucks were required. The railroad system extended south to Beersheba from near Nazareth, and south to Medina in the Hedjaz, from Damascus. Three branches to the coast at Bierut, Haifa, and at Jaffa were of little value, as the Allies controlled the sea. On the Allies' side, the railroad extended along the Nile, along the Suez canal, and forward to El Arish after General Murray's capture of that place, in January, 1917.

(3) *Forces and plans.* (a) (i) A strong fortress was built at Gaza, as the central work of a deep defensive zone that covered the whole coastal plain. A German General, Kress von Kressenstein, was in actual command of the troops on the Syrian front. The Turkish defensive line against operations from Egypt extended from Gaza to Beersheba with an advance position at El Audja; against operations from Hedjaz, there was to be a defense from Fort Akaba to the Medina railroad at Ma'an.

(ii) General von Falkenhayn decided that the defensive attitude should be maintained, and, in the event of a British attack on Gaza, that a decision should be sought by counter attack from the east with a view of enveloping the British right flank and cutting their line of communications between El Arish and Rafa.

(b) General Murray was in command of the Allied forces. He held the line of El Arish, with advance detachments at Rafa, which was the railhead for advanced operations. His force was in two columns, one a heavy column, was along the railroad to Rafa; the other an exceedingly mobile force for desert work, was on the right. He planned to attack Gaza in front, and, with the light cavalry and camel corps on the right, to penetrate the thin line between Gaza and Beersheba in order to turn Gaza.

(4) *Operations.* General Murray delivered the attack as planned, but the main attack did not capture Gaza, and, although the turning movement succeeded as a tactical maneuver, it could not maintain itself on account of lack of water. The Turkish counter attack, on March 27, forced General

Murray to abandon the attack and to retreat. This operation is known as the first battle of Gaza.

3. Situation in European Theater, January 1, 1917. (Map 57.) *a. Central Powers' growth.* (1) From the beginning of the war to the end of 1916, the Germans and Austrians had increased their control over territory in the "Mittel Europa" theater by conquest and by alliance until, by the end of 1916, they and their allies were maintaining a frontage of 2,640 miles. This frontage required so many troops that the problem of holding out a strategical reserve for use as a mass of maneuver seemed to be nearly impossible.

(2) With the removal of Constantine, the brother-in-law of the Kaiser, from the Greek throne, the last contiguous state that might have joined the Central Powers cast in its lot with the Allies. "Mittel Europa" had then reached its point of culmination in growth by accretion of allies. Thereafter, unless they could force a separate peace from one of the Allies, the Central Powers could expect to decline relatively, in resources and in strength.

b. Encircling policy of Allies. (1) The Allies, with no loss except Montenegro, had continued the execution of their strategic plan of encircling the Central Powers. The blockade of the Central Powers' coast lines and of their approaches to the sea, had been carried out so effectively that the people of the Central Powers considered that they were being subjected to a siege. In fact, the encircling policy of the Allies was an effort to enforce a great strategical siege against the Central Powers.

(2) It was effective in that, by the end of 1916, the Central Powers felt a great shortage of essential supplies needed for modern war, such as rubber, and a great shortage of essential foodstuffs, such as sugar and fats.

(3) The purpose of the Allies in enforcing that great siege was to produce a public opinion among the people of the Central Powers in favor of peace. Hence, it is interesting to note that the first reaction in Germany to those privations was an intense national hatred of Great Britain whose fleet was enforcing the blockade, and a national desire to starve England by cutting off her food supplies by the use of submarine warfare.

c. Change in French High Command. (1) General Joffre's failure to prepare Verdun for defense against an attack, his

failure to win a great victory at the Somme, and the quite general belief that as commander-in-chief of all French armies on all fronts, he was really responsible for failure in the Balkans in 1916, caused his relief from command December 3, 1916. He was given the honorarium of Marshal of France.

(2) General Nivelle was appointed Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the French front.

4. PLANS OF CAMPAIGN. *a. Central Powers.* Marshal von Hindenburg, estimating that Russia would be able to take the offensive again in 1917, secured the Kaiser's approval to the plan that on the land the Central Powers, while defending on all fronts, should assume the strategical attitude of "in readiness,"—reserves for this purpose to be secured by a retirement on the Western front to a shortened, stronger line; that a decision should be sought on the sea by launching a strategical and tactical unrestricted submarine offensive against the Allied sea lines of communication, especially against Great Britain's vital merchant marine food line, with the view of forcing that country to a separate peace, by July, 1917.

b. Allies. The Allies' plan of campaign was to continue the policy of encirclement against the Central Powers by blocking all Central Power approaches to the sea, and, on the sea, to make the blockade still more effective. On land, they planned to seek a decision by launching the maximum strategical and tactical offensives on all fronts as nearly simultaneously and as early in the year as possible. The Allied offensives, under this plan, on the Mesopotamian and the Syrian fronts have already been considered.

5. SUBMARINE WARFARE. *a. Method of waging.* (1) On January 31, 1917, the Kaiser announced that beginning February 1, 1917, wide zones around Great Britain and France and all of the Mediterranean, except a narrow passage to Greece, were blockaded areas, in which, without any further notice or warning, all sea traffic would be prevented by all available weapons, including submarines.

(2) As announced, after January 31, 1917, submarines did begin to sink ships, both Allied and neutral, in these zones. The submarine campaign was based on Wilhelmshaven, Ostend, and Zeebrugge, and was coordinated by means of radio and sea post offices (great buoys anchored in certain known places).

(3) Sea lanes were observed and ships enticed to places of submarine ambuscade by false radio messages. Eventually, the attack by gun or torpedo was delivered without warning and without providing for the safety of the crew or passengers. By October, 1917, the menace to the sea control of the Allies was acute. Many ships had been sunk and it looked as though the sinkings might reduce the amount of sea tonnage below that required to meet the minimum demands of Great Britain's living scale and force her to a separate peace.

b. Method of defense. (1) The Allies and the neutral world were taken by surprise and had no defense measures ready. Arming merchantmen was tried but was found to be insufficient.

(2) In seamanship, the following methods were found to be valuable in defense, i.e., leaving the regular sea lanes and sailing on unexpected courses; high speed and the zigzagging of the course, so that an officer in the submarine's chart room could not plot the ship's course.

(3) The craft found most efficacious for attacking the submarine were fast torpedo boat destroyers and very fast, high power, motor boats. Ships were found to be safest in convoy, under escort of torpedo boat destroyers.

(4) The best weapons were rapid fire cannon and heavy depth charges. The latter were merely mines with plungers adjusted to be released by water pressure, at any desired depth.

(5) So, in the latter part of the war, vessels moved in convoys off the regular lanes and on zigzag courses. They were escorted by torpedo boat destroyers, armed with depth bombs, and by aircraft which observed the sea.

(6) A mine barrage laid by the American and British fleets across the North Sea from the Orkney Islands to Norway, and the defense methods already mentioned became more and more effective. The result was that, although the submarine made the sailing of the sea dangerous, the Allies maintained control of the sea during the year and did not relax the efficiency of the blockade. In addition to lowering the aggregate of losses through increased efficiency of defense measures, the net loss of shipping through submarine operations was considerably reduced by the building of ships on the part of the whole neutral world.

c. Effect on the neutral world. The unrestricted submarine warfare launched by Germany was such a departure from the

rules of international law and such an invasion of the sovereign rights of neutral powers that, after Germany refused to heed their protests, the following states declared war against Germany:

The United States	April 6, 1917
Panama and Cuba	April 7, 1917
Bolivia	April 9, 1917
Honduras	May 17, 1917
Siam	July 22, 1917
China	Aug. 14, 1917
Brazil	Oct. 26, 1917
Ecuador	Dec. 8, 1917
Guatemala	April 21, 1918
Nicaragua	May 7, 1918
Costa Rica	May 24, 1918
Haiti	July 15, 1918

In the case of the United States, there was the additional cause that Germany plotted, under cover of ambassadorial privilege in the United States, to attack the United States through the agency of two proposed new allies, Mexico and Japan.

6. WESTERN FRONT. (Maps 5, 39, 57, 58 and 59.) *a. Situation.* The possession by the Allies of high ground between the rivers running to the west and those running to the northeast gave them excellent observation of the German lines and an excellent area from which to launch an offensive.

b. Order of Battle, January 1, 1917.

(1) *Allies.*

French XXXVI Corps: on left of line.

Belgian Army (The King): to Ypres salient (exclusive).

British Armies (Marshal Haig): Second, First, Third, Fifth, and Fourth: from Ypres salient to the Somme.

French Forces:

Northern Group (General d'Esperey), Third and First Armies (First Army designated for reserve in the Reserve Group): to the Aisne.

Reserve Group (General Micheler), Sixth and Fifth Armies, with Tenth Army in reserve: to south of Rheims.

Central Group (General Petain), Fourth and Second Armies: to St. Mihiel.

The Eighth Army (General Gerard): to Epinal (exclusive).

The Seventh Army (General Debeney): to Switzerland.

A total of 204 divisions.

General Nivelle's Headquarters were at Beauvais, north of Paris. After February 26, he was in command of all Allied

troops on the Western front, for the purpose of executing a major offensive to reduce the Noyon salient.

(2) *Central Powers.*

Crown Prince of Bavaria's Group, Fourth, Sixth and Second Armies: from the Channel to the Oise.

Crown Prince of Germany's Group, First, Seventh, Third, and Fifth Armies: from the Oise to St. Mihiel (exclusive).

Duke of Wurtemberg's Group, three army detachments: to Switzerland.

A total of 154 divisions, i.e., fifty less than the Allied force on that front. Headquarters were at Kreuznach.

c. Plans. (1) General Nivelle's general plan for a major offensive early in April was to reduce the Noyon salient by successive attacks from north to south. General Haig was to attack in the direction of Cambrai, then General d'Esperey, commanding the Northern Group, was to attack in the direction of St. Quentin; both attacks being intended merely to attract Marshal von Hindenburg's attention. The Germans' attention being held to the north, General Micheler, commanding the Reserve Group, was to attack with the Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Armies (First Army in reserve) with the mission of penetrating the German line between Rheims and the canal from the Oise to the Aisne. The whole line involved in the battle was to force the attack with all disposable means to secure a decision.

(2) (a) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that the Allies would operate against the Noyon salient in the spring of 1917. By February, he had definite information of General Nivelle's plan for the unlimited offensive early in April. Von Hindenburg estimated that it was not advisable to be drawn into battle on the Western front pending the submarine campaign against Great Britain which was to begin February 1, and which he hoped would force Great Britain to sign a separate peace by July, 1917.

(b) He considered that the Allies, on high ground, had a great advantage in launching and maintaining an offensive, and that their preponderance of force was so great that he could not defend his then existing line. He, therefore, decided to avoid the coming offensive by a voluntary strategical retreat from the Noyon salient.

(c) For the new line, he selected a chord of the Noyon salient whose trace was: from near Arras—west of Cambrai—via St. Quentin—La Fere—west of Vailly. He named it the

"Siegfried Line." It was generally known as the "Hindenburg Line." The Siegfried line was a nearly perfect type of a deep, wide, defensive zone, in which the maximum advantages of the defensive features of the terrain were made use of and strengthened with concrete construction for the use of weapons, for defense, and for shelter. The line was to be ready by March 1.

(d) The ends which he desired to attain in the retreating maneuver were to avoid a battle; to save all equipment and supplies; to destroy all roads, towns, villages, and wells to a depth of ten miles in front, in order to prevent the Allies from readily establishing themselves near the Siegfried line; to gain reserves; to secure a stronger line. Generally speaking, his purpose was to avoid land warfare, as he expected that the submarine campaign, through the elimination of Great Britain, would end the war.

d. German retreat. On February 4, Marshal von Hindenburg gave the order to carry out the retreat plan. On February 9, the removal of impedimenta and the destruction of terrain features began. The retreat began March 16, and was completed on April 9. The Allies followed up closely with small detachments but did not interrupt the execution of Marshal Hindenburg's schedule.

e. General Nivelle's spring offensive. (1) *Plans.* (a) *German.* (i) After retreat to the Siegfried line, Marshal von Hindenburg withdrew many divisions to the Western front reserve and to the strategical reserve in Germany. His general plan for the defense of the Western front was to make the whole front a deep defensive zone, with each position strengthened in defense and shelter by concrete.

(ii) The troops were not to be disposed on a continuous line but in a complex system of nuclei distributed in breadth and depth. All forces were to be mobile and to be withdrawn beyond range during hostile artillery preparation. Afterwards, the abandoned line was to be regained by counter attack. The lines were to be held very lightly, but with increasing strength to the rear. The machine gun was to be used as the principal weapon for local defense of the front lines. The whole system of defense depended upon tactical cooperation between neighbors until a major counter attack should restore the situation.

(b) *French.* General Nivelle's general plan for the spring offensive was changed very little after the German retreat.

It provided for successive attacks from the north to the south, beginning April 9. These attacks constituted a great converging maneuver against the Laon salient as follows:

(i) The British First and Third Armies (Marshal Haig) were to penetrate the German line between Givenchy and Queant and exploit in the direction of Maubeuge.

(ii) The French Reserve Group (General Micheler), in forty-eight hours, was to penetrate the line between Rheims and the Aisne Canal to the west with the Fifth and Sixth Armies and to exploit with the Tenth Army in the direction of Hirson with the view of cutting the German line of communications.

(iii) The Northern Group (General d'Esperey), with the Third Army, assisted by the British Fourth Army, was to cooperate with General Haig to the north and with General Micheler to the east, by attacking the nose of the salient and holding the enemy on its front.

(iv) The Central Group (General Petain) was to assist General Micheler with the Fourth Army, by attacking in the direction of Vouzieres.

(v) The Belgian Army and the British Second Army were to attack in the general direction of Ghent.

(vi) The French First Army was sent to strategical reserve in the rear of General Micheler's main effort.

(2) *Operations.* (a) *Marshal Haig's operation (April 9-16).* (i) Marshal Haig prepared for the maneuver by a long continued aerial offensive which gave him air supremacy over the proposed zone of action, by a three weeks' program of wire cutting artillery fire, by interdiction of back areas, and, for a few days preceding the attack, with a terrific destruction fire accompanied by extensive gas discharges, put down by 4,000 cannon along this whole front. Tanks were assigned to each corps to lead in the assaults. It was prescribed that halts for reorganization would occur only after the capture of each successive position.

(ii) On April 9, at 5:30 AM, under cover of a rolling barrage, the First Army (General Horne) north of the Scarpe, and the Third Army (General Allenby) south of the Scarpe, advanced to the attack with seventeen divisions, including reserves, on a twenty-mile front. In forty minutes, Marshal Haig captured the German first position and some artillery was displaced forward. He reorganized and, at 7:30 AM, advanced

against the second position. Here greater opposition was met with, but the position was captured by 12:00 noon.

Very shortly after noon, the reorganized line moved forward to attack the third position. The wire of this position, because of the long range at which the artillery fire against it had been delivered, was not well cut. Local counter attacks were met and repulsed. By the end of the day, Marshal Haig had penetrated the third and last heavily organized position.

(iii) The Cavalry Corps intended for the exploitation was concentrated east of Arras. Marshal Haig decided not to make the effort then to push it through for exploitation, sent it back to the west of Arras, and gave instructions for the gap in the third line to be widened. That night, when Marshal von Hindenburg realized that Marshal Haig was not pushing an exploiting force through the gap, it is said that he grasped von Ludendorff by the hand, as reinforcements were coming by emergency trains and the crisis was over.

(iv) Marshal Haig continued widening the gap during the night of April 9-10. The next day he completed the capture of the German third position in his front. His artillery was not up, however, and his further advance was stopped by the machine gun fire of German reinforcements.

(v) German counter attacks protected their line of communications. The battle soon degenerated into one of attrition in which Marshal Haig forced Marshal von Hindenburg to double the number of troops in front of the British line and to withdraw twenty-three divisions from that front for rest and reorganization.

(vi) Marshal Haig's operations had secured high ground, but the great opportunity to strike at the enemy line of communications on the evening of April 9 had not been grasped.

(vii) The operations of the Fourth and Fifth Armies (Generals Rawlinson and Gough), to the south, held the enemy in front by advancing and threatening the Siegfried line.

(viii) By May 5, Marshal Haig had advanced five miles on a front of twenty miles and siege conditions again obtained.

(b) *General Micheler's operation (April 16-May 5).* (i) General Micheler (Commander of the Reserve Group) prepared for his penetrating maneuver as follows:

He assembled 1,800 pieces of light artillery (75's); 1,700 pieces of heavy artillery; 1,650 trench mortars; 24,000,000

shells for 75's; 9,000,000 shells for heavy artillery, and 200 tanks. Besides the accumulation of these munitions, he built 150 miles of railroad for supply.

He disposed his troops with the Fifth Army (General Mazel) and the Sixth Army (General Mangin) on the line, side by side, from right to left, with eighteen divisions on a thirty-six-mile front, and with ten divisions in local army reserve.

The Tenth Army (General Duchesne) of four infantry and one cavalry corps, in reserve on the boundary line between the Fifth and Sixth Armies, was disposed as follows:

Infantry corps were in double column. From right to left, the II and XVIII Corps, abreast, were in the first line, south of the Aisne; the IX and III Corps, abreast, were in the second line, south of the Vesle. The I Cavalry Corps was to the left of the III Corps, in the second line.

The First Army (General Fayolle) was massed and in readiness in the Chateau-Thierry—Epernay region.

The four armies made a total of 1,400,000 men.

(ii) General Micheler's plan for the maneuver was that, after an intense and prolonged artillery preparation, the Fifth and Sixth Armies, at dawn, April 16, were to advance and penetrate the German line and fold back the inner flanks of the dislocated wings. The Tenth Army, advancing as formed, was then on April 16, to pass through the gap and by night reach the line: Laon—Amifontaine. The I Cavalry Corps, also, was to reach the line of the Serre River, by the evening of April 17, with the Tenth Army advancing under its screen and cover.

(iii) Marshal von Hindenburg had learned, from a French order captured during a local offensive in Champagne about the middle of February, of General Micheler's plan and had specially prepared that part of the front to receive the threatened attack by strengthening the defenses and by assembling strong local reserves behind that part of the line. A special protective measure taken was to prepare lines on reverse slopes and in hollows where they were safe from the artillery preparation.

(iv) On April 16, at 6:00 AM, after a ten days' artillery preparation, the Fifth and Sixth Armies advanced to the attack from Courcy to Soupir. From the start, the infantry was subjected to fire from machine guns located at the last

moment in the open field, and from guns under shelter that had not been destroyed by the artillery.

The Fifth Army, on the right, captured lodgment in the first German position in the vicinity of Courcy, but was practically ejected by counter attacks. Farther to the left, lodgment could not be secured in the German first position and the French attacking troops were forced back to the line of departure.

The Sixth Army captured a lodgment in the German first position on the Chemin des Dames, at Heurtebise Farm, but could not advance farther.

On the rest of the line, the Army was unable to capture the German first position. The tanks were not able to tie the infantry groups together, or to lead them in the attack, and abandoned the attempt to force a way through to Juvincourt.

(v) General Micheler was defeated April 16, but General Nivelle decided to continue the attack and seek the desired penetration by the method of attrition. That night, he directed the Sixth Army to consolidate and organize its position, and that the effort of the Reserve Group be to the northeast to spread out the lodgment secured by the Fifth Army in the enemy position.

On the 17th of April, the Fourth Army (General Anthoine) with the mission of capturing the observation position at Moronvillers and of assisting in the general offensive, and after a six days' artillery preparation, advanced to the attack with five divisions on a ten-mile front but was stopped by machine gun fire and by little islands of resistance. The Fourth Army continued the battle, largely with hand grenades and artillery fire, and, by May 20, captured the high ground of Moronvillers, and thus secured excellent observation over the plains of Champagne.

To the west, the Fifth Army continued its operation, and, after April 21, on the front from Rheims to Berry-au-Bac only, operated in cooperation with the Fourth Army. By May 20, it had captured the German first position and secured a lodgment on the second position on a front of ten miles.

The Sixth Army, after organizing the ground, reduced the small Vailly salient, by a converging attack, by April 21.

(vi) On April 20, General Nivelle abandoned the hope of exploiting a penetration and placed the Tenth Army in the line, from Berry-au-Bac to Cerny.

The Tenth and Sixth Armies, in cooperation, thereafter continued the maneuver against the heights of the Chemin des Dames. After an intense but short artillery bombardment, the French 36th Division, on the night of May 4, captured the village of Craonne, a key point on the Chemin des Dames.

The next day, May 5, the Tenth and Sixth Armies attacked from Californie to Vauxaillon and on the west reduced the new small salient Moulin Lauffaux and captured the crest of the Chemin des Dames to the west as far as Cerny and to the east captured the plateau of Craonne.

The Crown Prince counter attacked for three days and three nights but was stopped by a terrific artillery interdiction fire.

(vii) The French troops, after the initial defeat April 16, considered success on the Aisne impossible. Units up to divisions in size, although asserting themselves to be loyal and ready, if necessary, to die for France, refused to continue the attack on the Aisne, on the ground that it was a useless loss of life.

7. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. Principle of the objective.* (Maps 2, 13, 39, 45, 46, 58 and 59.) (1) At the beginning of the war, Germany made the French (after August 4, the Allied) armies her first and main objective. She was repulsed at the Battle of the Marne, in September, 1914. Again, in 1916, Germany made the French armies, her first and main objective. She was again repulsed at Verdun. At the end of 1916, the Russian armies had been so badly defeated that they were apparently no longer a menace to the Central Powers. Serbia and Roumania had been defeated and for the moment, at least, there was no menace to the Central Powers in the Balkans. With Russia and Serbia defeated, it seemed probable that Austria could defend against Italy without German assistance.

(2) On the Western front, however, the Allies had not been defeated. They were stronger than they had been at any time during the war, and at the Battle of the Somme, in 1916, had nearly defeated Germany. The Allied forces on the Western front clearly were the greatest menace to Germany, and that force was Germany's proper objective. That Allied force was composed mainly of French and British troops. The defeat of either, if such were possible, would accomplish the defeat of the Allied force on the Western front and win the war. Marshal von Hindenburg decided to operate against the British. As

Germany, therefore, had failed to defeat decisively Allied forces on the Western front, she decided to accomplish the defeat of the British by destroying their resources. She estimated that the British armies were dependent for supplies on England and that England, in turn, was dependent on supplies received by means of ships. She estimated that by use of unrestricted submarine warfare she could, by July, 1917, so reduce supplies in England that the latter would be compelled to make peace. Beginning February 1, 1917, Germany began submarine warfare and carried it on so successfully that, in April, 1917, England estimated that, unless the rate of sinking was reduced or production of new ships increased, she would be forced to sue for peace, by October, 1917. Thus Germany, in the spring of 1917, selected British resources as her first and main objective.

b. Principle of security. After Germany decided to seek a decision by destruction of British resources, Marshal von Hindenburg decided, pending the issue of that submarine operation, to avoid battle. The British, by the Battle of the Somme, secured favorable ground for launching an offensive operation. Practically all the Central Powers' troops were immobilized in holding the long lines of the different fronts. Marshal von Hindenburg knew that the Allies would seek a decision on the Western front early in the spring of 1917. By avoiding that battle, through shortening his line, Marshal von Hindenburg illustrated compliance with the *principle of security* by establishing a more easily defendable line and by gaining enough reserves to give him freedom of action.

c. Principle of the offensive. (1) It is not possible to completely illustrate the *principle of the offensive* without reference to other principles of war, as without complying with them, according to the situation, the offensive must fail.

(2) (a) Marshal Haig launched the northern converging blow of General Nivelle's great offensive, on April 9, 1917, with the objective of cutting the German line of communications near Cambrai. That night, he had penetrated all the German defense positions and the road lay practically open from the gap which he had made to the railroad German line of communications near Cambrai. He had cavalry troops ready to push through that gap and exploit the success. He had superiority of force, had complied with the *principle of mass and surprise* but, by not hurling his mass against the German line of com-

munications at the decisive time and place, he failed to comply with the *principle of movement* and his offensive failed.

(b) General Micheler launched the southern blow of that great converging operation on April 16, with the mission of penetrating the German line and cutting his rail line of communications near Mezieres. He had a tremendous superiority over the German forces in his front, but through his failure to comply with the *principle of surprise* his offensive operation also failed.

(3) Compliance with the *principle of surprise* appears to be an essential element of the success of any offensive under modern war conditions, hence, failure to effect a surprise should cause an unpromising offensive to be abandoned at once. This procedure should have been followed at the Aisne, in 1917, where, when General Nivelle ordered the offensive continued, the French soldiers up to include the division unit, refused to fight further in an operation in which they believed there was no chance of success.

CHAPTER IX

Events Leading up to America's Participation in the War

	Page
1. American Policies	171
a. Origin and reason	171
b. No entangling alliances	172
c. The freedom of the seas	173
d. The Monroe Doctrine	174
e. A small army	177
f. Attitude of the United States in 1914	177
2. German Policies	177
a. Ancient policies	177
b. Modern policies	178
c. Attitude of Germany in 1914	179
3. Conflict of Policies	179
a. No arbitration treaty with Germany	179
b. Invasion of Belgium	179
c. Germany violates American neutrality	179
d. Germany denies the freedom of the seas	180
4. The Declaration of War	184
a. Germany's action in Mexico	184
b. Germany's estimate of the United States	185
c. Action of the government of the United States	185
d. Text of the Declaration of War	186
5. Principles of War.—Principle of surprise	186

1. American Policies. (Maps 1 and 2.) *a. Origin and reasons.* (1) Before the day of rapid transit and rapid communication, the Atlantic Ocean separated America from Europe by six weeks' or two months' travel, depending upon the winds. This isolation developed the self-government idea in the minds of the American colonists until, by its exercise, they finally attained an attitude of independence. They declared in 1776 that: "These United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states." This declaration of independence, with the assistance of France, and, to a lesser degree, of Spain and Holland, was made good by force of arms, and the United States of America came into being as an independent and sovereign state in the family of nations.

(2) The policies which have governed many of her relations with other nations were conceived in the womb of that same isolation already referred to and grew out of and were adopted on account of the necessity of guarding the independence of the, then young, United States. These policies are:

No entangling alliances.
The freedom of the seas.
The Monroe Doctrine.
A small army.

b. No entangling alliances. (1) The first and greatest President of the United States, George Washington, decided to retire to private life at the end of his second term as President. He announced that decision on September 19, 1796, in a "Farewell Address to his Fellow Citizens," in which he, like a father, advised them as to policies that would strengthen the government of the young United States. Among other policies, he announced one with regard to alliances with foreign states. He stated that policy in part as follows:

> "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have no, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. * * * Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. * * * Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? * * * 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world. * * * Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, in a respectably defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. * * * If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not far off (* * *) when we may choose peace or war as our interests, guided by justice, shall counsel."

(2) It is perfectly plain from a reading of the whole of his *Farewell Address* that Washington did not intend to commit this country for all time to a policy of political isolation, but, rather, advised taking advantage of its then strategical distance from Europe until it should progress to that degree of strength under which it could take "command of its own fortunes." In the course of time, the exact language of Washington was forgotten, and, based upon what he was presumed to have said, in the minds of the people of the United States there crystallized the policy of no entangling alliances, meaning thereby, at first, no alliance with any European country and, later, with any country foreign to the two Americas.

(3) In 1793, France, emerging as a republic from a bloody revolution, found herself at war with all her neighbors. She

sent a minister, Citizen Genet, to the United States with the mission of claiming American assistance on the ground of reciprocity for French assistance given during the American Revolution. Citizen Genet, proceeding upon the assumption that of course the United States would ally herself with France, delivered public speeches, worked up a tremendous enthusiasm in favor of the war, and went so far as to commission privateers and recruit men for them, in order to conquer Spanish Louisiana for France. Washington proclaimed the neutrality of the United States. Citizen Genet continued his activities and made outrageous demands on the American government. Washington then demanded and secured his recall.

(4) The action of Washington in this instance has been used as an illustration of what Washington meant in his *Farewell Address* with respect to the permanent future policy of the United States. This conclusion is not justified, for the reason that the Genet incident occurred three years before the delivery of the *Farewell Address*, and further because it appears that Washington was guided in the Genet incident by the belief that the United States then was not strong enough to maintain her independence in the then terrific European war. In other words, the time described in his *Farewell Address* had not yet arrived "when we may choose peace or war as our interests, guided by justice, shall counsel."

(5) The policy, however, of no entangling alliances, became firmly grounded in the American mind, and, as a result, the United States would not participate in the Algeciras Conference in 1906 until it was expressly understood that her interest in the Moroccan complication was and would remain purely academic."

c. The Freedom of the Seas. (1) The United States has always been a seafaring nation. The sea has been of vital interest to it since the time when the colonies from which the nation was formed were but scattered communities along the seacoast. This interest, coupled with the expectation of neutrality in most wars, has led to the adoption of the policy called "Freedom of the Seas." In support of this principle, the nation has resorted to arms on occasions. For instance, in 1801, to insure the freedom of the seas to American merchantmen, the United States made war on the Barbary States in North Africa, who were treating the Mediterranean as a closed sea. Again, in 1812, in order to maintain the freedom of the seas for America

against British aggression through searching American ships, both public and private, and the impressment of American seamen, the United States declared war against England. Although impressment of seamen was not mentioned in the peace treaty, Great Britain since that war has not stopped any American ships for the purpose of impressing seamen. In fact, since the War of 1812, she has abandoned the old doctrine of indelible allegiance.

(2) The policy of the United States before the World War with regard to rights of commercial vessels in war was well established on the recognized principles of international law, and well maintained at the various conventions which considered that subject. That policy was as follows:

> "A belligerent may with the knowledge of the world and with visible vessels blockade an enemy port or coast line; he may stop a neutral and confiscate any contraband found, and also he may stop, seize, confiscate, sink or burn an enemy commercial vessel; but before sinking or burning any commercial vessel, he must secure the lives of all persons on the commercial vessel, and put all such persons in a safe place."

d. The Monroe Doctrine. (1) The Monroe Doctrine is the next great policy that has controlled our foreign relations. This policy was born under the following circumstances: James Monroe, President of the United States, when confronted with the fact that the Holly Alliance meant to aid Spain in bringing her revolted South American colonies to obedience, announced in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823, that "We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing the South American States or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

(2) Monroe's policy was adhered to by following administrations and finally crystallized as follows:

> "The United States insists that America forms a separate system, wherein still existing European possessions may be tolerated, but on the understanding that no extension of them and no establishment of foreign control over a nominally independent American State, will be allowed."

(3) (a) In pursuance of that policy the United States forced France, in 1867, to abandon her attempt to colonize Mexico.

(b) A dispute having arisen between England and Venezuela concerning the boundary between Venezuela and British

Guiana, and the British having attempted to exercise jurisdiction in the disputed area, the President of the United States (Mr. Cleveland) stated in a message to Congress, that he would consider any attempt by Great Britain to enforce its boundary claim on Venezuela without resort to arbitration to be a cause of war by the United States.

(4) (a) An important outgrowth of the Monroe Doctrine is the Pan-American Union. Its history and policy is as follows:

On the inspiration of James G. Blaine, the American Secretary of State, the Latin Republics in the Americas were invited, in 1888, to a conference in Washington to consider measures for preserving the peace, etc. The first conference was followed by others at various places, with resulting improvement in the relations between the American Republics. In 1910, a permanent building for the home of the executive officers of the Pan-American Union was dedicated in Washington. The same year, the fourth conference met in Buenos Aires.

(b) The policy of the Pan-American Union has been to preserve the peace by submitting disputable differences to arbitration. This policy is well illustrated by the action of the third conference in 1906, at Rio de Janeiro, when a resolution was adopted which instructed the delegates from the American Republics to the second conference at the Hague "to endeavor to secure there the celebration of a general arbitration convention so effective and definite that, meriting the approval of the civilized world, it shall be accepted and put in force by every Nation."

(5) The policies of non-entanglement in foreign alliances and of denying foreign states the right to colonize in the Americas finally were joined and are generally so stated; as for instance, in the reservations read into the minutes of the proceedings of both conferences on arbitration at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, as follows:

> "Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

This combination of policies has frequently been called the "American Policy."

(6) Those who are not friendly to the Monroe Doctrine sometimes affirm that it is at the best only a claim to a sphere of influence, and is not the result of any treaty. They compare, as an equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine, the Roman policy which forbade any Asiatic King entering Europe and acquiring any part of it. However, it is clear that the Pan-Americanism which grew out of the Monroe Doctrine has consistently sought peace rather than war.

(7) The principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine have been held by the people of the United States as of prime importance, and this esteem has inclined them powerfully to an attitude of sympathetic benevolence toward any other American group of people who desired independence.

(a) March 2, 1836, the representatives of the people of Texas declared Texas independent of Mexico. A republican form of government similar to that of the United States was adopted, and in September, 1836, a president was elected.

In 1837, the independence of the Republic of Texas was recognized by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium. Mexico, however, did not recognize the independence of Texas and made various attempts to put down what she termed a rebellion. An application by Texas to enter the the Federal Union was acted on favorably by the people of the United States, in the presidential election of 1844, when they elected as President, James K. Polk who had made his campaign on this issue. Texas was admitted to the Union under a joint resolution of Congress. In the war that ensued, the larger part of Mexico, including the capital, was occupied. The war was terminated by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, under which the present boundary between the United States and Mexico was established.

(b) (i) As long ago as 1820, a considerable portion of the Cuban people were desirous of a much greater degree of self-government than Spain was willing to give. The problem of discontent in Cuba had become acute by 1850. Many people in the United States sympathized with that national aspiration. From 1849 to 1851, three filibustering expeditions were organized in the United States to aid the Cubans in their fight for independence. In 1868, a revolution was proclaimed and war was waged against Spain (almost entirely in the eastern provinces) until January, 1878, when the revolution was ended

by the convention of Zanjon. Later the "Little War" of 1879-1880 was easily repressed.

(ii) In 1895, another revolution covering the entire island was launched. In the conduct of operations incident to repressing this revolution, Spain inflicted many hardships (including physical suffering and much starvation) on the people of Cuba. The attitude of the people of the United States was exceedingly friendly to the revolutionists in Cuba, and when the American battleship *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbor in February, 1898, the American people rose and demanded the expulsion of Spain from Cuba. On April 20, the United States demanded the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Cuba. War followed at once. By the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished the island of Cuba to the United States in trust for its inhabitants.

e. A small army. Preceding the World War, the military policy of the United States was largely shaped by the Anglo-Saxon prejudice against standing armies as a dangerous menace to liberty, with the result that the Regular Army had always been small. The National Guard units of the various states could not be used as such beyond the continental limits of the United States. The United States was not prepared for war and the attitude of a large proportion of her citizens is fairly reflected by the statement once made by a noted secretary of state to the effect that she did not need to prepare as she could "raise a million men between sunrise and sunset."

f. Attitude of the United States in 1914. Early in 1914, the United States maintained the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of no entangling alliances, insisted upon the fredom of the seas, looked with favor upon the exercise of national self-determination, and, still relying upon her strategic ocean-isolated position, maintained a very small army, with the expectation of calling for volunteers to wage any war that might be forced upon her. In short, her Government, based upon the consent of the governed, respected the sovereignty of all other nations and expected them, in return, to respect her sovereign powers.

2. GERMAN POLICIES. *a. Ancient policies.* The German nation has ancient national attitudes that profoundly affect her policies to this day. The German Empire was an outgrowth of Prussia and inherited many of her policies; among others, the following:

The Emperor rules by Divine Right.
War is Germany's national industry.
Germany must continually extend her boundaries.
Germany must have a larger and better army than any other nation.
Under the "Frederican Tradition," Germany's interest is paramount to all international obligations.

b. Modern policies. (1) The German Empire, after the reconstruction of 1871, adhered to all her ancient policies. For this reason and through the creation of the Triple Alliance in 1878-1881, and through committing herself to the plan for a German-dominated world empire, Germany's policies lay almost perpendicular to those of the United States.

(2) (a) The Pan-German plan was fully crystallized by 1911. The coveted territory is shown on a map (Map 60) taken from Tannenberg's work, *"Greater Germany—the Work of the 20th Century,"* which was published at Leipsic, in 1911. This work is evidence of first importance as to the German policy at that time. It gives as German objectives the very lines that Germany tried to seize and hold in the World War, i.e., Berlin—Calais; Berlin—Riga; Hamburg—Saloniki; Hamburg—Persian Gulf.

(b) This same book, published three years before the war, not only gives the German general plan, but also contains the following statements: "Germany will take under her protection the Republics of Argentina, Chili, Uruguay, Paraguay, the southern third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the basin of the Rio de la Plata, and that part of southern Brazil in which German culture prevails," and, "German South America will provide for us, in the temperate zone, a colonial region where our emigrants will be able to settle as farmers."

(3) The registration of all Germans in every part of the world was begun in 1895. The result of that registration was published in the Pan-German Atlas, published by Justus Perthes, at Gotha, in 1900. According to the data published, 15,000,000 Americans of German birth had settled in the industrial and commercial regions of the eastern part of the United States and of the Great Lakes and were carrying on German culture.

(4) The plan to extend Pan-Germania into the Americas was greatly strengthened by the German law of 1913, called Delbruck's Law, under which a German could obtain permission to become a citizen of a foreign state while secretly retaining his German nationality.

c. Attitude of Germany in 1914. It may be said that early in 1914, the German Government was autocratic, did not respect the sovereignty of other nations, and sought opportunities to enlarge German territory at their expense.

3. CONFLICT OF POLICIES. *a. No arbitration treaty with Germany.* (1) The United States had consistently carried out her policy of peaceful adjustment of differences between nations by negotiating arbitration treaties with Great Britain and nineteen other nations. Germany, however, declined to negotiate such a treaty. At both conferences at The Hague, the German delegates were the most active in blocking all projects for the pacific settlement of disputes between nations.

(2) The policies of European nations were not well understood in the United States. The conflict of those policies, accordingly, was not seen, and, as a result, the people of the United States were greatly shocked by the war. To them, the war was incomprehensible. Its first effect was to disillusionize those who had believed that there would be no more war.

(3) On August 3, Mr. Wilson cabled an offer of his services as mediator. It was not acceptable to Germany.

b. Invasion of Belgium. The invasion of Belgium by Germany, one of the guarantors of its neutrality, greatly shocked the American people. The subsequent treatment of Belgium by Germany caused the people of the United States to believe that the latter country was not waging war fairly. Soon Belgium's helpless condition made such an appeal that the American people generally contributed to its relief, a commission for the purpose being formed with Mr. Herbert C. Hoover in charge.

c. Germany violates American neutrality. The German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, returned from Germany to the United States, August 25, 1914, and brought back with him a Doctor Dernburg who promptly organized and carried on press activities with a view of inclining public opinion in the United States to the German side. In addition to influencing them through profitable contracts on paid advertising, great pressure was brought to bear by Germanophiles on newspapers to induce them to print the news furnished by the Dernburg Press Bureau. Also, newspapers were purchased outright. Dr. Dernburg's violations of American neutrality were continued until May, 1915, when his defense of the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the killing by Germans of women and

children became so callous and brutal that, upon the initiative of the American press, the Government requested Ambassador Bernstorff to send him back to Germany.

(2) During the first year of the war, a feeling of resentment was stirred up in Germany on account of the insistence by the United States of its right as a neutral state to trade in munitions with belligerents. As a neutral, Germany had always asserted and practiced that right and did not question the legal right of the United States to engage in that trade. The German appeals were not for the observance of the rule of international law involved, but rather with a view to its revision in Germany's interest. The United States maintained her right to engage in the trade and pointed out that, not being a militaristic nation, she would be quite dependent on the purchase of munitions from neutrals should she unhappily become engaged in a war.

d. Germany denies the freedom of the seas. (1) (a) As a reply to the blockade of Germany by Great Britain, Germany announced February 4, 1915, that beginning February 18, 1915, the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland would be a "War Zone" and any enemy merchant ships found in those waters would be destroyed. She warned neutrals to keep out of those waters because of the danger of being sunk.

(b) On February 10, 1915, the President protested against such illegal acts, reminded Germany that, except in blockades, the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, and warned Germany that the United States would hold her to strict accountability for the acts of her navy and that the United States would take the necessary steps to safeguard American lives and property, and secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

(c) On February 16, 1915, the German Government replied to the effect that she proposed to plant mines in the British waters and that neutral vessels entering those waters would do so at their own risk.

(2) (a) In defiance of the American protest, a German submarine sunk the British merchantman *Fa'oba* on March 28, 1915, without placing those on board in safety and Mr. Thrasher, an American citizen, was drowned. The American press, with the exception of papers controlled by Dr. Dernburg, condemed that act in the most vigorous manner.

(b) April 28, 1915, the American steamer *Cushing* was bombed in the North Sea by a German seaplane.

(c) May 1, 1915, the American oil tank steamship *Gulflight*, off the coast of France, was torpedoed without warning by a submarine. Her captain died from shock and ten of her crew who jumped overboard were drowned.

(3) (a) Captain Schwieger, commanding the German submarine *U 20*, acting under direct orders of the German Government, fired two torpedoes without warning at 2:15 PM, May 7, 1915, at the great Cunard Liner *Lusitania*. They struck her on the port bow, and she sunk, within sight of the south coast of Ireland, in twenty minutes. There were 1,198 lives lost, of whom 124 were Americans and 35 were infants. The sinking of the *Lusitania* stirred the United States as nothing else had done since the sinking of the *Maine*, and many Americans at once demanded war against Germany.

(b) Before any diplomatic action had been taken, and while the question of war or peace hung in the balance in the the public mind, Mr. Wilson on May 10, delivered an address at Philadelphia, in which he said:

> "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a Nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."

Although uttered with no apparent reference to the *Lusitania*, and disclaimed by Mr. Wilson as having any bearing on the subject, that language was interpreted in Germany to mean that Mr. Wilson had decided that the United States would not enter the war.

(c) On May 13, three days later, Mr. Wilson sent the first *Lusitania* note to Berlin in which he said:

> "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

(d) The press of the country compared that *Lusitania* note with Mr. Wilson's strict accountability note. Theodore Roosevelt, who had assumed leadership of those who desired to take more aggressive action against Germany, demanded that all trade and diplomatic relations with Germany be suspended within twenty-four hours.

(e) Germany repeated her previous statements and claimed that she had not sunk the *Lusitania* without warning and cited

an advertisement that she had published in American papers which read as follows:

"NOTICE

"Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great Britain and her Allies; that the Zone of War includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her Allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the War Zone on ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY,
Washington, D. C., April 22, 1915."

(f) (i) Mr. Wilson personally prepared the second *Lusitania* note in which he informed Germany that the advertisement in the press was not the kind of a warning that the *Lusitania* was entitled to under the rules of international law, but that rather it was a denial to the United States and other neutrals of the freedom of the seas and he demanded that Germany give assurances that she would safeguard American lives and American ships.

(ii) At that time, when public opinion was moving straight toward war, a group in the United States centered about Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State, who unofficially contended that any question between Germany and the United States should not be considered a cause for war until a year had been spent in investigation, and that American citizens should be formally warned by the Government not to travel on the ships of belligerents.

(iii) Mr. Bryan considered the second *Lusitania* note too drastic and resigned his position as Secretary of State.

(g) Not receiving satisfactory guarantees from Germany, the President, July 21, 1915, instructed his Ambassador at Berlin, Mr. Gerard, to deliver a note to the German Government which contained the warning that a repetition of acts in contravention of American right to free use of the seas would be regarded as deliberately unfriendly. For a period of time thereafter, ships were warned before being sunk, and crews and passengers were given a chance to escape.

(4) (a) On August 9, 1915, however, the steamship *Arabic* was torpedoed without warning and without placing the crew and passengers in safety. As a consequence, two Americans were drowned.

(b) The American public considered this sinking to be "a deliberate unfriendly act" and the press demanded the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany.

(c) The German Ambassador, on August 26, prevented a crisis by informing the Government of the United States that thereafter no liner would be sunk by submarines "without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." This pledge was formally confirmed by the German Government in October.

(5) (a) On March 24, 1916, the unarmed steamer *Sussex*, while crossing the English Channel, was torpedoed without warning by a German submarine and two Americans were injured.

(b) After careful investigation of the facts, the Government of the United States sent a note to Germany, April 18, 1916, which contained the following ultimatum:

> "If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of International Law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

(c) May 4, 1916, the German Government declared that it sincerely regretted the *Sussex* case, that it was ready to indemnify the injured Americans, and that it disapproved of the conduct of the submarine commander who already had been punished.

(d) Mr. Wilson's *Sussex* ultimatum was a diplomatic victory which gave him great prestige, and his party conducted the campaign in 1916 for his reelection on the slogan of, "He kept us out of War." He was reelected by a small plurality. His reelection was misinterpreted in Germany.

(6) (a) On December 18, 1916, Mr. Wilson, disclaiming any connection with the German peace proposals which had recently been forwarded to the Allies, sent identical notes to all the Allies asking them to make unequivocal statements of their war aims. That note created great agitation in the United States and caused a sharp break in the stock market. It was

criticized by the Allies and praised by the Central Powers because, in spite of the President's denial, it was understood to support the German peace proposals.

(b) After carefully considering the replies to his note of December 18, 1916, Mr. Wilson went before Congress, January 22, 1917, and advocated that the United States declare herself ready to join a League of Nations consisting of all the Powers, which would apply a sort of Monroe Doctrine to the entire world. In order to accomplish this, he said, there must be "A peace without victory."

(c) The Senate considered that joining such a League involved a reversal of the traditional policy of the United States with respect to entering in entangling alliances, and on January 30, 1917, laid the President's proposition on the table.

(7) (a) The next day, January 31, 1917, Germany presented a note revoking her pledges to the United States and announcing unrestricted submarine warfare beginning February 1, the following day, against all enemy and neutral shipping within a described area around the British Isles. The United States was to be allowed only one passenger liner a week sailing from New York to Falmouth, England, on a schedule designated by the German Government, carrying only such freight as the German contraband list admitted and marked as follows:

> "On ship's hull and superstructure three vertical stripes, one meter wide each, alternately white and red. Each mast to show a large flag checkered white and red, and the American National Flag at the stern."

(b) Such orders to the Republic of the United States were considered as unprecedentedly arrogant and insulting. President Wilson at once handed passports to the German Ambassador, recalled the American Ambassador from Berlin, severed all diplomatic relations with Germany, and on February 3, 1917, addressed Congress reporting the action taken. He stated that if Germany should actually commit the overt acts threatened against Americans and American shipping he would ask Congress for authority to protect Americans in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. The Senate approved the President's course by a large majority.

4. THE DECLARATION OF WAR. *a. Germany's action in Mexico.* February 28, 1917, Mr. Lansing, the American Secre-

tary of State, made public the following note from the German Foreign Secretary to the German Ambassador in Mexico:

"Berlin, January 19, 1917.

"On February 1st, we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

"If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico.

"That we shall make war together and together make peace.

"We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

"You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

"Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

"ZIMMERMAN."

b. Germany's estimate of the United States. It developed that Germany estimated, because of America's non-entanglement policy and the reputed pacifism of her people, that she could not be forced into the war; or that, if she should enter the war, her small army and non-militaristic attitude rendered her in any event but a negligible quantity as a combatant power.

c. Action of the Government of the United States. (1) Germany's denial of American freedom of the sea and her challenge of the effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine carried the defense of those policies past the diplomatic stage and forced the United States to defend them by force of arms.

(2) In his address to Congress, February 3, 1917, Mr. Wilson stated that he would wait for an overt act by a submarine before he would believe that Germany meant to make war openly on the United States. For over a month no overt submarine act was committed, but on March 2, Germany sunk the American steamship *Algonquin* without warning, and on March 18, off the English coast, she sunk three American ships without warning.

(3) On March 21, Mr. Wilson summoned Congress to meet April 2. On April 2, 1917, Mr. Wilson appeared before the special session of Congress and, after a recital of German aggression and acts of war against the United States, asked the Congress to declare that a state of warfare existed with Germany.

d. Text of the declaration of war. Four days later, Congress passed this resolution:

"TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR

Joint Resolution Passed by:
The United States Senate and House of Representatives.
(Effective April 6, 1917, at 1:18 PM.)

"Whereas, The Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; therefore, be it

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

"That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government, which has thus been thrust upon the United States, is hereby formally declared; and

"That the President be, and he is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States."

5. PRINCIPLES OF WAR.—*Principle of surprise.* The German estimate of the situation in the United States was that the Government of the United States could not be forced into a war with Germany. When the United States declared war against Germany, on April 6, 1917, Germany was surprised. This surprise was not effected through any intention of the United States, but rather was due entirely to the German incorrect estimate of the situation. This surprise became effective later in 1918, when American forces in France gave *mass* to Germany's enemies.

CHAPTER X

German and American Plans

	Page
1. SITUATION, APRIL, 1917	187
a. The Central Powers	187
b. The Allies	189
c. The United States	190
2. AIMS OF BELLIGERENTS	190
a. German aims	190
b. American aims	191
3. GERMAN PLAN	192
a. General plan	192
b. Plans affecting the United States	192
4. AMERICAN PLAN	193
a. Immediate measures to counteract effects of submarine warfare	193
b. The Council of National Defense	194
c. Coordination of American effort with that of Allies	195
d. Financing the war	196
e. Production and distribution of foodstuffs	197
f. Anti-submarine warfare measures	197
(1) Shipbuilding program	197
(2) Naval action	199
g. Mobilization of army	199
h. American expeditionary force	201
5. PRINCIPLES OF WAR	201
a. Principle of surprise	201
b. Principle of mass	202

1. THE SITUATION, APRIL, 1917. The situation when the United States associated herself with the Allies was as follows: (Maps 1, 2, 57, 58, 59, and 60.)

a. The Central Powers. (1) Germany had three objects in view when she enlarged the local Austro-Serbian conflict into a World War by declaring war against Russia, August 1, 1914. Those objects were:

First: The defeat of France and Russia.
Second: The creation of a great German-dominated empire through the center of Europe, across the Bosphorus, and through Turkey to the Persian Gulf.
Third: The eventual defeat of England and tranfer of control of the sea to Germany.

(2) By the spring of 1917, she had made the following progress in attaining those objects:

(a) The first object: (i) The effort to defeat France had failed but she had defeated all attempts to expel her from France. Her effort to defeat Russia had been more successful and the Czar's autocratic government had been overthrown, in March, 1917, by a socialistic revolution which in a feeble way was still maintaining the Russian front.

(ii) Thus, although she had not attained the first end in forcing treaties of peace from France and Russia, she had extended her front well into the territory of each and forced the ravages of war upon them.

(b) The second object: (i) She had succeeded, by alliance or the sword, in creating a great German-dominated empire that extended her control to the east in Russia as far as Riga (exclusive), to the west through Luxemburg and Belgium to Dunkirk (exclusive), and to the south through Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Turkey to Mesopotamia.

(ii) As a result, she had secured much needed mines of coal and metals in France, oil in Roumania and Russia, and an exceedingly rich territory for the supply of agricultural products in Russia, in the Balkans, and in Mesopotamia. Although suffering from the sea blockade enforced by Great Britain and her Allies, Germany had secured, by thus extending her territory, sufficient supplies with which to continue the war.

(iii) Strategically, her position on land was as follows:

By the occupation of the Dardanelles and the Balkans, she had penetrated between Russia and the latter's Allies. By winning a coast line on the English Channel west of Holland, she acquired the ports of Bruges and Ostend for use as submarine bases in maritime warfare against British control of the sea. Also, the territory in "Mittel Europa," extended, was all contiguous, which gave her the full benefit of the great Hamburg—Bagdad Railroad, and permitted operations on interior lines.

(c) The third object: Failing to win control of the sea by the action of surface ships, Germany revoked her pledge to the United States, given after the submarine attack on the *Sussex*, and on February 1, 1917, resumed unrestricted submarine warfare. At the time when the United States entered the war, the sinkings through submarine warfare were occurring at the maximum rate.

b. The Allies. (1) Although Montenegro was the only one of the Allies who had made a separate peace, the small states of Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania had been defeated and their troops practically forced out of national territory, i.e., Belgium troops into France, Serbian troops into Greece, and Roumanian troops into Russia.

(2) Russia, which held nearly the whole East front against Germany and Austro-Hungary in Europe and Turkey at the Caucasus, had been practically separated from her allies since the closing of the Dardanelles and the Balkans. Her only routes of communications were via the ports of Vladivostock and Archangel which were closed by ice during several months of the year. To improve her communications, she had built a railroad to the ice free port at Kola, on the Arctic Ocean, by the winter of 1916. But it was too late. Unable to fight effectively without sufficient arms, ammunition, equipment, or supplies, Russia revolted, and, in March, 1917, replaced the Romanoff Dynasty as autocratic rulers of Russia by a German-suggested socialistic provisional government. The new government did not maintain discipline in the army or navy and did not want to continue the war.

(3) The Western front, from north to south, was broken by Switzerland, and the Adriatic Sea. North of Switzerland, France and her allies faced Germany. South of Switzerland, Italy and her allies faced Austria-Hungary. In the Balkans, Serbia with Allied troops in Grecian territory, faced Bulgaria and her allies. In Asia Minor, Great Britain faced Turkey in Syria and in Mesopotamia.

(4) (a) Of these fronts, the only two that could communicate with each other by land were the Western and Italian fronts. Communication with the other fronts was entirely by sea. Also, communication between Great Britain and all of these fronts was by sea.

(b) Inasmuch as the Allies were operating on exterior lines whose means of communication were by sea, the control of the sea was essential—loss of control of the sea meant to the Allies, in 1917, the loss of the war.

(c) The unrestricted submarine warfare resumed by Germany February 1, 1917, was exceedingly effective. In April, 1917, she sunk 874,576 ship tons. At that rate of sinking, unless the rate of shipbuilding was increased, England would reach

the irreducible minimum by November, 1917, and would be forced to make peace.

(d) The withdrawal of England would reduce the sea power of Germany's enemies so much that Germany, whose naval strength was exceeded only by that of Great Britain, could control the sea and break up the Allies' communication between the different fronts and cause their defeat.

c. The United States. (1) The President had faithfully followed, in thought and in act, the policy of neutrality which he proclaimed, in August, 1914, for the conduct of the American people. As a result, when Germany began to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against the United States, on February 1, 1917, the people of the United States were surprised, and neither they or the Government were prepared to proceed at once to the assistance of the Allies as an associate or to wage war in any way without the protection of the Allies.

(2) Although the Central Powers had agreed to make war together and to make peace together and were united in adherence to the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, the United States limited her Declaration of War to Germany as the acts of war so far committed against the United States had been by nationals and ships of Germany.

2. AIMS OF BELLIGERENTS. *a. German aims.* (1) In the spring of 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare with the object of forcing England, who was dependent on supplies received by ship, to a separate peace, as the German General Staff estimated that the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Allies would give Germany control of the sea, and end the war.

(2) The greater part of Great Britain's supplies came from the United States, and before February 1, 1917, much of it was carried in American bottoms. The German General Staff believed that under the restrictions which the United States had imposed on submarine warfare, sufficient supplies would reach England to keep her in the war, and estimated that unrestricted submarine warfare would force a peace from England within a few months and long before Germany need fear any blow from the United States.

(3) So Germany's aim in beginning unrestricted submarine warfare against the United States, on February 1,

1917, was to reduce the supplies reaching England to such a point that Great Britain would be forced to make peace.

b. The American aims. (1) *Freedom of the Seas.* The American military mission was to defend the freedom of the seas for Americans and American shipping by the defeat of Germany who was, by unrestricted submarine warfare, denying that freedom of the seas to America.

(2) *To make the world safe for democracy.* (a) The President, Mr. Wilson, was a man of peace who abhorred the use of force in international relations. However, finally regarding war as necessary to win back freedom of the seas for America, he then also considered it a war to insure peace. During the war, he had progressively crystallized his ideal of a new international system which should perpetuate peace between the nations. Thus, in his second inaugural address, he declared: "We are provincials no longer. The tragical events of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the World. There can be no turning back."

(b) The four Central Powers, i.e., Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey all had the monarchial form of government which was administered in an autocratic way. On the other hand, the Allies, excepting Russia, had republican or limited monarchial governments, which were administered in a democratic way.

(c) After the Russian autocratic government, through revolution, had been supplanted by one representative in nature, when asking for the Declaration of War, Mr. Wilson said: "The great, generous Russian people have been added in all their majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor. * * * We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. * * * The World must be made safe for Demorcacy."

(d) Throughout America, by the spring of 1917, there was widespread sympathy with the Allies, due to the similarity of their political principles and systems of government to those of the United States, and a conviction that Germany was the enemy of all that America stood for and had to be defeated.

3. GERMAN PLAN. *a. General plan.* Marshal von Hindenburg's plan of campaign for 1917, approved by the Kaiser as Supreme Commander of the Central Powers' forces, was as follows: That on the land the Central Powers, while defending on all fronts, should assume the strategical attitude of "in readiness," for which reserves were to be secured by retirement on the French front to a shortened stronger line, and that a decision should be sought on the sea by launching a strategical and tactical unrestricted submarine offensive against England's sea lines of communication, and against her vital merchant marine food supply line.

b. Plans affecting the United States. The German General Staff estimated that the unrestricted submarine campaign against the merchant marine food and supply line to Great Britain would be successful and would force a separate peace from that country long before the United States could strike an effective blow against Germany. Accordingly, the German plan of campaign against the United States was in two parts.

(1) The first part of the plan was to continue the waging of unrestricted submarine warfare against Americans and American shipping in accordance with her submarine ultimatum to the world, January 31, 1917, with the addition, that the unrestricted submarine warfare after April 6, 1917, should be waged against Americans and American shipping wherever found without regard to the barred zones described in her ultimatum of January 31, 1917.

(2) The second part of the plan contemplated delaying effective American participation in the war, by propaganda and by sabotage. (a) The propaganda had as its mission:

> First: To confuse the American public on the causes of the original outbreak of the war in 1914.
>
> Second: To confuse the American public on the causes of American participation in the war against Germany.
>
> Third: To encourage pacifism, socialism, and *slackerism* in America.
>
> Fourth: By means of incorrect news articles, that indicated the near failure of the Central Powers, to superinduce the idea that the Allies would win without aggressive action by the United States. To strengthen that superinduced idea, Germany published much by propaganda and by offers to indicate that she desired peace.
>
> Fifth: To produce dissatisfaction with their wages among American workers.
>
> Sixth: To superinduce the idea that Great Britain intended to crush German industry and sea power so that she, Great Britain, after the war, could dominate the industry and sea traffic of the world.

Seventh: To hold so-called German-Americans to loyalty to Germany and disloyalty to the United States, and to create dissension between the United States and the Allies.

(b) The sabotage campaign had as its mission:

First: Interference with the production of raw materials by destruction of standing crops, etc.

Second: Prevention of movement of raw or manufactured materials in the United States by destruction of railroads, bridges and tunnels, canal locks, etc.

Third: The destruction of raw and manufactured materials in the United States by burning, etc.

Fourth: The destruction of raw and manufactured materials on the sea by tampering with machinery, by bombs in the coal, etc.

4. AMERICAN PLAN. The President having been true to the neutrality which he had proclaimed in 1914, the United States came into the World War absolutely unprepared, literally without a plan of campaign. As a result, the United States, behind the protection of the Allies on land and sea, took action progressively to meet the necessities of the rapidly changing situation.

a. Immediate measures to counteract effects of submarine warfare. (1) *Seizure of German ships.* Unrestricted submarine warfare was the weapon with which Germany had been waging war against the United States since February 1, 1917. By April 7, 1917, the situation had become so acute as to threaten a German victory. Hence, the first war measures taken by the administration were to meet the submarine warfare situation. As soon as the President decided to ask Congress for a declaration of war, as a measure of protection, he took charge of all German vessels interned in ports controlled by the United States. As soon as war was declared, he seized ninety-one German vessels of more than 600,000 gross tons. When Austria-Hungary severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 9, 1917, the President removed the crews of fourteen interned Austro-Hungarian ships of 120,000 gross tons. These measures increased American shipping by 720,000 gross tons.

(2) *Neutrals invited to join in an armed neutrality.* When the President asked Congress to declare the then existing war, he invited all neutral countries to follow his lead and declare an armed neutrality against Germany. All European neutrals excused themselves. Liberia and China, towards whom the American attitude has always been benevolent, and most of the countries associated with the United States in the Pan-

American Union, declared neutrality with benevolence to the United States, severed diplomatic relations with or declared war against Germany, and took charge of German ships in their respective harbors aggregating more than 1,000,000 gross tons.

b. The Council of National Defense. (1) An important item of the Defense Act of August 29, 1916, provided for the creation of a Council of National Defense to consist of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The Council was to be an administrative laboratory where national needs would be studied. It was authorized to set up the necessary administrative organizations to meet its ends. It was provided that it should function under the advice of an "Advisory Commission" to be composed of not more than seven persons, each of whom should have special knowledge of some industry, public utility, or the developments of some natural resource or be otherwise specially qualified.

(2) The original organization of the Advisory Commission with the functions under their supervision was as follows:

Daniel Williard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio R. R., to have charge of *transportation* and *communication.*

Howard E. Coffin, a consulting engineer with experience in the construction of automobile engines, to have charge of *munitions* and *manufacturing* to include *standardization,* and *industrial relations.*

Julius Rosenwald, President of the Sears Roebuck Co., to have charge of *supplies* including *clothing.*

Bernard M. Baruch, a financier and member of the New York Stock Exchange, to have charge of *minerals, metals,* and *raw materials.*

Dr. Hillis Godfrey, an engineer and President of the Drexel Institute, to have charge of *engineering* and *education.*

Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, to have charge of *labor,* including the *conservation of the health* and *the welfare of the workers.*

Dr. Franklin H. Martin, Regent and General Secretary of the American Society of Surgeons, to have charge of *medicine, surgery,* and *general sanitation.*

The Director was Mr. Gifford, a leading official of the telephone and telegraph industry.

(3) The Council of National Defense had no important work until after the breach with Germany, February 3, 1917,

between which date and the declaration of war, April 6, 1917, it sat in continuous session upon the problems of the procurement agencies of the Government. During the war, it organized a great many boards and committees. It really was the agency upon which the President, at first, placed his greatest reliance in the conduct of the war against Germany.

c. Coordination of American effort with that of Allies. (1) In the latter part of April, 1917, a War Council consisting of large missions of British and French military, naval, and economic experts (headed respectively by Mr. Balfour and Monsieur Viviani, assisted by Marshal Joffre) and corresponding American officials met in Washington. Their mission was to coordinate the American effort with that of the Allies, to advise as to what was necessary, and to assist American officials in the preparation of the necessary plans.

(2) The Allied Mission had information that General Nivelle's spring offensive on the Western front had not succeeded and that the Allies estimated that a decision could not be secured over Germany before 1918, at the earliest. Marshal Joffre and the other representatives insisted that French and British morale was low and stated that their reserve man power was much reduced.

(3) As the United States was fighting Germany only, in view of transportation difficulties and the Russian revolution, it was agreed that the American battle effort should be made on the Western front. All members of the mission were agreed that the United States could not prepare forces for effective participation on the Western front before 1918. It was agreed that plans for American participation should be drawn with that understanding.

(4) The Commissions further advised that the order of urgency in which American assistance was needed was as follows:

> First: money.
> Second: food.
> Third: help against submarines.
> Fourth: men, except, however, that to brace the morale of the British and French, some troops should be sent to the Western front as soon as possible.

(5) Commissioners from other allied countries came later but gave no contrary advice. The heads of the commissions returned to their respective countries but left a large number of assistants to help formulate plans.

(6) (a) As a result of the conference with the Allied Missions, any idea that may have been held that America would help with money alone, or with money and food alone, or even with money, food, and ships alone, was at once abandoned, and American effort was coordinated by the plan (which was never fully formulated) that the United States would make war against Germany as an associate of the Allies:

> First: with money.
> Second: with food.
> Third: with assistance in the fight against the submarine.
> Fourth: by organizing and sending to France a large force for participation in the 1918 campaign.
> Fifth: by sending, at once, a small expeditionary force to France to hearten the Allies.

(b) Further, although the United States declined to bind herself as an ally, she made it clear to the Allied Missions that she committed herself to the war until the common cause for which they were fighting was won.

d. Financing the war. (1) On April 24, 1917, the Congress passed a War Finance Act authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to raise $7,000,000,000.00 to meet the cost of the war and granting authority to lend the Allies $3,000,000,000.00 of that sum. As early as April 25, 1917, the Secretary of the Treasury handed a treasury warrant for $200,000,000.00 to the British Ambassador.

(2) The other Allies soon asked for money and by the end of June, 1917, more than $1,000,000,000.00 had been lent to the Allies. The total amount lent, as of August 15, 1920, with some deductions because of payment, tabulates as follows:

Borrower	*Amount*
Great Britain	$4,277,000,000
France	3,047,974,777
Italy	1,666,260,179
Belgium	350,428,793
Russia	187,729,750
Czecho-Slovakia	67,329,041
Greece	48,236,629
Serbia	26,780,465
Roumania	25,000,000
Cuba	10,000,000
Liberia	5,000,000
Total	$9,711,739,636

(3) The money lent to the Allies, together with money expended by the United States on its own account, was raised by Liberty and Victory Loans, by the issue of certificates of indebtedness, and by an increase in taxation. These loans

gave new life to the governments of the allied states as they had nearly reached the limit of their financial strength. The last British loan which had been floated in the United States bore interest at the rate of 5½% although it was managed by American bankers, J. P. Morgan & Co., was secured by collateral, and called for only $60,000,000.00.

e. Production and distribution of foodstuffs. (1) The Council of National Defense on April 11, 1917, created a Committee on Food Supply and Prices, with Mr. Herbert C. Hoover as Chairman. After the meeting of the Allied Missions in Washington, the President, on May 20, 1917, named Mr. Hoover as Food Commissioner. Mr. Hoover, inspired by the allied appeal, at once concentrated his efforts on two great missions; i.e., first, to produce food and, second, to prevent its hoarding and to secure its effective distribution.

(2) To carry out the first mission, he appealed to all to increase the 1917 crop and created a great volunteer agricultural crop producing campaign under the slogan, "Food will win the war."

(3) To carry out the second mission, under executive authority and enabling acts of Congress, he initiated food control with the following objects:

> First: to increase American exports of breadstuffs, meats, fats, and sugar.
> Second: to maintain such stability of prices as would encourage the producer and protect the consumer.
> Third: to regulate exports so that none would go to the Central Powers, the minimum to neutrals, and the maximum would be properly divided among the Allies.

(4) Under these policies, Mr. Hoover, between July, 1917, and July, 1919, furnished food commodities to the Allies and to countries liberated from the Central Powers to the total value of $3,670,000,000.00. The British have frankly stated that although the American program for shipment of food to the Allies ran badly behind because of lack of ship tonnage and because of railway congestion in the United States, yet the food which Mr. Hoover did send saved the situation during the winter of 1917-1918.

f. Anti-submarine warfare measures. In the fight against the submarine, the United States decided to help not only with her fleet but also by building new ships.

(1) *Shipbuilding program.* (a) Immediately after the beginning of the World War, in 1914, ship building became pro-

fitable and private enterprise in the United States launched many ships. It was apparent, after war was declared, that building ships was one of the means of defeating submarine warfare, and when the Allied Missions urged the crucial importance of rapidly creating a great amount of ship tonnage, it was agreed with them that the United States should assume the obligation of building 6,000,000 dead weight tons or more, before the end of 1918.

(b) On September 7, 1916, the Congress created a Shipping Board with the view of developing an American Merchant Marine, primarily for trade with South America, with which the regular routes of communication had hitherto been via Europe. After war was declared, the peacetime establishment actually functioned as a War Board with emergency powers, and on April 16, 1917, it created and had incorporated in the District of Columbia, "The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation" with a capital stock of $50,000,000.00, all of which was subscribed by the Shipping Board on behalf of the United States. This capital stock was increased by October to nearly $2,000,000,000.00. The mission of the Corporation was to purchase, construct, equip, lease, charter, maintain, and operate merchant vessels in the commerce of the United States.

(c) (i) Major General George W. Goethals, the builder of the Panama Canal, was appointed manager of the Corporation. However, he favored steel ships over wooden ships and, as a result of the ensuing controversy, the shipping program was delayed and General Goethals resigned.

(ii) The ships built by the Corporation were standardized at 8,000 tons so that the parts could be made in quantity in factories and sent to various shipyards for assembly.

(iii) By October 1, 1918, the United States had constructed 384 steel ships with a total tonnage of 1,547,824 tons, and 289 wooden ships with a total tonnage of 504,108 ton. The aggregate tonnage thus created was 2,051,932 tons. The United States thus was nearly 4,000,000 tons below its obligation to the Allies and more than 5,000,000 tons below its program of November 15, 1917.

(d) Another source of securing tonnage was the requisitioning of ships under construction in American yards. October 15, 1917, the Corporation requisitioned all ships of 2,500 tons or more under construction and thus secured an additional

3,000,000 tons. Most of the ships requisitioned had been ordered by foreign ship owners. Thereafter, all ships of above 2,500 tons were built on government account.

(2) *Naval action.* (a) In 1914, the American Navy, in relative strength, compared with those of other powers, ranked third; the Navy of Great Britain being first, and that of Germany, second.

(b) On the recommendation of the President, the Congress, in 1915, decided to increase the Navy in a three-year building program and appropriated $502,482,214.00 for the construction of:

10 dreadnaughts.
6 battle cruisers.
10 scout cruisers.
50 destroyers.
15 fleet submarines.
85 coast submarine and various other ships.

(c) As soon as war was declared, the Navy patrolled the American coast. Within two months, American destroyers reported to Admiral Sims, Commander of American Naval Forces in Europe, and were cooperating with the British fleet against German submarines.

(d) The great Northern Mine Barrage, extending from Norway to the Orkney Islands, was laid by the British and American Navies together. The American Navy had some part in blockading the Austrian coast, on the Adriatic, and participated in maintaining the Allied command of the sea.

(e) The principal accomplishment of the American Navy in the war was the development of a convoy system whereby over 2,000,000 troops were carried safely over the 3,000 miles, to France.

g. Moblization of army. (1) When Germany declared war against Russia and France, the Regular Army of the United States consisted of a small General Staff, 31 regiments of infantry, 15 regiments of cavalry, 6 regiments of field artillery, a coast artillery corps, and certain supply and administrative troops. The whole force totaled only 86,000 officers and men. The National Guard consisted of less than 9,000 officers and 120,000 men.

(2) A fair idea of equipment on hand can be formed from the fact that there were only:

21 airplanes.
634 modern guns, 6-inch or less in caliber.
2 days' fire of ammunition.
1000 machine guns, mainly of the obsolete Gatling and Colt models

(3) After the sinking of the *Lusitania* and because of a preparedness movement which had taken a strong hold on the public mind, the Congress enacted "The National Defense Act of 1916" which increased the Regular Army to 185,000 with a further possible increase in war, increased the National Guard to the ratio of 800 men for each Representative and Senator in Congress, provided for a Reserve composed of those discharged from the Army and National Guard, created an Officers' Reserve Corps and made provision for a Reserve Officers' Training Corps at colleges and universities.

(4) When the United States declared war, it was generally agreed that eventually American troops would be sent to France, if needed. But it was doubted whether they ever would be needed and the General Staff believed that no men should be sent until the United States had equipped and trained a large army.

(5) (a) The revelation by Marshal Joffre and the Allied Missions that France and England were nearly exhausted brought about a realization that active participation in the war on the continent of Europe was necessary. Before the Allied Missions had left the United States, the Congress enacted a Selective Service Draft Law (May 18, 1917), which increased the Regular Army to 287,000 men, authorized mustering the National Guard into the Federal Service, and to the amazement of the rest of the world and of Germany in particular, authorized the President to enroll all males between 21 and 31 years of age, and from them to raise a force of 500,000 men, and, if necessary, a later force of 500,000 more.

(b) By June 5, 1917, 9,586,508 men were enrolled, and on July 20, names were drawn to make up a force of 687,000 men, which the President directed to be assembled, September 18, 1917. This force was named the National Army.

(c) Based on the foregoing Selective Service Draft Law, the Army of the United States was to be built up of:

The Regular Army: Divisions 1 to 25.
The National Guard (Federalized): Divisions 26 to 50.
The National Army: Divisions 50 to 100.

(ii) The organization was to be in three phases:

First: the immediate recruitment of the Regular Army.
Second: the federalization of the National Guard, in July.
Third: the organization of the National Army, in September and October.

(iii) The Regular Army furnished the senior officers for the National Army, for all units from regiments up to and including divisions. Junior officers were obtained through fifteen training camps, organized and conducted on the Plattsburg Plan, each of a capacity of 2,500 men. Graduates from these camps were recommended for temporary commissions, to include the grade of major.

(6) Sixteen cantonments were constructed for the training of the National Guard, and sixteen for the National Army. The courses of training prescribed by the War Department for National Guard and National Army divisions training in the United States covered sixteen weeks.

h. American Expeditionary Force. (1) Marshal Joffre's request for the appearance of American troops in France to hearten the French people and the French Army, appealed to the American people and created a popular demand that Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, who, for a long time, had aggressively espoused the Allied Cause, be permitted to recruit a division at once and take it to France. In fact, the Congress in the Act of May 18, 1917, authorized the President to send four volunteer divisions abroad as soon as they were ready. The President, however, was opposed to the volunteer system on account of its inadequacy in a war of unlimited effort and did not take action under this authority.

(2) Mr. Wilson had been much impressed by the loyal and efficient manner in which his very unpopular policy, with its exceedingly difficult duty, had been carried out in Mexico, and on May 26, 1917, selected Brigadier General John J. Pershing who had commanded the American forces on the border and in Mexico, to be the Commander-in-Chief of American Forces in Europe, and directed the sending overseas of the first detachment of the American Army.

5. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. Principle of surprise.* When the United States, contrary to the German estimate, adopted a selective service law and began the drafting of a great army, the effect on Germany illustrated the *principle of surprise.* Here again, the surprise was not through any intention of the

United States but was due wholly to an incorrect estimate of the situation by the Germans.

b. Principle of mass. The raising of a large force by the United States, and its later transportation to France, made possible the illustration of *mass* on the French front in 1918, when American troops turned the tide at the Second Battle of the Marne, and delivered the decisive blow November 1-5, 1918, near Dun-sur-Meuse.

CHAPTER XI

Plans for the Use of American Forces in Europe

	Page
1. The President's Instructions to General Pershing	203
2. General Pershing's Arrival in Europe	204
3. Situation, June 13, 1917	204
a. The Central Powers	204
b. The Allies	205
4. General Pershing's Estimate of the Situation and General Plan	206
a. Estimate	206
b. General plan	206
5. Organization of a General Staff	206
a. Basis of organization	206
b. Description of organization	207
6. General Organization Project for an Army	207
a. Basic considerations	207
b. Composition of units	208
7. Selection of Front for the American Effort	210
a. Basic considerations	210
b. Available front	210
c. The front selected	211
8. Project for Organization of a Service of the Rear	211
a. Base of supplies	211
b. Base ports in France	211
c. Lines of communication	212
d. Main depots of supply	213
e. Sections	213
f. Service of supply troops	213
9. Schedule for Priority of Shipments	214
10. Training Project	214
a. General Pershing's training doctrine	214
b. Division training areas	215
c. Schools	216
11. Principles of War.—Principle of security	217

1. The President's Instructions to General Pershing. The President's instructions to General Pershing dated May 26, 1917, contained the following important direction:

> "5. In military operations against the Imperial German Government, you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the

other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision as to when your command, or any of its parts, is ready for action is confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in determining the manner of cooperation. But until the forces of the United States are in your judgment sufficiently strong to warrant cooperation as an independent command, it is understood that you will cooperate as a component of whatever army you may be assigned to by the French Government."

2. GENERAL PERSHING'S ARRIVAL IN EUROPE. General Pershing, while still in Washington, assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief of American troops in Europe. He selected a small staff of 53 officers and, with it and 146 enlisted men, departed May 28, 1917, on the *S.S. Baltic,* for London where he arrived June 9, 1917. After spending some days in consultation with British authorities, he reached Paris, June 13, 1917. He was received with great enthusiasm in England and France. His military bearing and confidence made such an impression on the French that, in his capacity as America's representative, they regarded him as the master who would lead the way out of an already lost war to an almost unbelievable victory. At Napoleon's tomb, they expressed their hopes by according to him the unique honor of bearing the sword of that great master which had remained sheathed behind plate glass for more than sixty years.

In compliance with the wish of Marshal Joffre, the 1st American (Regular) Division arrived in France June 26, 1917. One battalion of the 16th Infantry paraded in Paris on July 4, 1917, and escorted General Pershing to the tomb of the great French hero of the American Revolution, where General Pershing pronounced those words which electrified France and revivified her hopes of ultimate victory, "Lafayette, we are here!"

3. THE SITUATION JUNE 13, 1917. (Map 57.) The situation when General Pershing arrived in France was as follows:

a. The Central Powers. (1) The Central Powers were in actual possession of a Central European empire that ex-

tended from the North and Baltic Seas, across the Bosphorus to include most of Turkey.

(2) The second German attempt to defeat France had failed at Verdun in 1916. The German 1917 plan, to assume the strategical attitude of *in readiness* on the land and to win a victory through starving England into a separate peace by means of unrestricted submarine warfare, apparently might succeed.

b. The Allies. (1) Great Britain attracted attention to Turkey in March by capturing Bagdad in Mesopotamia, and by the attempt to capture Gaza in Syria.

(2) The Allies also had attracted attention to the Balkans by forcing the abdication of Constantine as King of Greece, in June, and allowing Greece to follow her national desire of entering into an alliance with the Allies.

(3) General Cadorna had incorrectly estimated that Austria was planning to attack Italy, and so did not carry out the Inter-Allied plan to assume the offensive early and synchronously with the Allied offensive in France. His hurried offensive was too late for coordination with the Allied offensive in France and resulted merely in an ordinary victory with a limited objective.

(4) The Russian Government had been overthrown by a socialistic revolution.

(5) The great offensive on the Western front under General Nivelle in April (generally called the Second Battle of the Aisne) which was intended to decisively defeat the Germans and force them out of France had failed and had resulted in a serious lowering of French morale.

(6) After the failure of General Nivelle, the Allies altered their plan for operations on the Western front as follows: General Haig with the assistance of the Allies was to capture the German submarine bases at Ostend and at Zeebrugge by a major offensive that would give some relief against submarine warfare, while General Petain (the new French commander), to the south, was to retain the initiative by minor offensives with limited objectives.

(7) Allied reserves of men at the front and at home were low and there was little prospect of materially increasing their armed strength even in the face of the probability

of having practically the whole military strength of the Central Powers against them in the spring of 1918.

(8) Briefly, the changed Allied plan called for the strategic defensive on the whole front pending arrival of American forces.

4. GENERAL PERSHING'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND GENERAL PLAN. *a. Estimate.* (1) General Pershing at first established his headquarters in Paris and there near the great Allied nerve center, formulated plans for the organization of the American forces in Europe. The Allied commanders in chief and their staffs placed their experience at his disposal and, through consultation, the most effective means of cooperation of effort were considered.

(2) General Pershing noted the fact that the Allies in France based their organization and training on the theory that their forces would be used in the so-called "War of Position." He clearly saw that victory could not be secured otherwise than by maneuver after the hostile defensive positions had been penetrated. He estimated that the United States was the only power that could furnish a sufficient force to end the war and decided that the American forces should be organized and trained basically for offensive war of maneuver.

b. General plan. In conformity with the estimate he had formed, he cabled Washington on July 6, 1917:

> "Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May."

This decision finally fixed the United States in the policy of participating in battle action in Europe and with a sufficient force to win the victory.

5. ORGANIZATION OF A GENERAL STAFF. *a. Basis of organization.* General Pershing understood that a well organized general staff is an essential element of a modern army and at once began the organization of a general staff for the American Expeditionary Force. As the American army had not previously contained a general staff broadly organized and trained for war, he selected from the French and British general staff systems certain features which had stood the test of experience. To these features, he added certain ideas of his own and molded the whole into a general staff system for his force. His problem was different

from that of either the French or the British. The former were conducting war at home; the latter, although their general staff was organized on an overseas basis, were within easy reach of their base of supplies, England. The American troops in Europe, on the other hand, would be 3,000 miles from their base of supplies and their line of communications therewith would be subject to all the handicaps incident to the use of water transportation exposed to the dangers of submarine warfare and of the elements.

b. Description of organization. The general staff, as finally organized, was divided into five groups, as follows:

The Administration Section, usually called "G1."
The Intelligence Section, usually called "G2."
The Operations Section, usually called "G3."
The Supply Section, usually called "G4."
The Training Section, usually called "G5."

The titles of the sections are indicative of their functions. The same allotment of duties was made to the staffs in the lower echelons of command down to include divisions. In corps and divisions, however, the "G4" or Supply Section was merged with the "G1" Section and the "G5" or Training Section, with the "G3" Section.

6. A General Organization Project for an Army. *a. Basic considerations.* (1) General Pershing, after he had made a careful study of the French and British experience on the Western front, furnished his conclusions to the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Force and directed that they be used as the basis for a general organization project covering, as far as possible, the personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units for one army, the idea being that other armies would be organized, as it became necessary, on the same basis. The project was prepared by the General Staff and forwarded by General Pershing to the War Department on July 11, 1917.

(2) The project called for, initially, one army of about 1,000,000 men, consisting of from three to five corps, each corps to consist of corps troops and four combat divisions with one replacement and one depot division. Each corps was intended to be capable of taking over a corps sector with two divisions in line and two in reserve while losses in the ranks were to be filled from the replacement and depot

divisions. In forwarding this project, General Pershing stated:

> "It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 men is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well balanced, and independent organization. However, it must be equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. It is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive in 1918, and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture of artillery, aviation, and other material, on three times this force, i.e., at least 3,000,000 men."

b. Composition of units. The project furnished the War Department with a model upon which it organized troops intended for service abroad and, with a few minor exceptions, the tables thereof controlled in the American Expeditionary Force to the end. The following is a resumé of the project:

(1) (a) An army was to consist of an army headquarters, certain army troops, and five corps.

(b) The army troops were to consist of the necessary artillery, aviation, engineer, signal, and sanitary troops, and a remount and veterinary service, traffic police, and trains in amount sufficient to reinforce the operations of the included corps.

(2) (a) A corps was to consist of a corps headquarters, certain corps troops, four combat divisions, one replacement division, and one depot division.

(b) The corps troops were to consist of the necessary cavalry, artillery, aviation, engineer, pioneer infantry, and signal troops and a remount service and trains, in amount sufficient to reinforce the operations of the included divisions.

(3) The division organization in the project differed considerably from that in vogue among the Allies. Its strength was about 28,000 men, practically double that of a French or German division. It was adopted because of its suitability for offensive rather than defensive warfare in the situation as it then existed on the Western front. In detail, the organization recommended was as follows:

(a) Each combat division was to consist of:

A division headquarters.
1 squadron cavalry (attached from corps).
1 regiment of engineers.
1 machine gun battalion.
1 tank company.
1 field signal battalion.
The division trains.
1 artillery brigade.
2 infantry brigades.

(b) The composition of the major units of the division was to be as follows:

(i) *Artillery brigade.*

Brigade headquarters.
2 gun regiments, 75-mm.
1 howitzer regiment, 6-inch.
1 trench mortar battery.
Each 75-mm. gun regiment was to consist of:
Regimental headquarters.
1 headquarters battery.
1 supply battery.
2 battalions (with headquarters and 3 batteries, each).
The 6-inch howitzer regiment was to consist of:
Regimental headquarters.
1 headquarters battery.
1 supply battery.
3 battalions (with headquarters and 2 batteries, each).

The trench mortar battery was to be an independent unit dependent upon brigade headquarters.

(ii) *Infantry brigade.*

Brigade headquarters.
2 infantry regiments.
Each infantry regiment was to consist of:
1 regimental headquarters.
1 headquarters company.
1 supply company.
3 battalions.
Each infantry battalion to consist of:
1 battalion headquarters.
1 machine gun company.
4 rifle companies of 250 men each.

(iii) *The division trains.*

1 train headquarters.
2 military police companies.
1 ammunition train.
1 supply train.
1 engineer train.
1 sanitary train.

(4) The plan for replacement and depot divisions was nearly the same. Their names indicate their respective

functions. Two ambulance companies and two field hospitals from both the replacement and depot divisions, and all the artillery from the replacement division, except one regiment of 75s and the trench mortar battery, were to be withdrawn for use with corps troops. Also, all of the artillery of the depot division, except one regiment of 75s and the trench mortar battery, was to be withdrawn for use with army troops.

7. SELECTION OF FRONT FOR THE AMERICAN EFFORT. (Maps 5, 6, 61 and 63.) *a. Basic considerations.* (1) The minimum size of force needed for offensive use in France in 1918 and the basis for its organization having been indicated to the War Department, General Pershing's next task was the selection of the probable front for the American effort. Always remembering that he was the commander of the American forces whose mission was offensive, it was necessary for him to select a front from which a decisive blow, that would end the war, could be delivered against the Germans.

(2) He found all France organized for resistance to the invader. The zones of operation of the French and British Armies were not fixed, but varied with the fortunes of war. Behind the zones of operation their communications zones and zone of the interior were organized to serve and maintain the combat troops in the zones of operations. These zones fluctuated in size according to the fortunes of the Allied armies.

(3) He observed that while the Allies had endeavored to maintain the offensive, the British, in order to guard the channel ports, were committed to operations in Flanders and the French, to the portion of the front protecting Paris; also, neither had sufficient troops for operations on a large scale elsewhere.

b. The available front. (1) The French line from Verdun to Switzerland and the German line from Metz to Switzerland were permanently fortified. The best opportunity for maneuver lay to the west of Metz and to the east of the French line directly defending Paris.

(2) The great hostile fortified district east of Verdun and around Metz menaced central France, protected the

most exposed portion of the German line of communications; i.e., between Carignan and Sedan, and covered the Briey iron region, from which the Germans obtained the greater part of the iron required for munitions and material. Also, the coal fields east of Metz were covered by these same defenses. A deep advance in the general direction of Metz would cut the German line of communications, capture the Briey iron basin, and force Germany to withdraw her troops from Northern France.

c. The front selected. The strategical and economical situation of the enemy indicated Lorraine as the field in which the blow of the American armies would be most effective. So General Pershing, with Allied approval, decided to prepare to deliver the American blow in Lorraine.

8. PROJECT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A SERVICE OF THE REAR.—(Maps 17, 61, 62, 63, and 64.) After the preparation of a project for the organization and preliminary training of combat troops and the selection of the probable front for the operations of the American Army, the next project in order of urgency was for the Service of the Rear, later called Service of Supply. General Pershing approached the solution of the formulation of a project for this purpose as follows:

a. Base of supplies. Inasmuch as Great Britain and France were unable to furnish all their own supplies and were dependent on America for large quantities of many important articles, General Pershing saw at once that he could not rely on a French or British base of supplies for the American Expeditionary Force and that for all practical purposes his forces were based on the American continent, more than 3,000 miles away.

b. Base ports in France. (1) Base ports in France were needed for the reception of the three and perhaps four million men, their replacements, and the enormous amount of supplies required to maintain the American effort.

(2) Examination showed that the northern ports were crowded by British shipping and supplies and that the available southern ports did not have adequate port facilities. Also, the railway system behind the active front in northern France was already overtaxed and would not

be available for American use for lines of supply, while the railways leading from the southern ports to northeastern France, although available, were not of sufficient capacity to meet American needs.

(3) General Pershing did not hesitate, but, having in mind the fact that he was to command the great American forces that were deemed essential to win the war, he decided, at once, to use the southern ports of France, at Bordeaux, La Pallice, and St. Nazaire, and the railway systems leading to the northeast; and to commit the United States to the mammoth essential program of shipbuilding in America, and dock, railway, and storage depot building in France which were necessary in order to create a reliable line of communication supply service.

c. Lines of communication. The American front and the base ports having been determined, there remained the problem of establishing lines of communication between them. The railroad lines of France were meeting the heavy demand of 3,500,000 combatants there engaged, and it was apparent that if the American armies were to have an independent and flexible railroad system, neither the railroads behind the British front nor those in rear of the French front covering Paris could be used. Specifically, General Pershing's problem was to superimpose the American Expeditionary Force's rail communications on those of France where there would be the least possible disturbance to the arteries of supply of the two great Allied armies already in the field. This required the utmost use of those lines of the existing French railroad system that could bear an added burden. Double track railroad lines from the ports of the Loire and the Gironde Rivers unite at Bourges, running thence via Nevers, Dijon, to Neufchateau with lines radiating therefrom toward the right wing of the Allied front. It was estimated that those railroads with the available collateral lines, after considerable improvement, could carry the additional 50,000 tons that would be required daily for an army of 2,000,000 men. So General Pershing decided, with Allied approval, that his lines of communication should be from the comparatively unused

French South Atlantic ports to the American front to the northeast.

Superimposing the map of France on that of the United States, it can be seen that the American base ports, from Brest to Bordeaux, would cover the approximate distance from Charlestown, South Carolina, to Richmond, Virginia, and that the length of the lines of communication would correspond roughly with the distance from Louisville, Kentucky, to the South Atlantic seaboard.

d. Main depots of supply. It was important that the main depots of supply should be easily accessible yet at a safe distance from the front, as the Germans were capable of taking the offensive in any one of several directions. The area embracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers, and Chateauroux, meeting these requirements, was chosen for location of the main depots as it also was centrally located with regard to all points on the arc of the Western front.

e. Sections.—(1) For the purpose of local administration, General Pershing divided the line of communications into *base sections,* which included the territory immediately surrounding the various base ports; an *intermediate section,* which embraced the region of the great storage depots; and an *advance section* within which the billeting and training areas of the earlier arriving divisions were located and which extended to the probable zone of operations.

(2) In providing for the storage and distribution of reserve supplies, the original plan called for forty-five days' supplies in the base sections, thirty days' in the intermediate, and fifteen days' in the advance section.

f. Service of Supply troops. (1) General Pershing forwarded, on July 11, 1917, a plan of organization for combat troops for the Zone of Operations. A project for the organization and construction of the Service of the Rear, including docks and railways, was cabled to Washington August 5, 1917, followed, September 18, 1917, by a complete schedule of the troops considered necessary for the Service of Supply. This list of troops comprised the necessary

aviation, engineer, supply, labor, and transportation troops, and sanitary, remount and veterinary services.

(2) Later, General Pershing transferred all of the Administrative and Supply Service Staff except the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's and Judge Advocate General's Departments, from his headquarters to Tours, where they functioned under a Commanding General, Service of Supply, who was responsible to General Pershing for the supply of the army.

9. SCHEDULE FOR PRIORITY OF SHIPMENTS. In order that the War Department might have a program to follow in the shipment of personnel and material to insure the gradual building up of a force at all times balanced and symmetrical, a comprehensive statement covering the order in which the troops and supplies should arrive in France, was prepared and forwarded, in the form of a schedule of priority of shipments, to the War Department, on October 7, 1917.

10. TRAINING PROJECT. Soon after his arrival in France, General Pershing made a careful study of the methods used by the French and British to train combat troops. He observed that they continuously maintained a system of schools and training centers where noncommissioned officers, inexperienced officers, and officers to be prepared for advancement were given both theoretical and practical instruction.

a. General Pershing's training doctrine. (1) On August 27, 1917, General Pershing announced his initial training project. It was based upon sound American doctrine that was contemplated to develop a self reliant infantry by thorough instruction in the use of the rifle, and to prepare an integral American force trained in maneuver which would be able in every respect to take the offensive.

(2) To coordinate the training in America with training to be given in France, General Pershing cabled Washington that the training of troops in stabilized warfare, or the so-called "trench warfare," should be limited to troops in France, and that the training of troops in America should be confined to instruction in maneuver, or the so-called "open warfare," and that, accordingly, the importance of

target practice and musketry training should be emphasized in the instruction at mobilization camps.

(3) He had observed that the long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they almost entirely dispensed with training for war of maneuver or open warfare. To make sure that the American forces would avoid that result he directed that the earlier divisions which were training in close association with the French should be instructed as follows:

> "Trench warfare naturally gives prominence to the defensive as opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of instruction should be essentially the offensive both in spirit and in practice. The defensive is accepted only to prepare for future offensive."

(4) And, in October, 1917, to inculcate the offensive spirit, he directed compliance with his now celebrated American doctrine as follows:

> "1. * * (a) The above methods to be employed must remain or become distinctly our own.
>
> (b) All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought.
>
> (c) The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill Regulations and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters.
>
> (d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman, both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.
>
> (e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history has discipline been so important; therefore discipline of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The standards for the American Army will be those of West Point. The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the Cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our Armies in France. * *"

b. Division training areas. (1) Based on the assumption that divisions would arrive from the United States with their basic training completed, a three months' training program was prescribed for them in France, as follows:

First month: Instruction of small units from battalion down.

Second month: Battalions in quiet sectors on the front.

Third month: Field practice in open warfare tactics by divisions, including artillery.

(2) Division training areas were selected and divisions assigned to them in rear of the Lorraine front, where General Pershing was later to strike the American blow.

(3) During the first two months, the division artillery units were to train in special localities such as Valdahon, Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge, where the instruction was carried on in conjunction with French artillery. In the third month, the artillery was to be assembled with its own division and its training was to be carried out in cooperation with the division infantry, in field practice.

c. Schools. (1) With the assistance of Marshal Haig and General Petain, who placed officers and men at his disposal for use as instructors, and by using experienced American officers, General Pershing started a system of schools, coordinate through the G-5 Section of the General Staff, to teach the application of the doctrine enunciated by him, to strategy, tactics, and technique.

(2) A General Staff College was organized in November, 1917, at the great French school center at Langres. This college graduated 537 officers. At the same place, Langres, a Line School, which graduated 488 officers, was organized.

(3) At corps centers of instruction for units of all arms and for noncommissioned officers, 12,891 officers and 21,330 noncommissioned officers were graduated.

(4) From the Candidates' Schools, where carefully selected enlisted men sought to win commissions, 11,000 men were graduated and commissioned for assignment as commanders of infantry platoons and companies. Similarly, Candidates' Schools were to be conducted for each arm, with a prospective promotion through the agency of those Candidate Schools of 7,000 men each month.

(5) Special Service Schools were organized for each arm where, in well coordinated curriculums, the doctrine of tactics and technique for the particular arm was taught.

(6) In addition, American officers were sent to Allied technical schools with a view of preparing American experts in the technique and tactics of new weapons. Upon return those officers were used as instructors in similar American schools or in their organizations.

11. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *Principle of security.* General Pershing by organizing a complete service of supply for the American forces, gained freedom of action. Based on the security thus obtained, he was able, later, to organize the decisive blow whose delivery brought the war to an end.

CHAPTER XII

All Fronts to End of 1917

Page

1. Balkan Front 218
   - *a.* Greece joins the Allies 218
   - *b.* Operations 219
2. Italian Front 219
   - *a.* Situation 219
   - *b.* Spring offensive 220
   - *c.* Summer offensive 220
3. Western Front 220
   - *a.* Situation 220
   - *b.* British offensive against submarine bases 221
4. Russian Front 223
   - *a.* Situation 223
   - *b.* Russian offensive 224
   - *c.* German counter offensive in Galicia 224
   - *d.* German victory at Riga 226
   - *e.* Bolsheviki revolution 227
   - *f.* Armistice of Brest-Litovsk 227
   - *g.* Roumania 227
5. Western Front 227
   - *a.* Situation on French front 227
   - *b.* Third Battle of Verdun 228
   - *c.* Capture of Malmaison 228
6. Italian Front 229
   - *a.* Situation 229
   - *b.* Central Powers' plans 229
   - *c.* Battle of Caporetto 230
7. Supreme War Council 231
8. Western Front 232
   - *a.* British plans, November, 1917 232
   - *b.* Battle of Cambrai 233
   - *c.* German counter attack 234
9. Syrian Front 234
   - *a.* Situation and plans 234
   - *b.* Second Battle of Gaza 235
   - *c.* Capture of Jerusalem 236
10. Diplomatic Attempts to End the War 236
11. Principles of War 237
    - *a.* Principle of the objective 237
    - *b.* Principle of security 238
    - *c.* Principle of the offensive 238
    - *d.* Principle of cooperation 239

1. Balkan Front. (Map 53.) *a. Greece joins the Allies.* (1) The Allies discovered that King Constan-

tine of Greece had been maintaining secret wireless communication with the Kaiser of Germany and had permitted the establishment of submarine bases by the Central Powers on the coast of Greece. They held him responsible for preventing General Sarrail's cooperation with the Roumanian Army in 1916. France, Great Britain, and Russia as the protectors of Greek representative constitutional government, forced Constantine to abdicate the throne, June 10, 1917, to renounce the right of the Crown Prince (a Germanophile) to the throne, and to take the Crown Prince with him into exile.

(2) Constantine's second son, Alexander, was crowned King of Greece at once. He recalled M. Venizelos to power as Prime Minister. Greece, then functioning with a representative constitutional government, declared war on the Central Powers on July 2, and began the reorganization of the Greek army, which was to consist of ten divisions (about 200,000 men). All officers in the government service who were known to hold German sympathies, were at once dismissed, and all Germanophiles were imprisoned or expatriated.

b. Operations. (1) During 1917, prior to King Constantine's abdication, General Sarrail had conducted an offensive along the whole line which, although it did not accomplish a penetration, it did hold a large Central Powers' force in his front.

(2) After Greece joined the Allies the blockade of Greece was raised. General Sarrail's many detachments in Greece returned to the front, and the Greek army took its place on the line, subject to orders of the commander of the Allies on the Balkan front. Preparations were begun at once for the delivery of a major offensive operation against the Bulgarian army.

2. ITALIAN FRONT. (Maps 57 and 65.) *a. Situation.* (1) The general plan of General von Arz, the new Austrian Chief of Staff, dictated by Marshal von Hindenburg, was a strategic "in readiness" for all of Austria's forces, but "passive defense" on the Italian front.

(2) The Austrian dispositions were:

Eleventh Army (General Conrad): in the Trent salient.
Tenth Army (General Krobatkin): on Dolomite and Carnic Alps front.
Second Army (General Boroevic): on the Isonzo front.

(2) (a) General Cadorna estimated that the Austrians would launch an early spring offensive from the Trent salient; and, contrary to the Inter-Allied general plan for an offensive on all fronts, took up an attitude of strategical "in readiness." By the end of April, General Cadorna saw his mistake and hastened to resume the offensive in the Carso against Trieste. General Cadorna's general plan was to defend except on the line of the Isonzo; to attract the Austrian attention by local attacks north of Goritzia and to deliver the main attack south of that place.

(3) The Italian dispositions were:

First Army: covering the Trent salient.
Fourth Army: covering the Dolomite Alps.
Second Army: north of Goritzia.
Third Army: south of Goritzia.
The rest of the front, from Tolomino to Toblach, was held by detachments.
There was no strategical reserve.

b. Spring offensive (May 14-26). (1) General Cadorna launched the Second Army in a diverting attack north of Goritzia on May 14, and continued the attack until May 23, when the near side of the plateau of Bainsizza was captured.

(2) On May 23, he suddenly launched the main attack, south of Goritzia, by the Third Army in a three days' severe battle. He penetrated the Austrian first line to a depth of ten to fifteen miles on a front of eight miles along the road to Trieste, and captured the west slopes of the natural fortress Hermada, east of Monfalcone.

c. Summer offensive (Aug. 19-Sept. 1). On August 19, General Cadorna renewed the offensive on the line from Plava to the sea with forty-eight divisions operating on a thirty-eight mile front. By September 1, he had captured the plateau of Bainsizza which dominates the whole plain of Goritzia. Farther south, he had captured a part of the high ground Hermada. By that time siege conditions obtained. He captured 30,000 prisoners and 150 cannon.

3. WESTERN FRONT. (Maps 57, 58, 66 and 67.) *a. Situation.* (1) The relief of General Nivelle as Comman-

der-in-Chief of the French troops on the Western front, May 15, 1917, returned the initiative for the operation of the British armies on that front to Marshal Haig. Coordinated action thereafter between the Allies on that front was secured by cooperation.

(2) The submarine campaign by Germany was exceedingly effective against shipping to and from England. Ostend and Zeebrugge were the principle bases for the submarine campaign and they became at once the objective of British operations in France.

b. British offensive against submarine bases. (1) Marshal Haig's general plan for the capture of Ostend and Zeebrugge was: in a preliminary maneuver, to capture the Messines Ridge, then pivoting thereon, to penetrate the German line, and, by cutting the German line of communications, to force withdrawal from the Belgian coast at Ostend and Zeebrugge.

(2) (a) Marshal Haig had been much embarrassed by the Messines Ridge salient just south of Ypres, which gave the Germans observation over his line. For a long time, he had planned a limited objective maneuver for the reduction of that salient. He now decided to capture that ridge before launching his main attack in Flanders against the submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. He assigned the execution of that preliminary maneuver to the Second Army (General Plummer).

(b) (Map 66.) The artillery bombardment began May 21, and, by May 23, had increased to maximum intensity, from 2400 cannon, one to every seven yards of front. At a signal given by the explosion of 1,000,000 pounds of high explosives placed in twenty mines under the German first position, twelve divisions, on a front of ten miles, with one corps in reserve, moved forward to the attack at 3:00 AM, June 7. The attack was carried out as planned and that evening Marshal Haig not only occupied the ridge, but had reduced the whole salient and repulsed the German local counter attack.

(3) (a) (Map 67.) Marshal Haig's plan for further conduct of the maneuver was for the Fifth Army (General Gough), with ten divisions including army reserves, to pene-

trate the German line on a front of seven and one-half miles, from Zillebecke to Boesinghe; to advance by bounds corresponding to German positions; and to protect the right flank with the Second British Army (General Plummer) at the Messines Ridge, from the Lys River to Hill 60 and the left flank by the French First Army (General Anthoine) to the line: Nordschoote—Luyghem.

(b) The first phase, which was an aerial battle to secure observation, was successful and gave the artillery fire superiority. As a result, Marshal Haig delayed D day from July 25 to 28 in order to allow the artillery to displace forward to positions within range of the German artillery which had displaced backward. Because of poor visibility and inability to locate the German artillery, he again delayed D day to July 31.

(c) The artillery preparation, with an extensive use of gas, continued for two weeks before D day. Preceded by discharges of thermite and oil drums, and covered by an accurate rolling barrage, the infantry attack was launched at 3:50 AM, July 31. During the day, the troops advanced per schedule and by night had reached the line: Bixchoote—St. Julian—Hollebecpue—Basse Ville. This line included the entire German first position, and, from hill 60 north, all of the second position. From St. Julian north to the boundary with the French, a line along the Hannebeck brook, beyond the German second position, was taken and held.

(d) The second bound, delayed because of wet weather, was taken at 4:25 AM, August 16, to the north of the Ypres—Roulers route, and made a wide gap in the German third position, from St. Julian to near Nordschoote.

(e) The weather again stopped the advance and the next bound was made at 5:40 AM, September 20, by nine divisions on a front of nine miles from Hollebecque on the south to the boundary with the French on the north. The day's fight gained some high ground, with good observation. The limited objective of about one mile depth in the enemy zone was reached by some troops as early as 8:00 AM; by others, not until night.

(f) After reorganization, Marshal Haig took the next bound at 5:50 AM, September 26, when the limited objec-

tive of the observation positions, Tover Hamlet and Zonnebecke, were taken in the usual way.

(g) Then by bounds, October 9, 12, 26, carried out in the same way each time by artillery preparation and the advance of infantry to the limit of artillery range, the British reached Paschendaele, a position which gave excellent observation to the front. Due to wet weather, the operations were here stopped short of the objectives, and the line was stabilized.

4. RUSSIAN FRONT. (Maps 57, 68 and 69.) *a. Situation.* (1) The Anarchists and so-called Extreme Socialists had for a long time sought to overthrow the Czar's government. They took advantage of every weakness of the government during the war to further their purposes. The effect of their machinations was increased by the German government, which through the psychological department of the General Staff, used the weapon of socialistic propaganda to strengthen the Russian revolution, and weaken the Russian power in the field.

(2) The Czar was loyal to his allied treaty obligations, but through the intrigues of the monk Rasputin, and the mistaken pacific attitude of the German-born Czarina, the real facts of the Russian situation were kept from him. The Czar, believing that all was well, left the control of matters of state in other and, as is now known, treacherous hands, while he took personal command at the front.

(3) The Russian court became very corrupt and, through fear and bribery, tractable to German intrigue.

(4) The Douma desired to preserve the Czar's government and to continue the war, but it was enraged by the exhibition of court corruption. The assassination of the monk Rasputin, in December, 1916, did not relieve the situation, as, suffering more from blockade even than Germany, the people of Russia were hungry. They believed that the war was the cause of their privations and that the Czar and his government would continue the war.

(5) Food riots began in Petrograd in the beginning of March, 1917, and the army sided with the people. The Douma then organized a "Provisional Government" with M. Kerensky, as Minister of War, at its head. On March 16,

the Czar abdicated in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. The latter, however, refused the throne.

(6) The extremists, headed by German Socialists, among whom was the leader Lenine, claimed credit for the revolution, and the right to direct it through organizations of soldiers and workmen called "Soviets."

In the spring, under the leadership of Kerensky, the Congress of all the Soviets voted to continue the war. Kerensky appointed General Brussilloff Commander-in-Chief of the Armies and directed him to resume the offensive, not only as required by the Russian treaty with the Allies, but as a means of saving Russia from a complete relapse into anarchy.

b. Russian offensive. (1) General Brussilloff's general plan was to deliver local holding attacks against the Germans and, with the view of uniting Russia through the national hatred against Austria, to deliver the main blow on the Austrian front astride the Dneister River with the object of destroying the Austrians east of the Carpathians.

(2) The Seventh Army, north of the Dneister, attacked north of Tarnopol and forced the Austrian line back toward Lemberg, July 1, 1917. On July 8, the Eighth Army (General Kornilov) south of the Dneister River, attacked north of Stanislau, and on July 11, south of Stanislau and captured 36,000 prisoners and 100 cannon.

(3) However, the agitation by the Bolsheviki, under the German agent Lenine, had taken such a hold on the people at home and in the armies that the offensive could not be sustained for lack of an offensive spirit. The Bolsheviki everywhere were continually advocating "Peace without delay." Soon, the troops refused to receive orders from their superiors and men and organizations up to regiments abandoned the trenches and left for home to reap the harvest which was just then ripening in the fields and to share in the distribution of the land.

c. German counter offensive in Galicia. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg and his predecessors had contrived the Russian Revolution and were not surprised when it broke. Marshal von Hindenburg's plan was to secure a separate peace from Russia through the psychological Bolsheviki propaganda campaign, which was expected to influence Rus-

sia to the end that, believing she was acting on her own initiative, she would ask for peace. He desired particularly not to resume the offensive by arms as he feared that such action might crystallize a racial and national spirit that would be superior to the blandishments of peace at any price. However, when Kerensky assumed the offensive, Marshal von Hindenburg decided at once to deliver a counter offensive. His general plan was to penetrate the Russian line at the base of the northernmost salient just made by General Brussilloff in front of Tarnopol.

(2) Marshal von Hindenburg quickly sent six first-class divisions, two from the Guards, and, under emergency conditions, organized them with 136 batteries into a mass for the penetrating maneuver, which was to be under the command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria.

(3) On July 19, Prince Leopold attacked on a front of twelve miles from south of Brody and toward Tarnopol. The Russian Second Army, forced to retreat, carried with it the Seventh and Eighth Armies, farther to the south. The Russian I Corps of the Guard abandoned Tarnopol without firing a shot, July 21. The Russian Stanislau salient was then endangered and to reap the strategical advantage of the tactical victory at Tarnopol, Marshal von Hindenburg ordered the immediate assumption of the offensive by the whole line south to the Danube. The Russian retreat became a rout and Kolomea was abandoned without resistance.

(4) The Russian Provisional Government passed through a crisis and Kerensky emerged as Provisional President of the Russian Republic. He dismissed General Brussilloff for not enforcing discipline and appointed General Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies. The Russian resistance under the better discipline of General Kornilov soon stiffened and stopped the advance of the Group of Armies of Archduke Joseph on the boundary of Bessarabia.

(5) The attack on the Roumanian army front by General von Mackensen made practically no headway due to the assistance of the French mission under the command of General Berthelot. General von Mackensen ceased the of-

fensive at the end of August, at which time the maneuver changed to the method of siege warfare.

d. German victory at Riga. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that he could not force a separate peace from Russia by operations in Galicia and decided to seek a decision by striking in the direction of Petrograd. His general plan was to concentrate the Eighth Army, heavily reinforced, at Chavli, under the command of General von Huttier whose mission should be the capture of Riga by a strategical and tactical surprise. The Russian position at Riga had been kept up since 1915 and was very strong. The Duna River was about 400 yards wide and in the vicinity of Uxhall contained many islands.

(2) General von Huttier's plan was to capture Riga by a converging maneuver, the eastern force to be the stronger. His plan for the eastern force which was to be composed of eight infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions was to penetrate the Russian line in the vicinity of Uxhall, then to deploy the mass of maneuver to envelop Riga by the east simultaneously with the western attack.

(3) The Eighth Army was concentrated at Chavli, more than one hundred miles in rear of the line, in August, where it rehearsed the operation down to the most minute detail.

(4) On September 1, after a violent three hours' artillery preparation, including gas concentrations, by 157 batteries and 550 minenwerfers, three first-class divisions, on a front of less than three miles south of Uxhall, penetrated the line. The Russians threw their arms away and abandoned the position without resistance. Under the cover of a heavy smoke screen, General von Huttier constructed bridges across the Duna. The northern force crossed at once, deployed and, covering its rear and flank, advanced against Riga. The Russians, however, at once evacuated Riga. The German troops occupied the city on September 3. The Russian Twelfth Army retreated without resistance, and by September 21, General von Huttier had established a new line beyond Riga, which joined the old line at Jacobstadt.

(5) Von Hindenburg then, for political effect to aid in forcing a peace with Russia, threatened Petrograd by transporting by sea an infantry division and a strong de-

tachment of cyclist troops to a position on the German left in readiness, apparently, to march on Petrograd. At the same time, in cooperation, the German fleet captured the islands of Dagol and Oesel. This measure protected the left flank of the line at Riga, and as intended, was interpreted at Petrograd to be a preparation for an advance to Petrograd.

e. Bolsheviki revolution. Marshal von Hindenburg's threat against Petrograd was successful and Kerensky moved the capital to Moscow. The Soviets no longer recognied Kerensky's authority. General Kornilov with a few faithful regiments, marched toward Moscow. Kerensky at once named himself Dictator and arrested Kornilov as a rebel. The Soviet power increased rapidly and, on November 12, Lenine and Trotsky, by revolution, seized the reins of power and proclaimed a Bolsheviki Government for Russia. The Ukraine, Courland, and Finland at once declared their independence.

f. Armistice of Brest-Litovsk. Lenine and Trotsky on December 15, signed an armistice with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, and a treaty of peace on December 23.

g. Roumania. Roumania also ceased hostilities and asked for peace with the Central Powers on December 9.

5. WESTERN FRONT. (Maps 57, 58, 59, 70, 71.) *a. Situation on French front.* (1) In preparation for the Nivelle offensive, officers were instructed to arouse the enthusiasm of the men, and for that purpose part of the plan of operation was communicated to them and the idea was propagated that it was to be the last great effort. The Poilu came to believe that it was the last blow. When the soldiers saw these promises of the end of the war vanish in defeat and realized that there were many weary months of fighting ahead of them there ensued a demoralization such as the French army probably had never before seen. Battalions, regiments, and even a division mutinied and, refusing to obey their officers, attempted to march on Paris.

(2) General Petain succeeded General Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western front on May 15, 1917. It was his first duty to restore discipline and to revive the morale of the armies. As a result, he was forced to maintain a defensive attitude. His wise and

patient efforts were successful and after several months he felt able to undertake operations with limited objectives.

b. Third Battle of Verdun. (*Aug. 20-26.*) (1) General Petain decided to recapture the heights which afforded hostile observation points in front of Verdun and gave that mission to the Second Army (General Guillaumat). The latter assembled 2,200 pieces of artillery (half heavy), and on the morning of August 20, after an artillery bombardment for seven days, launched twelve divisions in attack, astride the Meuse, on an eleven mile front. On the west bank, Dead Man's Hill was easily taken. On the east bank, the troops easily ran over Talou Hill and hill 344. The attack was continued to August 26, when the high ground from which Verdun could be observed had been captured.

(2) Although the advance had not reached the original first position of February, 1916, it had reached the line, Avocourt—Samogneux—Bezonvaux—Damloup, the limited objectives given for the operation. This success greatly improved the morale of the French troops.

c. Capture of Malmaison. (*Oct. 23-26.*) (1) General Maistre, commanding the French Tenth Army, estimated that the capture of the high ground in the German Allimant salient would force German withdrawal from the Chemin des Dames (Ladies Road on Map 71) as the latter was observed and controlled by the former. Permission was secured for the execution of the maneuver as an operation with a limited objective. The French troops to participate in the operation were carefully trained and rehearsed the maneuver down to the most minute detail on other but similar ground.

(2) After an artillery preparation of six days and nights that destroyed all works on the surface of the ground and interdicted all roads to the rear of the German salient, General Maistre launched the infantry attack before daylight on October 23, with eight divisions, preceded by five groups of tanks, on a ten mile front. The objectives, Allimant, Vaudesson, Chavignon, were reached that day and immediately organized. The next day, the Crown Prince evacuated the high ground near Pinon, and, by November 2, had abandoned the Chemin des Dames and retired to the north of the Ailette.

(3) This operation which was based on surprise, captured with comparative ease, what General Nivelle failed to capture with nearly a million and a half men. It worked marvels in the restoration of confidence and the rehabilitation of the French soldiers' morale.

6. ITALIAN FRONT. (Maps 57 and 72.) *a. Situation.* When siege conditions obtained at the end of August on the Russian front, von Hindenburg estimated that Italy would force Austria to a separate peace, unless Germany should help the latter to a victory over the hated Italians sufficiently brilliant to hold the races of the Dual Monarchy loyal to the alliance. He decided not only to do that but to launch a strategical and tactical offensive against Italy that would force her to a separate peace. He directed General Ludendorff to prepare the offensive against Italy.

b. Central Powers' plans. (1) General Ludendorff had a careful reconnaissance of the whole Italian theater made. He discovered that the junction between the Isonzo and the Alpine fronts was weakly held and that General Cadorna did not have a general reserve.

(2) After a careful estimate, he decided on the following general plan for the operation:

(a) To launch immediately a psychological campaign through fraternization at the front, and through agents of the German psychological department in Italy, as had been done in Russia, with the view of fixing in the Italian soldier's mind the idea that it was a sin to kill his brother, that the Austrians and Italians were brothers, and that if they each refused to fight there would be no war. The psychological campaign having been well started, he planned to reduce the Udine salient by a surprise strategical and tactical converging operation that would destroy the Italian armies.

(b) Before D day, the line was to remain unchanged.

(c) The eastern and principal blow was to be struck by a specially trained German Fourteenth army under the command of General von Below, whose mission was to penetrate the Italian line at the weak point, Caporetto, and to exploit the penetration by the destruction of the Italian army.

(d) The western blow was then to be delivered from the Trent salient by General Conrad against the left flank of the Italian line with the view of completing the destruction of those armies when they arrived at the Piave River in their retreat.

c. The Batttle of Caporetto. (1) The psychological campaign was so successful that there was a great demand in Italy for a separate peace, and many Italian soldiers at the front fraternized with the Austrians and agreed not to fight them.

(2) General von Below's German Fourteenth Army was secretly assembled in the vicinity of Villach. It comprised about 100,000 men, selected with the greatest secrecy and care, and trained secretly to the greatest detail of the operation, by rehearsal.

(3) Following a formidable artillery preparation by emission of asphyxiating gas, General von Below launched his attack at 2:00 AM, October 24. In the advance, the troops avoided the mountains and infiltrated up the valleys. The army crossed the Isonzo at Plezzo, Caporetto, and Tolmino. Two Italian brigades, throwing their arms away, fled in a panic which, inside the Second Army, was communicated to the right and left. In spite of the heroic conduct of a brigade which sacrificed itself, General von Below captured the summit of Matajur, the Thermopylae Pass of that front, the next day, October 25. The penetration was complete and reached Cividale, October 26.

(4) General Cadorna, on October 25, ordered the evacuation of Bainsizza. He then, to avoid the envelopment of the Second and Third Armies, ordered them to retreat at once to the west. On October 28, he abandoned Goritzia and Monfalcone. The Third Army destroyed most of its artillery and provisions and crossed to the west bank of the Isonzo. October 29, General Cadorna's headquarters, by a sudden flight from Udine, barely missed capture.

(5) The Italian rout quickly extended to the left and the detachments at the passes of Plezzo and Pleocken abandoned their stations and fell back toward the Tagliamento, followed by the Austrian Tenth Army under General Krobatin.

(6) On October 30, General Cadorna began to retire across the Tagliamento at Codroipe, Dignano, and Pinzano. His forces, although protected by rear guards, were under great pressure from General von Below's Fourteenth Army and General Boroevic's Second Army.

(7) On October 31, General Boroevic captured the bridgeheads at Codroipe and at Bignano and, thus enveloping the left flank of the Italian Third Army, captured 60,000 prisoners and 300 cannon.

(8) On November 3, General Krobatin forced the Tagliamento at Gemona. The Italian Fourth Army being forced by this maneuver to the Piave, carried all the troops on the right to the Piave River. General Cadorna decided, November 5, to hold the line, Piave—Mont Grappa—Lake Garda.

(9) On November 9, General von Arz's forces reached the Piave, from Suzegane to the coast. General Cadorna prepared all the bridges for destruction and defended the west bank of the river.

(10) General Conrad, on November 9, according to the plan, launched his enveloping attack from the Trent salient against General Cadorna's left.

(11) By the end of November, French and British reinforcing divisions, under emergency orders, had arrived and siege conditions obtained on the line, Piave—Mont Grappa—Lake Garda. General Fayolle was relieved from command of the Central Group on the Western front and placed in command of the British and French troops in Italy. Some of the reinforcing troops were interspersed with Italian troops to stiffen the line, other divisions took over the Mont Grappa Sector, and others were held in rear as a strategic reserve.

7. SUPREME WAR COUNCIL. (1) The Caporetto disaster completely disorganized the Italian army and for a short time its escape was doubtful. The British and French Governments rushed to Italy's assistance the troops which they had refused before. General Foch, the French Chief of Staff, visited the Italian General Headquarters and arranged for a complete rehabilitation of the Italian army.

(2) In order to secure better coordination in waging the war, the heads of the British, French, and Italian gov-

ernments met at Rapollo, Italy, and there, in conference, November 7, drew up and signed a scheme of organization for a Supreme War Council, which was to meet at Versailles and which was to consist of the Prime Ministers and one other member of the government of each of the Great Powers whose armies were fighting on the Western front. There was also to be a military representative from each of those powers. A clause provided a way for extending the scope of the council to other fronts.

8. WESTERN FRONT. (Maps 57 and 73.) *a. British plans, November, 1917.* (1) Responding to General Cadorna's appeal for help, Marshal Haig decided to launch an offensive of sufficient force and effect to hold German troops on the Western front.

(2) His general plan was for the Third Army (General Byng) to penetrate the German line toward Cambrai, in a surprise maneuver, and to exploit the penetration by cutting the German line of communications which was only eight miles away.

(3) Estimating that German reinforcements could not come up in less than forty-eight hours, he prescribed that the infantry, tanks, and artillery should penetrate all the enemy lines the first day. As soon as the enemy third line, which was his last line, should be penetrated, the cavalry corps was to pass through and cut the enemy lines of railroad communication near Cambrai.

(4) A special reserve of three infantry divisions at Bapaume was provided to fold back to the north the inner flank of the dislocated German right wing.

(5) (a) To secure surprise, the orders were furnished only in greatest confidence to the minimum number who really should understand the maneuver. Outside of the superior officers in the British Army, only the French High Command knew of the operation.

(b) There was to be no change before H hour in dispositions, reconnaissance, or fire on the front line. Increase of circulation due to movements of new troops and transportation was confined to the hours of darkness. There was to be no artillery preparations whatsoever. Even registration by new batteries coming to the operation was forbid-

den. All the troops were specially trained for the operation and reheased their parts on other, but similar terrain.

(c) The night before the operation, the French sent General Degoutte's detachment of two infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, secretly, by motor trucks and by train to Peronne, to report to General Byng. General Degoutte himself knew nothing of the operation on the morrow.

b. Battle of Cambrai. (1) November 20, at 6:20 AM, General Byng launched the attack with five divisions in the front line and two in reserve, on a front of six miles between the legs of the triangle, Peronne—Cambrai and Bapaume—Cambrai. Three hundred and sixty tanks led tthe way. At the instant when they crossed the line of departure, 300 pieces of heavy artillery and 7,000 pieces of light artillery began firing counter battery and a rolling barrage. Also, at H hour, demonstrations with gas, smoke and artillery took place on practically all the rest of the British front.

(2) The attack was a complete strategical and tactical surprise, and under a heavy smoke barrage, promptly rolled over the first two German positions. By night, the infantry had crossed the Escaut River at Masnieres and occupied the German third and last position, but the tanks and cavalry, for lack of bridges, could not cross. During the day, at Flesquieres, the advance was retarded by one German officer who, alone, as the last survivor of his battery, with a single cannon, hit and destroyed ten tanks before he was killed.

(3) The next day, the line was built up to the German third position, in which lodgments had been made, and the cavalry, passing through the breaches, reached the outskirts of Cambrai. When General Haig's forty-eight hours expired, he was not satisfied with the penetration and did not give the orders for exploitation. He did not order the Bapaume force to fold back the inner flank of the German northern wing, and he gave no orders at all to General Degoutte's force at Peronne. He knew that heavy German reinforcements were due, and contented himself with limiting his future action to the capture of the high ground at Bourlon. By the 23d, this had been accomplished. However, he had

failed to organize the salient in depth, or even arrange his troops in that manner.

c. German counter attack. (1) As soon as possible after the launching of Marshal Haig's offensive, German local counter attacks were delivered and troops from local reserves on the Western front, and from the general reserve, even divisions designated for the Italian front, were ordered to Cambrai. The reinforcements began to arrive at Cambrai on November 22.

(2) The Crown Prince of Bavaria first utilized all available troops to stop Marshal Haig. He then planned to reduce the British salient by a converging maneuver with four divisions in the northern force and seven divisions in the southern force. The converging attacks were delivered by surprise and in mass formation, on the morning of November 30. The northern attack was held, but the southern made headway and pushed the base of the salient in beyond the original line and to Gouseaucourt. General Byng delivered a counter attack with one infantry corps, one cavalry corps, and sixty tanks and recaptured Gouseaucourt.

(3) After two days of inaction, the Crown Prince of Bavaria renewed the attack by the northern force, and, after a five days' battle pushed the British line back to Flesquieres.

9. SYRIAN FRONT. (Maps 56, 57 and 74.) *a. Situation and plans.* (1) (a) General von Falkenhayn, after the first battle of Gaza, constructed a deep defensive position from Gaza to Beersheba, strengthened by groups of very strong earth fortifications, without gaps. The line was held by a total force of 180,000 men, organized into nine infantry divisions and one cavalry division.

(b) In rear of and parallel to the defensive position, he constructed an excellent motor road from Gaza to Beersheba. The water problem was solved by piping water from the wells at Beersheba.

(2) (a) General Allenby relieved General Murray after the first Battle of Gaza. Although his infantry, in spite of some reinforcements, was not equal to that of von Kressenstein, he decided to assume the strategic and tactical

offensive and to seek a decision in Palestine. His general plan for the maneuver against the Gaza—Beersheba line was to deliver a holding attack against Gaza with the left of his army, with a naval squadron (under Rear Admiral T. Jackson) cooperating, and to envelop the Turkish east or left flank by a surprise attack with his light mobile column.

(b) The British force totaled seven infantry divisions and four mounted divisions. The infantry divisions were grouped into two corps, and the cavalry into a mounted corps. The whole force, including laborers, totaled 470,000 men and 160,000 animals. The air service, reinforced to three squadrons, secured complete control of the air.

b. Second Battle of Gaza. (1) On October 27, General Allenby began the land bombardment of Gaza. The bombardment lasted four days, on the last day of which the fleet joined in with all its guns.

(2) On the first day, von Kressenstein sent out a reconnaissance in force to discover General Allenby's intentions.

(3) The British enveloping force, consisting of the cavalry corps reinforced by two divisions and a brigade of infantry, the Imperial Camel Corps, and a regiment of cavalry, assembled after dark on October 30, and, by a night march, reached the enemy advanced defenses at Beersheba by daybreak. The force holding Beersheba was surprised and the place captured that day.

(4) On November 2, at 3:00 AM, the frontal holding attack was delivered against Gaza and continued with great violence.

(5) As soon as Beersheba was captured, General Allenby sent the cavalry north and captured the Jerwal (1540) Ridge, November 4 and 5.

(6) From that ridge and from El Kalasa, a successful attack was delivered against the Turkish left. The cavalry quickly reorganized and cut the Gaza line of communications, at Sheria, at daybreak November 7.

(7) The second holding attack against Gaza was delivered at daylight, November 7, and found only rear guards that were protecting the evacuation of the place. By the

end of November 7, General Allenby had occupied the whole line.

c. Capture of Jerusalem. (1) The greater part of the Turkish army retired north toward Jaffa, while a smaller part retired toward Hebron. General von Falkenhayn sent reinforcements to Hebron, and von Kressenstein occupied the position, Hebron—Ramleh—Ludd, while rear guard delaying actions were being fought.

(2) (a) General Allenby decided to contain the southern Turkish flank and to envelop the northern flank. His cavalry captured the junction of the Gaza—Jaffa railway lines, November 15. He occupied Jaffa November 16, and thus acquired a new base port and a much shorter line of communications.

(b) General Allenby, relieved of the care of supplying his main coastal forces, which he based at once on Jaffa, used the old line of communications through Rafa for supply of the more mobile columns. He decided to capture Jerusalem by a double envelopment. The operation succeeded because of rapidity of action. The main column enveloping from the north, cut the road to Nablus on December 9, and the same day, by a synchronized effort, the southern mobile column cut the road to Jericho.

(c) The Turkish army evacuated Jerusalem and escaped to the north. December 11, 1917, General Allenby received the surrender of Jerusalem. The possession by the Allies of the two holy cities, Mecca and Jerusalem, at the end of the year, had a depressing effect on Turkish prestige in Asia Minor.

10. Diplomatic Attempts to end the War.—*a.* Von Scheidman, a socialistic agent of the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, invited the socialists of England and France to a conference at Stockholm in June, 1917, to discuss peace. The Allied governments refused passports to the socialistic delegates and nothing was accomplished.

b. On July 19, the German Reichstag adopted a resolution in favor of "peace of conciliation without annexation or indemnities." Von Hindenburg opposed this proposition and claimed that peace should be based on territory con-

quered during the war. The chancellor was superseded by Dr. Michaelis, who supported von Hindenburg's program.

c. The Pope, on August 1, proposed a peace conditioned on a return to the status prevailing before the war. The Allies refused.

d. Mr. Wilson, in December, proposed fourteen points as a basis for peace. Germany declined the proposal and claimed a "German-made Peace."

11. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. (Maps 57, 66, 67 and 72.) *a. Principle of the objective.* (1) The object of German submarine warfare, launched February 1, 1917, was to destroy British resources and thus force Great Britain to a separate peace. The first evidence of the attainment of that object undoubtedly would have been the lowering of British battle efficiency on the Western front. The defeat of Great Britain then could and probably would have been brought about by the decisive defeat of the British armies in France. There is little doubt that following the defeat of the British, Germany could have defeated the French. So the objective of the German submarine navy in destroying British resources was the British army in France.

(2) (a) Early in 1917, submarine warfare constituted the greatest menace to Great Britain, and its defeat became her first and main object. The methods of combatting submarine warfare on the sea called for an exhibition of the highest intelligence and skill in their application.

(b) The bases from which most of the submarines issued were Zeebrugge and Ostend. The capture, destruction, or obstruction of those bases was a part of the British objective and the British armies in France were a part of the weapon to be used to attain that objective.

(c) Thus it appears that while the German submarine navy was used to defeat the British army in France by destroying its resources, the British army in France tried to defeat the German submarine by destroying its bases. The attainment of that objective was attempted in the Second Battle of Flanders, when the British tried to capture Ostend and Zeebrugge.

(3) (a) In 1917, the result of the German policy of destroying Russian resources and preventing Russia from

resupplying from abroad became apparent in the lack of ability of Russia to make war, because of insufficient means and because of lack of discipline as a result thereof. In a long war, in which one of the combatants conducts successful operations against the enemy resources, results similar to the Russian debacle may be expected.

(b) It is notworthy that, after the capture of Riga, Germany secured a separate peace from Russia by merely making the Russians believe that the Russian capital was the German objective. It was not necessary for Germany to conduct an offensive operation toward Petrograd, because, by merely threatening Petrograd, she attained the ultimate or absolute objective of causing Russian public opinion to demand peace.

(4) The outstanding comment on the Central Powers' land operations on the Western front is that their objective on that front, in 1917, was the defeat of Italy so that in 1918 the Allies in France would have been forced to defend both north and south of Switzerland.

b. Principle of security. When General Cadorna did not provide a general reserve for use on the Italian front against a possible surprise hostile operation, he violated the *principle of security.* In consequence when he was surprised on October 24, he was defeated.

c. Principle of the offensive. (1) (a) At the beginning of 1917, Marshal von Hindenburg assumed an attitude of "in readiness" pending an expected victory by submarine warfare. During the summer, it became apparent that although the submarine was an effective weapon, the Allies had devised means sufficiently effective to avoid defeat. Marshal von Hindenburg then placed his reliance in compliance with the *principle of the offensive* for the further conduct of land warfare.

(b) As most of the German and Austrian troops were immobilized on the long frontage held by the method of position warfare, Marshal von Hindenburg was guided in that offensive warfare by compliance with the *principle of economy of force.* Under that principle, he took the maximum advantage of obstacles and fire power in order to

defend with the least possible number of troops everywhere except at the point of attack.

(c) By compliance with the *principle of economy of force,* he succeeded in assembing a greatly superior force at the point of attack, and complied with the *principle of mass,* which was composed not only of men but also of superior weapons, and fire power.

(d) He complied also with the *principle of surprise* in secretly assembling that *mass* either without the enemy's knowledge or before the enemy could prepare to meet it.

(e) By launching that *mass* in an unexpected terrific blow, which advanced at a maximum rate of speed along the decisive direction, he illustrated the *principle of movement.*

(2) Marshal von Hindenburg having gained the military energy for an offensive by complying with the *principle of economy of force,* then in conformity with the *principle of mass, surprise, and movement* conducted three successful offensive operations in 1917, but only one at a time as is also required under the *principle of simplicity.* In this manner complying with the *principle of the offensive,* he won the great victories of July 19, against the Russians in Galicia; September 1, against the Russians at Riga; and October 24, against the Italians at Caporetto.

d. Principle of cooperation. (1) When the Allied Powers organized the Supreme War Council at Rapollo, Italy, November 7, 1917, to coordinate Allied plans and effort, they illustrated the *principle of cooperation.*

When Marshal Haig, in response to General Cadorna's appeal for help, organized and launched November 20, a major offensive operation on the Cambrai front, that drew to his front hostile troops that had been designated for the Italian front, he illustrated the *principle of cooperation.*

CHAPTER XIII

Western Front to Include German Offensive of March 21, 1918

Page

1. SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1918 241
   a. Theaters of operations 241
   b. German defense against Bolshevism 241
   c. Unity of command versus cooperation 242
   d. Submarine warfare 242

2. PROGRESS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 243
   a. Inherent difficulties 243
   b. Opposition of the Allies to General Pershing's plan 243
      (1) British 243
      (2) French 244
   c. General Pershing adheres to plan for distinctively American force 246
      (1) The decision 246
      (2) Headquarters moves to Chaumont 246
      (3) Reports on necessity of American decisive action 246
      (4) The I Corps organized 247
      (5) The II Corps organized 247

3. PLANS OF CAMPAIGN FOR 1918 248
   a. General plans 248
      (1) The Allies 248
      (2) The Central Powers 248
   b. Plans, Western front 248
      (1) The strength and dispositions of the Allies 248
         (a) The French 248
         (b) The British 249
         (c) The Belgians 249
         (d) The Americans 249
      (2) The strength and dispositions of the Central Powers 249
         (a) Duke of Wurtemburg's Group 249
         (b) Von Gallwitz's Group 250
         (c) German Crown Prince's Group 250
         (d) Bavarian Crown Prince's Group 250
      (3) Von Hindenburg's penetration doctrine 250
         (a) Surprsie 250
         (b) Short artillery preparation 250
         (c) Rehearsals 250
         (d) Advance by infiltration 250
         (e) Constant artillery support 251
         (f) Pressure maintained by passage of lines 251
         (g) Exploitation 251
      (4) Von Hindenburg's estimate and plan 251
         (a) The estimate 251
         (b) The plan 252

4. The German Offensive of March 21st 252
a. March 21 252
b. March 24 253
c. March 25 253
d. March 26 253
e. Unity of Allied and American command centered in General Foch 253
f. March 27 253
(1) The capture of Montdidier 253
(2) Counter-measures by General Foch 254
(3) American participation 254
g. March 31 254
(1) The Allies' line reorganized 254
(2) The German attack is stopped 255

5. The Principles of War 255
a. Principle of security 255
b. Principle of the offensive 257
c. Principle of simplicity 258

---

1. Situation at the Beginning of 1918. (Map 75.)

a. Theaters of operations. (1) By January 1, 1918, the Central Powers had decisively defeated Russia and Roumania and concluded separate peace treaties with them. That reduced the number of fronts upon which actual hostilities were being waged to five, i.e.:

The Western front
The Italian front
The Balkan front
The Syrian front
The Mesopotamian front

(2) After Italy's defeat at Caporetto, and due to railroad communication, the Western and Italian fronts had many interests in common: for instance, the elimination of Italy from the war would have created a French front south of Switzerland, subject to attack by the Central Powers. For these reasons, and on account of the geographical relations of the two fronts, the Italian front is sometimes considered as a part of the Western front.

b. German defense against Bolshevism. The defeat of Russia and Roumania released many Central Powers' troops from that front for use on other fronts in 1918. The German General Staff, however, was so afraid of the psychological weapon of Bolshevism, with which they had palsied the Russian martial spirit, that they did not dare to uncover the Russian front, and accordingly, maintained a reduced

force on that front to prevent the spread of Bolshevism from Russia to the people of the Central Powers.

c. Unity of command versus cooperation. (1) In the application of the *principle of simplicity* to command, the Central Powers began operations in 1918 with unity of command still centered in the Emperor of Germany as the All Supreme Commander. He continued the delegation of authority to make all strategical and tactical decisions to his Chief of Staff Marshal von Hindenburg who was authorized to issue such decisions "By order of his Majesty."

(2) In the application of the *principle of cooperation,* the Allies began operations in 1918 with the Supreme War Council in Versailles as a coordinating agency.

d. Submarine warfare. (Maps 1 and 75.) (1) The unrestricted submarine warfare was waged ruthlessly in 1917 as announced in the German ultimatum of January 31, 1917. The Allies and the United States, however, met the submarine warfare by increased shipbuilding and the evolution of a defense against the submarine that included visual detection of a submarine by airship, aural detection by hydrophone, limitation of radius of activity by mine field and net, avoidance of torpedo hits by use of the convoy zigzag system, capture of the submarine by nets, and destruction of the submarine by the use of depth charges. These methods of defense made the operation of submarines so dangerous that crews for submarines could be obtained only by forced detail. The crews of submarines at Kiel were in such terror of the operations of the Allies against submarines, that on January 17, 1918, they mutinied and killed thirty-eight of their officers. The mutiny was promptly suppressed by force.

(2) The German plan to use submarine warfare to starve England into a separate peace, and thus defeat the Allies, having failed, the Central Powers were forced to seek the desired decision by land warfare.

(3) However, unrestricted submarine warfare was not discontinued. Although not decisive, it was exceedingly irritating and effective. To secure temporary relief, the British navy executed successful blocking expeditions against the submarine bases Zeebrugge April 23, and Ostend

May 10, 1918, by sinking ships athwart their harbor channels.

2. Progress in the Organization of the American Expeditionary Force. (Maps 1, 75 and 76.) *a. Inherent difficulties.* General Pershing's undertaking to organize an integral American force in France, with a submarine infested 3000-mile wide Atlantic between his base in America and his base ports in France, and a more than 300-mile line of communications from his base ports to the American front, was not at best an easy task.

b. Opposition of the Allies to General Pershing's plan. General Pershing's difficulties were not confined to limited receipts of men and material from America; on the contrary, the Allies actively opposed his effort to build up a distinctly American force, and sought to secure the Americans to increase their respective forces.

(1) *British.* (a) The original British Commission to Washington began its effort to secure the Americans for the British forces when General Bridges of the British Mission, on May 5, 1917, wrote to the American Chief of Staff requesting that 500,000 untrained men be sent at once to England for training there; these men to be drafted later into the British armies in France for use in the 1917 campaign. He stated that this request represented the view of Marshal Haig, the British Commander in Chief in France, and of General Robertson, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

(b) On December 2, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George begged Colonel House to consider favorably a proposition to replace one company in British battalions by one American company, or if not that, then to replace one battalion in each British brigade by one American battalion.

(c) (i) A very frank discussion of the British proposals took place at a conference at the Trianon Palace, Versailles, on January 29, 1918, at which were present the Premier, Mr. Lloyd George; the Imperial Chief of Staff, General Robertson; the British Commander in Chief in France, Marshal Haig; the British member of the Supreme War Council, General Wilson; General Pershing; and the

American member of the Supreme War Council, General Bliss.

(ii) Mr. Lloyd George urged that, in the then existing situation, the placing of American soldiers in British units was a necessity.

(iii) General Pershing expressed the opinion that the submergence of Americans in the British forces would antagonize American national sentiment; would create a general opposition against the direction of the war, with bitter criticism of the President; would raise the question of the competence of American officers, and also the question of whether we were in the war to fight for Great Britain. He reminded the conferees that troops of one nationality do not amalgamate with those of another, and cited the fact that, at the beginning of the war, the British had not amalgamated with the French, and that, at no time during the war, had they amalgamated the Canadian forces with the British forces.

(d) On the initiative of General Pershing, the British retired from their attitude of absorbing American replacements, and the so-called "six-division plan" was agreed to, under which, with later modifications, the British, without interfering with General Pershing's priority project, undertook to furnish their own transportation for the troops of six American divisions. Under the training part of that plan, American high commanders, staff, infantry, and auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British divisions, beginning with battalions and progressing to regiments. The artillery was to be trained with French materiel under American direction. It was agreed that, when the units were sufficiently trained, they were to be assembled as divisions under their own officers. The period of training was estimated to be about ten weeks.

(2) *French.* (a) The French also, beginning with the original mission to the United States, were insistent that America should be a reservoir for the recruitment of the French armies.

(b) General Petain, in December, 1917, called General Pershing's attention to the fact that Russia's disloyalty and Italy's defeat at the Piave had changed the situation, and

urged General Pershing to accept the plan of incorporating one American regiment in each French division. General Pershing, in reply, stated that the difference in language, in military methods, and in national characteristics would seriously hinder complete cooperation in battle. He also stated that:

> "The American people would not approve of giving up the integrity of our organization and scattering it among French and British units. Such a plan would prevent the final building up of a cohesive, aggressive, self-reliant American force which must be depended upon to deliver the final blow necessary to end the war."

(c) The French Ambassador then called on the Secretary of War and read to him a dispatch from M. Clemenceau to the effect that General Pershing, after conference with General Petain, had reported himself and General Petain in substantial agreement on the question of attaching American units to French divisions before committing a part of the line to an American division. The Secretary of War cabled a copy to General Pershing. General Pershing, on January 5, 1918, wrote to M. Clemenceau, who was President of the War Council, quoting the War Department cable, and stating:

> "May I not suggest to you, my dear Mr. President, the inexpediency of communicating such matters to Washington by cable? These questions must all be settled here eventually on their merits, through friendly conference between General Petain and myself, and cables of this sort are likely, I fear, to convey the impression in Washington of serious disagreement between us when such is not the case."

(d) (i) When both the French and British failed to secure General Pershing's approval to the amalgamation of American units with their respective forces, their governments took an appeal direct to Washington over General Pershing's head, and on December 25, 1917, the War Department cabled General Pershing that:

> "Both English and French are pressing upon the President their desire to have your forces amalgamated with theirs by regiments and companies and both express belief in impending heavy drive by Germans somewhere along the lines of the Western front. We do not desire loss of identity of our forces, but regard that as secondary to the meeting of any critical situation by the most helpful use possible of the troops of your command. The difficulty of course is to determine where the drive or the drives of the enemy will take place; and in advance of some knowledge

> of that question, any redistribution of your forces would be difficult. The President, however, desires you to have full authority to use the forces at your command as you deem wise in consultation with the French and British Commanders-in-Chief. * * * The President's sole purpose being to acquaint you with the representations made here and to authorize you to act with entire freedom in making the best disposition and use of your forces as appears possible to accomplish the main purposes in view.

(ii) General Pershing, in reply, cabled the War Department:

> "Do not think emergency now exists that would warrant our putting companies or battalions into British or French divisions, and would not do so except in grave crisis."

c. General Pershing adheres to plan for distinctively American force. (1) *The decision.* General Pershing understood that Germany was training her forces for war of maneuver. He knew that the Allies were still training their forces in trench warfare, and that their reserves and morale were so low that only defensive warfare could be expected from them. He estimated that the American forces constituted the balance of power on the Western front and that the best chance for victory lay in the delivery of a distinctly American blow against Germany. Accordingly, with a mental reserve for the contingency of a great emergency, General Pershing adhered to his plan of building a distinctive American force trained for war of maneuver, with the object of using it for the delivery of a decisive blow against Germany in Lorraine.

(2) *Headquarters moves to Chaumont.* As soon as General Pershing had completed his original plans, he moved his headquarters, in September 1917, from Paris to Chaumont, in the center of the training areas on the Lorraine front. The offices of his General Headquarters were installed in the barracks of the 109th French Infantry Regiment, and the officers were billeted in the dwellings of the citizens of the town.

(3) *Reports on necessity of American decisive action.* (a) The War Department's response to General Pershing's request of July 6, 1917, for 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, was a plan to send twenty-one divisions (each of 20,000 men) and 200,000 replacements and service of supply troops making a total of 650,000 by June 15, 1918.

(b) On December 2, 1917, General Pershing cabled to the War Department:

> "The Allies are very weak and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is therefore strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department * * * be regarded as immediate."
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> "It is of the utmost importance to the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June 1918 is four army corps of twenty-four divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear."

(c) On December 20, 1917, General Pershing called the attention of the War Department to the fact that the schedule of arrival of troops in France was not being maintained, and stated:

> "It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30."

And, calling attention to the fact that, as the number of troops in France increased, the necessity for supply also increased, he stated further:

> "It is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once."

(d) By the end of 1917, General Pershing had received in France four divisions, i.e., the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d, which, with Service of Supply troops, made a total of 176,655 men. However, none of the divisions was ready to take over any part of the line. So small an American contingent, eight months after America's declaration of war, was a great disappointment to General Pershing and to the Allies, who were almost in despair. However, within the United States, morale was very high, the war was popular with the people, and all in the Army at home were disappointed because they could not get to France.

(4) *The I Corps organized.* On January 15, 1918, General Pershing created the American I Corps, Major General Hunter Liggett commanding, with Headquarters at Neufchateau and with administrative control over the 1st, 2d, 26th and 42d Divisions.

(5) *The II Corps organized.* To supervise the administration and training of American divisions with the

British forces, under the six-division plan, General Pershing, on February 20, 1918, organized the II Corps, detailed a corps staff, with Colonel George S. Simonds, as Chief of Staff, and retained command of the corps in himself until June 14, 1918, when he assigned Major General Geo. W. Read to its command. The corps staff was assembled at British General Headquarters at Montreuil. March 9, 1918, the II Corps Headquarters, consisting of a few staff officers, moved to Chateau Bryas, near St. Pol.

3. PLANS OF CAMPAIGN FOR 1918. (Map 75.) *a. General plans.* (1) *The Allies.* The Allies estimated that Marshal von Hindenburg would use the troops released from the Russian and Roumanian fronts in a major offensive on the Western and Italian fronts. Their plan of campaign, for 1918, was to assume the strategical and tactical defensive on the Western and Italian fronts, while awaiting American troops with which to assume the offensive. On the Balkan, Syrian, and Mesopotamian fronts, the offensive or position defensive attitude was to be maintained, according to the estimate of the situation by the local commander, but the Allied troops on those fronts were considered as reservoirs of reserves from which replacement troops might be taken for the mighty struggle expected on the Western front.

(2) *The Central Powers.* Marshal von Hindenburg's plan of campaign for 1918 was, before the United States could make its effort felt, to destroy the Allied armies in France by a major offensive; to pin the Allies to the Italian front by a later Austrian major offensive, and to assume the strategic and tactical defensive on the other fronts.

b. Plans, Western front. (Maps 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, and 81.) (1) *The strength and dispositions of the Allies.* On March 20, 1918, the Allied order of battle, from south to the north, was as follows:

(a) The French (General Petain, with General Headquarters at Compeigne) disposed of 99 divisions, of which 39 were in reserve, i.e., the Reserve Group of Armies south of Compeigne, the Third Army west of Compeigne and the XXXVI Army Corps at Dunkirk.

The divisions on the line were grouped as follows:

The Eastern Group, from Switzerland to the Aisne:
The Seventh Army
The Eighth Army
The First Army
The Second Army
The Northern Group, from the Aisne to the Oise:
The Fourth Army
The Fifth Army
The Sixth Army

(b) The British Marshal Haig, with General Headquarters at Montreuil, disposed of 59 British and 2 Portuguese divisions of which 19 were in reserve.

The divisions on the line were grouped from the French, on the right, to Ypres (inclusive) as follows:

The Fifth Army
The Third Army
The First Army
The Second Army

(c) The Belgians (the King, with General Headquarters at Hauthem) disposed of 12 divisions of which 3 were in reserve.

The divisions on the line extended from Ypres (exclusive) to the sea.

(d) The Americans (General Pershing, with General Headquarters at Chaumont) disposed of 4 divisions of which 2 were with French troops in the Eastern Group and 2 were in camps of instruction.

A total of 172 divisions, of which 61 were in reserve.

(2) *The strength and dispositions of the Central Powers.* Marshal von Hindenburg moved his General Headquarters from Kreuznach to Spa. By taking every available German from all the fronts, a strategical reserve of 100,000 men was built up. The armies were regrouped along dynastic lines for political effect and to increase the effectiveness of maneuver. On March 20, 1918, the German order of battle from south to north was as follows:

(a) *Duke of Wurtemburg's Group,* from Switzerland to the Moselle:

Army Detachment B
Army Detachment A
The Nineteenth Army

(b) *Von Gallwitz's Group,* from the Moselle to the Aisne:

Army Detachment C
The Fifth Army

(c) *German Crown Prince's Group,* from the Aisne to the Sambre:

The Third Army
The First Army
The Seventh Army
The Eighteenth Army

(d) *Bavarian Crown Prince's Group,* from the Sambre to the sea:

The Second Army
The Seventeenth Army
The Sixth Army
The Fourth Army

The total strength of the German forces was 195 infantry divisions, of which 80 were in reserve.

(3) *Von Hindenburg's penetration doctrine.* Marshal von Hindenburg had evolved a new doctrine for penetrating a defensive line which he taught to the armies for use in the 1918 decisive offensive, i.e.:

(a) *Surprise.* The attack must be a strategical surprise secured by preserving the order of battle without change until just before the attack, when the attacking troops are to come up by night marches and take their places under cover.

(b) *Short artillery preparation.* The artillery preparation must secure tactical surprise, hence it must be very brief. It must also include a great distribution of gas in enemy rear areas.

(c) *Rehearsals.* The troops for the penetrating attack must be carefully trained and, upon similar terrain must rehearse the exact maneuver down to the smallest detail.

(d) *Advance by infiltration.* The infantry attack should be delivered at break of day and be executed by infiltration or by groups of successive thin lines, accompanied by machine guns, trench mortars, and pieces of light artillery. The advance must be covered by gas, smoke, and artillery fire, and, when possible, advantage should be taken of fog.

(e) *Constant artillery support.* The light artillery must follow the infantry closely and be prepared to support it at all times and at all costs.

(f) *Pressure maintained by passage of lines.* No objectives can be prescribed, but instead, divisions must march on lines of direction; and, without loss of time, fresh divisions must be ready, by passage of lines, to carry on the advance as other divisions fall out. Every means of transportation must be used without stint to expedite the advance.

(g) *Exploitation.* The inner flanks of the dislocated enemy wings must be forced back at once, and then the mobile forces for strategical exploitation must pass through as rapidly as possible.

(4) *Von Hindenburg's estimate and plan.* (a) *The estimate.* (i) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that the defeat of either the British or the French armies would encompass the defeat of France and force her to a separate peace; that the British armies, not being so well trained, could be defeated more easily than the French armies; that the terrain and tactical considerations invited action on the British front; that, because of divided command, penetration would be easier along the British-French boundary line than elsewhere; and, because the British Fifth Army held a wider frontage than any other army, that it should not be difficult to push it back and away from the French boundary line.

(ii) He estimated that the cutting of the British line of communications at Amiens, and at Hazebrouck—Bethune, would be decisive strategically, and accomplish the surrender or destruction of the British armies in France, as the first would separate them from their French Allies, and the second would practically separate them from England.

(iii) He estimated that, by such an operation, he would extend his lines to the Somme, which for the remainder of the war, would reduce by about twenty divisions the strength of the forces necessary to hold the front.

(iv) He also estimated that the cutting of the Paris—Verdun railroad would force the evacuation of Verdun and

win the line of communications: Metz—Verdun—Rheims —Amiens.

(b) *The plan.* (i) Marshal von Hindenburg's plan for the operations required compliance with his new doctrine for penetrating attacks against fixed lines.

(ii) It contemplated penetrating the Allied line between the British and French forces and cutting the British line of communications in the vicinity of Amiens by the Eighteenth Army (General von Huttier, the victor of Riga), the Second Army (General von Marwitz, the victor at the Cambrai counter attack) and the Seventeenth Army (General von Below, the victor of Caporetto), on the front: La Fere—Croisilles (the Cambrai salient excluded) and in the general direction of Amiens. It contemplated, also, diversions on the Lys and from the Aisne; and long distance artillery fire in connection with aerial bombing on Paris: this to induce the French to prepare for the defense of Paris instead of going to the help of the British. The Crown Princes of Bavaria and of Germany were charged with this maneuver.

(iii) A contingent second phase, following the penetration, provided for a dislocation of the British line near the Channel followed by a double envelopment of the dislocated British armies and their destruction. While the operations against the British were going on, the French were to be struck hard enough to prevent them from assisting the Allies. The Crown Princes of Bavaria and of Germany were also charged with this maneuver.

(iv) A contingent third phase was the decisive operations to be carried on against the French.

4. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21ST. *a. March 21.* (1) The artillery preparation began at 4:30 AM, March 21, and, including gas, continued until 9:45 AM, when the attack was launched as planned, in a heavy mist, by forty divisions on a front of forty miles, against twenty-one divisions in the front line of the British Third and Fifth Armies.

(2) That day, General von Below (Seventeenth Army) captured the British first position, and General von Huttier

(Eighteenth Army) threw the British Fifth Army back against the Crozat Canal, between St. Simon and Targnier.

(3) General Petain at once sent reserves, consisting of the V Army Corps and three regiments of heavy artillery, to assist the British at Noyon.

b. March 24. (1) By March 24, the Germans had captured the Cambrai salient, the British third positions, and had nearly routed the British Fifth Army. The British Third Army had kept its organization and slowed down the attack.

(2) General Petain sent the French Third Army from his strategical reserve to the British Army area and, on Marshal Haig's request, the French Third Army Commander (General Humbert) took over the direction of the defense south of the Somme.

c. March 25. By March 25, Bapaume, Combles, and Nesle had been captured; Montdidier and Amiens were threatened, and a penetration of the very thin line between the British and French Third Army was imminent.

d. March 26. On March 26, General Petain sent the Reserve Group of Armies (General Fayolle) forward, with instru tions to maintain the line between the Oise, connecting with the French Sixth Army and the British Fifth Army. The group consisted of the Third Army (six divisions) already on the line, and the First Army (General Debeney) (six divisions en route by train from Lorraine to extend the left of the Third Army). Pending the arrival of the First Army, three cavalry divisions were put in to maintain connection between the Third Army and the right of the British Fifth Army.

e. Unity of Allied and American command centered in General Foch. That same day, March 26, a conference of the Allies at Doullens, acting on General Pershing's idea of unity of command, selected General Foch to coordinate the action of the Allied armies on the Western front.

General Foch immediately sent out the following order: "Hold—hold at all costs—every man where he is."

f. March 27. (1) *The capture of Montdidier.* The Crown Prince captured Montdidier in the evening of March 27, and penerated the Allied line on a front of eight miles

between the French Third and First Armies, but did not push a penetrating force through or take any action to fold back the inner flanks of the dislocated wings.

(2) *Counter measures by General Foch.* General Foch gave emergency orders for the closing of the gap and followed these at once by orders for the assembly of a sufficient force in front of the Crown Prince to stop him. The XXXVI Corps was brought from Dunkirk to Amiens by emergency railroad transportation, and its first elements detrained at Amiens that day, March 27. He ordered the French Fifth Army (General Micheler) from the Rheims sector to be "in readiness" near Beauvais, and the Commander (General Maistre) and Staff of the Tenth Army from Italy, to form a mass of maneuver in the vicinity of Hornoy in rear of the British front. He reinforced the Fifth army with the American 1st Division from Lorraine.

(3) *American participation.* (Map 76.) (a) General Pershing considered the events near Amiens to be an emergency that should delay the proper organization of the American Expeditionary Forces, and so, on March 27, he hurried to Bombon and stated to General Foch:

> "I have come to tell you that the American people would consider it an honor for our troops to be engaged in the present battle. I ask you for this in their name and my own. Infantry, artillery, aviation—all that we have is yours. Use it as you wish. More will come in numbers equal to requirements."

(b) The four available American divisions were disposed as follows: The 1st Division was put into the line north of Montdidier. The 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions took over quiet sectors and thus relieved three French divisions.

g. March 31. (1) *The Allies' line reorganized.* By March 31, General Foch had reorganized the line by extending the sector of the French Northern Group from the Oise to the Somme. The reorganized order of battle of the Allied front around the Amiens salient that night from south to north was:

> The French Sixth Army (General Duchesne), to the Oise.
> The French Third Army (General Humbert), from the Oise to vicinity Montdidier (exclusive).
> The French First Army (General Debeney), from vicinity of Montdidier (inclusive) to Luce River (exclusive).
> The British Fifth Army (General Gough), from Luce River (inclusive) to Albert (inclusive).

The British Third Army (General Byng), from Albert (exclusive) to Arras (inclusive).
Reserves:
French XXXVI Corps, en route from Dunkirk to Amiens.
French Fifth Army (General Micheler) en route from Rheims to Beauvais.
General Maistre and Staff en route from French Tenth Army in Italy to vicinity of Hornoy north of Beauvais to organize a Tenth Army.

(2) *The German attack is stopped.* The Crown Prince's attack was stopped on the night of March 31, by General Foch's reorganized line by local counter attack, and siege conditions obtained on the line: Noyon—Orvillers—Moreuil—Albert—Vimy ridge.

5. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. The principle of security.* (Maps 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80 and 81.) (1) The Allies on the Western front, in the spring of 1918, had assumed the strategical and tactical defensive attitude and purposed to maintain that attitude until, by accretion of American forces, they would be superior to the German force on that front, when, under the *principle of mass,* they hoped to organize and launch a decisive operation under the *principle of the offensive.*

(2) (a) In the meantime, however, the fundamental principle of war which should have controlled the attitude and method of operation of the Allies was *security.* An examination of the situation, just preceding the German offensive of March 21, shows that the French held the line from Switzerland to the Oise River and that the British (with the exception of a small sector in Flanders, held by the Belgians) held from the Oise to the sea.

(b) The French base was Paris and the French line of communication led back to Paris.

(c) The British base was England, with base port (principal) at Calais and the British line of communications led back to the British Channel.

(3) These Allies, since the Nivelle defeat on the Aisne in the spring of 1917, had been operating separately and coordinating their combined effort under the *principle of cooperation.* The British and the French were not able to rise to the plane of unity of command under the *principle of simplicity,* as the British were afraid that a French commander-in-chief would sacrifice the British base on the

Channel to secure the protection of Paris, and the French were afraid that a British commander-in-chief would sacrifice Paris to protect the British base on the Channel.

(4) (a) They made a really excellent effort to carry on the war under the *principle of cooperation* by the creation of the Supreme War Council. The Supreme War Council and every one (including the Germans) was fully aware that the weakest point on the Allied line was at the junction of the French and British forces. The line was known to be insecure (and naturally so) at that junction. General Foch pointed out to the Supreme War Council that the insecurity at that junction could and should be corrected by an Allied general reserve in rear of that point of junction.

(b) The Supreme War Council, however, being limited to the idea of *cooperation,* could not agree on a commander for that Allied general reserve, because that commander would not be subject to the orders of either the French or the British commanders-in-chief in respect to the operation of his Allied general reserve.

(c) As a result of that deadlock in the Supreme War Council, it was agreed, under the *principle of cooperation,* that the French and the British Commanders-in-Chief should respectively maintain reserves which they should use under the *principle of cooperation* to protect that junction point.

(d) The insecurity of the junction point was actually proven by the German drive through that point March 21.

(5) (a) The inadequacy of reliance on operations under *cooperation* between Allies was fully proven when the French, after the German attack of March 21, made the defense of the lines of communication to Paris and the defense of Paris their first consideration, while maintenance of contact with the British was made only the second consideration. Similarly, the British made the defense of their lines of communication to the Channel and the defense of the base ports at the Channel their first object while maintenance of contact with the French was secondary.

(b) When confronted with the terrible possibility of decisive defeat, the Allies saw the error of considering *cooperation* as the controlling *principle,* and turned to unity

of command under the *principle of simplicity* to gain *security.*

(6) Freed from the limitation of the *principle of cooperation,* General Foch, in whom was fixed unity of command under the *principle of simplicity,* as soon as he had the authority, ordered that the first and main mission of both the French and the British was to maintain contact with each other. That order, which it was impossible to give under the *principle of cooperation,* was easy to give with unity of command under the *principle of simplicity,* and complied with the controlling idea of the Allied situation, i.e., *security.*

(7) This is but one case, but it points the way to a conclusion; that, when Allies join together defensively in war, they should not attempt to operate under the *principle of cooperation;* but, under the *principle of simplicity,* they should select a Commander-in-Chief and confer on him the power of unity of command.

b. The principle of the offensive. (1) Strategically, the offensive seeks the direction to a vital part called a decisive strategical area. In the effort to progress in that direction, it seeks the weakest part of the enemy's line, that is, the line of least resistance.

(2) And so, having chosen the British army as the first great objective of his March 2 operation, Marshal von Hindenburg correctly selected the junction of the French and British sectors as the weakest part of the line, the line of least resistance, and launched his blow along that direction toward the decisive strategical railroad center—Amiens, the possession of which would separate the British from the French and render easy the defeat of the British.

(3) In the preparation and launching of that offensive, Marshal von Hindenburg complied with the *principle of security* by securing freedom of action through diversion and secrecy. He complied with the *principle of mass* by assembling a force that was greatly superior to his enemy in command, in fire power, and in numbers. He complied with the *principle of surprise* by launching an unexpected major and almost decisive operation against the Allies on March 21. He complied with the *principle of movement,*

in a partial way, by advancing against the enemy with mass and speed. The *principle of movement,* however, requires that *mass* (which includes fire of all weapons as well as numbers) must be hurled at the decisive moment along the decisive direction to secure a decision. That decisive moment was the night of March 27-28. The decisive direction was through the eight mile gap north of Montdidier toward Amiens. No force was hurled that night along that decisive direction. The next day it was too late, as the Allies had brought up troops and were secure. Unless an illustration of *mass* and *movement* can be given at the decisive time and place for which the whole operation has been preparatory, the offensive will fail. And so it was. Marshal von Hindenburg had the situation, i.e., an eight mile gap north of Montdidier on the night of March 27-28, that his whole preceding operation was intended to produce; but, through lack of information or because of fatigue or inability, he took no advantage of it and his offensive failed.

c. The principle of simplicity. (1) General Pershing saw, soon after arrival in France, that the Allied attempt to win the war by cooperation would fail. He advocated unity of command. His suggestion was not taken. When confronted with defeat, the Allies haltingly turned toward *simplicity,* and thus avoided defeat.

(2) General Pershing, however, gave the best illustration of compliance with the *principle of simplicity* when he said to General Foch: "Infantry, artillery, aviation. All that we have is yours. Use it as you wish."

CHAPTER XIV

Western Front---March to June, 1918

1. SITUATION AFTER THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21 260

2. PLANS 260
   a. Plans of the Allies 260
      (1) Unity of command 260
      (2) Emergency use of American troops in France 261
      (3) Emergency transportation of American troops to France 262
   b. German plan 263

3. OPERATIONS 263
   a. German offensive toward Amiens, April 4 263
   b. German offensive on the Lys, April 9 263
   c. German offensive toward Amiens, April 25 265

4. SITUATION AFTER THE LYS AND AMIENS OFFENSIVES 266
   a. Allies implore American assistance 266
      (1) The London Agreement, April 21 266
      (2) Abbeville Conference, May 1-2 266
      (3) Allies attempt to override General Pershing's authority 267
      (4) American troops in France by May 267
         (a) Creation of III Corps 267
         (b) Other American troops in France 268
         (c) Total American forces in France in May 268
   b. French disregard General Pershing's authority 268
   c. General Pershing's superior vision 268

5. THE AMERICAN 1ST DIVISION CAPTURES CANTIGNY 269
   a. Situation that required the battle 269
   b. Plan 270
   c. Operation 270
   d. Results 271

6. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY 27 271
   a. Situation leading up to the offensive of May 27 272
   b. Order of battle May 27, 1918 272
   c. Von Hindenburg's plan 274
   d. Operation 275
      (1) General description 275
      (2) America's part in German repulse 276
         (a) 2d and 3d Divisions to French Sixth Army 276
         (b) 3d Division prevents German crossing of the Marne 277
         (c) 2d Division stops German advance toward Paris 277

7. THE AMERICAN 2D DIVISION COUNTER ATTACKS 279
   a. Situation 279
   b. The American 2d Division captures Belleau Woods and Bouresches 280
   c. The American 2d Division captures Vaux 280

8. GERMAN ESTIMATE OF QUALITY OF AMERICAN TROOPS....281
9. GENERAL PERSHING COMMENDS THE 1ST AND THE 2D DIVISIONS....281
10. GENERAL FOCH'S PLAN FOR USE OF AMERICAN FORCES....282
11. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR....282
a. Principle of offensive and its relation to other principles....282
b. Mass....282
c. Surprise....283
d. Movement....283
e. The offensive spirit....284

---

1. SITUATION AFTER THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21. (Maps 75, 77 and 81.) Von Hindenburg had expected that the offensive of March 21, would penetrate the Allied line and win a decision. The failure of that operation kept the Allied cause alive, but brought out clearly the fact that the margin between defeat and victory was very small. The morale of the German forces suffered because they had expected a victory that would end the war. The morale of the Allied troops also suffered through contemplation of the narrow margin by which they were saved and the fear of defeat by another German blow.

2. PLANS. The unexpectedness of the result both to Germany and to the Allies required a reconsideration of plans.

a. Plans of the Allies. (1) *Unity of command.* (a) The Allied plan had been based on reliance on the *principle of cooperation.* They recognized that cooperation was not strong enough to control the then existing situation. Hence, they completely changed the whole basis of making war on the Western front by turning to *unity of command,* under the *principle of simplicity,* for the control of that situation.

(b) As the power conferred on General Foch at Doullens on March 26, to coordinate the operations of the Allied armies, was not sufficiently broad to grant authority except when those armies were in action, a second conference was called at Beauvais on April 3. At this conference, General Pershing urged that the Allies should comply with the *principle of unity of command,* stated that they could not do so without a Supreme Commander, and proposed that Allied Supreme Command be conferred on General Foch.

After much discussion, General Foch was selected. His appointment as of April 3, 1918 (approved by the President, April 16) was as follows:

"BEAUVAIS, *April 3, 1918.*

General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American Governments with the coordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the Western front; to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the same end, the British, French, and American Governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations.

The Commander-in-Chief of the British, French, and American Armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his Government, if in his opinion his Army is placed in danger by the instructions received from General Foch.

(Signed)

G. CLEMENCEAU
PETAIN
F. FOCH
LLOYD GEORGE
D. HAIG, F.M.
HENRY WILSON
TASKER H. BLISS, *General and Chief of Staff*
JOHN J. PERSHING, *General, U.S.A.*"

(2) *Emergency use of American troops in France.* (Map 76.) (a) By March 31, approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. These troops included the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions (each equal in strength to two French divisions) that had been assigned to the I Corps (General Liggett) for administrative control. In addition, one regiment of the 93d Division was with the French in the Argonne, the 41st Depot Division was in the Service of Supply, and the 3d, 32d, and 5th Divisions were arriving.

(b) (i) Under the emergency created by the German offensive of March 21, and under General Pershing's offer of March 27 to General Foch, the American troops in France became effective, from the combat point of view, as follows:

The 1st and 2d Divisions (Generals Bullard and Bundy) were in the line on the south and north face of the St. Mihiel salient respectively;

The 26th and 42d Divisions had just been withdrawn after one month of training in trench warfare;

The 42d Division (General Menoher) at once relieved two French divisions in quiet sectors;

The 26th Division (General Edwards) relieved the 1st Division (General Bullard) which was sent, on April 8, to the Fifth French Army (General Micheler) which was in reserve near Beauvais, between Paris and Amiens.

(3) *Emergency transportation of American troops to France.* (a) The German offensive consumed such a large part of the Allied reserve that the Allies estimated that they could not continue a successful defense unless some way could be found immediately to accelerate the arrival of American troops and to increase their numbers.

(b) The military representatives of the Supreme War Council prepared their joint note, Number 18, on March 27, in which they asked that, until further notice, only American infantry and machine gun units be sent to France for temporary service in Allied army divisions and corps. Though the note was in general terms, it referred more particularly to American troops due under the British six-division plan.

(c) The President, in approving the request, April 2, issued instructions as follows:

> "The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and, therefore, the recommendation of the Military Representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported, will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this Government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation permits, into an independent American Army, acting in concert with the Armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view."

(d) General Pershing at once made arrangements for the training of American units with the French and British forces and for the early employment of such infantry units as might be assigned to each.

(e) The Allies, however, under the President's instructions, claimed indefinite continuation of the infantry and machine gun priority, with complete absorption of those Americans to make up their losses, so General Pershing

settled the matter by cabling the War Department on April 3, that the infantry and machine gun priority should be limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the necessity of any priority in the future should be determined later.

b. German plans. (Maps 79, 80, and 81.) (1) Marshal von Hindenburg did not accept, as final, the failure of his initial operation of March 21 to separate the British forces from the French forces.

(2) Estimating that the Allies were badly shaken, he believed that a second strong blow toward Amiens might succeed. In any event, he estimated that such a second blow along the same direction line, toward Amiens, would attract practically all the British reserves away from the northern part of the line.

(3) He consoled himself over the failure of the great offensive of March 21 with the hope that he might, by hard successive blows at sensitive points, batter and shake down the Western front, as he had battered and shaken down the Russian front. So he decided to strike again toward Amiens, and to deliver the northern converging blow that had been planned to follow the penetration toward Amiens.

3. OPERATIONS. (Maps 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, and 82.) *a. German offensive toward Amiens, April 4.* Marshal von Hindenburg secretly assembled a superior force near the nose of the Amiens salient, and with it launched a surprise attack of great violence, on April 4, with twenty-five divisions on a twenty mile front, from Grivesnes to the Somme, with the original object of forcing apart the French First Army and British Fifth Army. The attack made some progress, but was stopped by violent Allied counter attacks with the reserves that General Foch had placed in rear of that part of the line to protect that exceedingly sensitive area.

b. German offensive on the Lys, April 9. (1) In pursuance of the original plan, the Bavarian Crown Prince was charged with the duty of penetrating the Allied line between the British and Belgian forces with a mass of twenty-seven divisions from the Fourth Army (von Arnim) and the Sixth Army (von Quast) under the von Hindenburg pene-

trating attack doctrine, with the object of cutting the British line of communications in the vicinity of Hazebrouck.

(2) (a) On the night of April 7, the Bavarian Crown Prince bombarded the British First Army with gas shell. At 4:00 AM, April 9, he resumed the bombardment with the greatest intensity with both gas and high explosive shell.

(b) At 7:00 AM, in a heavy fog, the German Sixth Army attacked La Basse to south of Armentieres, against a front held principally by two Portuguese divisions. The Portuguese at once abandoned their trenches and retired rapidly to the Lys River, which was held by a thin line of British troops.

(c) The next day, April 10, the German Fourth Army joined the attack and forced the British back from Messines Ridge.

(d) April 11, the attack was continued in the general direction of Hazebrouck and Aire.

(3) Marshal Haig, now thoroughly alarmed, called on General Foch for assistance. General Foch directed Marshal Haig to hold Mount Kemmel and the high ground of Flanders in that vicinity at all costs, and sent the following reinforcements to him:

(a) The II Cavalry Corps (General Robillot) started at noon April 12 from the vicinity of Neufchatel and proceeding by forced marches, reached St. Omer by noon April 15. It covered sixty-five miles in the first twenty-four hours, and forty-six in the next twenty-four hours.

(b) Two divisions coming from Alsace for the Fifth Army were sent direct to Marshal Haig. On the 11th of April, the Tenth Army was moved from vicinity of Neufchatel to the vicinity of Amiens, and there held in readiness.

(4) The German attack continued with great violence on April 13 and General Foch moved the Tenth Army to vicinity of Doullens, and ordered the Belgians to help the British left flank.

(5) (a) On April 17, General Foch created the Northern Army Detachment, composed of all the French troops sent to Marshal Haig, and placed General de Mitry in com-

mand of it. He directed General de Mitry to report to General Plummer of the British Second Army.

(b) In addition to troops already on the battlefield, General Foch sent the 39th Division by train from Abbeville, and the 34th and 154th Divisions from the Tenth Army in the vicinity of Doullens.

(6) (a) The Bavarian Crown Prince paused from April 19 to 24 for resupply and reorganization. He had not succeeded in penetrating the Allied line, and decided to capture Mount Kemmel, the best observation station in Flanders, as a limited objective.

(b) The next morning, April 25, after a short but terrific artillery preparation, including gas, he launched a converging attack on Mount Kemmel by nine divisions and promptly captured it, thus gaining perfect observation of the British Ypres salient.

(c) He attempted to exploit the advantage of the good observation at Mount Kemmel by executing the penetration, but the superior Allied strength stopped him. Marshal von Hindenburg ordered the action stopped, as he did not want it to degenerate into a battle of attrition.

c. German offensive toward Amiens, April 25. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg believed that the Lys offensive had attracted most of the British reserves, and, although the penetration had not been effected near Amiens, decided to go ahead with the attack that should have folded back the British right; and thus cut the British line of communication at Amiens. After three hours of heavy artillery preparation, the Bavarian Crown Prince, on April 25, sent five divisions forward in a dense fog, preceded by German tanks, against the extreme right flank of the British at the Somme.

(2) The German light tanks penetrated the line and the German infantry began to pass through rapidly, but they were driven back by heavy tanks and a counter attack. However, they captured Villers-Bretonneux and brought Amiens under artillery fire. Marshal Haig launched a counter attack by three infantry brigades that night, which at dawn recaptured Villers-Bretonneux.

4. SITUATION AFTER THE LYS AND AMIENS OFFENSIVE. *a. Allies implore American assistance.* After Marshal von Hindenburg's Lys offensive, the British were thoroughly alarmed. He had nearly accomplish the destruction of the British forces. Their losses had been heavy and they were not able to replace them entirely. Accordingly, the British began to make extraordinary efforts to increase the shipping available for American troops, as they considered that the Western front could be saved only by increasing the number of American troops.

(1) *The London Agreement.* (a) On April 21, General Pershing went to London, where it was agreed that during May, American troops should be sent to Europe in British ships in the following order: infantry, machine guns, engineer, signal and headquarters troops to include units up to divisions for training with the British army in France, but only up to the total of six divisions. Any excess shipping was to be used to make the American divisions complete. The divisional artillery and corps troops were to follow immediately. The artillery was to train with French materiel and to join its own divisions as soon as trained.

(b) The following concessions by the British were new:

> "(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps, when trained and organized, shall be utilized under the American Commander-in-Chief in an American group.
>
> "(e) That the American Commander-in-Chief shall allot American troops to the French or British for training, or train them with American units, at his discretion, with the understanding that troops already transported by British shipping, or included in the six divisions mentioned in par. (a), are to be trained with the British Army, details as to rations, equipment, and transport to be determined by special agreement."

(2) *The Abbeville Conference May 1-2.* (a) When Marshal von Hindenburg actually interdicted Amiens with artillery fire on April 25, the Allies fully realized the extreme gravity of the situation and the necessity of providing at once all possible tonnage for transportation of American troops.

(b) The French interpreted the London Agreement as an indefinite assignment of American infantry to British units, and at once wanted some American infantry to be

assigned indefinitely to French units. Accordingly, at the meeting of the Supreme War Council at Abbeville, May 1 and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans with the French and British was reopened. The French started the conference with the statement that the first business was the allotment of American troops to the Allies. Both French and Italian representatives made urgent appeals for American replacements or units to serve with their Armies. After prolonged discussion, the Supreme War Council finally acknowledged that the Allies could not win the war without the assistance of an independent American Army. The Abbeville Agreement was as follows:

> "It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In order to meet the present emergency, it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American Army, preference be given to infantry and machine gun units for training and service with French and British armies with the understanding that such infantry and machine gun units are to be withdrawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France."

(3) *Allies attempt to override General Pershing's authority.* The French and British who were parties to the Abbeville Agreement of May 1-2, however, almost at once appealed to the President, through their Ambassadors in Washington, to increase the infantry and machine gun priority to compensate for the critical steady drain on the limited number of available French and British replacements. The President decided that General Pershing and General Foch should adjust that in conference.

(4) *American troops in France by May.* (Map 83.) (a) *Creation of the III Corps.* The 3d, 32d, and 5th Divisions were practically complete and were placed under the administrative control of the III Corps which General Pershing created May 16, the command of which he retained temporarily, with corps headquarters near Chatillon-sur-Seine.

(b) *Other American troops in France.* (i) The British, under the stimulus of the German offensive against Amiens and Hazebrouck, had gathered a great number of vessels for transportation of American troops to France under the agreements described above. Accordingly, at the end of May, the 28th and 77th Divisions had arrived, and the 4th, 27th, 30th, 33d, 35th, and 82d Divisions were arriving in the British area, to be trained by the British, under the administrative control of the II Corps, the command of which General Pershing still retained.

(ii) On the French portion of the front, besides the III Corps, the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions were still under the administrative control of the I Corps (General Liggett). The 41st Depot Division was in the Service of Supply.

(c) *Total American forces in France in May.* The total American force in France, at the end of May, 1918, was about 600,000 men.

b. French disregard General Pershing's authority. The French were slow to recognize General Pershing's authority over American troops. For instance, the 26th Division (General Edwards) was serving with the French Eighth Army on the Nancy front. On May 2, the French Eighth Army Commander changed the sector of the 26th Division without informing the American Commander-in-Chief. General Pershing at once wrote to the Chief of the French Military Commission that:

> "Inasmuch as the final decision as to the American divisions to be sent to the battle front must be made by these headquarters, it is suggested that in the future I be informed as to the proposals of the French Command before any action is taken."

c. General Pershing's superior vision. (1) It is apparent from the foregoing that the Allies estimated that the war could not be won without a tremendous increase in the number of American infantry, including machine gun units, and that these troops should serve in the French and British forces.

(2) The attitude of the Allies with respect to the training and future use of the Americans is well explained in a memorandum on instruction of attached American units

issued from Headquarters of the French Commander-in-Chief on May 1, 1918, in which General Petain stated:

> "It should be borne in mind that they have an extremely highly developed sense of 'amour propre' based on their pride in belonging to one of the greatest nations in the world. Consequently an attitude of superiority over them should be assiduously avoided, a fact which in no way prevents the absolute subordination required by the service, for carrying out the rules of hierarchy. * * * In case of necessity, French officers should not hesitate to exercise their authority * * *. Americans dream of operating in open country, after having broken through the front. This results in too much attention being devoted to this form of operations."

(3) The difference of conception indicated in the French instructions existed and therein lies one of the qualities of General Pershing's greatness. The Germans were teaching their armies to fight in the open, in the expectation of breaking through the Allied line and winning the war in open warfare. The Allies were teaching trench warfare of defense. General Pershing, however, saw clearly that the only way to win the war was to break through the German lines and then to defeat the Germans in open warfare. He had the vision and the courage to teach that to the American forces. And that was the way to victory.

5. The American 1st Division Captures Cantigny. (Maps 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86.) *a. Situation that required the battle.* The situation was so grave after the German thrusts at Amiens, Hazebrouck and Bethune, that, although more than 100,000 Americans arrived in April, and they were arriving in May at the rate of more than 200,000 a month, the Germans belittled the possibility of Americans fighting well, and the Allies really did not know just how much reliance could be placed on American fighting ability. They considered the situation grave, did not share General Pershing's belief that a really effective American force could be built up in time to prevent defeat, and planned to test American combat efficiency, under General Pershing's doctrine, on the battlefield. The French Government selected the 1st Division (General Bullard), then on the line of the First French Army (General Debeney) in front of the apex of the German Amiens salient for that test.

b. Plan. (1) The task assigned was to capture and hold the fortified town of Cantigny. Cantigny was an important objective because it constituted a salient west of Montdidier, marked the point farthest west reached by the German Amiens drive, gave excellent observation, dominated the left bank of the Avre River, and was on the line of advance to recapture the southern branch of the Amiens —Compiegne railroad. That part of the line was very active and the German artillery took a daily toll of forty or fifty casualties. The Germans had intrenched, constructed strong points, armed the town with machine guns, and had reserves and artillery in the woods back of the town.

(2) The division commander (General Bullard) selected the 28th Infantry (Colonel Hanson Ely) for the task. It was to be supported by a battalion of the 18th Infantry (Colonel Frank Parker), one company of 1st Engineers, by the division artillery (General Summerall), and by French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers. The front of attack was one and two-tenths miles. The regiment formed with three battalions on the line. The 2d and 3d Battalions each had three companies on the line and one in battalion reserve. The 1st Battalion had two companies on the line, with two companies in regimental reserve. One of these companies was to go to the right of the line and be on the south flank of Cantigny, while the other was to remain in regimental reserve in rear.

c. Operation. (1) After an hour of artillery preparation, the infantry, accompanied by tanks and flame throwers, attacked at 6:45 AM, May 28, under cover of a rolling barrage that advanced one hundred meters every two minutes for a period of six minutes, thereafter one hundred meters every four minutes. The advance was also protected by heavy destruction and interdiction fire on the German rear areas.

(2) To be sure of a record of the American performance, the French photographed the American advance. That picture shows the American line advancing under the protection of French tanks with the accuracy of a field exercise in America. The objective was captured with great skill and the new line intrenched. The French assis-

tance was then withdrawn and sent in all haste to participate in the defense against the German offensive which von Hindenburg had launched on May 27 from the Aisne.

(3) The Germans counter attacked twice on May 28, and kept up the attempt to recapture Cantigny all the next day, but all the German attacks were repulsed.

d. Results. (1) General Bullard, in a commendatory order describing the work of the division, said: "The moral effects to flow from this proof of the reliability in battle of the American soldier far outweigh the direct military importance of the action itself."

(2) General Pershing congratulated General Bullard at once and soon the Commanders of the neighboring French divisions, corps, and armies, the French Commander-in-Chief, and the Premier, M. Clemenceau, appeared and expressed to General Bullard profound admiration for the success of the American troops.

(3) The demonstration at Cantigny greatly impressed the French, and soon the French Commander-in-Chief sent the following citation:

"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE EAST

Staff
PERSONNEL BUREAU
Decorations

General Order No. 11.875 "D"

After approval of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E.F., in France, the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the East, cites in Army Orders:

28th Regiment of U.S. Infantry

'A regiment inspired by a magnificent offensive spirit under command of Colonel H. E. Ely, this regiment rushed forward with irresistible dash to attack a strongly fortified village. It reached all its objectives and held the conquered ground in spite of repeated counter attacks.'

General Headquarters,
The Marshal of France,
Commander-in-Chief of the French
Armies of the East.
(Signed) PETAIN."

(4) The Allies accepted the fact at once that Americans could be depended upon, and they began to talk of soon assuming the offensive and enforcing a victorious peace.

6. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY 27. (Maps 89,

90, and 91.) *a. Situation leading up to the offensive of May 27.* The Allies were still on the defensive after stopping von Hindenburg's Amiens and Lys offensives. They considered the situation exceedingly grave and were buoyed up only by the hope that Americans could and would fight, and would arrive in sufficient numbers before it should be too late. The welcome news from Cantigny, that Americans were reliable in battle did not come until after Marshal von Hindenburg had launched the great offensive of May 27. The Allies expected the next German offensive would be delivered against the British front. The French had extended their front from the Oise to Amiens, about sixty kilometers, to meet the German offensive of March 21; and, during the German offensive on the Lys they had sent heavy reinforcements to the British. As a result, the center of gravity of French reserves was to the left and north of Paris.

b. Order of battle May 27, 1918. (1) *Allied.* General Foch was in command with General Headquarters at Versailles. Divisions on the line, from south to north, were grouped as follows:

(a) French Eastern Group from Switzerland to Verdun salient:

The Seventh Army.
The Eighth Army, including 2 American divisions).
The Second Army (including 1 Italian division).
Reserves—12 divisions including 1 American and 1 Italian division.

(b) French Northern Group from Verdun salient (exclusive) to the Oise (exclusive):

The Fourth Army.
The Sixth Army (including 3 British divisions).
Reserves—7 divisions (including 2 British divisions).

(c) French Reserve Group, from the Oise (inclusive) to the Somme (exclusive):

The Third Army.
The First Army (including 1 American division).
Reserves—8 divisions (including 1 American division).

(d) British Group, from the Somme (inclusive) to the Ypres salient (including French Northern Detachment that had 3 divisions in reserve):

Reserves—26 divisions, of which 2 were Portuguese.

(e) Belgian force from Ypres salient (exclusive) to the sea:

Reserves—3 divisions.

(f) General Allied reserves:

Fifth Army near Beauvais (7 divisions in reserve).
Tenth Army in British Sector in rear of Arras (4 divisions in reserve).

(2) *German.* Marshal von Hindenburg in command, with General Headquarters at Spa. Divisions on the line, from south to north, were grouped as follows:

(a) Duke of Wurtemburg's Group from Switzerland to the Moselle (inclusive):

Army Detachment B.
Army Detachment A.
The Nineteenth Army.
Reserve—2 divisions.

(b) General von Gallwitz's Group, from the Moselle (exclusive) to Verdun salient (inclusive):

Army Detachment C.
The Fifth Army.

(c) Crown Prince of Germany's Group, from Verdun salient (exclusive) to the line of the Sambre (extended):

The Third Army.
The First Army.
The Seventh Army.
The Eighteenth Army.
Reserves—13 divisions.

(d) Crown Prince of Bavaria's Group, from line of the Sambre (extended) to the sea:

The Second Army.
The Seventeenth Army.
The Sixth Army.
The Fourth Army.

(e) General reserves for Western front, in vicinity of Hirson, 48 divisions.

(3) *Relative strength.* Relative strength in division units may be stated as follows:

Nations	*Total*	*In Line*	*In Reserve*
France	105	67	38
British	61	37	24
Belgium	12	9	3
United States	4	3	1
Italian	2	1	1
Total Allies	184	117	67
Germans	207	124	83
German superiority	23	7	16

c. Von Hindenburg's plan. (1) Von Hindenburg's plan, to penetrate between the British and the French, had failed; and the blow of the northern force that was intended to penetrate between the British and the Belgians, also had failed. Von Hindenburg believed that heavy blows at the British line, like blows against a wall, would shake and shatter it. In that also, he had so far failed. He had delivered five powerful blows against the British front, and, although he had forced it back, it was still intact. He had also failed to cut the British line of communications at Amiens and at Hazebrouck, but had succeeded in interdicting those points by artillery fire.

(2) The original plan called for the destruction of the British army before a major offensive should be launched against the French army. The British had not been destroyed, but the plans for the offensive against the French had been prepared by the Crown Prince.

(3) It would take some time to prepare plans and assemble material for the delivery of another blow against the British army. If operations were stopped in order to prepare for the next blow in Flanders, von Hindenburg believed that he might lose the initiative and give General Foch a chance to strike against the very vulnerable German salients.

(4) However, he had advanced far enough to lay the great railroad lines of communication behind the British lines under his interdicting fire. He estimated that he had nearly destroyed the British army, and that he would have destroyed it had it not been reinforced by the French. He decided to deliver another and, he believed a decisive blow against the British in Flanders; and, while that blow was being prepared, to retain the initiative by delivery of the

blow against the French originally planned for delivery after destruction of the British army. Although he would not have the troops available to deliver as powerful a blow as would have been the case had the first two phases destroyed the British army, still he planned the blow to be sufficiently powerful to cut the French line of communications between Paris and Verdun, and intended, in the event of promising tactical success, to penetrate the French line, and in any event to prevent the French from going to the assistance of the British in Flanders, where he then planned to strike the decisive and last blow of the war.

(5) His plan of maneuver against the French was to deliver a blow, in the general direction: Soissons—Fismes, that would threaten Paris; to cut the Paris—Epernay railroad; and then, under the protection of the interruption in the French line of communications, to thrust a powerful penetrating blow through the vicinity of Epernay—Chalons, and exploit the penetration against the inner flanks of the two dislocated wings of the French forces.

d. Operation. (1) *General description.* (a) The preparation was carried out strictly according to the Hindenburg doctrine. This was quite easy, as the French believed the line of the Aisne to be so strong that it would not be attacked, hence the line had been weakened there by the withdrawal of the Fifth Army to help the British. Forty-two German divisions and 4,000 pieces of artillery were secretly assembled for the attack. The French did not suspect any attack until the evening of May 26, and had only eleven divisions on that front.

(b) At 4:00 AM, May 27, after a short, violent artillery preparation, the Crown Prince attacked by rapid infiltration with nineteen divisions, preceded by tanks, on a front of twenty-five miles, from Berry-au-Bac to Anizy. By 8:00 AM the French were pushed back across the Chemin des Dames. At noon, the attack had crossed the Aisne, and by evening the Vesle.

(c) On May 28, the advance was resumed at dawn, continued all day, and reached the line: Chery-Chartreuse —Mont Courville.

(d) During this time, Paris was being bombarded by long range artillery and people were already leaving the city. General Foch sent reinforcements by train, by truck, and by marching to the Northern Group. Six divisions, without much coordination, were thrown into the line on May 28; and the Fifth Army, called from the General Reserve, was sent to the high ground of Rheims, on the east face of the salient forming at Chateau-Thierry.

(e) Soissons was captured by the Germans at dawn May 29. By the 30th, the attack reached the Marne at Jaulgonne. General Foch called the Tenth Army from Doullens in the British Sector and put it in between the Sixth and the Third Army against the west face of the salient rapidly forming at Chateau-Thierry. At the same time, General Foch decided to counter attack by a converging operation against the German salient; so he ordered the assembly of three fresh divisions on the high ground of Rheims to attack in the direction of Fismes, and four fresh divisions in the vicinity of Attichy to attack in the direction of Soissons. By the 1st of June, after a four days' advance, the attack had created a great salient from Rheims (exclusive)—along the Marne from Dormans to Chateau-Thierry—along east side of Villers-Cotterets Forest—Fontenoy—Pontoise. Allied and American reinforcements were then arriving rapidly, and the attack was slowed up.

(f) General Foch had now organized the new front from east to west as follows:

The Fifth Army from Rheims (inclusive) to Dormans (inclusive).
The Sixth Army from Dormans (exclusive) to Faverolles (inclusive).
The Tenth Army from Faverolles (exclusive) to Moulin-sous-Touvent (exclusive).
The Third Army from Moulin-sous-Touvent (inclusive) to continuation of old line.
General reserves—six divisions near junction of the Ourcq and the Marne.

(g) By June 3, von Hindenburg's advance against the Paris—Verdun line of communications came to a stop; and, although he was not astride that railroad, he held it under his interdiction fire.

(2) *America's part in German repulse.* (Maps 81, 82, 83, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95.) (a) *2d and 3d Divisions to*

French Sixth Army. On May 30, General Pershing placed the 2d Division (General Bundy), from the I Corps, and the 3d Division (General Dickman), from the III Corps, at the disposal of the French commander of the Northern Group (General d'Esperey) to assist in resisting the German offensive of May 27. The group commander placed them at the disposal of the French Sixth Army (General Duchesne).

(b) *Third division prevents German crossing of the Marne.* (i) The Sixth Army commander, General Duchesne, in emergency orders, sent the 3d Division (General Dickman) to assist the French XXXVIII Corps (General Marchand of Fashoda fame) to defend the line of the Marne near Chateau-Thierry.

(ii) The division motorized machine gun battalion was sent ahead at top speed, and, amidst the cheers of the French soldiers, arrived in time to assist materially in defending the crossings of the Marne at Chateau-Thierry, May 31. The French were much impressed by the American marching and fighting ability, and General Marchand, in corps orders, commended the 7th Machine Gun Battalion. Also, General Duchesne, in the Sixth Army order of the day, commended the 7th Machine Gun Battalion as follows:

> "Prevented the enemy from crossing the Marne. In the course of violent combats, particularly on May 31 and June 1, this battalion disputed the northern suburbs of Chateau-Thierry foot by foot, inflicted severe losses on the enemy, and covered itself with glory by its bravery and ability."

(iii) The crossing at Chateau-Thierry being prevented by American machine gun fire, the Germans crossed the Marne near Jaulgonne, June 1, with the intention of cutting the French communications between Paris and Epernay. By that time, the 5th Brigade (General Sladen) and 6th Brigade (General Crawford) of the 3d American Division, after a long forced march, had reached the battlefield; and, cooperating with the French, soon secured fire superiority over the Germans and assisted materially in forcing them to recross the Marne.

(c) *The 2d Division stops German advance toward Paris.* (i) The French Sixth Army commander (General Duchesne), also in emergency orders, sent the American 2d

Division (General Bundy) to the French XXI Corps (General Degoutte), as a reinforcement of the effort to stop the German advance along the direct road to Paris. The division had been designated to relieve the First Division near Montdidier, but, on the evening of May 30, the orders were received at Chaumont-en-Vexin to proceed by emergency truck transportation to Meaux to help stop the German advance from the Aisne.

(ii) When General Bundy reported to General Degoutte on the morning of June 1, he found the situation to be as follows: The German advance forces then occupied Chateau-Thierry and hill 204 (just west of Chateau-Thierry) and controlled the north bank of the Marne and also the direct road west through Vaux toward Paris. The XXI Corps, besides its artillery, had available to oppose the German advance toward Paris only two depleted divisions that had been worn out by five days' continuous battle. General Degoutte did not have any infantry reserves.

The French XXXVIII Corps on the right of the XXI Corps held the line with one French division from La Nouvette Farm to the Marne. The French VII Corps on the left of the XXI Corps held from hill 142 to the left. The defense of the interval from the left of the XXXVIII Corps to the right of the VII Corps involved the stopping of the German advance on the direct road to Paris.

Opposite that interval, on June 1, the advancing German line ran along the line: Chateau-Thierry—Vaux—Bouresches—Belleau Woods—Torcy—Bussieres.

(iii) General Degoutte directed General Bundy to put the 2d Division in line as soon as possible, and to hold the line: La Nouvette Farm—the southern edge of Bois de la Marette—Le Thiolet on the Paris road—Bois de Clerembauts—Lucy-le-Bocage—hill 142.

(iv) General Bundy assigned the 3d Brigade (General Lewis) to defend the line south of the Paris road, and the 4th Brigade (General Harbord) to defend the line north of the Paris road. By noon, the greater portion of the two brigades were in line. That night, the 23d Infantry, reinforced by a battalion of marines, Companies C and D, 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and Company C, 2d Engineers, all

under the command of Colonel Malone, was sent in great haste to fill a gap of several kilometers reported between Gandelu and Montigny on the front of the French VII Corps on the left.

(v) The appearance of the 2d and 3d American Divisions (equal to four full strength fresh French divisions) on the line buoyed up the morale of the French, and the word spread to the right and left along the line at once that the Americans had entered the line in large force. The line held. The German advance was stopped. On the night of June 3, the two depleted French divisions were withdrawn from the line for reorganization, and the Malone detachment was returned to the line. On June 4, the American force, unaided except by French artillery, successfully resisted the German attack. On June 5, the French turned over the further defense of the sector astride the Paris road to the 2d Division.

7. The American 2d Division Counter Attacks. *a. Situation.* (1) After the 2d Division (General Bundy) had closed the gap in the French line and stopped the German advance on the direct road to Paris, the Germans, who had not believed in the possibility of any effective American military action, smarting under the blows given by the 1st Division at Cantigny and the 3d Division at Chateau-Thierry, decided that it was necessary to destroy the growing prestige of the Americans in order to dispel German fear and also in order to destroy the growing confidence of the Allies in the Americans. Also, they wanted to push the Americans out of the way so that, in the approaching great offensive, they could cut the French railroad line of communications near Chateau-Thierry.

(2) Accordingly, two first-class divisions were sent to defeat the 2d Division. The Germans selected a strong position in Belleau Woods and in Bouresches village, strengthened it, and, preceding offensive action, prepared it for defense under a well coordinated plan that called for use of all of the existing weapons, and the use of machine guns in nests that were both self-supporting and interlaced by fire, so that the victors over one machine gun nest would be destroyed at once by other supporting machine gun nests.

b. The 2d Division captures Belleau Woods and Bouresches. The challenge of the Germans was promptly accepted, and the 2d Division (General Bundy) was given the mission of advancing the line to include Belleau Woods and Bouresches village. General Bundy, on June 4, attacked and captured Bouresches village. On the 10th and 11th, he captured the greater part of Belleau Woods, and, on the 14th and 19th, repulsed the German counter attacks. On the 21st, he resumed the attack and with the 4th Brigade captured the remaining part of Belleau Woods. That action was commended by General Duchesnes in the French Sixth Army order, as follows:

> "Thrown into the thick of the battle in a sector violently attacked by the enemy, the brigade gave immediate proof of first-class fighting qualities. In liaison with French troops, this brigade broke up a powerful German attack at a very important point of the position and afterwards carried out a series of attacks. Thanks to the bravery, fighting spirit and tenacity of the men, who stoically bore fatigue and losses, thanks also to the activity of the officers, as also to the personal influence of its Commander, General J. Harbord, the efforts of the 4th Brigade were entirely successful. Acting in close cooperation, the two regiments and machine gun battalion of the brigade advanced from 1500 to 2000 yards on a 2½ mile front, after twelve days of incessant fighting (from June 2 to 13, 1918), over very difficult ground, capturing a large quantity of material and 500 prisoners, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, and carrying two very important positions, the village of Bouresches and the fortified Belleau Wood."

c. The 2d Division captures Vaux. (1) The mission of capturing Belleau Woods and Bouresches had been executed by the 4th Brigade. The Germans still held Vaux in front of the 3d Brigade.

(2) General Lewis, commanding the 3d Brigade, was charged with the duty of capturing Vaux.

(3) The plan for the attack provided for destructive, interdiction, and harassing artillery fire on areas shown by letters on the map. The artillery preparation was to precede the attack by several hours.

(4) The infantry attack was formed with regiments abreast, the 9th Infantry on the right and the 23d Infantry on the left. Each infantry regiment was to advance in column of battalions under a barrage that rolled forward one hundred meters in three minutes, for twenty-four minutes. The attack was launched about noon, July 1, and,

by evening, had captured the village of Vaux, the Wood of La Roche and had repulsed the German counter attack.

(5) The attack was a brilliant success and captured 500 prisoners with many machine guns. Although the French on the right failed to capture hill 204 which dominated Vaux, the 2d Division held Vaux.

(6) The French High Command commended the 3d Brigade as follows:

> "During the operation north of the Marne between July 1 and July 2, 1918, this brigade, stimulated by the energy of its commander, General Lewis, and brilliantly led by its officers, careless of the heavy losses sustained, advanced valiantly and carried Vaux in a fierce hand to hand combat, also the Wood of La Roche, giving a splendid sample of aggressive spirit, abnegation, and contributing in no small measure to the victory which caused the enemy to evacuate French territory and eventually constrained him to ask for an Armistice."

8. GERMAN ESTIMATE OF QUALITY OF AMERICAN TROOPS. The Germans, after the defeat of their two first-class divisions by the 2d U.S. Division, recognized their mistake in estimating the combat value of the American troops, and published a new estimate to the German army as follows:

> "The Second American Division must be considered a very good one and may even perhaps be reckoned as a storm troop. The different attacks on Belleau Woods were carried out with bravery and dash. The moral effect of our own gun fire can not seriously impede the advance of the American Infantry. The Americans' nerves are not yet worn out.
>
> The qualities of the men individually may be described as remarkable. They are physically well set up, their attitude is good, and they range in age from 18 to 28 years. They lack at present only training and experience to make formidable adversaries. The men are in fine spirits and are filled with naive assurance; the words of a prisoner are characteristic: '*We kill or we get killed.*' "

9. GENERAL PERSHING COMMENDS THE 1ST AND THE 2D DIVISIONS. After these operations, General Pershing published the following commendatory order:

> "G.H.Q.
> AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
> FRANCE, *July 9, 1918.*
>
> GENERAL ORDERS
> No 112
>
> The Commander-in-Chief desires to record in the General Orders of the American Expeditionary Forces his appreciation of the splendid courage, service and sacrifice of the officers and men

of the First and Second Divisions of these forces during the recent operations in which these divisions participated, and in which the enemy was checked by the resolute defense and counter offense of the allied armies.

These divisions, subjected fully for the first time to all the drastic tests of modern warfare, bore themselves always with fine valor; their cooperation with their brothers-in-arms of the unified command was prompt, and efficient and brought from their allied comrades many expressions of sincere appreciation. The conduct of these brave men and that of their fallen comrades, who made the supreme sacrifice, has established a standard of service and prestige which every division of the American Expeditionary Force will strive to emulate and preserve.

This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL PERSHING:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General."

10. GENERAL FOCH'S PLAN FOR USE OF AMERICAN FORCES. By June 17, there were more than 1,000,000 American troops in France. General Pershing, on that day, informed General Foch that the United States planned to have 3,000,000 men in France by March, 1919, and asked General Foch to consider the necessity of uniting the Americans into an American Army. General Foch replied that the morale and fighting spirit of the Americans was so high that their contact with French troops improved the morale of the French troops, and finally announced his plan for use of Americans as follows:

> "To build up the British Army in manpower, and second, to build up the morale of the French Army and in August to assemble the American Army."

11. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. (Maps 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95.) *a. Principle of offensive and its relation to other principles.* With combatants that are fairly well balanced in numbers, weapons, training, and morale, compliance with the *principle of the offensive* requires compliance with several other principles.

b. Mass. Under the *principle of economy of force* sufficient troops must be gained from other places of contact with the enemy, without violating the *principle of security,* to give a superiority under the *principle of mass,* at the time and place of the offensive blow.

(1) Marshal von Hindenburg did that for the offensive operations of April 4 toward Amiens, of April 9 on the Lys, and of May 27 from the Aisne.

(2) (a) In the operation of April 25 toward Amiens, he believed that, by the use of tanks, he was superior and was complying with the *principle of mass.*

(b) The Allies, however, met his attack with a more powerful force of tanks which gave them sufficient superiority, under the *principle of mass,* to defeat the German attack.

c. Surprise. (1) Having attained *mass,* it is essential, ordinarily, that the *mass* shall be hurled at the enemy under the *principle of surprise.*

(2) (a) Marshal von Hindenburg did that in the offensive operation of April 9 on the Lys, and of May 27 from the Aisne.

(b) In the operation of April 4 toward Amiens, he believed that he had complied with the *principle of surprise,* but he did not actually effect a surprise. The surprise, on that direction line, was effected by the operation of March 21. General Foch had estimated that the junction line between the Allies (including Amiens) was the most sensitive of all the Allied strategical areas, so, by assembling ample reserves there, he complied with the *principle of security.* The Allies, without much difficulty, repulsed the German attack.

d. Movement. (1) Having attained *mass* and *surprise,* it is essential, under the *principle of movement,* that the forward impetus of the *mass* should continue at the decisive movement and place. The offensive must be organized on broad enough lines to accomplish this, else it will fail.

(2) The decisive moment came on April 19, in the Lys operation. The Bavarian Crown Prince did not have *mass* ready with which he could continue *movement,* so the operation failed.

(3) The decisive moment came on May 31, and on June 1, in the operation from the Aisne, when, taken by surprise at the appearance of the Americans in their front, the German Crown Prince did not have *mass* ready with which he could continue *movement,* so the operation failed.

e. The offensive spirit. (1) Compliance with the *principle of mass, surprise, and movement* is not sufficient to insure the success of an offensive.

(2) To be successful, an offensive ordinarily must be based on an offensive spirit. If the troops do not have a well developed offensive spirit, an offensive has but little chance of success. Other conditions being equal, the side which has developed the keener edge to its offensive spirit will win.

(3) One of General Pershing's greatest contributions to the victory, and possibly the deciding one, was the inculcation of the offensive spirit into the American force.

CHAPTER XV

German Offensive at the Second Battle of the Marne

Page

1. SITUATION AFTER THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY 27 285
   a. General situation on Western front 285
   b. Dependence of Allies upon America to secure victory 286
   c. Employment of American troops 286

2. GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMPIEGNE 287
   a. Plans 287
      (1) German plans 287
      (2) Allied and American plans 287
   b. Operations 288

3. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE 289
   a. General situation 289
      (1) Events leading up to the battle 289
      (2) Morale situation 290
      (3) Allied and American situation 290
      (4) German situation 290
   b. Plans of maneuver 291
      (1) German plans 291
      (2) Allied and American plans 292
   c. The German offensive of July 15 294
      (1) German preparations 294
      (2) Operations east of Rheims 294
      (3) Operations west of Rheims 297

4. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR 302
   a. The principle of security 302
   b. The principle of the offensive 303

1. SITUATION AFTER THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY 27. (Maps 75, 78, 81, 82, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, and 99.) *a. General situation on Western front.* (1) As a result of the German offensive against the British, the French line had been extended from the Oise to the Somme. The Marne salient still further lengthened the French line by forty-five kilometers. This extension of front reduced the French reserves to an extremely low point. The center of gravity of the remaining French reserves was north of Paris, near Compiegne.

(2) The British reserves had practically all been used to defend against the German operations toward Amiens and on the Lys.

(3) The American troops had met and defeated the Germans at Cantigny and near Chateau-Thierry and the morale of the American army was high. In America, all army units were praying to get to France and the people were determined to win the war without regard to cost. The President expressed their sentiments exactly when he replied to the challenge of the German 1918 offensive, as follows:

> "The United States will use Force—Force to the utmost—Force without stint or limit, to make right the law of the World."

(4) Marshal von Hindenburg's failure to include Compiegne in either the Ameins or the Marne salient, or Rheims in the Marne salient, left the forty divisions in the Marne salient dependent for supplies on the single railroad line from Laon to Sossons. That line of communication was not sufficient. The capture of Rheims would open the trunk line to Mezieres and give sufficient facilities, but the original German plan called for the next great offensive toward Chalons, and von Hindenburg did not want to attract attention to Rheims before the delivery of that attack.

b. Dependence of Allies upon America to secure victory. As a result of a conference at Versailles, June 1 and 2, attended by General Pershing and representatives of the Allied Powers, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy cabled the Allied thanks to Mr. Wilson for expediting the shipment of American troops, and stated: that Germany had 200 divisions on the Western front to the Allies' 162; that the British and French could not maintain their then present force; that ultimate victory was impossible unless America should maintain 100 divisions in France as soon as possible, and that, in order to avoid Allied defeat by exhaustion of reserves, the maximum number of infantry and machine gunners should be shipped from America in the months of June and July.

c. Employment of American troops. On June 3, General Pershing, after consultation with Marshal Haig,

relieved five of the ten American divisions then in the II Corps (General Read) and ordered them to duty on the French portion of the front, as follows:

The 77th and 82d were to release the 42d and 26th for employment on a more active portion of the front. The 35th was to enter the line in the Vosges and the 4th and 28th were to move to the vicinity of Meaux and Chateau-Thierry as reserves.

2. GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMPIEGNE. *a. Plans.* (1) *German plans.* (a) The Germans were greatly handicapped by the insufficient line of supply for the troops in the Marne salient. It was estimated that the capture of Compiegne would open the great trunk line from Liege and solve the supply problem. Also, it was estimated that an operation against Compiegne would be interpreted by the Allies as an advance toward Paris and would tend to hold Allied reserves west of the Marne salient, where they would not be readily available for quick movement to the east of Chateau-Thierry, when the decisive offensive should be launched toward Chalons to penetrate the French line.

Accordingly, it was decided to reduce the Compiegne salient, thus securing direct supply from Liege for the troops in the salient, and securing increased facility for transfer of troops between the Amiens and the Marne salients.

(b) The plan of maneuver called for a converging operation by the Eighteenth Army (von Huttier) and the Seventh Army (von Boehn). Von Huttier's blow from the north was to be prepared in all haste, regardless of allied observation; von Boehn's blow from the east was to be launched later, as a surprise.

(c) Von Huttier's mission was to capture Compiegne and the railroad line from Compiegne to Montdidier. The mission of the Seventh Army was to capture the railroad line from Soissons to Compiegne.

(2) *Allied and American plans.* (a) General Foch estimated that the direct route of any German advance against Paris would be astride the great trunk railroad: Liege—Compiegne. He estimated that the German reserves were not yet exhausted.

(b) General Pershing pointed out the fact that the line of communications for all German troops in the Marne salient ran through Soissons, and that Soissons was so close to the edge of the salient that it could be captured and requested permission to execute that operation with American troops. General Foch agreed with General Pershing but was not prepared, then, to approve the latter's request.

(c) General Foch estimated that the single railroad through Soissons was not sufficient for supply of the German troops in the Marne salient. He estimated for that reason, and because of the exposed situation of Soissons, that the Marne salient was not secure.

(d) He estimated that the German capture of Compiegne would protect Soissons and by opening up the main trunk line railroad: Compiegne—Liege, would correct the insecure supply situation in the Marne salient.

(e) Accordingly, he estimated that Compiegne was just then his most sensitive strategical area, and, as its defense was also essential to the defense of Paris, he decided to remain on the defensive and hold the mass of his strategical reserves in the vicinity of Compiegne.

b. Operations. (1) (a) (i) After an artillery preparation of the greatest intensity which lasted several hours, and included a new kind of poisonous gas, von Huttier attacked at 4:30 AM, June 9, with thirteen divisions on a front of twenty miles, from near Montdidier to the Oise. So much asphyxiating gas was used in this operation that it befogged the air like a mist.

(ii) On the east flank, fourteen assaults failed to capture Little Switzerland.

(iii) In the center, the attack progressed easily and ran over and completely disorganized the French artillery system.

(iv) On the west flank, after many attacks, the Germans failed to pass le Frestoy.

(v) The next day, June 10, von Huttier captured Ribecourt and forced the French to fall back to the line: Molin-sous-Touvent—Bailly.

(b) General Fayolle, commanding the Reserve Group, ordered General Mangin to counter attack in the direction

of Ressons and concentrated five divisions, three by train and two by truck, by the night of June 10, in the vicinity of Maignelay—St. Just-en-Chaussee. The supplies and ammunition having been provided under emergency right of way, General Mangin formed a mass of maneuver on the night of June 10, and, without any artillery preparation, launched the attack of the five divisions on a front of six miles, as a surprise, at 11:00 AM, June 11, against the flank of von Huttier's army. The attack was supported by all the heavy and light artillery that could be assembled, and advanced with 160 tanks on the line. This counter attack captured Mery and Belloy and, by June 13, had stopped von Huttier's advance.

(2) Von Boehn (Seventh Army) delivered his attack as a surprise, with three new divisions on a front of six miles, from St. Pierre l'Aigle to the Aisne, in the direction of Pierrefonds, at dawn, June 12, and, during that day, reached the Retz brook. He was unable to advance beyond that point and lost part of his gains on account of hostile counter attacks.

3. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE. (Maps 7, 10, 11, 13, 15, 30, 45, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103 and 104.) *a. General situation.* (1) *Events leading up to the battle.* (a) The failure of the German offensive of March 21 to obtain a decisive victory over the British and a consequent inability to defeat the French, left the German line occupying two extensive salients, i.e., the Amiens and the Marne. The line of supply for the Marne salient was inadequate and insecure. To correct its deficiencies, the unsuccessful operation of June 9, against Compiegne, was undertaken. The failure of the latter undertaking brought about the decision to correct the supply situation by the capture of Rheims and to deliver a decisive blow against the French between Paris and Verdun, all in one operation.

(b) So, after four years of war and many victories, Germany attempted again the solution of the problem which she failed to solve in the First Battle of the Marne. If she had won the First Battle of the Marne she would have been

the victor in the war. Similarly, if she had won the Second Battle of the Marne she would have won the war.

(c) (i) The two situations, however, were not quite the same. In the First Battle of the Marne, the western French flank rested on Paris and the western German flank was in the air. In the Second Battle of the Marne, the western flanks of both forces rested on the sea.

(ii) In the First Battle of the Marne, the Allies operated on interior lines. In the Second battle of the Marne, the Germans operated on interior lines.

(iii) In the First Battle of the Marne, no American unit was present. In the Second Battle of the Marne, America participated as an associate of the Allies.

(2) *Morale situation.* In view of the fact that the Germans had forced the Allied line back almost to the breaking point in the three previous offensives toward Amiens, in the two offensives on the Lys, and in the offensive from the Aisne, the Allied successful defense against the German Compiegne offensive, June 9, lowered the German morale and the German soldiers' confidence in victory and, in exactly the reverse ratio, raised the Allied morale.

(3) *Allied and American situation.* Under the plan to defend until the arrival of American troops would give a preponderance of force on the Western front, the chief effort of the Allies and the United States was to expedite in every way the transportation of American troops to France. By July 14, there were more than 1,000,000 American troops in France and they were arriving at the rate of 10,000 a day. To insure an ample supply of American troops to turn the balance of power on the Western front against Germany, the President of the United States prescribed a second draft for military service on June 25.

(4) *German situation.* The failure to capture the railroad to Compiegne in the offensive of June 9 was a hard blow to the Germans. There were already forty divisions in the Marne salient depending on the single railroad line through Soissons for supply. The Germans were so short of gasoline that truck transportation was not available in the Marne salient, except in an emergency, and, as a result,

those forty divisions were largely dependent on animal transportation.

b. Plans of maneuver. (1) *German plans.* (a) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that the British had been so badly hurt that Marshal Haig would not be able to send any help to the French. Also, that he could not adequately supply the troops in the Marne salient for any considerable period of time by means of the single rail line through Soissons. He also estimated that the capture of Epernay and Chalons would accomplish the capture of Rheims and thus solve the supply situation, would force the evacuation of Verdun, would penetrate the French line and permit him to fold the left flank of the dislocated French right wing back on the eastern French fortified line and Switzerland, and permit him to fold the right flank of the dislocated French left wing back on Paris.

(b) He decided to launch the offensive against Chalons in a maneuver astride Rheims. The Third Army (von Einem) and the First Army (Fritz von Below) was to attack east of Rheims. The Seventh Army (von Boehn) was to attack west of Rheims. The inner flanks of the two forces were to meet near Epernay, when the whole force would advance the attack in the direction of Chalons. The whole maneuver was to be under the direction of the German Crown Prince.

(c) In the hope of lulling the French to a fancied sense of security, von Hindenburg, contrary to his custom before the other offensive operations, did not demonstrate on other parts of the line, but instead, he maintained subnormal activity, and, hoping that the French would be deep in the celebration of the French national holiday, July 14, fixed the time of attack as about 4:30 AM, July 15.

(d) The problem presented to the Third and First Armies was to break through an elaborately constructed and perfectly organized deep zone of defense dug into a chalk terrain. The problem of the Seventh Army was to accomplish a river crossing in the face of the enemy, and then to advance in the direction of Epernay.

(e) The German order of battle from east to west on the Champagne—Marne front was:

The Third Army (von Einem), to Rheims salient (exclusive).
The First Army (Fritz von Below), opposite the Rheims salient.
The Seventh Army (von Boehn), to Braisnes (exclusive).

As von Boehn would be busy with the operation toward Epernay, the Ninth Army Headquarters (von Eben) were brought from Roumania to assist the Seventh Army to protect the western base of the Marne salient. The Ninth Army sector extended west to include the Oise.

With available reserves, Marshal Hindenburg disposed of eighty-five divisions on the Champagne—Marne front, which gave him a preponderance of fifteen divisions over the Allied and American force on that part of the Western front.

(2) *Allied and American plans.* (a) After repulsing the German offensive of June 9 toward Compiegne, General Foch estimated that the German reserves had not yet been exhausted. He estimated that Marshal von Hindenburg would not voluntarily give up the initiative, and that the latter, in order to preserve it and in an effort to secure a decision, would launch another offensive operation either in Champagne against the French or in Flanders against the British.

(b) General Foch estimated that the time had not yet arrived to make the attempt to seize the initiative and decided to await defensively the expected German offensive. He had a detailed plan prepared for emergency transportation of large bodies of French troops to the British sector, or of large bodies of British troops to the French sector; and he accumulated a strategic reserve in the vicinity of Compiegne.

(c) For defense against the next German offensive, he directed that the first battle position be held by light outposts only and that the enemy be received at the second battle position, which he named "The Position of Resistance."

(d) He estimated that the next German offensive would practically exhaust the German reserves and that the proper time to assume the initiative would be after repulsing that German offensive.

(e) At the beginning of June, he informed the Allied commanders that he would resume the offensive. He adopted General Pershing's idea that the Marne salient was not stable, and that it should be attacked from the general direction of Compiegne toward Soissons and, on June 7, ordered plans prepared for a counter offensive against the German Marne salient. The attack was to be directed toward Soissons, with the objective of capturing the single railroad that supplied the German forces in that salient. The plans were ready on June 16.

(f) By July 10, General Foch estimated that Marshal von Hindenburg would attack in Champagne. He instructed General Gouraud, commanding the Fourth Army, to prepare for defense at about three kilometers in rear of his first battle position, as indicated in preceding instructions. Also, in order to change the center of gravity of French troops slightly to the east, he organized a new army, the Ninth (General Mitry), south of the Marne near Fere-Champenoise and held it in readiness to place on the line.

(g) On July 13, he estimated that Marshal Hindenburg's attack in Champagne would be launched July 15, and that it would be repulsed. He approved the June 7 plan for counter attack toward Soissons and fixed July 18 as the day of execution.

(h) General Foch made the following dispositions:

Between the Oise and the Argonne he had seventy divisions, of which fifty-seven were French, seven American, four British, and two Italian.

He set aside one-third of that force, i.e., twenty-seven divisions, for the counter offensive against the western face of the German Marne salient.

He also requested Marshal Haig to prepare operation plans for regaining control of the Paris—Ameins railroad.

(i) The Allied order of battle on the Champagne—Marne front, from east to west, was:

The Fourth Army (General Gouraud), east of Rheims;
The Fifth Army (General Berthelot), to Chatillon-sur-Marne (inclusive);
The Sixth Army (General Degoutte), to Faverolles (inclusive);
The Tenth Army (General Mangin), to the Oise (inclusive);
The Ninth Army (General Mitry), being assembled in reserve near Fere-Champenoise.

c. The German offensive of July 15. (1) *German preparations.* The Germans prepared for the July 15 offensive on a collossal scale. A tremendous amount of supplies, an unheard of amount of artillery, and nearly the whole available German reserve man power were assembled on the Marne front. To preserve secrecy, all movements were made at night and an effort was made to leave no mark or sign of the preparation that could be observed by an Allied eye or registered by an Allied camera. Marshal von Hindenburg and the German Government believed that the Chalons offensive of July 15 would break the French line and force France to a separate peace.

(2) *Operations east of Rheims.* (a) General Gouraud commanded the French Fourth Army in Champagne. Champagne is a chalk country, and lends itself easily to excavation. The Fourth Army had prepared its defensive zone perfectly with three positions: i.e., the *first battle position,* which was not to be held in force, the *intermediate position,* where energetic resistance was to be offered, and the *second battle position,* which was to be held at all costs. General Gouraud carried out the instructions of General Foch with respect to holding the *first battle position* lightly, and to prepare to receive the German attack on the *intermediate* and *second positions.* The 42d Division (General Menoher), the 369th, 371st and 372d regiments of infantry, serving with French divisions, and a part of the 30th Brigade, coast artillery corps, were American combat units serving in the French Fourth Army.

(b) To prepare the troops for a decisive repulse of the expected German attack, General Gouraud gave a fine example of the psychological preparation of a command for a defensive battle in the issue of the following exhortation:

"TO THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS OF THE FOURTH ARMY

We may be attacked at any moment.

You all know that a defensive battle was never engaged in under more favorable circumstances. We are awake and on our guard. We are powerfully reinforced in Infantry and Artillery. You are fighting on a terrain that you have transformed by your work and your perseverance into a redoubtable fortress. This invincible fortress and all its passages are well guarded.

The bombardment will be terrific. You will stand it without weakness. The assault will be ferocious, in a cloud of smoke, dust, and gas.

But your positions and your armament are formidable. In your breasts beat the strong hearts of free men. None shall look to the rear, none shall yield a step. Each shall have but one thought: To kill—to kill a-plenty—until they have had their fill.

Therefore, your General says to you: You will break this assault, and it will be a happy day.

GOURAUD."

(c) (i) To verify the estimate of the coming attack, General Gouraud sent a raiding party into the German lines on the evening of July 14. It captured a large number of prisoners from the German assaulting troops then awaiting *H* hour. He learned from them that the German artillery preparation would begin at midnight and the infantry attack would be launched about 4:30 o'clock, the next morning, July 15.

(ii) General Gouraud gave out this information to his army at 10:45 PM July 14, and reported the information to General Foch. He also ordered the artillery counter preparation fire to be laid down on the assembled German assaulting units at once and ordered all to their battle positions.

(d) (i) At midnight, July 14-15, the Germans opened along the whole front east of Rheims with an artillery preparation including gas, of previously unheard of intensity. The foreground clear to Chalons, fifteen miles away, was illuminated, and even Paris saw the light.

(ii) The German assault units of the First and Third Armies were surprised and seriously injured by the counter preparation which General Gouraud's artilery fired before midnight July 14-15. The infantry attack however, was launched at dawn from Rheims (exclusive) to Ripont.

(iii) The troops in the first battle position, with the exception of a light outpost, had been withdrawn to the *intermediate* and to the *second battle positions.* The German fire attack had been directed principally at the *first battle position,* and the infantry attack was launched against the *first battle position.* As that was not occupied in great force, the casualties were not great and the blow was in the air. The French and the American artillery then

literally slaughtered the German attack waves as they approached the *first battle position,* when they were in that position, and in their advance to the *intermediate position.* The French and American infantry with their auxiliary arms in the *intermediate battle position* also had a "field day" firing at the approaching Germans. The soldiers in the American infantry were good rifle shots and picked off their men by aim, as at target practice.

(iv) The obstacles before the *intermediate position* were so effective and the superiority of French and American fire so great that the German troops were stopped in front of the *intermediate position* at about 7:00 AM and held there along the whole army front.

(v) Three battalions of the American 42d Division were in the *intermediate position,* and repulsed a number of attacks.

The 2d Battalion (Major Anderson) of the 165th Infantry (Col. McCoy) was engaged for about six hours on the 15th in violent battle action and also repulsed several attacks on the morning of July 16.

At about 11:30 AM, July 15, the 83d Brigade (General Lenihan) sent forward a battalion of the 166th Infantry (Col. Hough) to reinforce the 170th French Division on the *intermediate position.* Two companies of the 168th Infantry (Colonel Bennett) were sent forward to support the French 13th Division, and two companies of the 167th Infantry (Colonel Screws) engaged in a counter attack.

GATLEY

The 42d Division Artillery, i.e., the 67th Artillery Brigade (General McKinstry), was engaged throughout the whole action. It was composed of the 149th Artillery (Colonel Reilly), the 150th Artillery (Colonel Tyndall) and the 151st Artillery (Colonel Leach).

(e) The German losses were so heavy that Marshal von Hindenburg decided to abandon the operation east of Rheims, and by noon of the 16th, orders to that effect had gone to the First and Third German Armies, and siege conditions were resumed east of Rheims.

(f) General Ludendorff says that "A continuation of the offensive east of Rheims would have cost us too much."

Von Hindenburg hoped, however, by the success of the Seventh Army to accomplish the capture of Rheims, and thus retain the initiative.

(g) (i) General Gouraud, July 16, congratulated the Fourth Army on its great victory and said:

> "It is a great day for France. I count on you to do the same every time that he dares to attack you, and from my heart as a soldier, I thank you."

General Gouraud did not then know that the Germans had lost so many men that their offensive east of Rheims was stopped.

(ii) The French greatly admire the performance of the American 42d Division in that battle. They say:

> "It had the honor of rivaling its French comrades in courage and daring. Its men went under fire as if to a football game, in shirt sleeves rolled up over sinewy biceps. In one trench where they worked with our chausseurs one could count 60 bodies in less than 750 feet. Oh! the Germans who have seen them at work can't any longer doubt that they are here, or even as our soldiers say, 'quite a bit here.'"

(3) *Operations west of Rheims.* (a) As the railroad line from Chalons to Rheims was under German artillery interdiction fire near Prunay, in the general vicinity of Rheims, the rail supply line of communications to Rheims was reduced to the small line from Epernay. This small railroad crossed the Heights of Rheims. The average distance from the German line on the east face of the Marne salient to the Epernay—Rheims railroad was about ten miles. The French Fifth Army, however, had prepared the Heights of Rheims for defense against an attack from the west with the same care and perfection of detail that the Fourth Army had used in preparing for defense against an attack from the north.

(b) The German blow, however, from the Marne salient was not directed merely to the cutting of the Epernay—Rheims railroad. It was to accomplish the actual capture of Epernay, and joining with the force that was to deliver the converging blow from the north (and discounting the capture of Rheims by that time as an accomplished fact), it was to participate in the penetration of the French line in the vicinity of Chalons.

(c) The Marne, flowing from Chalons past Epernay in territory held by the French, became the southern boundary of the German Marne salient from near Chatillon-sur-Marne to Chateau-Thierry. Between these points the river is about 75 meters wide and about four meters deep. The banks are from one to two meters high. The river is flanked on both sides by commanding bluffs about 175 meters high. The terrain is generally wooded. The Paris —Epernay railroad line formed an excellent line of defense on the south side.

The German Seventh Army blow against Epernay was to be astride the Marne River. Ten divisions were designated as a special force for that part of the operation which should be conducted south of the Marne.

(d) As the Marne River ran along only a part of the line between the German and Allied lines, the Sixth Army (General Degoutte), which was defending the Marne River crossings, treated the Marne as an obstacle and defended at the river line, with the express approval of General Petain, the group commander. General Degoutte humorously referred to his defending the river line by saying that he "fought with one foot in the water."

(e) All bridges had been destroyed. However, forests north of the Marne offered good concealment for river crossing preparations and there were many practicable routes from the north that led to possible places for the launching of boats and the building of bridges.

(f) (i) The American 3d Division (General Dickman) held the sector extending from opposite Jaulgonne (exclusive) to opposite Chateau-Thierry (exclusive).

(ii) The 5th Brigade (General Sladen) contained the 4th Infantry (Colonel Dorey) and the 7th Infantry (Colonel Anderson).

(iii) The 6th Brigade (General Crawford) contained the 30th Infantry (Colonel Butts) and the 38th Infantry (Colonel McAlexander).

(iv) The 3d Artillery Brigade (General Cruikshank) contained the 10th Field Artillery (Colonel Lloyd), the 18th Field Artillery (Colonel Farr) and the 76th Field Artillery (Colonel Rivers).

(v) The 6th Engineer Regiment was commanded by Colonel Hodges.

(g) The Allied front along the Marne River was organized into two positions. The *first position* was to be defended by combat divisions (supported).

The *second position* was well to the rear and along reverse slopes. This was the army position and was to be held for general reserves.

Neither position was completely organized before the German attack of July 15. General Dickman, however, had succeeded in perfecting the defenses of the American 3d Division sector sufficiently so that the division could occupy them and conduct a coordinated defense.

(h) (i) In accordance with the general plan for defense of the line of the river, General Dickman organized the first position in his division sector into: an outpost line, a main line of resistance, and a reserve line. The *outpost line* consisted of an *outpost line of observation* and an *outpost line of resistance.* The *outpost line of observation* was along the river. It was sparsely held by riflemen in pits and by machine gun men in emplacements. Close behind that line, along the Paris—Epernay railroad, was the *outpost line of resistance.* This was held by a fairly strong line capable of developing considerable small arms fire. The outpost line was called *the railroad line.*

The *main line of resistance* was along the forward slopes of the line of hills south of the Marne where there was a broken line of strong points. This was called *the Aqueduct Line* and was to be held in case of attack.

The *reserve line* followed the military crest of the second line of hills to the south and was known as the *Wood Line.*

(ii) The basic idea of the 3d Division defense was to actually prevent, by the use of rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire, any German crossing in its front, and, in the event of a German crossing, to counter attack and force such Germans to recross the river. General Dickman grouped his machine guns in the center of the division sector and in front of the reserve line.

(iii) The division artillery and supporting artillery was grouped on the *reserve line of the first position,* on the

army line and between the two lines. It was prepared to cover the Marne River and its northern bank with a thick heavy barrage in the division sector, and to drop an *S.O.S.* barrage in front of the *line of resistance south of the river,* or on a line farther to the south.

(iv) General Dickman divided the division sector into four regimental sub-sectors, which from left to right were occupied by the 4th, 7th, 30th and 38th Regiments of Infantry. In general, the arrangement of the infantry regiments was in column of battalions.

(v) After receiving information of the time of the German attack, General Degoutte directed all troops to take up their final fighting positions before the attack and that there should be no maneuvering under fire. He delivered a gas shell attack on the enemy position at 8:00 PM, July 14, and ordered the general counter preparation fire to be delivered at 11:30 PM.

(i) (i) The river crossing maneuver of the German Seventh Army (von Boehn) on July 15, was covered by an artillery preparation fired by 500 batteries. The Germans' plan called for the crossing of the 10th Division, parts of the 36th Division, and the 10th Landwehr Division, on the front of the American 3d Division, and for driving the 3d Division back to the southwest to the line: Blesmes—Courboin. Under cover of that preparation and of a fog and smoke screen, Germans crossed in boats and on ponton bridges, from the east of Gland to the east of Dormans. With rifles and hand grenades, the outpost of the 3d Division sunk many German boats and nearly prevented the Germans crossing in its front. The Germans, however, effected a lodgment on the south bank, crossed and captured the Paris—Epernay railroad, which was their line of departure for the attack toward Epernay. The attack advanced but was slowed up by the resistance and violent counter attacks of French and American troops.

(ii) General Dickman decided to drive them back into the Marne by a counter attack. When he reported his intention, the Commander of the French Corps in which the 3d Division was serving informed him that he should wait. General Dickman replied:

"We regret being unable on this occasion to follow the counsel of our masters, the French; but the American flag has been forced to retire. This is unendurable, and none of our soldiers would understand their not being asked to do whatever is necessary to remedy a situation which is humiliating to us and unacceptable to our Country's honor. We are going to counter attack."

The counter attacks were executed and General Dickman reported that:

"Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of our first-line positions causing the infantry and machine gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50% loss, no German soldier crossed the road: Fossoy—Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the Third Division sector except the dead."

(iii) Referring to the magnificent work of the 38th Infantry (Col. McAlexander) against the 10th and 36th German Infantry Divisions, General Pershing in his *Final Report* states that:

"On this occasion, a single regiment of the 3d Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners."

(iv) The French expressed the greatest admiration for the efficient battle action and gallantry of the 3d Division and were amazed at the accuracy of its rifle fire.

(j) (i) Although Marshal von Hindenburg accepted the defeat of the operation east of Rheims by the night of July 15-16, and stopped that operation by noon of the 16th, he still hoped to capture Rheims through the operation of the Seventh Army. Although, under the changed plan, the Seventh Army could not join hands with the First Army at Epernay, Marshal von Hindenburg gave the mission to the Seventh Army of cutting the railroad communication between Rheims and Epernay, by the capture of Epernay if possible, but in any event, by the interruption of traffic on the small railroad from Rheims to Epernay.

(ii) The Seventh Army made every effort, on July 16 and 17 to push the ten divisions that were south of the Marne to Epernay, but progress was stopped by counter

attacks on the night of the 17th. The ten German divisions south of the Marne, without artillery support and with their bridges over the Marne under constant interdiction fire and aerial bombing, could not maintain their position and were ordered to recross the river on the night of July 19-20.

(iii) Even after acceptance of the failure of the divisions south of the Marne, Marshal von Hindenburg hoped that Rheims could be captured by cutting the rail line from Rheims to Epernay and continued the effort to the evening of July 17.

(iv) On the night of July 17, he accepted defeat. He hoped to retain the initiative and planned to rest the troops and, with reinforcement and resupply, to soon resume the local attack against the Rheims—Epernay railroad.

(k) General Ludendorff was ordered north to prepare, with the Bavarian Crown Prince, "The Great Peace Battle of Flanders," early in August, and the shipment north of heavy artillery and divisions of the second line was at once begun.

4. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *a. The principle of security.* (1) (a) The end of the German offensive of May 27 uncovered the fact that the Marne salient was not stable in that its forty German divisions were wholly dependent for supply on the one railroad line through Soissons, and in that Soissons lay so close to the edge of the salient that it was a source of weakness and invited attack. The salient could have been made stable from the supply point of view only by the capture of Compiegne or Rheims, or both.

(b) The continued occupation of the salient violated the *principle of security.* The violation became more pronounced after the German failure, June 9, to improve the supply situation by capture of Compiegne.

(c) The launching of the attack to the south of the Marne, July 15, by ten divisions that were based on that unstable salient accentuated the violation of the *principle of security.*

(d) The retention of the German forty divisions in that salient after the failure to capture Rheims, July 15, continued the violation of the *principle of security.* *Security*

for freedom of action is an essential to decisive operations, unless a commander is willing to commit the fortunes of his country to a gambler's chance.

(2) (a) In the operation of July 15, Marshal von Hindenburg had a double objective, i.e., the capture of Rheims (which would have gained security from a supply point of view and given freedom of action), and the penetration of the French line.

(b) If the capture of Rheims had been a *first phase,* to be followed by an exploitation that called for a penetration of the French line there would have been no violation of the *principle of economy of force* or of the *principle of simplicity.* But the plan proceeded on the assumption that Rheims would be captured, and called for direction lines of advance from the beginning that contemplated the dealing of a mortal blow to France.

Marshal von Hindenburg and the German government expected the July 15 offensive to defeat France decisively. As Marshal von Hindenburg did not have security for freedom of action looking toward a decisive operation and could not gain that freedom of action until Rheims should be captured, his simultaneous pursuit of the double operation of capturing Rheims and of penetrating the French line violated the *principle of simplicity.*

(c) He should have had but one objective, at the most, at a time. He very nearly captured the Rheims—Epernay railroad line. It is not at all impossible that under the *principle of economy of force,* had he not pursued the objective of penetrating the French line, he would have had sufficient troops with which to isolate or capture Rheims.

(3) The *principle of security* for freedom of action on the Marne—Champagne front required Marshal von Hindenburg to concentrate his whole available force to capture Rheims. When he failed to do that, he violated the *principle of security.*

b. The principle of the offensive. (1) A combatant before launching an offensive should comply with the requirements of *security.* When possible he should also provide *mass.* In the launching of the offensive he should attempt *surprise.*

(2) In the German offensive of July 15, the offensive blow from the Marne salient was not based on *security*, and neither the Marne salient blow nor the Champagne blow complied with the *principle of surprise*, hence the offensive failed.

(3) (a) An essential element to the success of an offensive, where the combatants are nearly balanced, is that the troops engaged in the offensive must be inspired and exalted by the offensive spirit.

(b) General Pershing undertook as a part of his great mission to teach that offensive spirit to the American forces.

(c) The illustration by the American 3d Division of the possession of that offensive spirit explains how it could defeat, in the defense of the south bank of the Marne, a superior German force.

CHAPTER XVI

All Fronts Except the Western Front to the End of the War

Page

1. Italian Front to June 23, 1918 305
   a. Situation 305
   b. Plans 306
   c. Operations 308

2. Turkish Theater 308
   a. Surrender of the Turkish Mesopotamian Army 308
   b. Syrian front 310
      (1) Situation 310
      (2) Plans 310
      (3) Decisive defeat of Turkey 311

3. Balkan Front 312
   a. Situation 312
   b. Order of battle 312
   c. Plans 313
   d. Decisive defeat of Bulgaria 314
   e. New situation in the Balkans 316
   f. New Balkan plans 316
   g. Operations against Central Powers' dislocated northern wing 317
   h. Operations against Central Powers' dislocated southern wing 318
   i. Covering connecting group 318
   j. Operations in Hungary 318

4. Italian Front after June 23d 319
   a. Situation 319
   b. Plans 320
   c. Decisive battle of Vittorio-Veneto 321

5. Russian Front 322
   a. Situation 322
   b. Allied plans 323
   c. Operations 324
      (1) Arctic Ocean front 324
      (2) Pacific Ocean front 324

6. Principles of War.—*The principle of the offensive* 325

1. Italian Front to June 23, 1918. (Maps 37, 72, 75, 105 and 106.) *a. Situation.* (1) (a) The offensive of the Central Powers in Italy, in 1917, was finally stopped on the line of the Piave. The 1918 plan of campaign re-

quired Emperor Charles to be ready to launch an offensive against Italy on call in 1918, with a view of pinning the Allied forces to the Italian front during the German offensive in France.

(b) The capture, by Austria, of the line of the Brenta-Bachiglione River, would give her Padua and Vicenza,and cut Italy off from railroad communications with Venice.

(2) (a) After the 1917 operations, General Diaz (the successor of General Cadorna) organized the Italian front for defense in great depth, with the first defensive system on the line of the Piave. The second system, in rear and parallel to it, extended from the sea to Lake Garda. The third system was still farther to the rear. It paralleled the second system and extended from the sea to Switzerland. From Lake Garda to Switzerland it constituted the second system. A fourth system was on the line of the Brenta-Bachiglione River. The fifth system was on the line of the Po, from the sea to the north of Lake Garda. The fifth system was prepared for inundation for a distance of about seventy-five miles from the sea.

(b) On May 1, Italy recognized General Foch as Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western and Italian fronts for purposes of coordination.

(3) (a) After Marshal von Hindenburg failed to defeat the British, the Kaiser sent for Emperor Charles, and at Spa, on May 12, perfected with him a plan for an immediate major Austrian offensive against Italy.

(b) The separate peace with Russia and Roumania had freed many Austrian troops, so they were available for operations on the Italian front.

b. Plans. (1) *Italian.* (a) Under the Allied plan of campaign for 1918, General Diaz maintained a passive defensive attitude and held himself in readiness to send reinforcements to France.

(b) *Italian dispositions.* During the calm after the 1917 operations, General Diaz had reorganized his forces, eliminated the pacifists and the socialists, and trained the organizations and restored morale. His order of battle from east to west was:

The Third Army (Duke of Aosta), on the Piave to the Trevise railroad.
The Eighth Army, from the Trevise railroad along the Piave.
The Fourth Army, between the Piave and the Brenta.
The Sixth Army, to which was attached French and English divisions, upon the plateau of Asiago.
The First Army, to the Adige.
The Seventh Army, to the west of Lake Garda.
The Ninth Army, in general reserve near Padua.
Also, nine infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions, in general reserve, were stationed near Verona.

(2) *Austrian.* (a) General von Arz's general plan for the Austrian offensive against Italy in 1918 was to execute a converging attack against the remaining Venice portion of the Udine salient. He did not hold out any available strategic reserves under his own control.

(b) *Austrian dispositions.* General von Arz disposed his troops in two groups, as follows:

Boundary between groups: the Piave River.
Armies from east to west.
General Boroevic's Group:
The Fifth Army (von Wurm) with eleven divisions in front line on the lower Piave; four divisions in reserve.
The Sixth Army (Archduke Joseph) before Montello and upon the Piave, four divisions in front line; two divisions in reserve.
The Fourth Army was in group reserve.
General Conrad's Group:
The Eleventh Army (General Schouschenstall), astride the Brenta with fifteen divisions in front line; eight divisions in reserve.
The Tenth Army (General Krobatin), Trent and to the west, eight divisions in front line; two divisions in reserve.
Four divisions in group reserve.

(c) (i) The Austrian plan of maneuver was to demonstrate against the west boundary of the Trent salient, from Lake Garda to Tonnello Pass, three days before the general attack, in order to attract reserves to the west of Lake Garda.

The converging attack was to be executed by a maneuver of the groups under Generals Boroevic and Conrad toward Padua, with protection of the right flank by the capture of Verona.

(ii) The maneuver was to be a strategical and tactical surprise, and was organized according to Marshal von Hindenburg's penetrating attack doctrine.

c. Operations. (1) On June 12, General Conrad executed a diversion by the Tenth Army against the passes through the west side of the Trent salient.

(2) On June 15, at 3:00 AM, the Austrian artillery preparation opened with great violence. The attack was not a surprise. General Diaz had estimated the exact hour of the attack, and met the artillery preparations by a violent, accurate counter preparation fire that was very disconcerting to the Austrian attack and caused many casualties among the assembled Austrian troops.

(3) The Austrian attack was scheduled for 4:00 AM. It actually started after 7:00 AM, on a front of ninety miles, from the Adige to the sea. The Austrian attack struck the line in great force at five places from east to west: i.e., from the sea to Santa Dona Di Piave; between Santa Dona Di Piave and the railroad Treviso—Norvesa; on the plateau of Montello; on the two sides of the Brenta; and on the plateau of the Seven Communes. The attacks did not advance far, being met at all points by well organized counter attacks.

(4) By June 20, although all the reserves had been fed into the line, the advance had not made appreciable progress at any of the points of attack. The attacks along the Piave were the most successful, but were brought to a halt. The Piave, because of rains, suddenly rose and carried away most of the Austrian bridges. General Diaz attacked continually, by aerial bombardment, the troops attempting to build new bridges.

(5) At 3:00 AM, June 23, the Austrians west of the Piave began the retreat, which General Diaz, by energetic pursuit, turned into a rout.

(6) General von Arz abandoned the further execution of the maneuver, and General Diaz resumed the passive defense on the line of the Piave, in order to be ready, if necessary, to send troops to the French front.

2. TURKISH THEATER. (Maps 43, 74, 75, 107, 108, 109.)
a. Surrender of the Turkish Mesopotamian Army. (1) On March 11, 1917, General Maude captured Bagdad. By September, he occupied Bakouba on the Diala, Samara on the Tigris, and Ramadijeh on the Euphrates.

(2) General Maude planned to advance to Mosul to prevent Turkish movements into Persia and Afghanistan, and to protect India. He rejected the route straight up the Tigris in favor of the route up the valley of the Diala to Kifri, thence via Tawk and Erbil to Mosul. He began the advance at the end of October, 1917, and reached Kara-Tepe by December. Here General Maude died of fever. His successor, General Marshall, at once stopped the operation and began operations up the Euphrates to protect the left flank.

(3) The enemy was at Hit, on the Euphrates. General Brooking, in charge of the operation, by enveloping the Turkish southern flank, drove the Turks out of Hit and to a position about fifteen miles beyond Bagdadijeh. General Brooking then sent his cavalry brigade (General Cassek) by a desert detour to a place in rear of the enemy position where it blocked the road. He then, at 5:00 AM, February 18, 1918, drove the Turks out of their position. The Turk's retreat was precipitate, and when they found the cavalry brigade astride the road in their front, with the remainder of the British force pursuing, they broke up and dispersed in disorder.

(4) General Brooking occupied Bagdadijeh and at once resumed the advance on Mosul by the Tigris route. The advance was really a pursuit, skillfully conducted, but German engineers had constructed a deep defensive zone at the Fatha Gorge, below the junction of the lesser Zab and the Tigris, with a second defensive system at the junction of these rivers, and a third farther up the river near a crossing. All Turkey believed, and the German engineers agreed, that the country to the right and left was impassable, and that the defensive zone was so strong that it could not be taken. General Marshal demonstrated in front of the Turkish defense with infantry divisions, and, with cavalry and infantry, reached its flank and rear. As a result, he forced the surrender, on October 30, of Ismail Hakki and the Turkish Mesopotamian Army. The road to Mosul lay open, and General Marshall was only twelve miles from that city, on November 1, when he was notified of the Turkish armistice.

b. Syrian front. (Maps 75, 108, 109.) (1) *Situation.* (a) After General Allenby captured Jerusalem, on December 11, 1917, he pursued the Turkish forces a short distance to the north, and established a new base at Jaffa. His line ran straight from the coast to the River Jordan, where it bent a little to the south to the Dead Sea, for flank protection. The Turkish forces, under General Liman von Sanders, faced him.

(b) The Turkish lines of communication extended from Haifa to the main line at Derat; thence back, via Damascus, to Aleppo, with a branch reaching to the sea at Beirut. To the east of the Hedjaz railroad was the great Syrian Desert.

(2) *Plans.* (a) (i) General Liman von Sanders was still in command of the Turkish forces at the front. Under von Hindenburg's plan of campaign, he was required to maintain a strictly passive defensive attitude. With the exception of a few model units, all German troop organizations had been withdrawn to the Western front. He organized an average defensive zone of two principal positions.

(ii) The Turkish order of battle was:

The Eighth Army, holding the sector from the sea to include Tul Keran.
The Seventh Army, from Tul Keran to the Jordan.
The Fourth Army, east of the Jordan.
The Second Army Corps, at Ma'an.
A strategical reserve in rear of the east flank at Damascus.

The whole totaled 104,000 men, armed as follows: 32,000 rifles, 4,000 sabers, 400 cannon.

(b) (i) Such a large portion of General Allenby's force was recalled to the Western front to help meet the German offensive, that he was forced to the defensive. The troops recalled to France were replaced by Indian troops.

(ii) In accordance with General Foch's request to prepare for an offensive General Allenby spent July, August, and the greater part of September in preparing his 1918 operation. His army was made up of two cavalry divisions, two divisions of mounted infantry, two Indian divisions, and French, Italian, Jewish, West Indian, Armenian, and Cape troops. The whole totaled: 57,000 rifles,

12,000 sabers, 540 guns. Thus he had a superiority over General von Sanders of: rifles, 75%, sabers, 300%, guns, 25%.

(iii) Inspired by Napoleon's plan for the invasion of Syria, General Allenby's plan for the maneuver was to dislocate the enemy right from the sea by a surprise attack; then, by enveloping it, to cut his line of communications and retreat to the north. All preparatory movements were to be at night, and to be conducted secretly.

(3) *Decisive defeat of Turkey.* (a) General Chaytar, on the right, executed diversions along the Jordan; and, early on the night of September 18-19, delivered a holding attack on the right.

(b) General Allenby massed five of his seven divisions and 383 of his 540 guns on his left for the dislocating effort.

In rear on the left, he held two cavalry divisions and one mounted infantry division in readiness to advance as soon as the enemy's flank should be dislocated.

(c) After a fifteen minute intensive artillery preparation, General Allenby launched the attack on the left with five divisions, at 4:30 AM, September 19, 1918, and successfully passed the enemy barrage lines before the barrage fell. The attack overcame the first position, and, after a severe fight, captured the second position. The attacking line then wheeled to the east.

(d) The cavalry command, under General Chauvel, was near the left of the line, well forward and in readiness. As soon as the infantry dislocated the enemy line from the sea, General Chauvel passed his whole command through the opening, and, by noon, they were eighteen miles north of the original front.

(e) The infantry wheeling maneuver was beautifully executed, and that day folded the Turkish line back nearly to Raffat. The next day, September 20, the right of the line attacked while the left continued its wheel to the east.

(f) The second day, the cavalry, by a bound of forty miles in the direction of Lake Tiberias, cut the enemy line of railroad communication at El Fuleh and Beisan.

(g) The next day, September 21, the cavalry held the crossings of the Jordan, south of Lake Tiberias, thus completely cutting the enemy line of retreat to the north, and

captured Nazareth, the Turkish Headquarters. General von Sanders fled to Damascus in an automobile. That day, the King of Hedjaz sent his army north from Ma'an (which he had captured) and destroyed such remnants of the Turkish army as crossed to the east of the Jordan.

(h) By September 28, the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies had been destroyed, and General Allenby had occupied the line Acre—Derad.

(i) On October 1, General Allenby entered Damascus. On October 27, the cavalry captured Aleppo, the junction of the Bagdad and Medina railroads. The Sultan of Turkey capitulated on October 30.

3. BALKAN FRONT. (Maps 41, 75, 110, 111 and 112.) *a. Situation.* The Allied line in the Balkans, at the end of operations in 1917, extended from the Aegean Sea, along the Stroumitza River, nearly to the boundary of Greece, thence to the Vardar at the Greek boundary, thence west, north of Monastir and via Lake Ochrida, to the Adriatic Sea north of Vallona—a distance of more than two hundred miles. The country is very mountainous, particularly west of the Vardar, where numerous mountains rise to 5,000 feet. The Berlin—Bagdad railroad runs through the peninsula from Budapest via Belgrade—Sofia—Adrianople to Constantinople. Branch railroads from Nich and Sofia run to Uskub, and one from Mitrowitza, via Uskub, runs to Saloniki. Another railroad runs from Saloniki, via Dedeagatch, to Adrianople.

b. Order of battle. (1) *Central Powers.* (a) In order to concentrate as many German troops as possible for the offensive in 1918 on the Western front, nearly all German soldiers were recalled from the Balkans. As a result, the Allied Salonika Army was contained by Bulgarian forces under the command of General Todaroff, with a large number of German officers in staff and line.

(b) The order of battle from east to west was:

The Bulgarian Fourth Army, from the Aegean Sea to Seres,
The Bulgarian Second Army, to the boundary,
The Bulgarian First Army, to Gradsko (inclusive),
The German Eleventh Army, with a German staff and commander, to Lake Ochrida,
The Austrian XIX Corps, to the Adriatic Sea.

(c) The whole force totaled about half a million men. It occupied a mountainous terrain which German engineers had organized into a deep defensive zone, with trenches blasted out of the rock. Most of the reserves were in rear of the Bulgarian left.

(d) Although the Germans had withdrawn troops, they furnished the Bulgarians with cannon, ammunition, machine guns, and all kinds of equipment in large quantities.

(2) (a) The Allied order of battle from east to west was:

The Greek Army, along the Stroumitza River facing the Bulgarian Fourth and Second Armies.
The British Army, to the boundary.
A French-Greek detachment, to the Vardar.
The Serbian First and Second Armies, to vicinity Monastir.
The French Army, to vicinity of Lake Ochrida.
The Italian Army, to the Adriatic Sea.

(b) These so-called armies were really detachments. The strategical reserves were mainly Greeks. The Serbians formed the largest contingent of the Allied forces.

c. Plans. (1) Marshal von Hindenburg, in the 1918 plan of campaign, prescribed the passive defense for the Balkan front; but, to forestall an Allied attack on that front, had a psychological campaign carried on, by propaganda from Berlin, to the effect that the Central Powers would conduct an offensive against the Saloniki force.

(2) (a) The Serbian Commander, General Mischitch, believed that he could penetrate the Bulgarian line in his front and requested authority to do so. In view of the very difficult mountainous terrain in front of the Serbians, General Sarrail disapproved the recommendation. General Mischitch then appealed to General Foch, who recalled General Sarrail and sent General d'Esperey to command in the Balkans, with instructions to approach the Serbian plan with an open mind. General d'Esperey approved the Serbian plan. The plan of maneuver was for the Serbians, by their own system of mountain warfare, to surprise and to penetrate the Bulgarian line in their front in the general direction: Gradsko—Uskub.

(b) The Serbian force, comprising six small divisions, was to be supported by two French divisions and forty batteries of heavy artillery.

(c) The inner flanks of the dislocated enemy wings were to be folded back by two special groups. On the right, the French-Grecian group of General Anselm was to fold back the right flank of the dislocated Bulgarian left wing. This force was to consist of one cavalry and two infantry divisions, and was to be supported by ten batteries of heavy artillery. On the left, the French army of General Henry, consisting of one cavalry and five infantry divisions, and supported by seventeen batteries of heavy artillery, with its left flank covered by Allied detachments, was to fold back the inner flank of the dislocated Bulgarian right wing.

(d) The British army, with seven divisions, reinforced, and supported by twenty-one batteries of heavy artillery, was to execute the secondary maneuver of penetrating the Bulgarian line along the Vardar.

(e) The Greek army, on the right, was to protect the right flank and hold the Bulgarian Fourth Army and part of the Second on its front.

(f) The Italian army was to protect the left flank, and hold the Austrian corps in its front.

(g) The second phase provided for exploitation (with the Serbians leading) by all the troops from the Stroumitza to the region of the Lakes.

(h) General Foch instructed General d'Esperey to arrange that the maneuver should be simultaneous with that on the Western front in September.

d. Decisive defeat of Bulgaria. (1) On September 15, after an artillery preparation of twenty-four hours, the Serbian force, reinforced by French divisions, advanced and penetrated the enemy line on a nine mile front. The Serbians then captured the fortified mountain defenses in their front. The east breach widening group (General Anselm) captured the mountains in its front and extended the gap to the east.

(2) (a) By September 18, the breach had been widened to fifteen miles, and the Serbians had advanced ten miles. The maneuver that day, in front of the Serbians, took on the character of a pursuit by cavalry and attack aviation.

(b) General d'Esperey ordered the secondary attack by the British. It did not make much progress against the Bulgarians.

(c) On September 18, General d'Esperey directed the exploitation of the penetration to be carried out as rapidly as possible in order to forestall the arrival of German reinforcements.

(3) On September 19, the Serbian pursuit was accentuated and the maneuver of folding back the inner flanks of the dislocated wings proceeded.

(4) By September 20, the Serbians and the Allied cavalry had advanced twenty-eight miles, and the breach widening groups had opened the gap to twenty-five miles.

(5) By September 21, the advance was taken up by the breach widening groups, and on the 22d the whole front, from Monastir to the Vardar—a front of nearly one hundred miles—advanced. The Bulgarian retreat now became a rout, with abandonment of arms, equipment, supplies, and even trains. On the evening of September 22, the Serbians cut the line of communication of the German Eleventh Army at Gradsko.

(6) By September 24, the Vardar had been crossed everywhere.

(7) By September 26, the enemy line of communication Gradsko—Prilep—Monastir had been cleared entirely of the enemy, while the British on the right had captured the fortified heights of Beles, had crossed the Stroumitza, and were advancing in Bulgarian territory in the direction of Sofia. In ten days, the Serbians had advanced sixty miles.

(8) The Bulgarian First, Second, and Fourth Armies retreated into Bulgaria, but the Eleventh German Army, cut off by the rapidity of the Serbian penetration, was forced to the west, where it defended itself and awaited German reinforcements.

(9) General Henry, commanding the left breach widening group, pushed his cavalry through Uskub, reinforced it heavily at once, and, by rapid marches and with the assistance of the Italians on his left, gained Uskub. The Eleventh German Army then, barred by the impassable

mountain Tchar, and cut off from the railroad and all lines of communication, surrendered on September 29, as follows: 5 general officers, 1600 officers, 77,000 men, 500 cannon, 10,000 horses, and an immense amount of arms and provisions.

(10) The Second Serbian Army practically destroyed the First Bulgarian Army, and, crossing the Bulgarian frontier, advanced on Sofia.

(11) On September 25, Czar Ferdinand requested a suspension of arms for forty-eight hours to allow for arrival of Bulgarian delegates at General d'Esperey's headquarters to agree on an armistice. General d'Esperey refused to suspend hostilities but agreed to receive the delegates. They arrived on September 28, and, on September 29, signed, without question, the armistice that was placed before them.

(12) On October 3, Czar Ferdinand abdicated the throne of Bulgaria.

e. New situation in the Balkans. Thus the Allied effort to penetrate the line of the Central Powers, begun at the Dardanelles in 1915, was finally executed from Saloniki, in 1918, by General d'Esperey under the direction of Marshal Foch.

f. New Balkan plans. (1) *Central Powers.* (a) As early as September 18, von Hindenburg appreciated the fact that the Allies were attempting to deliver a mortal blow against him in the decisive direction Saloniki—Uskub—Belgrade — Budapest — Vienna — Berlin, and, although pressed to the limit for troops on the Western front, where General Pershing had just reduced the St. Mihiel salient, he decided that German reinforcements must be sent with all haste to General Todaroff from the Russian front (which was still held against Bolshevism), from Roumania, which was still held by General von Mackensen, and from the Western front; that Austria-Hungary must be relieved of furnishing any troops for the Western front and must send help at once to General Todaroff. Due to the speed of General d'Esperey's pursuit, these reinforcements did not arrive in time to save Bulgaria.

(b) Von Hindenburg then decided that the line of the Danube must be held defensively, and gave the necessary instructions to General von Mackensen who was in Roumania, and to General von Arz, Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian troops.

(2) *Allied Powers.* General d'Esperey, acting under the direction of Marshal Foch, appreciated the full value of the strategical penetration in the Balkans and estimated that, to secure the greatest result, exploitation must be expedited with all possible speed. His general plan was to fold the Central Powers' dislocated northern wing back by a rapid advance along the Nich—Budapest railroad, and to fold the Central Powers' dislocated southern wing back by a rapid advance through Thrace against Constantinople, and also to protect those two forces by occupying the Dobruja.

g. Operations against Central Powers' dislocated northern wing. (1) The operation was conducted as a pursuit, with the Serbian First Army, reinforced by the French cavalry, as the advance guard. By aggressive and rapid offensive action, General d'Esperey captured the Austrian forces that threatened his left from a flank position in Albania.

(2) The Serbian First Army, by mountain fighting, passed the defiles of Vrania and Leskovats. After an energetic pursuit, it reached the vicinity of Nish, and in a three days' battle, captured that city on October 12, and stood astride the Central Powers' railroad line of communication with Turkey.

(3) The right flank group (French) advanced via Kastendil, occupied Sofia on the Berlin—Bagdad railroad, proceeded by train to Pirot, and reached the Danube near Lem-Palanka—Vidin, on October 24, where it captured a large convoy of barges en route to Turkey.

(4) The Serbian First Army, inspired by the joy of returning to their native land, was superior to cold, snow, and ice, and rapidly advanced to Semendria. On November 1, it entered Belgrade, having advanced more than three hundred miles in forty-five days. To do that, it was necessary to cut loose from the supply trains and live off the country, although the retreating enemy had devastated it as much as his limited time permitted.

h. Operations against the Central Powers' dislocated southern wing. (1) To force back the inner flank of the dislocated southern wing, General d'Esperey constituted a detachment composed of: three British divisions, three Greek divisions, one French division, and one Italian brigade.

(2) He designated General Milne, the senior British officer with the Saloniki forces, to command, and gave him the first task of clearing the railroad: Dedeagatch—Adrianople, and the second task of capturing Constantinople in order to force the surrender of Turkey. The detachment advanced in two columns, the northern by the Sofia—Adrianople railroad; the southern, which included the cavalry, by the highway along the coast of the Aegean Sea.

(3) The detachment had arrived at the frontier, and was ready to advance on Constantinople on October 31, when General Milne was informed that Turkey had surrendered that day.

i. Covering connecting group. (1) In order to protect the right flank of the forces operating toward Belgrade, and the left flank of the forces operating toward Constantinople, General d'Esperey constituted a covering connecting group of two infantry divisions (one French and one British) and one French cavalry division, placed General Berthelot (called from the Western front) in command, and instructed him to prevent General von Mackensen from attacking either column from the Dobruja.

(2) On November 1, the advance guards crossed the Danube at Nicopolis, Sistova, and Giorgevo, and organized bridgeheads north of the Danube. That day, Roumania again declared war against the Central Powers and ordered the mobilization of her forces.

(3) General von Mackensen gave up the defense of the north bank of the Danube and began a rapid retreat through Transylvania to join the German forces in Germany.

j. Operations in Hungary. (1) General d'Esperey decided to prevent General von Mackensen's return to Germany by cutting his line of communications.

(2) Under the terms of the Austrian armistice of November 4, the Allies had the right to operate through Aus-

tria against Germany. So General d'Esperey constituted a "Hungarian Detachment" which advanced toward Budapest. The end of the war stopped this maneuver, which, as a parallel pursuit, is most interesting.

4. ITALIAN FRONT AFTER JUNE 23D. (Maps 37, 75, 106, 112, 113 and 114.) *a. Situation.* The Austrian offensive against Italy collapsed on June 23, 1918. After Marshal Foch was placed in command of the Western front, General Diaz, during the early days of the fall of 1918, was not able to take the offensive, as he was confronted by an Austrian superiority of twelve infantry divisions and a twenty per cent predominance in artillery. He held himself in readiness to send troops to France.

(2) General d'Esperey penetrated the Bulgarian line in the Balkans, and, by October, was menacing Austria-Hungary from the south.

(3) The United States declared war against Austria-Hungary on December 7, 1917, which greatly heartened Italy after the nearly fatal disaster of Caporetto. Italy, following the lead of France and Great Britain, asked for American troops on her front, both for reinforcement in strength and in morale. Italy's request was approved in part, and, on June 26, 1918, just after the battle of the Piave, General Pershing designated General Eben Swift as Commanding General of American troops in Italy, and detailed the 332d Infantry (Colonel Wallace) from the 83d Division, with certain auxiliary troops, as a detachment for reinforcement of the Italian armies. The arrival of this detachment created great enthusiasm in Italy. The detachment at first was placed in General Headquarters Reserve and the officers were taken to the various parts of the line to be seen by the Italian troops as a measure for helping morale.

(4) Austria-Hungary was tremendously agitated after the Second Battle of the Marne, and the various races in that Dual Monarchy were talking very loudly of racial aspirations and apparently cared very little as to what became of the Hapsburg Monarchy.

(5) The Austrian army in the Udine salient was dependent on two railroad lines: one running north, and the other running almost east from near Venice.

b. Plans. (1) *Austrian.* General von Arz maintained a strictly passive defense on the Italian front. He had withdrawn many troops from the Italian front to oppose General d'Esperey's offensive from the Balkans, and to prevent domestic disorder, and did not hold out a strategical reserve on the Italian front.

(2) *Italian.* (a) General Diaz's order of battle, from the south to the north, was as follows (Map 113):

The Third Army
The Tenth Army
The Eighth Army
The Twelfth Army
The Fourth Army
The Sixth Army (Allied detachments), in front of Seven Communes
The First Army, to Lake Garda
The Seventh Army, to Switzerland.

(b) His general plan was to destroy the Austrian forces by a surprise strategical and tactical penetration, and an exploitation of the success.

(c) His plan for the maneuver was that, after a strong attack by the Fourth Army to draw Austrian reserves to its front, the Twelfth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies, as a group, advancing side by side, should penetrate the enemy front and fold the inner flanks of the dislocated wings back from all lines of communication. The direction of the main blow was to be along the boundary between the Austrian Fifth and Sixth Armies.

(d) To gain mass for this attack, the Third, First, and Seventh Armies were reduced to the lowest limit, the troops thus gained being sent to the group of the Tenth, Eighth, and Twelfth Armies. As a result, that group was raised to forty-one divisions, with twenty-two in line and nineteen in reserve, while the opposing Austrian line was held by only twenty-three divisions, of which ten and one-half were in reserve. In addition, General Diaz succeeded in concentrating 4800 guns on that part of the front, thus giving him a great superiority in artillery fire.

(e) General Diaz held the Ninth Army near Padua, in strategical reserve.

The Tenth Army was to lay three bridges, the Eighth was to lay seven bridges, and the Twelfth Army, with its right wing, was to lay one.

The Twelfth Army was to attack nearly due north, astride the Piave.

The Tenth Army was to cross the Piave and form a defensive flank to protect the principal blow by the Eighth Army toward Vittorio.

c. Decisive Battle of Vittorio-Veneto. (1) Bridging began with the fall of darkness on October 26. Due to the swift current of the river and the accuracy of the enemy fire, the Eighth Army laid only two of its seven bridges.

(2) General Diaz began his bombardment half an hour before midnight.

The infantry advanced at 6:45 AM, October 27. The attack was a complete surprise. Austrian airmen were very active in bombing the bridges, but by night (October 27) all bridges were installed.

(3) On October 29, the Eighth and Twelfth Armies penetrated the Austrian front, and, by October 30, the penetration had been completetd and the troops in front of the Eighth and Twelfth Armies had been driven north past their line of communications.

(4) (a) Late in the evening of October 30, the Austrian command issued the following:

> "Taking into account the resolve so often expressed to bring about the conclusion of an armistice and peace, putting an end to the struggle of nations, our troops fighting on Italian soil will evacuate the occupied region."

(b) The Austrians began a general retreat. The whole Italian cavalry force passed through the breach, and, with the assistance of attack and bombing planes, turned the retreat into a rout. The bombing planes devoted their attention especially to bridges in front of the Austrian retreating forces.

(5) In that retreat, the American 332d Infantry was with the Tenth Army and was stopped on November 3, at the Tagliamento River, by a desperate Austrian rear guard action. It received an order, at 3:15 AM, November 4, to cross the river. Before 9:00 AM that day, the regi-

ment had crossed the river, had defeated the enemy rear guard, and had captured all its stores.

(6) The Austrian armies disintegrated. The various races of Austria-Hungary, except the Austrians and the Magyars, were in revolt. The Czechs and the Slovaks had already proclaimed their independence.

(7) On November 3, a small detachment of Italian troops, under protection of the Italian navy, landed at Trieste and occupied the city without any appreciable opposition.

(8) At Pola, the Austrian naval base, the sailors rose against their officers, in a mutiny headed by Croatian officers under the orders of the Jugo-Slav National Council; and the dying Hapsburg Monarchy handed the fleet over to the new Jugo-Slav State.

(9) Austria's request for an armistice was granted. The armistice went into effect at 3:00 PM, November 4. Under that armistice, Austria placed all her territory at the disposal of the Allies for military operations against Germany. The armistice was followed by the abdication of the Hapsburg dynasty.

(10) Under the terms of that armistice, and in accordance with the directions of Marshal Foch, General Diaz began preparations for an advance via Innsbruck, east of Switzerland, against Germany's southern frontier, in cooperation with General d'Esperey's advance through Austri-Hungary from the Balkans.

(11) After 3:00 PM, November 4, 1918, Germany stood alone against the Allied powers and the United States.

5. RUSSIAN FRONT. (Maps 1, 75, 114, 115, and 116.)

a. Situation. (1) (a) The Northern Slavs or Czecho-Slovaks were a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the war. Their racial aspiration for national recognition had not been granted, as had that of the Magyars in Hungary, and their loyalty to the Central Powers during the World War cannot be said to have been enthusiastic.

(b) As a result, many thousands deserted to their racial brothers, the Russians, and, at the end of 1917, more than 120,000 of them were serving in the Russian army.

(2) In December, 1917, Finland, under the doctrine of national self-determination, asserted her independence of Russia.

(3) (a) On March 2, 1918, Germany forced Russia to sign the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, and at once entered upon a policy of exploiting Russia and the states that had separated from her.

(b) One of the features of her policy was the German domination of Finland, for whose throne she nominated Duke Adolph Friedrick of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The German Government had a secret understanding with the de facto government of Finland by which the Murman Coast in the north, and the Murman railway were to be annexed to a dependent Finland, and a submarine base established by Germany on the ice-free Murman Coast. Accordingly, a German force of 20,000 men occupied Helsingfors, the Finnish capital, and took charge of the country.

(4) At that time, many millions of tons of munitions and warlike supplies, that had been imported by Russia and Roumania, were stored at Kola and Archangel, and, under the German-Finnish understanding, were to be turned over to Germany by Finland.

(5) (a) After the peace of Brest-Litovsk the Czecho-Slovak Legion, about 120,000 strong, refused exchange back to Austria, and, retaining their arms, started for the Western front via Vladivostock and America. At first, they advanced with Russian permission, but, when that was withdrawn, they continued their advance by force of arms.

(b) They seized Samara, on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and then captured the Russian state treasury at Kazan, where they seized $315,000,000. They then drove the Bolsheviki out of Tcheliabinsk, the European terminal of the Siberian Railroad.

b. Allied plans. The Allies were fearful, at this time, that they might not be able to defend successfully against the German offensive in France. Accordingly they planned to reconstitute an Eastern front against the Germans of at least sufficient strength to prevent Germany from securing the munitions and supplies at Kola and Archangel, and also to deter Germany from diverting any more troops from Russia to the Western front.

c. Operations. (1) *Arctic Ocean front.* (a) General Ironside, of the British Army, was selected as Allied Commander-in-Chief on the White Sea front, and, in July, 1918, an Allied expedition under his command was sent to that front, where it was welcomed by the inhabitants who immediately seceded from the Bolsheviki Government of Russia and established an independent government. The Allies at once seized Kola and Archangel, and advanced down the Kola railroad to the point where the Germans were planning to connect with the Finnish railroad at Uleaborg.

(b) (i) General Pershing selected Brigadier General Wilds P. Richardson to command the American Detachment which consisted of the following troops:

339th Infantry
1st Battalion, 310th Engineers
337th Field Hospital Company
337th Ambulance Company

(ii) General Richardson was given the mission of guarding the ports and as much of the surrounding country as might develop threatening conditions.

(iii) Under General Ironside, this American detachment operated over a front of four hundred and fifty miles and participated in a series of minor engagements. It was all withdrawn before the United States made peace with Germany.

(2) *Pacific Ocean front.* (a) Also, the Allies announced, in July, 1918, that they had determined to send an Allied force to Vladivostock, under the command of General Otani of the Japanese army, to aid the Czecho-Slovakian army, to break up the armed bands of German and Austrian prisoners who were, at that time, the main part of the Bolsheviki forces, and, also, to protect the great supply of munitions that had been imported by Russia and stored at Vladivostock.

(b) Major General William S. Graves was selected to command the American detachment, which consisted of the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments from the Philippine Islands and administrative and auxiliary troops from the United States. The whole force totaled 10,000 men.

(c) The Czecho-Slovakian troops were rescued and the Bolsheviki were prevented from using the munitions at

Vladivostock or sending them to the Germans. The American detachment was withdrawn before the United States made peace with Germany.

(3) The American operations in Russia were not a violation of Russian neutrality, as Russia at that time had no duly constituted government, was in anarchy, and entirely unable to resist the demands of Germany to whom the munitions at Vladivostock, at Kola, and Archangel were available resources. So the defense of those munitions against seizure by Germany was a very proper military operation.

6. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *The principle of the offensive.* (Maps 75, 108, 109, 111 and 113. *a.* (1) The original object of the Allied operations in Mesopotamia was to defeat the Turkish army and thus protect the British naval oil base at the head of the Persian Gulf, and to prevent the Central Powers from receiving supplies via the Persian Gulf. When that end was attained, the Allied object in further Mesopotamian operations was to protect India from the Turkish menace. When that end was attained, the Allied object, in still further operations in Mesopotamia, was to defeat the Turkish army and thus deprive the Central Powers of the use of Mesopotamia for supply. Thus the Allied object, from the beginning to the end of the Mesopotamian operations, was to defeat the Turkish Mesopotamian army.

(2) The original object of Allied operations in Syria was to defend the Suez Canal. When that end was attained, the Allied object for further operations in Syria was to capture Jerusalem. When that end was attained, the Allied object for further operations in Syria was to protect Mecca, and by the capture of Aleppo, to deprive the Central Powers of the use of Mesopotamia for supply.

(3) With the exception of the very first phase of the defense of the Suez Canal, the Allies, from the beginning, when they had freedom of action, conducted offensive warfare in both Mesopotamia and Syria.

(4) The lines of communication, for the Turkish armies in Mesopotamia and Syria, were by rail back to Con-

stantinople. These lines of communication came together at Aleppo and from there ran back to Constantinople.

b. (1) In offensive operations, the main blow should be delivered against a vital point. An army's line of communications is such a vital point. In the Turkish theater, the vital line of communications of the Turkish armies in both Mesopotamia and Syria were vulnerable at Aleppo. The railroad junction point, Aleppo, was close to the sea. The coast line there was entirely practicable for the landing of expeditionary forces. The terrain, from the sea to Aleppo, was not difficult and gave no special advantage to the defense.

(2) The Allies had control of the sea and thus could execute a hostile landing as a surprise. The Allied Island of Cyprus afforded an excellent advance base for such an expedition.

(3) The *principle of the offensive* requires that the shortest and most direct practicable line to the objective should always be taken.

(4) The Turkish line of communications was in fact the true Allied objective in the operations in Turkey. When that objective was attained, Turkey surrendered.

(5) In the effort to attain the objective Aleppo, the Allied offensive operation should have been launched along the line: the sea—Aleppo. This would have been the simplest and most direct way to execute an offensive against Turkey. By splitting the Allied forces in Turkey into two separate forces which conducted separate operations, the Allies violated the *principles of simplicity* and *of economy of force.* However, the great Allied mistake, from the point of view of the whole operation in Turkey, was that, by not operating against the objective, Aleppo, along the most direct practicable line, they violated the *principle of the offensive.*

c. (1) In the decisive offensive operations of General Allenby in Syria, under the above limitations, of General d'Esperey in the Balkans, and of General Diaz in Italy, each attained his objective—the enemy line of communications. Each illustrated the *principles of mass* and *surprise.* Each, also, under the *principle of movement,* launched a superior

force, by surprise, along the shortest, most direct, practicable route to his objective. All three offensives were illustrations of the penetration of a line defended by the method of position warfare.

(2) General Allenby penetrated the enemy line by dislocating it from an Allied-controlled sea. Generals d'Esperey and Diaz each penetrated the enemy line by a piercing blow that ruptured it at a central point.

CHAPTER XVII

Allied and American Counter Offensive at the Second Battle of the Marne

Page

1. SITUATION 328
   a. Boundary of the Marne salient 328
   b. German situation 329
   c. Allied and American situation 330
2. PLANS AND DISPOSITIONS 332
   a. German plans 332
   b. Allied and American plans 333
   c. Allied and American preparations for maneuver 335
3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WHOLE OPERATION 336
4. THE AMERICAN III CORPS (SOISSONS FRONT) 337
   a. Constitution 337
   b. Mission 338
   c. Terrain in front 338
   d. Concentration 339
   e. Reconnaissance and deployment 339
   f. Corps plan and formation 339
   g. 1st Division formation 339
   h. 2d Division formation 340
   i. Attack of July 18 340
   j. Attack of July 19 341
   k. Attack of July 20 342
   l. Attack of July 21 342
   m. Accomplishments of American III Corps (French XX Corps) 342
5. THE AMERICAN I CORPS 343
   a. Operations July 18-23 343
   b. Operations July 23-August 3 344
   c. Operations August 3-12 344
   d. Transfer to Woevre 344
6. THE AMERICAN 3D, 28TH AND 32D DIVISIONS (FRENCH XXXVIII CORPS) 344
   a. Operations July 18 344
   b. Operations July 20-30 344
7. THE AMERICAN III CORPS (SOUTHERN FRONT) 344
8. THE AMERICAN 4TH DIVISION 345
9. THE AMERICAN 32D DIVISION 345
10. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR—*The principle of the offensive* 345

1. SITUATION. (Maps 75, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, 104, 117, 118 and 119.) *a. Boundary of the Marne salient.* The boundary

of the Marne salient, when the German offensive of July 15 had been stopped, ran as follows: From Fontenoy (west of Soissons); a little east of south to the Marne near Chateau-Thierry; thence along the north bank of the Marne in front of the American 3d Division to near Gland; thence south of the Marne, via St. Aignan and Comblizy, to the Marne west of Epernay near Oeuilly; thence a little east of north, via Peurcy and Vrigny, to west of Rheims near Thillois. The base of the salient, from Fontenoy to Thillois, was about sixty kilometers and the depth of the salient was about forty kilometers.

b. German situation. (1) *Supply situation.* (a) The offensive of May 27 won the Marne salient for Germany. This salient was not stable because the single railroad through Soissons was not a sufficient line of communications for the efficient maintenance of the troops within the salient. Also that line of communications was not ample to sustain a new offensive from the salient as a base. The offensive of June 9, which was intended to correct the supply situation by the capture of Compiegne, failed. If the German offensive of July 15 had captured Rheims as planned, the problem of supply on the Marne—Champagne front would have been solved. The results actually obtained by the offensive of July 15 did not improve the supply situation. On the contrary, it made it still worse by increasing the area to be supplied.

(b) On the premise that it was necessary to maintain the Marne salient, the only remaining method of securing an ample line of communication into that salient was to construct one. That solution was attempted by the construction of a branch railroad from the north of Rheims to the west of Rheims. Although the work was pushed at emergency rate it was still incomplete when the Germans were compelled to defend the Marne salient against General Foch's counter offensive.

(c) Another disadvantage in the situation was the insufficiency of the railroad net inside the Marne salient. The principal railroad in the net was from Fismes to Chateau-Thierry. That line and the line south from Fismes were not sufficient to supply properly the mass of troops in the peak of the salient nor to supply the offensive maneuver toward Epernay. Truck transportation was not available in sufficient quantity for lack of gasoline, and animal transportation, though insufficient, was used.

(2) *Sensitive Soissons.* (a) If Rheims had been captured, as planned, by the offensive of July 15, the ten divisions south of the Marne would have had an ample line of supply via Rheims to Epernay. However, that offensive failed. The continuous bombardment of the bridges over the Marne by Allied and American artillery and aviation interdicted their line of supply and, as a result, these divisions were living on the iron ration.

(b) They had no artillery of their own. With the river at their back and an increasing volume of French and American fire in their front they were in a very dangerous situation. Von Hindenburg discontinued the attack south of the Marne on July 17 and ordered the ten divisions engaged to recross to the north bank on the night of July 19-20.

(c) The most sensitive German area on the whole French front was, as a result of the supply situation, the railroad in the vicinity of Soissons and from Soissons to the junction of the Soissons—Fismes railroad with the Fismes—Chateau-Thierry railroad. The cutting of that road would deprive the more than forty divisions in the salient of nearly all supplies.

(3) *German morale.* The German soldiers in the Marne salient had heard much of the great assemblage of nearly a million men with which the German Crown Prince was to end the war in the maneuver which began July 15. They had been impressed by the great preparations for that offensive and by the violence of the artillery preparation on the morning of July 15. They had heard that the objectives had not yet been reached but they did not know that the German offensive had been definitely stopped. Von Hindenburg had reports that a tank offensive was being organized south of Compiegne. He believed that General Foch had put practically all his available reserves into the line to stop the German offensive of July 15. The troops shared that belief and when the German advance was checked, the soldiers inside the salient went into the fields to harvest the wheat crop. Briefly, although the German soldiers understood that they had failed to defeat the French, they had absolutely no apprehension of a counter offensive.

c. Allied and American situation. (1) *Railroad situation.* While the Germans had difficulty in supplying the troops in the Marne salient, the French railroad net around the salient was fairly well adapted to the concentration and maintenance of troops engaged in the reduction of that salient. On the

south face of the salient, the railroad from Epernay to Rheims paralleled the front at a distance of about five miles, while on the west face the great lines leading east from Compiegne to Soissons, and from Paris to Chateau-Thierry, together with the two branch lines leading to Fere-en-Tardenois and Soissons, respectively, made four railroad lines of approach to the west face of the salient at nearly equidistant intervals of about eight miles. From east of the American 3d Division sector, near Chateau-Thierry, to Epernay, the Paris—Chalons railroad was in possession of the German divisions south of the Marne until the morning of July 20 and the nearest railroad back of the French line was the Paris—Vitry line, about thirty miles south.

(2) *Concealment.* The front from Rheims to the Marne was in the Champagne dry chalk country and offered no other concealment than the vineyards to a concentration of troops for an offensive maneuver against the German troops in the Marne salient.

The front from Epernay to east of Chateau-Thierry was wooded and troops could be secretly concentrated there but, because of the poor railroad facilities, considerable time would be required. The west front from Chateau-Thierry to west of Soissons was well wooded and, in connection with the four railroads to that front, afforded an excellent area for the secret concentration of a large force.

(3) *American forces.* (a) By July 13, the following divisions had arrived in France:

In the Service of Supply:	
41st Depot Division	1
In American Training Areas:	
29th, 37th, 83d, 89th, 90th and 92d Divisions	6
Training with the British:	
27th, 30th, 33d, 78th, 80th and 91st Divisions	6
Brigaded with the French on the front line:	
5th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 35th, 77th and 82d Divisions	7
On the front line or enroute thereto:	
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 42d and 93d Divisions	6
Total divisions	26

(b) The I, II, and III Corps had been formed. The I Corps (Major General Hunter Liggett, Commanding; Brigadier General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff) occupied a sector on the Marne. The II Corps (Major General G. W. Reed, Commanding; Colonel G. S. Simonds, Chief of Staff) was in administra-

tive control of divisions on the British front. The III Corps (Major General R. L. Bullard, Commanding; Brigadier General A. W. Bjornstad, Chief of Staff) was not yet in the front line.

(c) There were more than 1,200,000 American troops in France. As the Allies were now willing to accept American divisions with any sort of training for the front line, because of the fine execution of combat duty by the 1st Division at Cantigny, by the 2d and 3d Divisions near Chateau-Thierry, and by the 42d Division in Champagne, the time had finally arrived when the preponderance of force passed from Germany to her enemies on the Western front.

(4) *Morale.* The morale of the Allies which had sunk to a very low level in 1917 and which, preceding the battle of Cantigny, was considerably lower than that of the Germans, began to improve with the evidence that American troops were superior to the Germans in combat. The battle performances of the American 1st, 2d, 3d, and 42d Divisions had made a tremendous impression on the Allies and they responded to it exactly as though they had just come out from under a great fear. They changed their attitude and were grateful that General Pershing had trained the American troops to use the weapons and tactics of open warfare and that he had instilled into them that offensive spirit which eagerly reaches forward to the battlefield as the place where it will win the victory.

Resting upon the knowledge that more than a million and a quarter of American soldiers had arrived in France, after July 15 the attitude of the Allies began to change from fear to confidence in an ultimate triumph.

2. PLANS AND DISPOSITIONS. *a. German Plans.* (1) Von Hindenburg says that, when he saw, at the end of the first day's attack in Champagne (July 15), that the German troops were bleeding to death and in vain under General Gouraud's fire, he decided, at noon July 16, to stop the offensive of the German First and Third Armies in front of the French Fourth Army and to consolidate his position. However, while abandoning the plan to capture Chalons, he adhered on the 16th to the minor included plan of capturing Rheims in order to improve his supply situation and to retain the initiative.

(2) (a) By evening of July 16, the German Seventh Army was within six miles of Epernay and, north of the Marne, it

nearly reached the Epernay—Rheims railroad. As the Germans from near Rheims held the Rheims—Chalons railroad under interdiction fire, the Rheims—Epernay railroad was the only remaining railroad line into Rheims which the French held. The fate of Rheims then hung by a thread.

(b) On July 17, however, von Hindenburg was much impressed by the force of the French local counter attack from the heights of Rheims and directed a temporary suspension of the effort to capture Rheims until a fresh and thorough preparation could be organized which would take many days.

(3) To retain the initiative and to derive as much value as possible from the effort already made, von Hindenburg, on July 16, planned to treat his Chalons offensive as a diversion in favor of the deferred final great offensive which he had planned to deliver in Flanders against the British. To expedite that operation, he directed that the prepared plan for the transfer of artillery, trench mortars, airplanes and troops be executed at once. The movement began at once and was well under way on the 16th. Von Ludendorff was sent north at once and, by July 17, was preparing with the Crown Prince of Bavaria the plans for the offensive against the British northern wing.

(4) By the night of July 17, von Hindenburg had relinquished the initiative on the French front pending preparation of a new attack on Rheims and had not yet asserted the initiative on the British front.

(5) The German order of battle was: The First Army (von Mudra) from east of Rheims to Thillois (inclusive); the Seventh Army (von Boehn), to Braisne (exclusive), the Ninth Army (von Eben), to west of Fontenoy.

b. Allied and American Plans. (1) When the American 2d and 3d Divisions had stopped the German advance in the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry, about June 1, and the Marne salient had assumed its final form, General Pershing saw at once that the salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter offensive which, if successful, would afford immediate relief to the Allied defensive, remove the threat against Paris and raise the Allied morale by relieving it from the fear which then oppressed it. He advised an immediate attack along the base of the western face of the Marne salient toward Soissons. On June 23 and again on July 10, he very strongly urged General Foch to concentrate the best American

divisions under American command for use as a striking force against the Marne salient.

(2) General Foch welcomed General Pershing's counsel as he himself was an ardent advocate of defending by means of attack, and adopted the suggested offensive measure in principle. At the beginning of June, he informed the Allied and American commanders that he would soon have superiority on the Western front and would assume the offensive.

(3) June 7, he decided to execute the offensive maneuver recommended by General Pershing, and ordered plans prepared for a counter offensive toward the most sensitive German area—the vincinity of Soissons.

(4) (a) The plans were completed by June 16, and General Mangin (Tenth Army) was charged with their execution under the direction of General Fayolle, the commander of the Reserve Group.

(b) Marshal Haig was requested to prepare plans for the offensive maneuvers necessary between the Somme and the Lys, to recover the Paris—Amiens railroad and the coal mines in the Bruay—Bethune mining area.

(5) (a) By July 13, General Foch estimated that he had ascertained the exact German plan for the offensive of July 15. He believed that his plans for defeating that attack were sound and, looking beyond the anticipated German defeat, he fixed July 18 as the day for the counter offensive against Soissons.

(b) (i) The plan of July 13 prescribed that the counter offensive maneuver between the Aisne and the Ourcq would be executed by the Tenth Army (General Mangin) supported by the Sixth Army (General Degoutte) in the general directions of Braisne and of Fere-en-Tardenois, respectively, with the mission of cutting the line of communication of the German troops in the salient.

(ii) The Fifth Army (General Berthelot), at the same time, was to attack the southern face of the salient in the general direction of Fismes with the object of cooperating with the Tenth Army on the west face of the salient. Having in mind the possibility of the Germans resuming the offensive for the capture of Rheims, the plan provided that the Fifth Army, if attacked, would defend the ground it held.

(6) On July 14, General Foch had seventy divisions at his disposal for meeting von Hindenburg's expected offensive. He set aside twenty-seven divisions of that force to be used in

the counter offensive maneuver of July 18, allotting them as follows: eighteen divisions, including the American 1st and 2d Divisions, to the Tenth Army, for the attack between the Aisne and the Ourcq; nine divisions, including the American 4th and 26th Divisions to the Sixth Army, for the attack between the Ourcq and the Marne.

(7) The final draft of the plan was as follows:

(a) The Sixth and Tenth Armies to attack as previously directed.

(b) The Fifth Army to reconquer the terrain lost between Rheims and the Marne.

(c) The Ninth Army, newly constituted from the staff of the Northern Group and troops sent to the south of the Marne, under command of General Mitry, was to complete the occupation of the south bank of the Marne.

(8) The Allied and American order of battle was:

The Fifth Army (General Berthelot), from Prunay (exclusive) to the Marne.
The Ninth Army (General Mitry), to Chateau-Thierry.
The Sixth Army (General Degoutte), to the Ourcq.
The Tenth Army (General Mangin), to the Aisne (inclusive).

c. Allied and American preparations for maneuver. (1) As soon as General Foch learned, on the morning of July 15, that General Gouraud had successfully resisted the German attack east of Rheims, disregarding the German success between the American 3d Division, near Chateau-Thierry, and Rheims, he decided to launch the counter offensive as planned.

(2) (a) General Foch estimated that tactical and strategical surprise was essential to the success of the counter offensive. Accordingly, the orders to army commanders were verbal and under the highest degree of secrecy. He did not even inform Marshal Haig of his plans. So, as soon as he decided, on July 15, to launch the counter offensive, he motored at once, to meet Marshal Haig, told him for the first time of his plan and requested the transfer south of the Aisne of four British divisions and other assistance. The necessary orders to begin operations were sent out on July 17.

(b) (i) All supplies and material necessary for the coming operation were moved at night and every effort was made to prevent the enemy from observing any change by day.

(ii) The incoming troops that were to participate in the attack were distributed in concealment in the rear areas and

rushed to the front line on the night of July 17. The great mass of incoming artillery was concealed by camouflage, night movement, and the use of abandoned positions. Registration was obtained by the alternating fire of old and new batteries without increasing the number of active guns.

(c) To preserve secrecy to the very last moment, there was to be no bombardment or artillery preparation of any kind preceding the launching of the infantry attack by the Tenth Army.

(3) (a) General Foch succeeded in secretly concentrating a force that was greatly superior to the German force in the line on the western face of the salient by the morning of July 18. On the Tenth Army front, twenty-three first-class divisions, thirteen of which were in the front line, faced the hostile front line held by eleven German divisions.

(b) In order to secure rapid destruction, interdiction, and concentration fires, the Tenth Army was supported by 470 batteries, the Sixth Army by 230 batteries.

(c) To secure absolute control of the air, the Tenth Army had forty and the Sixth Army had twenty-eight air squadrons.

(d) To overcome enemy obstacles, to destroy hostile machine gun nests and to transport infantrymen and personnel for installing supporting machine gun nests in rear of enemy front lines, 375 light tanks were assigned to the Tenth Army and 170 to the Sixth Army.

(4) (a) In the French Tenth Army (General Mangin), which was to deliver the decisive blow, the order of battle for the attack, by corps from north to south, was XVIII, I, XX,* XXX, and XI Corps.

(b) The mission of the Sixth Army† for July 18 was for the left wing to maintain connection with the right of the Tenth Army, while the center and right were to hold the Germans in the peak of the salient.

3. General Description of the Whole Operation. *a. July 18.* The Tenth and Sixth Armies attacked as planned and effected a complete strategical and tactical surprise on the German troops holding the western face of the salient. German soldiers, not for duty on the front line, were harvesting

*The American III Corps formed four-fifths of this corps.

†The American I Corps, the French XXXVIII Corps composed of American divisions, and the 4th Division formed part of this Army.

in the wheat fields and were terrified by the appearance of tanks, some of which went through the line destroying machine gun nests and breaking up German groups, while others transported troops who established machine gun nests and strong points in advance of the oncoming Allied and American troops. The Tenth and Sixth Armies reached the line, Fontenoy—Chaudun—Vierzy—Noroy—Belleau, by the night of July 18.

b. July 19 to 21. (1) The Tenth Army reached the eastern slope of the Soissons plateau.

(2) The Sixth Army cleared the north banks of the Marne to Jaulgonne.

(3) The Ninth Army (General Mitry) was delayed by the non-arrival of tanks but attacked on July 20 and cleared the south bank of the Marne. The bridges had been destroyed and this army could not cross until others had been laid.

(4) The Fifth Army (General Berthelot), on July 19, attacked the German flank in the direction of Fismes from the Rheims heights.

c. July 22 to 29. (1) Attacked on three fronts, the Crown Prince fought desperately to save his troops, his material, and his one railroad at Soissons. He threw all his local reserves as well as those from Noyon and Champagne into the line. He called for more help and von Gallwitz sent him three and the Crown Prince of Bavaria six divisions.

(2) As a result of the situation, von Hindenburg countermanded his order for the Flanders offensive which was to have been launched early in August.

(3) By July 29, General Foch had reduced the salient to the line, Bligny—Villers Agnon—Sergy—Rozoy—west of Soissons.

d. July 30 to August 4. On July 30, the Tenth Army prepared for a new blow. On August 2, with two corps in the line on its right, it advanced in the direction of the plateau of Arcy—Ste. Restitue, in order to turn the River Crise by the south. The river was crossed that night. The rest of the line also advanced in cooperation with the Tenth Army and cleared the salient to the line of the Vesle, after which siege conditions obtained.

4. THE AMERICAN III CORPS (SOISSONS FRONT). *a. Constitution.* When General Pershing learned that his original plan for decisive operations along the base of the Marne

salient against Soissons was to be executed, he transferred the two first-class divisions then available, the 1st (General Summerall) and the 2d Division (General Harbord) to the III Corps, placed the III Corps at the disposal of the French Tenth Army and directed General Bullard, commanding the corps to transfer his headquarters at once to the Tenth Army area and to proceed there himself with the idea of employing the III Corps in the coming attack with the 1st and 2d Divisions side by side. However, as General Bullard did not arrive in the zone of concentration until July 16, and then with a very small staff, General Mangin decided it was not practicable to give the III Corps a separate zone in the approaching attack. He attached the III Corps to the French XX Corps (General Berdulat), with the understanding that General Bullard should have administrative control of the American 1st and 2d Divisions and should serve in the approaching offensive as an assistant to General Berdulat who would exercise tactical control. The only other division in the French XX Corps was the 1st Moroccan Division. As a French division was only one-half as large as an American division, Americans composed four-fifths of the XX Corps.

b. Mission. The French XX Corps was the spearhead of the Tenth Army attack. It had the immediate mission of reaching the high plateau northeast of Hardennes which would dominate Soissons, cut the highways from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry and to Paris and the railroad from Soissons to Paris. Its eventual mission was to cut the Soissons—Fismes railroad which was the single rail supply line for German troops in the salient.

c. Terrain in front. The terrain in front of the French XX Corps was well adapted to defense. The bare plateau west of Soissons and south of the Aisne is cut by many deep and wooded ravines which run from south to north. There are very few roads running to the east. The little villages contained many buildings of solid masonry which the Germans converted into strong points. Machine gun nests, coordinated to cover with fire all possible approaches from the west, were particularly well located. Also, the Germans had scattered forward guns throughout the whole front area and particularly in the wheat fields. The German defense was based upon the very strong natural positions of Berzy-le-sec, Buzancy, and

Villemontoire. These positions stood high on the crests that marked the eastern edge of the plateau.

d. Concentration. Secrecy had been so carefully maintained that General Bullard, commanding the III Corps, had not learned of the approaching counter offensive between the Aisne and the Ourcq until 2:00 PM, July 15. He and his headquarters started at once and arrived in the III Corps zone of concentration on July 16. The 1st and 2d Divisions, in process of transportation, received their orders from the French XX Corps the same day, the 16th. By forced night marching, without rest and in the greatest discomfort, culminating in the development march on the night of July 17-18, in the rain and mud and along trails drenched with mustard gas, the 1st and 2d Divisions finally reached their places in the battle.

e. Reconnaissance and deployment. The 1st Division's concentration was a much simpler problem than that of the 2d Division and both infantry and artillery were able to reconnoiter the division zone on July 17, secure some rest and to deploy calmly on the morning of the 18th. The 2d Division, on the other hand, had an extremely difficult problem in concentration and, without rest or reconnaissance, was forced to deploy some units at double time in order to attack at the prescribed hour. In fact, there was so little time available that the attack order was distributed to units as they were marching to their positions and several of the front line units were still deploying when the barrage started.

f. Corps plan and formation. The corps commander planned to launch the attack at 4:15 AM, under cover of a rolling barrage, with the 2d Division (General Harbord) on the right, the 1st Moroccan Division in the center, and the 1st Division (General Summerall), on the left. Three objectives were to be reached on July 18, the first objective at a distance of about two and one-half kilometers, the second about four, and the final objective about six kilometers from the line of departure. The rate of advance to the first objective was to be controlled by the rolling barrage. The barrage was to stand while the several objectives were being organized.

g. 1st Division formation. The 1st Division, on a front of one and one-quarter miles, formed with brigades abreast, the 1st Brigade on the right. The infantry regiments were in line from right to left in the following order: 18th, 16th, 26th,

28th. Each regiment was in column of battalions. The division was reinforced by one French artillery regiment of 75's and by forty-eight Schneider tanks. The brigade reserve was composed of the third line battalions of the two interior regiments, each reinforced by an engineer company. The division reserve was composed of the 1st Engineer Regiment (less two companies), the division machine gun battalion and the third line battalions of the two exterior regiments, which battalions were to conform to the attack formation and to follow in the regimental zones of action. The division artillery, reinforced, was to support the attck.

h. 2d Division formation. The 2d Division, on a front of one and one-quarter miles, formed with brigades abreast, the 3d Brigade on the right. The infantry regiments of the 3d Brigade were abreast, the 23d Infantry on the right, the 9th Infantry on the left. Each regiment was in column of battalions. The 4th Brigade placed the 5th Marine Regiment on the line with two battalions abreast and one in reserve. The division was reinforced by one French artillery regiment of 75's and by fifty-four St. Chaumond tanks. The division reserve consisted of the 2d Engineers and the 4th Machine Gun Battalion. The 6th Marines were in special corps reserve in rear of the division sector.

i. Attack of July 18. (1) The assault battalions, preceded by tanks and under cover of a rolling barrage, crossed the line of departure at 4:45 AM. The attack was a complete surprise and, by 7:30 AM, the two American divisions of the American III Corps and the Moroccan Division had captured most of the corps objectives for the day. The French 153d Division on the left could not keep up, hence, the 1st Division could not capture all its third and final objective for the day.

(2) In the 2d Division, the 3d Brigade, inspired by the daring leadership of General Ely, the brigade commander, captured Vierzy late in the day. Communication with division headquarters had been broken. However, batteries of the 15th Field Artillery were displaced forward to Beaurepaire farm by 11:00 AM. Under cover of a light barrage and concentrations fired by these batteries, and accompanied by tanks, the infantry advanced, defeated the German defending force and captured Vierzy before dark. At the end of the day, the 2d Division had forced a well marked salient into the German line and the

American III Corps had led the French on their right and left and the Moroccan Division in the center.

j. Attack of July 19. (1) The corps order for the attack of July 19 gave the German base position of Berzy-le-sec—Buzancy—Villemontoire—Tigny as the objective for the day. The attack was to be launched at 4:00 AM, without artillery preparation, but with a barrage which was to roll forward at the rate of one hundred meters in three minutes. Tanks were to precede the infantry. The corps order was not received until late during the night of July 18-19. When General Harbord had not received the order at 2:00 AM, July 19, he issued his own order for the attack of July 19 for the 2d Division. He fixed the objectives and directed that the attack be launched at 7:00 AM, after one hour of artillery preparation. The infantry, preceded by tanks, was to advance under cover of a rolling barrage. The corps order received later did not conflict in any essential particulars with General Harbord's order, except as to hour to attack. The difference in the hour of attack, however, was not of great importance as the 2d Division had suffered such casualties on the 18th that it could not be prepared for an attack earlier than 7:00 AM. The task the second day was more difficult than on the 18th, because the terrain was more difficult, the effect of the surprise had worn off, and the Germans had reinforced the line in front of the French XX Corps with sufficient first-class divisions to secure preponderance of force.

(2) The 2d Division, in an exceedingly bold offensive maneuver, reached the outskirts of Tigny by 10:30 AM, but at such a cost that no further effort could be expected of it. In those two days, the 2d Division advanced more than eight miles against most stubborn resistance and was always ahead of the units on its flanks. It had captured more than 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It sustained 3,788 casualties, including 154 officers. At the request of General Harbord, the division was relieved on the night of July 19-20 by the French 59th Colonial Division and went to Tenth Army Reserve.

(3) The French 153d Division again failed to reach its objective on July 19, and, as a result, the 1st Division was held up by violent fire from the north. A special attack, at 5:30 PM, brought the 2d Brigade up to the 1st Brigade, but at a terrible cost.

(4) At the end of the day, the line reached by the III Corps again led all neighboring units.

k. Attack of July 20. Corps orders were received July 20 which transferred the objective of the French 153d Division, Berzy-le-sec, to the American 1st Division. After an artillery preparation of two hours by the division artillery and under a rolling barrage, the division attacked at 2:00 PM. The 2d Brigade lost heavily from machine gun fire from the uncovered north and was not able to take Berzy-le-sec.

l. Attack of July 21. (1) During the night of July 20-21, corps orders prescribed that the Moroccan division would be relieved that night by the French 87th Division, that the French 153d Division would be reinforced by a regiment of infantry, and that the American 1st Division would attack at 4:00 AM, July 21, with the objective, Berzy-le-sec and the heights north and east of Buzancy.

(2) The French 153d Division on the left, after a three hours' artillery preparation, attacked at 8:00 AM.

(3) The 1st Division attacked at 4:00 AM, and captured Berzy-le-sec at 9:15 AM. The division then stood astride of the highway from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry and the Villers-Cotterets railroad, and held ground that dominated Soissons. During the remainder of the day, that night, and the next day, the division organized the position and straightened its line. Its relief began on the night of July 22-23 and was completed on the night of July 23-24. In these five days the 1st Division led all its neighbors. It captured about 3,800 prisoners and 70 guns from the seven German divisions used against it. It sustained 7,000 casualties, with 1,000 killed. The casualties of infantry officers were 60%, and of infantry field officers 73%.

m. Accomplishments of the American III Corps (French XX Corps). (1) The accomplishments of the 1st and 2d American Divisions in the American III Corps are most impressive. As they led all neighbors, it is proper (without disparaging the gallant Moroccan Division) to speak of the troops of the American III Corps as the spearhead of the decisive blow against Soissons. Aside from the French XX Corps, the Tenth Army made practically no advance. The result of that blow was that von Hindenburg, abandoning all other plans, gathered reserves wherever he could get them and sent them to stop the counter offensive southwest of Soissons. From the high ground captured, the railroad net near Soissons

was interdicted by artillery and, as a result, trains carrying troops and material were compelled to unload near Laon from which place troops were sent forward by forced marching. Von Hindenburg decided to evacuate the Marne salient.

(2) It is an outstanding fact of the World War that the American 1st and 2 Divisions of the American III Corps by their magnificent dash and power in open warfare in front of Soissons turned the tide of the World War against Germany.

(3) General Mangin, commanding the French Tenth Army, expressed his appreciation of the American troops under his command in the following order:

HEADQUARTERS, JULY 30TH, 1918

10th Army
Staff
3d Bureau
No. 862/S

GENERAL ORDER NO. 318

Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and Soldiers of the 3d United States Army Corps.

Shoulder to shoulder with your French comrades you were thrown into the counter offensive battle which commenced on the 18th of July.

You rushed into the fight as to a festival.

Your magnificent courage completely routed a surprised enemy and your indomitable tenacity checked the counter attacks of his fresh divisions.

You have shown yourselves worthy sons of your great country and you were admired by your brothers in arms.

Ninety-one guns, 7,200 prisoners, immense booty, ten kilometers of country reconquered; this is your portion of the spoil of victory.

Furthermore, you have really felt your superiority over the barbarous enemy of the whole human race, against whom the children of Liberty are striving.

To attack him is to vanquish him.

American Comrades: I am grateful to you for the blood so generously spilled on the soil of my Country.

I am proud to have commanded you during such days and to have fought with you for the deliverance of the world.

MANGIN.

5. THE AMERICAN I CORPS. *a. Operations, July 18 to 23.* In the order of battle, the American I Corps (General Liggett), held the Chateau-Thierry sector at the peak of the Marne salient. It consisted of the American 26th Division (General Edwards) on the right and the French 167th Division on the left. It participated in the action of the French Sixth Army (General Degoutte) on July 18 and was the pivot of the counter offensive maneuver against Soissons. It captured the village of Belleau on the 18th and, beating the Germans back by continued and successive attacks, reached the Forest of Fere, July 23.

b. Operations, July 23 to August 3. The 42d Division (General Menoher) relieved the 26th Division July 23, and, also taking over the frontage of the French 167th Division, carried the advance of the I Corps toward the Vesle until relieved August 3.

c. Operations, August 3 to 12. The 4th Division (General Cameron) relieved the 42d Division, August 3, and passed, almost without resistance, through the Dale forest to the Vesle crossing the latter on August 6. It continued the advance until August 12, when it was relieved by the 77th Division, of the III Corps.

d. Transfer to Woevre. The I Corps was then transferred to the Woevre and the control of its front was turned over to the III Corps.

6. THE AMERICAN 3D, 28TH AND 32D DIVISIONS (FRENCH XXXVIII CORPS). *a. Operation July 18.* The French XXXVIII Corps (General Mondesir) occupied the sector just to the east of the American I Corps with the American 3d Division (General Dickman) in the line and the American 28th Division (General Morton) in reserve. As the American I Corps was the pivot of the counter offensive against the west face of the Marne salient, the French XXXVIII Corps took no part in the action of July 18 other than to hold the Germans in front by fire.

b. Operations July 20-30. (1) On the night of July 20, when the Germans began to retreat, the 3d Division crossed the Marne and, pursuing the German rear guards closely and aggressively against stubborn resistance and against counter attack, cleared the north bank of the Marne to include Jaulgonne. It then, in its zone of action, aggressively pursued the Germans to the northeast until July 29, when it was relieved for much needed rest and recuperation.

(2) A brigade of the 28th Division relieved the French 39th Division on July 26, and conducted the pursuit with much vigor until it was relieved July 30.

(3) The American 32d Division (General Haan), relieving the 3d Division on July 29, and a brigade of the 28th Division on July 30, continued the pursuit.

7. THE AMERICAN III CORPS (SOUTHERN FRONT). *a.* As the French XXXVIII Corps (General Mondesir) then consisted of American units only, the III Corps (General Bullard) recently relieved from the Soissons front, relieved it

on August 1 and took over the sector with the American 32d Division in line, the 28th in support ,and the 3d in reserve.

b. On August 4, the 32d Division captured Fismes. On August 6, the 32d Division encountered serious opposition when attempting to advance north of the Vesle.

c. The 28th Division (General Muir) relieved the 32d Division on August 6 and extended its front to the east, August 13.

d. The American 77th Division (General Duncan) joined the III Corps and took its place on the line relieving the 4th Division on August 12.

e. The III Corps then, with the 28th Division on the right and the 77th Division on the left, continued the advance against the most desperate resistance of which the Germans were capable, until September 7, when the 28th Division was relieved from the line.

f. On September 9, the III Corps was relieved from duty in the Marne salient and ordered to the vicinity of Verdun.

g. The 77th Division remained in the Marne salient until September 17, when it was relieved.

8. THE AMERICAN 4TH DIVISION. The 4th Division (General Cameron), serving in the French Sixth Army between the pivot and the main blow, had elements attack with the French II and VII Corps south of the Ourcq on July 18. The last element remained in the line until July 21.

9. THE AMERICAN 32D DIVISION. The 32d Division (General Haan) upon its relief from the battle on the Vesle, joined a French corps in the Tenth Army north of Soissons and attacked August 29 to 31, and, after particularly desperate fighting, captured Juvigny and cut the important road from Soissons to Chauny.

10. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR.—*The principle of the offensive.* *a.* When two combatants are fairly evenly balanced, the violation by one of them of a principle of war that is vital to the success of the operation in progress, gives to the other combatant an unsought opportunity to try for a victory. Of course, it is essential that the other combatant shall observe and appreciate the fact that his antagonist has committed such a violation. This was the case at the Second Battle of the Marne.

b. (1) The German position inside the Marne salient violated the *principle of security* in at least two important respects. First, the only line of communication for the troops in that salient ran so close to the border of the salient at Soissons as to invite attack and to make the defense of Soissons a separate problem upon which hung the safety of the whole salient. Second, the vulnerability and insufficiency of the line of communication through Soissons and the lack of adequate means of transportation in front of Soissons for the number of troops in the salient, hopelessly handicapped any offensive action from the Marne salient as a base.

(2) General Pershing recognized the German violation of the *principle of security* as soon as the May 27 offensive had been stopped, informed General Foch of his opinion and requested permission to take advantage of that violation by launching an offensive with American troops against Soissons. General Foch may have recognized already the German violation of the *principle of security.* In any case, he agreed with General Pershing's estimate and accepted in principle his plan to take full advantage of the German error by launching a major offensive blow against the insecure, strategically decisive area of Soissons.

c. In the preparation for that offensive, General Foch counted upon von Hindenburg's lack of freedom of action from the Marne salient and thus was able to assemble a superior *mass* opposite Soissons. He assembled that *mass* secretly and in launching the attack complied with the *principle of surprise.*

d. The high ground south of Soissons dominated Soissons and so was the real objective of the operation rather than the physical occupation of Soissons itself. General Foch recognized this fact and, complying with the *principle of the objective,* launched the attack along the shortest practical route to those heights.

e. By the assembly of all practicable forms of military energy and by launching that military energy in an aggressive, continuing, attack at the maximum speed at which all of the elements could coordinate in the delivery of that military energy in *mass* against the enemy, the offensive of July 18 complied with the *principle of movement.*

f. All of the elements essential to the estimate of the situation and to the execution of decisive action in that situation, were considered and acted upon. As a result, the deci-

sive operation which commenced July 18, 1918, and for which credit must be given to General Pershing and to the troops trained by him, is an excellent example of the *principle of the offensive.*

The French gracefully gave credit for this to General Pershing. In awarding the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor to him, August 6, 1918, they stated that:

"* * * you arrived on the battlefield at the decisive hour * * *."

CHAPTER XVIII

Allied and American Offensive to September 25, 1918

Page

1. Situation After the Second Battle of the Marne 348
   a. German situation 349
   b. Allied and American situation 349
2. Plans 349
   a. German plans 349
   b. Allied and American plans 350
3. Reduction of the Amiens Salient 351
   a. Plans 351
      (1) German plans 351
      (2) Allied plans 351
   b. Operations 351
      (1) The diversion in Flanders 351
      (2) August 8 352
      (3) August 9-10 353
      (4) August 11-15 353
   c. Exploitation of success in reducing the Amiens salient 353
      (1) Marshal Foch's plan 353
      (2) Operations 354
         (a) French operation 354
         (b) British operation 354
4. Reduction of the Lys Salient 355
5. German Retreat to the Siegfried Line 356
   a. Situation by September 1 356
   b. Plans 356
      (1) German plans 356
      (2) Allied plans 357
      (3) Operations 357
         (a) The first phase (to September 7) 357
         (b) The second phase (to September 25) 359
6. Reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient 359
   a. Organization of the American First Army 359
   b. Situation in the Woevre 362
   c. Plans 363
      (1) German plans 363
      (2) General Pershing's plan 364
   d. Concentration of troops 365
   e. Operations 366
7. The Principles of War.—*The principle of security* 367

1. Situation After the Second Battle of the Marne.

(Maps 89, 90, 91, 97, 104, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125,

126, 127.) After stopping the German offensive of July 15, General Foch seized the initiative by launching a counter offensive, on July 18, toward Soissons, and retained it by the ensuing offensive operation which reduced the Marne salient.

a. German situation. Marshal von Hindenburg knew that he could not expect any material assistance on the Western front from the other fronts. The morale of the German troops had been lowered. More than ten divisions had been broken up for replacements. Some units had shirked their duty at the front and others had mutinied. General Ludendorff pronounced the situation "very grave." The German discouragement at the front was shared by the people back in Germany and by the German Government. The German Chancellor, Count von Hertling, said, "At the beginning of July, 1918, I was convinced, I confess, that before the first of September our adversaries would send us peace proposals. * * * We expected grave events in Paris for the end of July. That was on the 15th. On the 18th, even the most optimistic among us understood that all was lost. The history of the world was played out in three days."

b. Allied and American situation. The removal of the German threat of operations against Paris dismissed the fear which had controlled the French at home and at the front and the French morale at once rose to the point known as enthusiasm for the war. The British also dismissed their fear for the safety of the Channel ports and wanted to drive the Germans entirely away from the Channel. The Americans had done exactly what they had expected to do, and their morale remained at its high point. They had gone to Europe to defeat Germany and all they asked for was the chance. American troops were arriving in France at the rate of more than 250,000 a month.

2. PLANS. *a. German plans.* (1) Marshal von Hindenburg estimated that he had lost the initiative, and that in view of the fact that he had used a large part of the reserves intended for the great peace drive in Flanders he was not strong enough to recover it at that time. He definitely abandoned the plan of destroying the British army and decided to rest and refresh the troops which had recently been in action, and to await some mistake of the enemy or a favorable opportunity to attempt a reseizure of the initiative. He estimated that the Allied and American troops had suffered as much as

the German troops and that they would not be able to assume the offensive for some time.

(2) He decided to hold the line he then occupied. He definitely assumed the strategical and tactical defensive attitude and made no material change in the order of battle except that he planned to place General von Boehn on the line as commander of a new group, consisting of the Ninth, Second, and Eighteenth Armies, between the Groups of the German and Bavarian Crown Princes.

b. Allied and American plans. (1) As soon as General Foch saw that he had actually seized the initiative on July 18 and was retaining it, he decided to hold it, and called a conference of the Commanders-in-Chief, for July 24, at his Headquarters at Bombon for the purpose of considering operations.

(2) At this conference, it was estimated that due to the arrival of the Americans, the Allies finally had acquired an equality of combatant strength on the line and a superiority of reserves, artillery, tanks, and aviation. Each Commander-in-Chief presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his command.

(3) All shared in the opinion of General Foch that the time had come to pass from the strategical and tactical defensive to a maintained strategical and tactical offensive.

(4) General Foch's final decision, upon which all plans were based, was that the Allied armies must retain the offensive by such aggressive action that the Germans would find no rest and that von Hindenburg would find no opportunity to seize the initiative.

(5) General Foch divided the proposed offensive into two periods as follows:

(a) The first period was to consist of surprise offensives with limited objectives and was to be initiated at once. Accordingly, there was to be an offensive to free the Paris—Amiens railroad route by reduction of the Amiens salient; an offensive to recover the mining area: Bruay—Bethune by reduction of the Hazebrouck salient; and an offensive to free the Paris—Avricourt railroad route near Commercy by reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. The exploitation of the success of reducing the Marne salient (considered in the preceding chapter) was also to continue.

(b) The second period was to be a general offensive that would end the war.

3. Reduction of the Amiens Salient. *a. Plans.* (1) *German plans.* The Germans had no specific plan for the defense of the Amiens salient except that of defense of lines then held. They had been so filled with the idea of victory that they had not well responded to the loss of initiative. They seemed to be stunned by the result of the Second Battle of the Marne. There was hesitation on the part of the High Command in informing the troops that the defensive attitude had been assumed, and, as a result, the German lines in the Amiens salient were not as well prepared for defense, by intrenchment and otherwise, as they should have been.

(2) *Allied plans.* (a) General Foch's plan for the reduction of the Amiens salient proposed to attract the Germans' attention to Flanders, then to execute a surprise converging attack against the salient.

(b) The northern force under Marshal Haig with left flank on the Somme was to attack on August 8 with the British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson) north of the line: Amiens—Roye and with the French First Army (General Debeney) south of that line. The British Fourth Army was to deliver the main attack without artillery preparation and with its main reliance on tanks for pushing through the enemy lines. The French XXXV Corps, attached to the French First Army, was to attack south of Montdidier, on August 9, in the direction of Roye, to force evacuation of Montdidier.

The southern force, i.e., the French Third Army (General Humbert), was to attack in the general direction of Lassigny—Roye, on August 10, for the purpose of striking the retreating German forces in flank.

(c) To exploit the success, Marshal Haig concentrated east of Amiens at zero hour, a special mobile force consisting of:

1 cavalry corps (3 cavalry divisions).
2 motor machine gun brigades.
1 Canadian cyclist battalion.

b. Operations. (1) *The diversion in Flanders.* To secure surprise by attracting the German attention to Flanders, Marshal Haig issued detailed instructions for a Flanders attack, put Canadian troops on the Mount Kemmel front, where they were identified, established dummy corps headquarters, erected casualty clearing stations in conspicuous positions, maintained great wireless activity in the First Army area, exhibited tanks concentrating in the St. Pol area, and carried out infantry and

tank combined maneuvers in that area on days when the visibility was good. These measures succeeded in deceiving the Germans.

(2) *August 8.* (a) On August 8, at 4:20 AM, without any artillery preparation, the British Fourth Army, accompanied by 400 tanks, and supported by an intense artillery concentration which crushed the German artillery, advanced to the attack with seven divisions in line and four in support, on a front of eleven miles. The French First Army artillery preparation began at 4:20 AM and, at 5:00 AM, its left corps advanced, keeping pace with the British.

(b) The whole attack was a surprise and penetrated the German lines. The Germans quickly fell back. The attack halted for two hours upon reaching its first objective. The mobile force was reinforced with light tanks and armored cars and was passed through the breach in the line. That night, the attacking infantry had advanced seven miles. The mobile force was well out to the front, and continuing the advance during the night, it cut telephonic communication between the German troops and their headquarters and captured several division headquarters by surprise. The air service also continued to operate all night with attack and bombing planes.

(c) Rumors quickly spread in the German line that the Allied cavalry and tanks were in their rear, and the retreat on that part of the line nearly became a rout. The Germans blew up their dumps, and, in their rush to the rear, left behind 13,000 prisoners and more than 300 guns. Because of the surprise, there were no German troops for local counter attacks. The necessary guns for such counter attacks had been captured. If Marshal Haig had then pushed forward to the line of the Somme, there would have been no formed bodies of German troops to stop him.

(d) General Ludendorff calls August 8 the blackest day of the war. The German soldiers lost confidence in the ability of their commanders to win victories and whole bodies of soldiers surrendered to single Allied troopers or isolated squadrons and there were cases of retiring troops, when meeting fresh divisions going into action, calling out to them, "black leg" and, "You are prolonging the war." General Ludendorff asked to be relieved, and asked for conferences with the German Government at Spa at once. There, he reported that it was no longer possible to force the Allies to peace, that peace

could not be won by a defensive policy, and that he recommended that the war be terminated by means of diplomacy.

(e) Von Hindenburg considered the situation very grave and gave orders at once for emergency concentration of twenty-four divisions against Marshal Haig. These divisions were to come from the Verdun front, from Flanders, from Lille, from the Ypres front, and from the general reserve.

(3) *August 9-10.* (a) On August 9, the French XXXV Corps delivered a surprise attack south of Montdidier and reached the railroad station at Faverolles. The Germans evacuated Montdidier and thus cleared the Paris—Amiens railroad. The general advance continued without meeting any serious opposition, and reached the line: Morlancourt—Proyart—Rouvray—Montdidier.

(b) The British III Corps, advancing north of the Somme to cover the left flank of the British Fourth Army, was stopped by the Germans at the Chipilly ridge.

(c) The American 131st Infantry Regiment (Colonel J. B. Sanborn) took its place in the line of attack on the night of August 9-10. The American infantry, outstripping the British on the flank, swept everything before them, and on August 10, captured the ridge in front of the 58th British Division.

(d) The French Third Army, attacking with tanks on August 10, struck the retreating Germans in the flank and attained all of its objectives.

(4) *August 11-15.* After August 10, by Marshal Foch's order, the pursuit took an easterly direction, and meeting more and more resistance from counter attacks by German reinforcements coming into the line, was practically stopped on August 15, on the old German 1916 line: Albert—Lihons—west of Roye—Ribecourt.

c. Exploitation of success in reducing the Amiens salient. (1) *Marshal Foch's plan.* (a) On the night of August 10, Marshal Foch decided to exploit the success by broadening the front of attack and by this means execute a converging maneuver against the German reinforcements that were being rushed to the Amiens salient.

(b) His general plan for the maneuver was to have the armies already engaged continue the converging operation in the following directions:

French Third Army (General Humbert), toward the Noyon area.

French First Army (General Debeney), toward the Ham—Guiscard road.

British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), toward the Somme north of Ham.

General Petain was to extend the offensive to the south, and to direct the French Tenth Army (General Mangin) to drive the Germans north of the line: Oise—Aillette.

Marshal Haig was to extend the offensive to the north, and, by combined operations of the British Third and First Armies, was to penetrate the German front on the axis: Arras—Cambrai.

(2) *Operations.* (a) *French operation.* General Fayolle (reserve group) by a preparatory local action, August 17-19, rectified the Tenth Army line and secured a better line of departure from Fontenoy (exclusive) to Nampcel (inclusive). On August 20, he delivered the main attack on a thirty-mile front from the Oise to Soissons with fourteen divisions, and by August 22, reached his objective, namely, the line of the Oise and the Ailette, from which he menaced the left of von Huttier's XVIII Army (north of the Oise) and the German position east of Soissons. General Fayolle also advanced the French Third Army across the Divette to make the line of the French Tenth and First Armies continuous.

(b) *British operation.* (i) Marshal Haig likewise divided his maneuver into two phases, a preliminary attack and the main attack.

(ii) The preliminary attack. The objective of the preliminary attack was to isolate the strong position Thiepval and to recover the line of the Amiens—Arras railroad as a line of departure. He delivered the attack at 4:55 AM, August 21, with four divisions, supported by tanks, on a nine-mile front, north of the Ancre from Thiepval (exclusive) to Moyenneville (inclusive). After capturing the German position, he passed three divisions through the lines, continued the advance with tanks, and, by the night of August 22, had captured the general line of the railroad, including Albert.

(iii) The main attack. The plan of maneuver for the main attack required the British Third Army and that portion of the British Fourth Army north of the Somme to advance toward the line: Cambrai—St. Quentin, with the mission of flanking the German position east of the Somme. The right flank was to be covered by that part of the British Fourth Army that was south of the Somme. That portion of the British First Army which was south of the River Sensee was to cover the left flank and to flank the German line east of Arras.

At dawn August 23, Marshal Haig launched the main attack on a front of thirty-three miles, from the north of Lihons to Mercatel, with the British Third and Fourth Armies reinforced by one hundred tanks. By the 26th, Thiepval was captured and the line had passed Bray. The operation was rapidly recovering the Arras—Bapaume railroad.

By August 25, Marshal Haig estimated that the German line was so badly disorganized that the planned converging blow should be delivered. Accordingly, at dawn, August 26, the Canadians of the First Army delivered a surprise attack upon the right flank of the German Seventeenth Army, captured the dominating position: Monchy-le Preaux. By the 29th they had reached Fontaine Croisilles, which was on the old branch of the Hindenburg line from Drocourt to Queant. In this offensive, Marshal Haig penetrated the German line in several places, but by concentration of reserves, the Germans succeeded each time in closing the breach.

Marshal von Hindenburg considered the Bavarian Crown Prince's position from Noyon to Croisilles untenable, and ordered a retirement to the line of the Sensee, the Somme, and the Canal du Nord. The retirement was successfully executed without disorder, but Marshal Haig captured Bapaume on August 29.

4. Reduction of the Lys Salient. *a.* In addition to penetrating the Allied line at the junction of the British and Belgian sectors, in coordination with the similar but stronger blow toward Amiens, which was intended to destroy the British forces in France, the Germans had the included purpose of securing and working the mines in the Bethune mining area inasmuch as Germany needed metals. Accordingly, when the German offensive failed there was no reason for maintaining the Lys salient other than to profit from the use of the mines in that area. After the reduction of the Marne and Amiens salient, the Lys salient, projecting well out into the Allied territory, was very vulnerable, and its further retention invited disaster. Also, under the *principle of economy of force,* the Germans decided to evacuate the salient in order to gain troops for more effective use against the Allied and American offensive, then in progress. Orders were accordingly given for the German Sixth and Fourth Armies to evacuate the salient. Their instructions were to put the mines out of order and to

devastate the country over which the retreat should be conducted.

b. The evacuation of the salient was progressing slowly, until Marshal Haig decided to reduce the salient by pressure. In the battle before Mount Kemmel, while the British troops pushed against the salient, the American 27th Division (General O'Ryan) and the American 30th Division (General Lewis) of the American II Corps (General Read) on the left, struck the blow (August 31-September 2) in the decisive direction along the northern base of the salient in the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge that expedited the German withdrawal. The reduction of the salient was completed by September 6.

5. GERMAN RETREAT TO THE SIEGFRIED LINE. *a. Situation by September 1.* By September 1, the Germans were driven back as far as the line: the Sensee—the Somme—Canal du Nord. General Ludendorff reported to the German Government that there was no further chance of a German victory.

b. Plans. (1) *German plans.* (a) The Germans estimated that there was no chance of defeating the Allies and America. Orders were given for the repair of the Siegfried line, and in order to shorten the front, and thus gain troops, it was decided to retire to that line. The plan, however, contemplated a vigorous step by step defensive which would exact a high toll of casualties from the Allies and Americans for every mile gained.

(b) Orders were likewise given for the reconnaissance and construction of a new second line (the Herman line) from a point on the Dutch frontier east of Bruges—thence along the Ecloo Canal south to the Lys—thence along the Lys to east of Courtrai—thence along the upper reaches of the Scheldt to the southwest of Valenciennes—thence via Solemes—Le Cateau—Guise—to the northeast of La Fere, where it would join the Hundig—Brunhilde position.

(c) The plan of retreat called for a thorough demolition of railroads, roads, and mines. Supplies from Germany were cut down to absolute essentials and a large scale evacuation of heavy material to Germany was undertaken. It was also directed that fortresses in Alsace-Lorraine should be put into a state of defense and that all military material not required

for immediate use should be removed from the region west and south of the Herman—Hundig—Brunhilde line.

(d) On August 13, at a conference at the new German General Headquarters at Spa, to which place it had been moved from Avesnes on August 8, and over which conference the Kaiser presided, it was decided that Germany had no other alternative than to ask for peace. Marshal von Hindenburg however, recommended that no official steps in the direction of peace be taken until there should be some improvement in the military situation. He hoped to accomplish this by making the Allies and America pay so much for their gains that they would be inclined toward peace.

(2) *Allied plans.* Marshal Foch planned to continue without relaxation the great converging maneuver then developing, under which the southern forces under General Petain would recapture the Chemin des Dames and the northern forces under Marshal Haig would penetrate the German line in the vicinity of Cambrai.

(3) *Operations.* The operations which forced the Germans back to the Siegfried line were conducted by Marshal Haig on the north, who was exploiting the success of the reduction of the Amiens salient, and by General Petain on the south, who was exploiting the success of the reduction of the Marne salient. These operations properly may be considered in two phases, namely, first phase, to September 7, and second phase, September 8 to 25.

(a) *The first phase (to September 7).* (i) *Marshal Haig's maneuver.* Marshal Haig's plan was to attack on the whole front of the British First, Third, and Fourth Armies to drive the enemy to the east and to hold him while delivering the main blow at the junction of the Siegfried and the Wotan lines, in the vicinity of Queant, with a view to enveloping the north flank of the dislocated southern wing of the German forces. The attack was launched at 5:00 AM, September 2, and progressed all day. The German resistance was principally by machine gun fire. The force to deliver the main blow against the junction of the Siegfried and the Wotan lines was composed of two specially constituted units. The first unit was the Canadian Corps of the First Army, reinforced by forty tanks, Canadian cavalry, armored cars, and a mobile force of motor machine gun units. With three divisions on a four and one-half-mile front, it advanced to the attack, on September 2, at

5:00 AM, and penetrated the Wotan line just north of the junction. At the same time, the XVII Corps of the British Third Army attacked and captured the triangle of fortifications marking the junction of the Wotan and the Siegfried lines. This success menaced the right flank of the dislocated southern wing of the German armies. Marshal von Hindenburg, at once, sent enough reserves to close the breach and gave the order for the step by step defensive retirement to begin from the Scarpe to the Vesle. The reduction of the Lys salient which really was a part of this operation has been described above.

(ii) *General Petain's maneuver.* The exploitation of the reduction of the Marne salient carried the operations north of Soissons. General Mangin, commanding the French Tenth Army, ordered a general attack at 5:25 AM, August 29, with the purpose of penetrating the German line in his front. While not succeeding in penetrating the German line, the Tenth Army crossed the Ailette on August 20, and by September 8 had driven the German Ninth Army (General von Eben) back beyond Servais. The American 32d Division (General Haan) participated in this operation. Its objective was the capture of Juvigny. It attacked, on August 30, with brigades in column, the 64th Brigade in front, and the 63d Brigade in support. The infantry regiments of the 64th Brigade attacked side by side, the 127th on the right and the 128th on the left, each with two battalions in the front line and one in reserve. The division was reinforced by two companies of tanks, by a troop of Moroccan cavalry, and by French artillery. The division led the Allied divisions on its right and left and in a well executed attack captured Juvigny. This opened the road from Soissons to Chaulny.

(iii) The French Sixth and Fifth Armies, farther to the east, crossed the Vesle on a frontage of thirty kilometers. The American 77th Division (Generals Duncan, Johnson, and Alexander) and the American 28th Division (General Muir), already north of the Vesle, by aggressive action in their sectors which reflected great credit upon American arms, drove the Germans northward to the Aisne.

(iv) *Combined operations in the center.* From Bapaume to the Oise, the British Third and Fourth Armies and the French First and Third Armies aggressively pursued the Germans by rapid advances and tactical victories, up to September 7,

when the Germans held between the Canal du Nord and the Oise on the line: Marauion—Trescaut—St. Simon—Crozat Canal, in order to gain time for the strengthening of the Siegfried line.

(b) *The second phase (to September 25).* (i) Marshal Foch desired to continue the operation with such vigor that Marshal von Hindenburg would not have any chance to attempt to seize the initiative. In pursuance of that plan, he issued instructions that there would be no pause in the operations.

(ii) On September 12, the British Third Army with two corps, on a front of five miles, captured the villages of Trescourt and Havrincourt, and by a succession of small local attacks, continued to drive the Germans on that north pivot back to the Siegfried line. Also, by a local attack, the French Third Army (General Humbert) crossed the Crozat Canal and drove the German line back to Travecy on the Siegfried line. The French First Army (General Debeney) also, by local attacks, kept the initiative and made small advances. On September 14, due to shortening of the line, the staff of the French Third Army was sent to reserve and the troops were sent to the First Army.

(iii) On September 18, Marshal Foch, by a combined British—French action, attacked the whole German force that was still in front of the Siegfried line. Marshal Haig attacked at 7:00 AM, in a heavy rain, with the British Third and Fourth Armies from Gouzecourt to Holnon, and by the 25th had forced the Germans on his front back to the Siegfried line. In this attack, dummy tanks were used with great success against the Germans. At the same time, the French First Army, by energetic attacks with limited objectives, forced the German line in its front back to the Siegfried line. The Tenth Army during this time attacked and advanced its right by capture of the high ground: La Malmaison—Pinon which controlled the Chemin-des-Dames (Maps 59, 71).

6. Reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient. (Maps 25, 35, 45, 63, 119, 128, 129 and 130.) *a. Organization of the American First Army.* (1) When the United States entered the war, the attitude of the Allies indicated a desire to utilize the American troops as a great reservoir from which to reinforce Allied troop units. Later, the Allies desired to make use of such reinforcements by absorbing American companies and battalions into Allied organizations.

(2) It was evident that American forces constituted the only hope of an Allied victory, and General Pershing insisted that the American forces could better assure such victory if formed into a distinctively American force which would deliver an American blow against Germany on a fixed part of the line.

(3) In a conference between General Pershing and General Petain at Chantilly May 19, 1918, i.e., in the interval between the German Lys offensive (April 9) and the Marne offensive (May 27), it was agreed that the American army would soon take complete charge of a sector in the Woevre when four American divisions would be on that line.

(4) Several American divisions had finished their training and were ready for active service against the Germans. However, General Pershing waived such use of these divisions, for the present, and again placed all American forces at General Foch's disposal to stop the German Marne offensive of May 27. They did stop it.

(5) In pursuance of his plan to create an American force that could deliver a decisive blow against Germany, the next step was to group those divisions into American corps. This grouping was effected as follows:

(a) *The I Corps.* The I Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed January 20, 1918, with the mission of taking over a sector on the Lorraine front with the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions. Major General Hunter Liggett was placed in command with Headquarters at Neufchateau.

(b) *The II Corps.* The II Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed February 20, 1918, with the immediate mission of supervising the administration and training of American divisions on the British part of the line. General Pershing, himself, retained command of the II Corps until June 14, 1918, when Major General George W. Read was placed in command of the Corps.

(c) *The III Corps.* The III Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed May 16, 1918, with the mission of administering the 3d, 5th and 32d Divisions. Major General Robert L. Bullard was placed in command.

(d) *The IV Corps.* The IV Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed June 21, 1918, and Major General Joseph T. Dickman was placed in command.

(e) *The V Corps.* The V Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed about August 1, 1918, with Major General George H. Cameron in command.

(f) *The VI Corps.* The VI Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed about September 1, 1918, with General Omar Bundy in command.

(g) *The VII Corps.* The VII Corps Staff and Headquarters was formed about September 1, 1918.

(6) The American First Army was organized on the Vesle front. During August, the American I and III Corps were serving side by side in the Marne salient. Marshal Foch, on August 9, finally consented to the organization of the American First Army, with headquarters at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and agreed to its early transfer to the Woevre sector on a front extending from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to the north of St. Mihiel. General Pershing arranged the details later the same day with General Petain. On August 10, General Pershing created the American First Army, retaining command thereof himself, with Brigadier General H. A. Drum as Chief of Staff.

(7) General Pershing took over nominal control of a sector on the Vesle front but began the secret transfer of the First Army, at once, to the Woevre front, with headquarters at Neufchateau, under the mission of reducing the St. Mihiel salient, assigned to him by General Foch, at Bombon, on July 24.

(8) General Pershing was concentrating the elements of the First Army from the various places to which the units had been sent under emergency call to stop the German offensive, and was organizing the First Army under the plan that it would require eleven American divisions for the first operation, i.e., the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, when he received a request from Marshal Foch, on August 23, for the detachment of five divisions, namely; the 27th and 30th to the British, and the 28th, 32d and 37th to the French, for reinforcement of their effort to continue the exploitation of the reduction of the Amiens and Marne salients. This request considerably inconvenienced the organization of the First Army and the preparation for the maneuver of reducing the St. Mihiel salient. Observing the French and English striving to obtain the use of American troops, the Italians likewise made a very determined effort to secure the use of from twenty

to twenty-five American divisions but their request was not favorably received.

(9) The foregoing are some of the obstacles which General Pershing had to overcome in order to create an American army. Finally, however, at Marshal Foch's Headquarters at Bombon, on September 2, at a conference at which General Petain was present, Marshal Foch conceded General Pershing's claim that the American Army should be used as a unit.

b. Situation in the Woevre. (1) After General von Moltke's defeat at the First Battle of the Marne, his successor, General von Falkenhayn, by way of diversion and to rectify the line, attempted to reduce the Verdun salient by a converging maneuver. The northern force under the German Crown Prince was stopped by the French Third Army on September 24, 1914. The southern force under General von Strantz was not stopped until after it had pushed in the St. Mihiel salient and captured St. Mihiel.

(2) The St. Mihiel salient thus formed was about twenty-four miles wide along the base, and about fourteen miles deep. It extended from Les Eparges, via St. Mihiel and Seicheprey, to Pont-a-Mousson, a distance of about forty miles. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse. The southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for eight kilometers to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, including within the German lines the detached heights of Loupmont and Montsec, which dominated the plain and afforded the Germans unusual facilities for observation. In this section, the fall rains begin about the middle of September, after which the Woevre plains become very difficult of passage.

(3) The French First Army attempted, without success, to reduce the St. Mihiel salient during February, 1915, as an operation with a limited objective and with the mission of retaining the initiative. Also, during the period April 5 to 14, 1915, the French High Command attempted, without success, to reduce the salient with four army corps and a cavalry corps in a converging maneuver intended to pinch off the salient along its base.

(4) From a defensive point of view to the Germans, the salient covered the great German fortress of Metz and its very sensitive railroad center. It also covered the extensive

mining region near Briey upon which Germany was dependent for iron.

From an offensive point of view to the Germans, the salient interrupted the main Paris—Nancy railroad, and the Toul—Verdun railroad. It also threatened a penetration of the French defensive system and was a constant check on French freedom of action, particularly against any offensive that might be launched from Verdun, the Argonne, or Champagne, against the German line of communications Metz—Mezierres.

(5) As the railroad from Verdun to St. Menehould was under German interdiction fire, the Germans in the St. Mihiel salient, at first, practically deprived Verdun of railroad communication. Verdun, in 1916, was saved by motor transport. But it was not until the French had built a new direct railroad from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, that Verdun became secure from a supply point of view.

(6) In addition to utilizing the salient's natural strength, the Germans organized it for defense. The first line of defense consisted of two positions, namely, the Wilhelm position and the Schroerer position. The Wilhelm position paralleled the front line and was close to it. About five kilometers farther to the rear the Germans had constructed the strong Schroerer position which, at its bases, joined the Michel position. The latter extending along the base of the salient was a part of the German second line of defense. During a period of four years the Germans had perfected the defense of the salient by every artificial means.

c. Plans. (1) *German plans.* (a) After General von Falkenhayn's defeat at Verdun, von Hindenburg had estimated that the French would reduce the St. Mihiel salient, and he had plans prepared for its evacuation to the Michel position. After the Allied successful exploitation of the reduction of the Amiens salient, he gave orders for a retreat to the Siegfried line. In like manner, on September 8, he directed the German forces in the St. Mihiel salient to withdraw to the Michel position. Because of the important industrial area in rear, guarded by the salient, and because of local confidence in ability to hold the salient, the execution of the order was not expedited either at the headquarters of General von Gallwitz's group or at the headquarters of General Fuch's Army Detachment C.

(b) The St. Mihiel salient was garrisoned by Army Detachment C (General Fuch), which was a part of General von Gallwitz's Army Group and consisted of the following forces:

The Bavarian I Corps on the south face with five divisions.
The V Corps on the west face with three divisions.
The first reserve line—one division in the lower third of the salient.
The general reserves—four divisions in the heart of the salient.

(2) *General Pershing's plan.* (a) General Pershing's general plan was to attract German attention to Belfort and then to reduce the St. Mihiel salient by the surprise delivery of a converging attack against the two faces of the salient; the stronger blow against the southern face, following an exceedingly intense but short artillery preparation. The two blows were to be accompanied by a holding attack against the nose of the salient.

(b) The order of battle from right to left was as follows:

(i) *The southern force.* The American I Corps (General Liggett), with right near Pont-a-Mousson, had divisions on the line as follows: 82d (General Burnham), 90th (General Allen), 5th (General McMahon), and 2d (General Lejeune), with the 78th (General McRae) in reserve.

The American IV Corps (General Dickman), with right joining the left of the I Corps, had divisions on the line as follows: 89th (General Wright), 42d (General Menoher), and 1st (General Summerall), with the 3d (General Buck) in reserve.

(ii) *Central force (French).* The French II Colonial Corps (General Blondlet), with right joining the left of the American IV Corps, had French divisions on the line as follows: 39th, 36th, and the 2d Cavalry Division (dismounted).

(iii) *The western force.* The American V Corps (General Cameron), with right joining the left of the French II Corps, had divisions on the line as follows: 26th (General Edwards), 4th (General Hines), and the French 15th. The left of the line was near Watronville.

(iv) General Pershing held the 35th and 91st Divisions (Generals Traub and Johnston) in rear of the western face of the salient, in reserve, and a general reserve consisting of the 80th Division (General Cronkhite) in rear of the western face and the 33d Division (General Bell) in rear of the southern face.

(c) *General Pershing's detailed plan.* (i) General Pershing's plan for attracting the German attention to Belfort provided for the movement of the American VI Corps Head-

quarters (General Bundy) to Belfort where it would establish itself and prepare detailed plans for an American offensive from that region toward Mulhouse, with the mission of insuring the destruction of the Rhine bridges and of establishing American lines along the Rhine.

(ii) General Pershing's detailed plan for the main operation called for a four hours' violent artillery preparation which would include interdiction of the extremely sensitive German road and railroad net back of the salient to include Metz.

(iii) The southern force, pivoting on the Moselle, and with its left near Xivray, was to swing in toward Vigneulles at dawn, on September 12, with seven divisions on a twelve-mile front. The 1st Division, on the left of the IV Corps, was to execute the double mission of protecting its own flank and of advancing about twelve miles due north toward the heart of the salient to make contact with troops of the V Corps.

(iv) The western force was to attack at 8:00 AM, on September 12, as follows: The 26th Division on the right of the V Corps was to make a deep advance southeast toward Vigneulles. The 4th Division was not to advance. The French 15th Division was to make a short advance to the edge of the heights to cover the left of the 26th Division.

(v) The French II Colonial Corps, covering a front of twenty-five miles on the nose of the salient, was to follow up the retreat of the enemy.

d. Concentration of troops. (1) The concentration for that operation, which was to be a surprise, involved the movement of approximately 500,000 troops which marched at night and remained concealed during the day. The American divisions, on September 1, were scattered on the line from Switzerland to the Oise, with the 27th and 30th Divisions in the II Corps still farther north in the British sector. The center of mass of the American divisions not on the line was south of Toul and east of Chaumont.

(2) (a) The French were generous in giving General Pershing assistance in that operation. Their staff assistance was valuable and they also furnished troops and weapons. The French II Colonial Corps, consisting of two infantry divisions and one cavaly division, was to hold its place against the nose of the salient. A fourth French division was placed under General Pershing's orders for use with the northern converging force near Les Eparges.

(b) The French also assisted materially toward the organization of corps and army troops by furnishing the following:

580 guns of 75-mm. caliber.
793 heavy cannon and mortars of various calibers.
182 trench mortars.
273 tanks.
An independent aerial division.

(c) This air division, together with bombing squadrons furnished by the British and the American forces, composed the largest assembly of aviation ever engaged in one operation on the Western front.

e. Operations. (1) *Belfort diversion.* Although the Belfort diversion did not succeed in making Marshal von Hindenburg believe that the expected American effort would be delivered at Belfort, it did create a sufficient doubt in his mind to cause him to reinforce General von Gundell's Army Detachment there by three divisions.

(2) *Main operation.* (a) After a violent artillery preparation of four hours, the attack, assisted by light tanks, was launched against the southern face of the salient at 5:00 AM, on September 12, in a dense fog, and advanced under cover of a great volume of artillery fire. Under similar conditions, the attack was launched against the west face of the salient, at 8:00 AM.

(b) The Germans, slow in executing the order to evacuate the salient, had apparently started to withdraw some troops on the eve of the attack, but had been unable to carry it through. They had no expectation that an American attack could be prepared so quickly and were taken completely by surprise.

(c) The operation was carried out with entire precision. On September 12, the southern converging force reached and passed the line Faye-en-Haye—Thiaucourt—Nonsard; the western converging force passed the line Combres—Dommartin—Sussey; and the French II Corps captured St. Mihiel and Apremont. The next day, September 13, the two converging forces joined at dawn near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, and advancing, reached the line: Noroy—Hattonville—Fresnes, which included all objectives. However, it was difficult to restrain the Americans who finally had obtained their chance to fight under their own officers, and by the 15th they had reached the line north of Noroy—north to Noel—Fresnes.

That completed the operation for the time being and the line was stabilized to be held by a smaller force.

(d) Nearly 16,000 prisoners, about 440 cannon, and large stores of materiel and supplies were captured at a cost of less than 7,000 casualties.

(e) Although the fighting was not as violent in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient as was the fighting by the 1st and 2d Divisions in the offensive toward Soissons, July 18, the result of the St. Mihiel operation had a profound effect on the contesting parties in the war. The mere presence of an American army in the line, capable of the effort described above, made a tremendous impression on all—both enemies and friends. The American troops had implicit confidence in their superiority. No propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the German troops of that demonstration of American ability to organize a large American force and to drive it successfully through the German defenses.

(f) The principal comment to be made on the St. Mihiel operation is that General Pershing here made the demonstration that the tactical doctrine of open warfare, in which he had trained the American forces, was correct.

7. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. (Maps 63, 78 and 131.)

a. The principle of security. (1) When General Foch, during the Second Battle of the Marne, decided to seize the initiative and to conduct offensive warfare, he divided that offensive into two periods. The offensive in the first period was to consist of several operations, each with a limited objective. He estimated that the attainment of those limited objectives would occupy the rest of the year 1918, and that in 1919 he could launch a general offensive for the purpose of gaining a decision. That general offensive was to be the second period.

(2) When General Foch made that decision, Germany occupied the most advanced position that she had attained on the Western front. From the Marne salient she threatened Paris, and it was necessary to immobilize troops for the defense of that city. From the Amiens salient, she threatened a penetration between the French and the British forces, and it was necessary to immobilize troops to protect that junction. From the Lys salient, she threatened the British base ports on the Channel, and it was necessary to immobilize troops to protect those ports. From the St. Mihiel salient, she threatened the line of communications of the Verdun salient, and it was neces-

sary to immobilize troops to protect those communications. Although Germany had failed in her great offensive she still occupied vantage points, from which, under favorable conditions, she might harm the Allied and American force.

(3) The situation, at this time, immobilized a large part of the Allied and American forces, and, moreover, the fact that his lines of communication were interdicted, deprived General Foch of freedom of action. His mission, therefore, was not only to make secure those lines of communication, but also to win freedom of action for decisive operations.

b. Through the offensives which, by September 25, 1918, reduced the Marne, the Amiens, the Lys, and the St. Mihiel salients, Marshal Foch observed the *principle of security* in that he gained freedom of action for the launching of an unlimited decisive general offensive operation.

CHAPTER XIX

Allied and American General Offensive to the End of the War

Page

1. SITUATION, SEPTEMBER 25, 1918 371
   a. Description of the battlefield 371
      (1) Line from Switzerland to Metz 371
      (2) Line from Metz to the Channel 371
   b. German situation 372
   c. Allied and American situation 373

2. PLANS 375
   a. German plans 375
      (1) General plans 375
      (2) Defensive system 375
      (3) German order of battle 377
   b. Marshal Foch's plan 378
   c. General Pershing's plans and preparation 379
      (1) The American sector 379
         (a) Its boundaries 379
         (b) Obstacles in front 380
            (i) Natural obstacles 380
            (ii) Artificial obstacles 380
            (iii) The Meuse-Argonne defile 381
         (c) Relation between American First Army and French Fourth Army 381
         (d) Enemy order of battle 382
      (2) General Pershing's general plan 382
      (3) American order of battle 382
      (4) General Pershing's plan of maneuver west of the Meuse 383

3. PHASES OF THE OPERATION 384

4. OPERATIONS—THE FIRST PHASE (SEPTEMBER 26-OCTOBER 13)—PENETRATION OF GERMAN FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE 385
   a. The southern converging blow 385
      (1) The American First Army 385
      (2) The French Fourth Army 387
      (3) The American 2d Division captures Blanc Mont 388
         (a) Situation 388
         (b) The 2d Division plan 389
         (c) The attack 389
      (4) The American 36th Division pursues to the Aisne 390
   b. Operations against the German center 390
      (1) Operations north of the Oise 390
         (a) Obstacles 390
         (b) Mission 390
         (c) Order of battle 391
         (d) Plan 391
         (e) The attack on Cambrai 391

(f) Main blow by Fourth Army (U. S. II Corps) 391
(i) The plan 391
(ii) Obstacles 391
(iii) The attack 392
(2) Operations east of the Oise 393
c. The northern converging blow 393
d. Results of the first phase operation 394

5. Operations—The Second Phase (October 13-20)—Driving the Germans Back to Second Line of Defense 395
a. Plans 395
(1) Marshal von Hindenburg's plan 395
(2) Marshal Foch's plan 395
b. The southern converging blow 395
(1) General Pershing's Group of Armies 395
(2) The French Fourth Army 396
c. The northern converging blow 396
d. Operations against the German center 396
e. Results of the second phase operation 397

6. Operations.—The Third Phase (October 20-November 4)—Penetration of German Second Line of Defense 398
a. Plans 398
(1) Marshal von Hindenburg's plan 398
(2) Marshal Foch's plan 398
b. The northern converging blow 398
c. Operations against the German center 399
d. Southern converging blow 400
(1) Situation 400
(2) General Pershing's attack, November 1 400
(a) Situation, October 31 400
(b) General Pershing's plan 400
(i) General plan 400
(ii) Purpose 401
(iii) Method 401
(iv) Plan of maneuver 401
(v) Order of battle 401
(vi) Artillery plan 401
(c) Operations 402
e. Results of third phase operation 403

7. Operations.—The Fourth Phase (November 4-11)—The Pursuit 403
a. Plans 403
(1) Marshal von Hindenburg's plans 403
(2) Marshal Foch's plan 403
(3) General Pershing's plan 403
b. Operations 403
(1) The Allied front 403
(2) The American front 404
(a) The First Army 404
(b) The Second Army 405

8. Armistice 405
a. German request for armistice 405
b. Terms of the Armistice 405
c. The advance into Germany 405

9. Return of American Forces to America 406

10. General Pershing 406

11. The Principles of War.—The Principle of the Offensive 407

1. SITUATION, SEPTEMBER 25, 1918. (Maps 61, 114, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 and 150.) *a. Description of the battlefield.* From the south to north, the battle line was approximately in the form of the capital letter "S" with the center of the letter between the two loops, just east of Verdun. The situations within those two loops were not alike.

(1) *Line from Switzerland to Metz (inclusive), i.e., the lower loop.* (a) From Switzerland to the Moselle, near Metz, the line ran throughout its length in front of the German permanent line of fortifications. Conforming to the frontier, and to the fortification line, it constituted a French salient whose base was about one hundred miles long and whose depth was about fifteen miles. The eastern face lay west of the Rhine from Switzerland to Strasbourg (inclusive) and was exceedingly strong. The other face, from Strasbourg via Mohrange to Metz (inclusive), passed through exceedingly difficult and easily defendable terrain, which had been greatly strengthened both before and during the war. The French failed to penetrate that line in September, 1914.

(b) An operation against the German line from Switzerland to Metz would have to have been organized with the greatest care. As the center of gravity of troops, material, and tranportation, on September 25, was far to the west and northwest, a considerable period of time would have been required for the organization of such an offensive. If such an offensive had been organized, it would have been forced to operate through exceedingly difficult terrain, against a line of permanent fortifications, and would have been subject to a German converging counter offensive from the general directions of Neuf Brisach and Mohrange. Operations against this line, if successful, would deliver a decisive blow against the southern flank of the German forces.

(2) *Line from Metz (inclusive) to the English Channel.* (a) The line from Metz to the English Channel constituted the other or upper loop. It ran from Metz, in a general westerly direction north of Verdun and Rheims, to the heights of the Aisne, which was the commanding terrain of northeastern France. Passing thereafter between Soissons and Laon, it ran a little west of north to the sea.

(b) *A German salient.* (i) In general terms, the battle line from Metz to the sea inclosed a German salient whose

base line from Metz to Ostend was nearly one hundred and eighty miles, whose depth was about sixty miles, and whose front line was more than three hundred miles long.

(ii) This salient, although apparently satisfactory for offensive operations, was inherently weak for defensive operations.

(iii) Its base line from Metz to Ostend rested upon a triangular area of French and Belgian occupied territory whose eastern face was the German frontier from near Metz north to Holland, and whose northern face, making practically an angle of 90° with the eastern face, extended along the southern boundary of Holland to the sea east of Bruges, and along the sea to include Ostend.

(iv) Thus the northern face of the triangular area rested on a neutral country whose boundary could not be crossed by German forces without being interned and on the sea which the Allies and America then controlled.

(v) The eastern face and the northern face of that triangular area were each about two hundred miles long.

(vi) Although a right angled base line is best, particularly in time of retreat, in this case it was a source of weakness to Germany because she did not control the northern leg of that base line, and would be entirely dependent on the eastern leg, i.e., from near Metz to Holland, for lines of communication and retreat.

b. German situation. (1) By September 25, the Germans had been driven out of the St. Mihiel salient, and, on the rest of the French front, had been forced back to the line from which they launched their great offensive earlier in the year.

(2) The shortening of the line and the strength of the Siegfried line had given an opportunity for some rest and to make an effort to build up a reserve. However, the Allied and American blows near the junction of the British and French forces had been delivered with such vigor, and so continually, that von Hindenburg was forced to create a new Group Headquarters to attend to that special situation. Von Boehn was placed in command of the new group which consisted of the Second Army (von Carlowitz), the Eighteenth Army (von Huttier), and the Ninth Army (von Eben). Von Boehn's Group was placed between the Group of the Crown Prince of Germany and the Group of the Crown Prince of Bavaria.

(3) On September 21, it was reported in Berlin that Bulgaria had asked for an armistice. As a matter of fact, she did not ask for the armistice until September 25.

(4) German morale was very low. The Kaiser, although Supreme Commander on all the fronts of the Central Powers, retained personal command on the Western front, exercising it through Marshal von Hindenburg.

(5) (a) The German lines of communication to the Western front north of Metz, and the lines of retreat therefrom, rested on two great trunk lines. One was the main railroad line from Germany to Paris via Liege. The other was the railroad system that came from the Rhine between Coblenz and Strasbourg, both inclusive, and that fed the line through the Luxembourg—Metz net.

(b) The Ardennes Forest, between those two trunk railroads, was so difficult of passage that no east and west railroad had been constructed in it.

(c) The Liege line covered the front from St. Quentin (inclusive) north to the sea, and the Luxembourg—Metz net covered the front: St. Quentin (exclusive) to the Moselle (inclusive). A small cross line connected those two trunk lines between Luxembourg and Namur. However, the main cross supply line in France was the Metz—Mezieres—Valenciennes—Doual—Lille—Courtrai—Ghent (Gand) line.

c. Allied and American situation. (1) (a) The Germans had been pushed back so far that rail communication had become much easier along the whole line.

(b) On September 3, the United States, following the lead of the Allies, recognized Czecho-Slovakia as a belligerent nation, as a war measure, because such recognition tended to disrupt Austria-Hungary, with whom the United States had been at war since December 7, 1917, and also tended to raise up a hostile state on Germany's border.

(c) American troops were still arriving at the rate of about 10,000 a day. Also, on September 12, about 13,000,000 more Americans were registered for military service under the second American Selective Service Act.

(d) Although success had attended the Allied and American execution of the limited objective operations called for in the first period of Marshal Foch's plan, and it was apparent to all that the time had arrived for the general offensive called

for in the *second period of his plan*, neither he or any of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief believed that a decision could be secured in 1918.

(2) (a) General Pershing, with Allied approval, organized the American Expeditionary Force for delivery of a distinctively American blow in Lorraine. In emergency, Marshal Foch used the American forces.

(b) Marshal Foch approved the organization of the American First Army, but did not authorize its use as such except in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. General Pershing desired the assignment of the American First Army to a sector in Lorraine.

(c) The subject of an American sector was considered at a conference between Marshal Foch and General Pershing at the latter's headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois on August 30. Marshal Foch announced that, in view of the success of the British at Amiens and the French at Chemin des Dames, he believed that the limited Allied offensive (i.e., *first period*) which was to prepare for the campaign of 1919 (i.e., *second period*) might be carried farther in 1918. He then proposed to split up the American forces as follows:

First: To limit the objective in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient to the line: Thiaucourt—Vigneulles, thus freeing the Paris—Avricourt railroad, and to reduce the American force used to ten or eleven divisions.

Second: To reinforce the French Second Army with four to six American divisions for an attack between the Meuse and the Argonne.

Third: To limit the American army to eight or ten divisions and to make a group of it with the French Fourth Army for a Franco-American attack extending from the Argonne west to the Souain Road. The attack was to be delivered by the American army astride the Aisne on the right, and by the French Fourth Army on the left.

(d) General Pershing told Marshal Foch that he could not accept the latter's proposals for the following reasons:

First: It was contrary to the idea of a distinctly American army operating on a particular front for which an enormous amount of preparation had already been made in construction of base ports, roads, railroads, regulating stations, etc., and for which idea General Pershing had been insistent from the beginning.

Second: The older American divisions had encountered so much difficulty, in their service with the French and British, that they were no longer willing to be incorporated in the Allied armies, even by larger units; and, if so incorporated, American morale would suffer further. General Pershing then very frankly told Marshal Foch that the strategical employment of the American First Army would be undertaken wherever Marshal Foch desired, but that the proposal of the latter to disrupt the American army for service with French armies would not be entertained.

(3) A further conference was held, on September 2, at Marshal Foch's headquarters at Bombon, with General Petain present. After considerable discussion, Marshal Foch conceded a distinctively American sector on the line in Lorraine.

2. PLANS. *a. German plans.* (1) *General plans.* Von Hindenburg realized that Germany could not win. He estimated that diplomacy and a bold defensive would secure a better peace than could be secured by surrender. His general plan for that bold defensive was, while defending the fortified line from Switzerland to Metz, to conduct a step by step defensive north of Metz from the great salient in France and Belgium to the German boundary, where, if necessary, the whole manhood of Germany should be called to the colors in a *levee en masse* to protect the Fatherland from invasion. The defense was to be conducted with the view of inflicting such great losses on the Allies and Americans as would incline them to more favorable peace terms than they then would be willing to give.

(2) *Defensive system.* The German defense system may be divided into two parts, the permanent defenses and the temporary defenses.

(a) *Permanent defenses.* Before the war, Germany fortified her side of the French frontier from Switzerland to Luxemburg at great expense and in a most efficient manner. That line consisted of the fortified areas: Istein-Neuf Brisach—Strasbourg—Mohrange, and Metz—Thionville. The part from Switzerland to Strasbourg (inclusive) defended the line of the Rhine. The line from Strasbourg to Metz was strengthened by the extensive fortified area of Mohrange. It was there that the French offensive, in September, 1914, was stopped and turned back. The part of the line from Switzerland to Luxemburg was exceedingly strong.

(b) *Temporary defense lines.* The lines of temporary defense, contemplated for this step by step defensive, including the line the Germans then occupied, were as follows:

(i) First line of defense: Preuss position from English Channel to junction with Wotan position near Lille. Wotan position to junction with Siegfried position northwest of Cambrai. Siegfried position from Cambrai passing west of St. Quentin to junction with Aisne—Vesle position west of Rheims —Apremont—Michel position—then to Switzerland. The first line of defense covered the following cross railroad line: Ostend —Courtrai—Lille—Douai—Valenciennes—Mezieres—Metz.

(ii) Second line of defense: Lys position from Dutch frontier northwest of Ecloo to junction with Herman position north of Tournai. Herman position, via Valenciennes, to junction with Hundig position on the Oise north of Laon. Hundig—Brunhilde position, via Rethel, to junction with Kriemhilde position southeast of Vouziers. Kriemhilde position along east bank of the Aisne to south of Vouziers, thence east to junction with first line of defense east of the Meuse. The second line of defense covered the following cross railroad line, Ghent—Brussels—Mons—Avesnes—Mezieres—Metz.

(iii) A switch line from the Dutch boundary, north of Ghent, extended via Ghent and along the Escaut River to junction with the second line of defense north of Tournai. It was intended to increase the defensive strength of the north line which rested on the Dutch border, and to protect the Antwerp—Brussels—Mons—Avesnes cross railroad line.

(iv) Third line of defense: Antwerp—Meuse position from Dutch boundary at mouth of Escaut—west of Antwerp—west of Brussels—Charleroi—east bank of Meuse to junction with the second and first lines of defense east of the Meuse and north of Verdun. The third line of defense covered the following cross railroad lines: Antwerp—Brussels—Namur—Mezieres—Metz, and the smaller cross railroad line further east: Namur—Luxemburg.

(v) The fourth line of defense: The Grenz position along the German boundary via both sides of Luxembourg to junction with first line of defense at the Moselle. The fourth line of defense was not organized. It was contemplated that the manhood of Germany, called to the colors as a *levee en masse*, would defend the Fatherland at the Grenz position.

(vi) Each of these lines was an exceedingly deep defensive zone, selected with the greatest care to take the maximum advantage of the defensive possibilities of the terrain. Various positions, particularly in the first line, were to be strengthened by reinforced concrete. The whole system was the most comphrehensive system for defense in history. A distinguishing feature of this system of temporary defense was the use of concrete for construction of strong points and places of shelter.

(vii) The German pivot: Metz—Mezieres, was defended by the first, second, and third lines. The railroad line: Mezieres—Valenciennes, was defended by the first and second lines. The railroad line: Valenciennes—Douai—Lille—Courtrai—Ostend, was defended by the first line only. This reveals the German plan to hold the line in front of Carignan—Sedan as the pivot of the whole German defense system in France and Belgium. Germany's whole plan for the step by step defensive was based on each line holding until the railroad which it was covering had done its work. Accordingly, sensitiveness increased from north to south, until the most sensitive line: Mezieres—Sedan—Carignan, was reached. This line was so sensitive that its penetration would force the surrender of German troops west of the line: Mezieres—Antwerp.

(3) *German order of battle.* The German order of battle from Switzerland to the Channel was as follows:

Duke of Wurtemburg's Group, to Metz (inclusive):
- Detachement B (von Gunde l).
- Detachment A (von Mudra).
- The Nineteenth Army (von Bothmer).

Von Gallwitz's Group, to the Meuse (inclusive):
- Detachment C (von Fuchs).
- The Fifth Army (von Marwitz).

German Crown Prince's Group, to the Aisne (inclusive):
- The Third Army (von Einem).
- The First Army (Fritz von Below).
- The Seventh Army (von Eberhardt).

Von Boehn's Group, to Cambrai (inclusive):
- The Ninth Army (von Eben).
- The Eighteenth Army (von Huttier).
- The Second Army (von Carlowitz).

Bavarian Crown Prince's Group, to the Sea:
- The Seventeenth Army (Otto von Below).
- The Sixth Army (von Quast).
- The Fourth Army (von Arnim).

(4) (a) Germany had a total of 163 divisions on the line, with 68, of which only 28 were fresh, in the strategical reserve.

In spite of a reduction of the line by about 120 miles, Germany was forced to use as many divisions on the line as on July 15.

(b) To secure replacements, Germany had been forced to dissolve sixteen divisions and to reduce the battalions of fifty divisions from four to three companies each.

(c) German General Headquarters were still maintained at Spa.

b. Marhsal Foch's plan. (1) In view of the success of the Allied and American limited objective offensive, Marshal Foch believed that the general offensive should be launched, although he did not expect it to end the war in 1918.

(2) (a) His general plan for that general offensive was to launch a great surprise converging offensive against the great German salient in France and Belgium with the idea of decisively defeating the Germans and forcing them to ask for peace.

(b) His plan conformed to the normal method of reducing a salient, i.e., to strike along the base of the salient on both of its faces while pressing the salient in by constant attack against its nose.

(3) Marshal Foch selected General Pershing to deliver the principal blow, along the base of the salient from the south, with the American army on the Meuse-Argonne front. The object was to capture the pivot of the German defense system north of Verdun and to cut the German lines of communication in the vicinity of Sedan. It was a plan for a strategical penetration. The American effort was to be supported by General Gouraud with the French Fourth Army, whose sector on the left of the American army extended to the River Suippe. Marshal Foch charged General Petain with the duty of coordinating the effort of these two armies.

(4) Marshal Foch selected the King of Belgium to deliver the blow along the northern base of the salient, in the general direction of Ghent, with the Flanders Group, consisting of the British Second, French Sixth, and the Belgian Army, with the task of cutting the German line of communications near Ghent and forcing the Germans away from the English Channel.

(5) To force the Germans back from the nose of the salient, Marshal Foch planned two maneuvers: first, that the French Fifth and Tenth Armies should drive the Germans beyond the Aisne, and, second, that the French First and the British Fourth, Third, and First Armies should attack in the direction of St. Quentin—Cambrai.

(6) These plans were announced to the Allied and American Commanders-in-Chief at the conference at Bombon on September 2, the necessary orders being issued the next day.

(7) The Allied and American order of battle, from Switzerland to the sea was as follows:

French Eastern Group (General Castelnau), to the Moselle:
The Seventh Army (General De Boissoudy).
The Eighth Army (General Gerard).
American Group (General Pershing), to the Aisne:
The First Army (General Pershing).
French Center Group (General Maistre), to the Aisne west of Rheims:
The Fourth Army (General Gouraud).
The Fifth Army (General Berthelot).
French Reserve Group (General Fayolle), to the Somme:
The Tenth Army (General Mangin).
The First Army (General Debeney).
British Group (Marshal Haig), to the Lys:
The Fourth Army (General Rawlinson).
The Third Army (General Byng).
The First Army (General Horne).
The Fifth Army (General Birdwood).
Flanders Group (King Albert), to the sea:
The British Second Army (General Plummer).
The French Sixth Army (General Degoutte).
The Belgian Army (General Wilmans).

(8) The following were Commanders-in-Chief:

General Petain of French forces, with headquarters at Provins, east of Paris.

Marshal Haig of British forces, with headquarters at Montreuil, northwest of Amiens.

General Pershing of American forces, with headquarters at Chaumont, on the Marne.

King Albert of the Belgian forces, with headquarters at Hauthem, south of Dunkirk.

Marshal Foch was actually the Commander-in-Chief (but without the title) of the Allied and American forces on the French front.

c. General Pershing's plan and preparation. (1) *The American sector.* (a) *Its boundaries.* (i) Most of the Allied troops were already in the sectors where they were to fight or in nearby reserves. The new element in the approaching great battle was the entry of the American forces on the line in an American sector.

(ii) The decisive strategical direction, for delivery of a blow that would defeat Germany on the Western front, was from the Meuse-Argonne front toward the pivot of the German defense system north of Verdun, and toward the German line of communications near Carignan—Sedan.

(iii) General Pershing believed that the war-worn Allied troops did not have the morale or offensive spirit necessary

for delivery of a decisive blow. So, when Marshal Foch gave him the choice, on September 2, of the Champagne or the Meuze-Argonne, he chose the Meuse-Argonne sector at once, as the post of honor, where the Americans should deliver the decisive blow for which they were sent to France.

(iv) The sector given to General Pershing, on September 2, extended from Port-sur-Seille, on the east bank of the Moselle, west to include the Argonne Forest, a frontage of about one hundred kilometers. That part of the new sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while nominally under General Pershing's control, did not pass to his command until September 22, on which day he established his Army Headquarters at Souilly, southwest of Verdun.

(b) *Obstacles in front.* (i) *Natural obstacles.* The Argonne Forest was almost an impenetrable tangle. It was a thick growth on deep ridges and valleys ideally placed for defense. And, as at that time of the year, in that part of France, there is generally a cold, wet drizzle, the Argonne Forest was an exceedingly difficult place for offensive warfare.

The terrain between the Argonne and the Meuse was heavily ridged, with a general trend east and west, which, with wooded areas, rendered it easily defendable.

In the middle of the area, the heights of Montfaucon gave the Germans perfect observation and a strong natural position which they heavily fortified.

(ii) *Artificial obstacles.* The whole defense system of the German forces in France and Belgium pivoted in front of the American sector. The actual point of the pivot was near the Bois de Consevoye, on the east bank of the Meuse; but, in approaching that pivot, the lines of defense came very close together. The vital importance of that portion of the German defense system was fully appreciated by the German High Command, who accepted such tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun.

That front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German offensive in 1916, and the French counter offensive in 1917, had remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918.

The net result of the four years' struggle on that ground was a German defense system of unusual depth and strength,

with a wide zone of utter devastation in front, which, in itself, was a serious obstacle to offensive operations.

The German system of defense, making the best possible use of the terrain, was built up of four positions, with an intermediate position between the first and second positions, and a switch position from the third position down to the Aire River at Fleville.

The result was that the terrain in front of General Pershing's Army was a practically continuous line of defenses of more than twenty kilometers in depth.

(iii) *The Meuse-Argonne defile.* The dominating heights east of the Meuse not only protected the German left, but gave observation and positions from which the Germans could deliver oblique fire on the west bank of the Meuse. Also, batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne could cover the German right flank and cross their fire with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse, with the result that the problem presented to General Pershing practically was that of forcing a defile, and inasmuch as Montfaucon divided the defile into two nearly equal parts, giving crossfire both ways, the problem presented to General Pershing was practically the forcing of two defiles.

(c) *Relation between American First Army and French Fourth Army.* (i) There was an intimate relation between the approaching operations of the American First Army and the French Fourth Army (General Gouraud). The task of each was to force the Germans across the Meuse. The general direction of advance of the two was towards Sedan—Mezieres, the American army on the right.

(ii) That part of the American First Army advancing in the Argonne needed protection of its west flank by the French Fourth Army. Also, the direction of the Aisne River was such that the French Fourth Army, when solving the problem of crossing that river, would be greatly assisted by action of the American First Army against the German defending troops.

(iii) The two armies were not a group and the American First Army was not included in the French Center Group. Marshal Foch, however, for the above reasons, and also for expedition of supplies, charged General Petain, the French Commander-in-Chief, with the duty of coordinating the

operations of the American First Army and the French Fourth Army (General Gouraud).

(iv) As General Gouraud's Fourth Army did not extend to the Argonne, and as General Pershing's army was limited to the Argonne, there was a gap between the two armies and General Petain constituted a connecting group of two infantry regiments, one French and one American (the American regiment was the 368th Infantry), and a French artillery detachment. This connecting group, operating between the Argonne and the Aisne, was to connect the two armies and neutralize the western fringes of the Argonne Forest.

(d) *Enemy order of battle.* (i) The American First Army faced General von Gallwitz's Group. On the immediate front, from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the Argonne (inclusive), General von Gallwitz had eleven divisions on the line and five in reserve.

(ii) The center of the German mass was near the Moselle in front of Metz. Apparently, von Gallwitz interpreted the reduction of St. Mihiel, and the American ruse east of the Moselle, to mean that General Pershing intended to operate against Metz.

(2) *General Pershing's general plan.* General Pershing's general plan, for the offensive of September 26, was to hold with his right to the east of the Meuse, but with ruses as far south as Luneville to deceive General von Gallwitz as to the direction of attack, and to attack with his left to the west of the Meuse.

(3) *American order of battle.* American order of battle, from right to left, was as follows:

The American IV Corps (General Dickman), from Port-sur Seille to Thiaucourt (inclusive).
Headquarters Menil-la-Tour.
Divisions in line:
69th French Division, east bank of the Moselle.
90th Division (General Allen).
78th Division (General McRae).
89th Division (General Wright).
42d Division (General Menoher).
In reserve:
5th Division (General McMahon).
En route to join:
7th Division (General Barth).
The French II Colonial Corps (General Blondlat) to Les Eparges, with headquarters at St. Mihiel. In addition to its French troops this corps also included the American 26th Division (General Edwards)

The French XVII Corps (General Claudel) to the Meuse, with headquarters at Fort Regret.

The American III Corps (General Bullard) to Malancourt, with headquarters at Rampont.

Divisions in line:

33d (General Bell).
80th (General Bailey).
4th (General John L. Hines).

In reserve:

3d Division (General Buck).

The American V Corps (General Cameron) to Vauquois, with headquarters at Ville-sur-Coussances.

Divisions in line:

79 (General Kuhn).
37th (General Farnsworth).
91st (General Wm. H. Johnston).

In reserve:

32d Division (General Haan).

The American I Corps (General Liggett) to the Argonne Forest (inclusive), with headquarters at Rarecourt.

Divisions in line:

35th (General Traub).
28th (General Muir).
77th (General Alexander).

In reserve:

92d Division (General Ballou).

General Pershing held three divisions in general reserve as follows:

1st Division (General Summerall), near Souilly.
29th Division (General Morton), near Osches.
82d Division (General Burnham), near Clermont.

The French 5th Cavalry Division, in rear of the left, was placed at General Pershing's disposal.

The Army Artillery (General McGlachlin) included the heaviest artillery up to railway artillery of 400-mm. caliber.

The corps and divisional artillery included 2,400 pieces, of which 1,000 were of 75-mm. caliber.

The artillery concentration, if made in line, would have placed a piece of artillery at every ten yards.

General Pershing also had 821 airplanes and 189 tanks.

General Pershing succeeded in secretly concentrating this force of men and materiel by the night of September 25. This gave him a preponderance of men, and superiority in guns, aviation, and tanks. In fact von Gallwitz had no tanks on that front.

(4) *General Pershing's plan of maneuver west of the Meuse.* (a) General Pershing's general plan of maneuver west of the Meuse called for a surprise penetration of the first three German positions on the axis: Montfaucon—Romagne—Buzancy. His plan was built upon the idea of capturing strong places by maneuver rather than by frontal attack.

(b) The positions on the east bank of the Meuse, at Montfaucon, and in the Argonne were three such strong places. His plan called for a double penetration to pass Mont-

faucon, and then to advance with left refused to help General Gouraud's Fourth Army across the Aisne.

(c) The troops were to be formed for the initial double penetration with divisions on a wide frontage opposite the obstacles and with a deep formation opposite the more easily passable terrain through which the penetrations were to be made. To insure the surprise, the French were to maintain a screen along the American front until the night before the battle.

(d) Under the artillery plan, interdiction and harassing fire was to begin at 11:30 PM, September 25, and fire of preparation at 2:30 AM, September 26.

The army artillery protective fire was to cover the east bank of the Meuse as far north as Dun-sur-Meuse, and on the west flank as far north as Grand Pre. The army artillery was to be ready to lay down a barrage 500 yards in advance of the infantry on the call of corps. The III Corps Artillery was to include the east bank of the Meuse in its target.

The corps and division artillery had the usual mission of firing a barrage to the limit of range.

3. PHASES OF THE OPERATION. *a.* The general offensive, to be launched September 26, required a continuous line of battle from Metz to the sea, and placed no limit on the strategical objective except the defeat of Germany. Some authors have called that great battle: "The Battle of the Liberation of France"; others have called it "The Battle of France"; still others have called it "The Battle of 1918." Following the lead of General Pershing, it will be referred to here as the "General Offensive of 1918."

b. Although the General Offensive of 1918 included many battles like the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne, the Battle of Champagne, the Battle of Cambresis, the Battle of Flanders, etc., each of those battles constituted merely a part of the whole, and cannot be well understood unless so considered.

c. From this point of view, the battle divides itself into four great phases as follows:

The first phase, from September 26 to October 13, in which the German first line of defense was penetrated;

The second phase, from October 13 to October 20, in which the Germans were forced back to the second line of defense.

The third phase, from October 20 to November 4, in which the German second line of defense was penetrated; and

The fourth phase, from November 5 to 11, which covers the German retirement and the pursuit by Allied and American forces.

4. OPERATIONS—THE FIRST PHASE (SEPTEMBER 26-OCTOBER 13).—PENETRATION OF GERMAN FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. *a. The southern converging blow.* The southern converging blow was delivered by General Pershing with his First Army, supported on the left by General Gouraud's Fourth Army.

(1) *The American First Army.* (a) General Pershing launched his attack as a strategical and tactical surprise at 5:30 AM, September 26. Accompanied by tanks, and under cover of a fixed and a rolling barrage, the infantry advanced over the German positions to the line of Montfaucon, where, as planned, the V Corps held while the III and I Corps continued the advance on the right and left of Montfaucon, respectively. By evening, all divisions had passed the German first position.

(b) By noon, September 27, the attack had captured Montfaucon, and the V Corps had resumed its advance.

(c) The problem of restoring communication was an exceedingly difficult one, as there had been only four roads over "no man's land," and these had been destroyed during the previous four years of war. The roads were sufficiently reconstructed by the engineers so that all division artillery, excepting a few heavy batteries, were moved forward on the afternoon of September 27, and continued the support of the infantry advance. The advance continued steadily through the German network of defense.

(d) However, on September 28, von Gallwitz reinforced his front line with six fresh divisions and began an exceedingly active defense, particularly on the front of the 28th and 35th Divisions, with machine guns supported by artillery fire, and with frequent counter attacks. The American fighting was of the direct frontal attack type and against strong hostile positions that were fully manned by a determined enemy.

(e) Many divisions had suffered heavily, especially those in the center that were subjected to artillery cross fire, so, on the evening of September 29, the 37th and 79th Divisions were relieved by the 32d and 3d Divisions, respectively, and, on the following night, the 35th was relieved by the 1st Division.

(f) In this first bound, the line had advanced about ten miles and had penetrated the German second position. Its

right was opposite Sivry, at the bend in the Meuse. From there, the line extended to the left a little south of west to the Argonne Forest, where, due to the exceeding difficulty of the advance and to flank fire, the left was refused to the southwest. As rapidly as possible, von Gallwitz was reinforcing the line west of the Meuse from the mass which he had assembled for the defense of Metz.

(g) General Pershing renewed the attack on October 4. The enemy had increased the strength of his front line from Fresnes to the Argonne by six divisions. The fighting was desperate and only small advances were realized by the evening of the 5th, except by the 1st Division, on the right of the I Corps, which captured Fleville.

(h) General Pershing then decided to extend the operation to the east of the Meuse with the view of driving the Germans from those commanding heights and forcing von Gallwitz to weaken his line west of the Meuse.

(i) The French XVII Corps (General Claudel) directed its attack toward the exact point on which the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from Northern France, and realized an advance of six kilometers to a line on the edge of the Bois de Consevoye, by the evening of October 9. This relieved the situation west of the Meuse very noticeably. The fighting west of the Meuse was desperate, but, by October 10, the converging attack on the Argonne Forest, by the American First Army and the French Fourth Army, was successful and the Germans were pinched out of that forest. As a result of American assistance delivered as from a bridgehead east of the Aire, the French Fourth Army was able to reach the junction of the Aisne and the Aire Rivers.

(j) By October 13, General Pershing had captured all the positions of the German first line of defense and was in front of the Kriemhilde position in the second line of defense, which Marshal von Hindenburg was reinforcing very heavily with the intention of stopping the American advance at all costs. General Pershing was then confronted with a shortage of replacements. He needed 90,000 to replenish exhausted divisions, but only 45,0000 would be available by November 1. Marshal Foch and General Petain agreed with General Pershing that the latter's attack against the German pivot should be sustained, but were not willing to return to him the American divisions that were with the Allies. General Pershing then

adopted the policy of breaking up newly arrived divisions to secure replacements.

(k) (i) By October 12, the American First Army was holding a front of more than 120 kilometers and had a strength of more than 1,000,000 men, so on that day General Pershing created the Second American Army (Major General R. L. Bullard Commanding; Brigadier General Stewart Heintzelman, Chief of Staff) and gave it the sector from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, and fixed its headquarters at Toul. He gave to General Bullard the task of extending the operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz.

(ii) General Pershing assigned General Liggett to command the First Army and, himself, assumed command of the American Group of Armies, with advanced Headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrios. With the organization of the Second Army and its association with the First Army in an American group which was to continue the American effort against the German line of communications, General Pershing's status changed and the American effort to end the war found its full expression. While, in a general sense, as head of the American Expeditionary Force, he had discharged his duties on a plane with the allied commanders, nevertheless, militarily speaking, General Pershing's status on the Western front had not been equal to that of the commander of a group of armies. Now, however, in addition to being the supreme military representative of the United States, he became the actual commander of a numerically strong, well appointed group of armies, which, actuated by a high morale and imbued with a determined offensive spirit, was operating on an American front, with its own mission, for the accomplishment of the ends of the Allies and of the United States. The American forces thus took their place in the common order of battle with those of France, Great Britain, and Italy and their commanders, General Pershing, General Petain, Marshal Haig, and General Diaz served as equals under Marshal Foch.

(2) *The French Fourth Army.* (a) The French Fourth Army, which supported the American army, extended the line to the west from the Aisne to the Suippe.

(b) The gap between the American First Army and the French Fourth Army was covered by a combined American and French provisional reinforced brigade.

(c) General Gouraud launched his attack synchronously with the American attack with twenty-seven divisions, including reserves. Each division was about half as strong as an American division.

(d) (i) General Gouraud really had a double immediate mission that may be expressed as follows: Every kilometer gained by his right flank supported General Pershing's maneuver to clear the Argonne Forest, and every kilometer gained by his left flank assisted just that much in relieving the pressure on Rheims.

(ii) Beyond his immediate mission, however, his task, also in support of General Pershing, was to cut the German line of communications in the vicinity of Mezieres. His strategical direction line was to the left of but parallel to General Pershing's decisive strategical direction line.

(e) The obstacles in front of the French Fourth Army were not so great and the German defense not so strong as before the American First Army. However, as on the Meuse-Argonne front, the arrival of German reinforcements slowed down the advance, and, on the 30th of September, General Gouraud's army was stopped on the line just north of Somme-Py. In its immediate front were the last and strongest trench lines of the position through which they had been advancing, and farther to the north was the high ground for which the French spent so many lives in 1917. The wooded height Blanc Mont, just northwest of Somme-Py, was a part of that high ground and the key to the German defense system before General Gouraud's army.

(3) *The American 2d Division captures Blanc Mont.* (a) *Situation.* (i) The French troops of the Fourth Army, having been definitely stopped, General Gouraud turned to the American 2d Division to carry the advance past Blanc Mont.

(ii) The American 2d Division was in the French Fourth Army reserve about ten kilometers south of Somme-Py when it received orders, on October 1, assigning it to the French XXI Corps, and, from the latter, orders directing it to relieve the French 61st Division on the line in front of Somme-Py and facing the decisive tactical and strategical area: Blanc Mont—Meddeah Ferme, on the night of October 1-2.

(iii) On October 2, and the following night, the 2d Division cleared out the Essen trench preparatory to the attack of October 3.

(iv) The division was reinforced by the artillery of the French 61st Division, and by the French 252d Aviation Squadron. The brigades were reinforced with tanks as follows:

3d Brigade with 3d Battalion French Tanks.
4th Brigade with 2d Battalion French Tanks.

(v) The larger units of the 2d Division were commanded as follows:

Division, Major General Lejeune.
3d Brigade, Brigadier General H. E. Ely.
4th Brigade, Brigadier General Neville.
2d Artillery Brigade, Brigadier General Bowley.

(b) *The 2d Division plan.* (i) The objective was the high ground: Meddeah Ferme—Blanc Mont, which was the most sensitive German area in front of General Gouraud's Fourth Army.

(ii) The type of maneuver was the converging attack by brigades, the 3d Brigade on the right. Each brigade was to advance without regard to units on its right or left. Each brigade was to attack in column of regiments. The leading regiment in each brigade was to attack in column of battalions. The rear regiment in each brigade followed in reserve in the formation prescribed by the brigade commander.

(c) *The attack.* (i) After an artillery preparation of five minutes, the infantry attack was launched at 5:50 AM, October 3, and, supported by a rolling barrage, advanced at the rate of one hundred meters in four minutes.

(ii) The attack met great machine gun resistance, and, as the French neighboring units on the outer flanks did not keep up, the right flank of the 3d Brigade and the left flank of the 4th Brigade were somewhat retarded by heavy fire from those flanks. The division objective, however, was reached at 8:30 AM, and work of consolidation begun.

(iii) Late in the afternoon of October 3, the rear regiment in each brigade passed through the line of the leading regiment and carried the advance forward to the general line: road fork about one kilometer southwest of Scay Ferme to point about one kilometer south of St. Etienne on the Blanc Mont—St. Etienne road. An outpost line was pushed out about one and one-half kilometers.

(iv) On October 5, at 6:15 AM, the 4th Brigade, after a special artillery preparation during the night, attacked and

captured machine gun nests on the left flank that had caused much damage, and thus brought the line up to that of the 3d Brigade. This success also permitted the French division on the left to advance.

(v) General Gouraud, the commander of the French Fourth Army, reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces that, as a result of the American 2d Division's capture of Blanc Mont, the German forces as far west as Rheims were in full retreat.

(4) *The American 36th Division pursues to the Aisne.* (a) The American 2d Division by local attacks on October 6, advanced its whole line to the front and to the left. It was relieved from front line duty, on the night of October 6-7, by the American 36th Division. The 36th Division had never been in action. On October 4, it was placed at the disposal of General Gouraud. One brigade sent ahead, was assigned to the 2d Division, and, on the night of October 6-7, relieved the 2d Division troops then in line.

(b) The command of the division sector passed from the 2d Division to the 36th Division (General W. R. Smith), on October 10. The 36th Division then participated in the exploitation of the success of the 2d Division, pursuing the Germans in its division sector to the Aisne (the German second line of defense), which was reached on October 13.

(c) The 36th Division was exceedingly aggressive in this pursuit and easily demonstrated its superiority to the German troops in its front.

b. Operations against the German center. (1) *Operations north of the Oise.* (a) *Obstacles.* (i) The principal obstacle to be overcome by Allied operations against the German center, north of the Oise, was the German first line of defense, which here extended over a depth of about six miles.

(ii) The general trend of that line of defense from north to south was as follows: To protect Lille and the railroad from Lille to Douai, it extended southwest; to protect Cambrai, St. Quentin, and La Fere—the terminals of the trunk line of communications from Liege—it extended east of south to the Oise; but in front of Arras it extended nearly southeast.

(b) *Mission.* Marshal Haig was placed in charge of those operations and given the objective of breaking the German first line of defense on the Cambrai—St. Quentin front, and of exploiting that success by capturing the extremely sensitive

German strategical area: the junction of the German two lines of communication near Avesnes.

(c) *Order of battle from north to south.*

The British Fifth Army (General Birdwood).
The British First Army (General Horne).
The British Third Army (General Byng).
The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), reinforced by the American II Corps (General Read).
The French First Army (General Debeney).

(d) *Plan.* (i) Marshal Haig's general plan called for a converging maneuver against the strategical area: Cambrai—St. Quentin, in which the British Third and First Armies, with the left flank protected by the British Fifth Army, were to deliver the northern and first converging attack.

(ii) The British Fourth Army, reinforced by the American II Corps and supported by the French First Army on its right flank, was to deliver the southern and main attack.

(e) *The attack on Cambrai.* (i) Marshal Haig launched the northern converging attack with his First and Third Armies at 5:20 AM, September 27, the day following the launching of General Pershing's attack, and supported it by tanks.

(ii) The type of maneuver was that of a converging attack on Cambrai. By the evening of the second day (September 28), the northern converging force had made a deep advance into the German first line of defense, contained Cambrai on the north and south, and thus had accomplished its first task, which was to protect the northern flank of the main attack by the Fourth Army.

(f) *Main blow by Fourth Army (U. S. II Corps).* (i) *The plan.* The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), after its left flank should be protected by the capture or isolation of Cambrai, was to deliver the main blow against the German center toward the junction of the two German lines of communication near Avesnes.

The American II Corps (General Read) was selected to deliver the spearhead attack. The British IX Corps was on its right and the British III Corps on its left. It was to be followed by an Australian corps and that in turn by British divisions so that there would be sufficient depth for penetration, including passage of lines.

(ii) *Obstacles.* In front of the British Fourth Army, the very difficult obstacle of the Cambrai—St. Quentin Canal made the German first line of defense there very strong.

About 2,000 yards in front of the American II Corps, the canal, by means of the Bellicourt Tunnel, passed longitudinally through a well defined ridge that in itself was a considerable obstacle. The tunnel, however, strengthened the German defense very much. Its length, from south of Vendhuile to south of Bellicourt, is about 6,000 yards. Its depth below the surface of the ground is 45 to 65 feet. It is built of masonry and the two ends were prepared for defense. There was sufficient space in it to quarter about one division of troops in barges, and branch tunnels led to the surface defenses on the ridge. In short, it met many of the requirements of a fort, in that the troops were safe and comfortable and could reach their posts of defense without danger.

(iii) *The attack.* After a heavy two-day bombardment, the Fourth Army, supported by the French First Army on its right, and accompanied by tanks, attacked at 5:50 AM, September 29, in a heavy fog.

The American II Corps attacked with divisions abreast, the 30th Division (General Lewis) on the right, the 27th Division (General O'Ryan) on the left. Each division had one brigade in line and one in reserve. Each brigade on the line had regiments abreast. Each regiment on the line had two battalions on the front line and one battalion in reserve. Each brigade in reserve had its regiments in column, the leading regiment in line of battalion columns, and the rear regiment in column of battalions, each in line.

The corps advanced under cover of artillery fire of concentration and of a rolling barrage. On September 29, the II Corps captured the tunnel defenses and penetrated the Hindenburg line, which, in front of the American II Corps, was the tunnel line, and, as planned, the Australian corps behind it passed through and consolidated the ground won by the II Corps, while the II Corps went to the reserve in the spearhead corps sector.

On the night of October 5-6, the II Corps relieved the Australian corps, and disposed the troops as follows:

> Divisions in column, 30th in front.
> 30th Division in column, 59th Brigade in front.

On October 8, the British Fourth Army resumed the attack to support the II Corps in a penetration of the German line. The disposition remained unchanged and the 59th

Brigade attacked at 5:10 AM, supported by heavy artillery fire of concentration and light artillery barrage fire. The attack was accompanied by one battalion of heavy tanks, and two companies of light tanks. A British cavalry corps was held in the II Corps area to push through after the penetration of the line and to exploit the success.

The 59th Brigade, from *H* hour, had three German divisions on its front, the 20th, 24th, and 34th. These divisions were also reinforced during the day by two other divisions, the 2d Guard Division and the 21st Division, and also by two battalions of the 2d Cyclist Brigade. The 59th Brigade reached all its objectives, but, due to the German concentration in its front, did not penetrate the German line.

The next morning, October 9, the 59th Brigade resumed the attack and continued it until afternoon when the 60th Brigade passed through and advanced the line to Busigny—Bohain.

The 30th Division then, by passage of lines, continued to advance until the night of October 11-12 when it was relieved by the 27th Division and the line stood in front of Le Cateau—St. Souptet (both exclusive)—Bohain (inclusive).

The 27th Division consolidated the position preparatory to a further advance by the corps.

The British Fifth Army and the French First Army protected the north and south flanks, respectively, of Marshal Haig's operation, and, by October 13, the German first line of defense, penetrated by the American II Corps, had been captured, and the advance carried past Cambrai and St. Quentin to the line of the Oise and the Selle.

(2) *Operations east of the Oise.* (a) The French Tenth Army (General Mangin) and the French Fifth Army (General Berthelot) attacked on September 29. The Germans, menaced by the French First and Fourth Armies on the west and east, fell back rapidly to the northeast before the attack of the Tenth and the Fifth Armies.

(b) By October 13, the Fifth and Tenth Armies were in front of La Fere, and had recaptured the high ground of St. Gobain, Laon, and the Chemin des Dames.

c. The northern converging blow. (1) Having selected the King of Belgium to deliver the northen converging blow, Marshal Foch created the Flanders Group of Armies on September 19, and placed it under the command of the King of Belgium. From north to south, it consisted of the Belgian Army,

the Sixth French Army (General Degoutte), and the Second British Army (General Plummer).

(2) The mission was to force the Germans away from the coast and to cut their line of communications near Ghent. King Albert attacked, on September 29, from the Lys to the sea, and also effected a strategical and tactical surprise. On the first day, he captured a part of the high ground of Flanders. The advance, as in the other operations, continued rapidly until it was retarded by arrival of German reinforcements. By October 13, the King had advanced twenty kilometers but had met severe German resistance at the Lys.

d. Results of the first phase operation. (1) By October 13, Marshal Foch had captured the German first line of defense and had pressed Marshal von Hindenburg so hard that the latter had used all his fresh reserves and had been forced to fall back to his second line of defense in front of the southern converging blow.

(2) On September 30, the German Chancellor, von Hertling, resigned, and was succeeded by Prince Max of Baden. In September, Germany offered peace to Belgium.

(3) On September 29, General Ludendorff, having lost all hope, pronounced the situation exceptionally grave, and, on October 1, pressed the new Chancellor to demand an armistice through Mr. Wilson as an intermediary, and to make peace at any price, as he stated that he would no longer be responsible for the solidarity of the troops. A request for an armistice was sent to Mr. Wilson on the night of October 4-5, in which a peace, based on Mr. Wilson's fourteen points, was accepted as far as Germany was concerned. On October 1, Marshal von Hindenburg left the front and followed the Kaiser to Berlin to be near him in the event of revolution.

(4) On October 3, Marshal von Hindenburg proposed to the leaders of the government that a *levee in mass* should be proclaimed, in order to secure one last reserve for the defense of the frontier at the Grenz position. The attempt was a failure.

(5) On October 9, the German government had Mr. Wilson's reply, which was to the effect that, from a military standpoint, a condition precedent to the conclusion of any armistice was the evacuation of the occupied territory in France and Belgium.

(6) On October 12, the second German note was sent to Mr. Wilson, in which Germany reiterated with emphasis her request for peace on the basis of the fourteen points enumerated by Mr. Wilson on January 8, 1918, as necessary to peace.

5. OPERATIONS. THE SECOND PHASE (OCTOBER 13-20)—DRIVING THE GERMANS BACK TO SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE. *a. Plans.* (1) *Marshal von Hindenburg's plan.* (a) Marshal von Hindenburg's general plan was to continue the bold step by step defensive while the new German government should secure a peace by diplomacy.

(b) His plan called for holding the second line of defense, and for such an aggressive defense of territory held in front of that second line of defense, on the west face of the salient, that time would be gained to strengthen it. The second line of defense in front of the American sector was to be held at all costs.

(c) He directed the outer defense to be made by interdepending groups of resistance that would make a maximum use of the machine gun. He directed all commands not to retreat until further defense of positions was hopeless, and to conduct the defense so that the Allied and American forces would have to pay so dearly for advances that they would be inclined toward peace.

(2) *Marshal Foch's plan.* Marshal Foch's plan, as published in his directive of October 10, was that the converging operation being conducted by General Pershing on the south should continue vigorously, but that the principal effort would be made to reduce the La Fere salient, the Lille salient, and the Flanders—Channel salient, and thus force the Germans back on the western face of the great salient to the second line of defense, as had been done by the southern converging operation. and by the British Fourth Army with the assistance of the American II Corps in the operation against the center.

b. The southern converging blow. (1) *General Pershing's group of armies.* (a) The American First Army (General Liggett) was in front of the German second line of defense, which, in that sector, was called the Kriemhilde position. West of the Meuse, it was based on the hills around Romagne, Bantheville, Landres, and the bends in the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Its position was about two and one-half miles deep and it was perfectly organized.

(b) General Pershing's plan was to hold with the Second Army (General Bullard), which was organizing on the right, and to attack with the First Army (General Liggett) on the left.

(c) The plan of maneuver for the American First Army was for the French XVII Corps (General Claudel), east of the Meuse, to continue the attack toward the actual German pivot near Consevoye, and, west of the Meuse, for the III Corps (General John L. Hines) and the V Corps (General Summerall) to attack in conjunction with General Gouraud's Fourth Army to help the I Corps (General Dickman) across the Aire, and to advance the whole line. The 42d and the 5th Divisions relieved the 1st and the 80th Divisions.

(d) (i) The attack of the American First Army encountered the most determined resistance, but Romagne, Cunel, and adjoining territory were captured, and, by the 20th of October the I Corps had crossed the Aire River and captured Grand Pre.

(ii) The fighting east of the Meuse also was violent, especially on October 18. Marshal von Hindenburg reinforced the line with six divisions, in his attempt to prevent the American First Army's advance.

(2) *The French Fourth Army.* General Gouraud attacked synchronously, but was held before the German second line of defense at the Aisne, where the American 36th Division did especially fine work. By October 20, General Gouraud had captured Vouziers.

c. The northern converging blow. On October 14, King Albert of Belgium resumed operations in the direction of Bruges and Ghent with great success. The Germans fell back on the north flank rapidly, to keep from being forced into Holland. By October 20, they had been forced back off the coast to their second line of defense.

d. Operations against the German center. (1) The British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson) attacked at 5:20 AM, October 17, astride the St. Quentin—Liege railroad, for the purpose of capturing the junction of that railroad and the Mezieres—Valenciennes railroad. The Fourth Army was supported by attacks by the French First Army on its right and the British Third Army on its left.

(2) Again, the American II Corps (General Read) was the spearhead of the attack. The II Corps, supported by tanks, attacked with divisions abreast, the 30th on the right

and the 27th on the left, in a heavy fog, with cavalry behind ready to exploit a penetration of the line. The British IX Corps on the right did not keep up, so the 30th Division's right flank was exposed to fire.

(3) The attack was resumed the next day with the same situation on the right flank, caused this time by the fact that the French First Army did not keep up. By the evening of October 19, the II Corps had captured the high ground that overlooked the Sambre canal, which was the German second line of defense, when, due to its very heavy losses, it was relieved for rest and replacement.

(4) The French First Army (General Debeney) and the French Tenth Army (General Mangin), by a converging attack, had reduced the La Fere salient by October 20.

(5) The French Fifth Army (General Berthelot), supported by the Fourth Army on its right and the Tenth Army on its left, drove the Germans back to the second line of defense.

(6) The British Third Army, in conjunction with the converging action by King Albert's Group, attacked the south face of the Lille salient, and, with the support of the British Fifth and First Armies' attack against its face, forced the Germans to retire from that salient. By October 20, the British forces had passed Lille and Douai and were approaching the German second line of defense.

e. Results of the second phase operation. (1) The results following Marshal Foch's instructions of October 10, were that the Germans had been forced back to the second line of defense, by October 20, all along the line, except in the vicinity of Tournai, and that they were defending the second line with the greatest desperation.

(2) (a) On October 20, the German government replied to Mr. Wilson's note, and, in an appeal for peace, promised to abandon submarine warfare.

(b) The second phase ended on October 20, with Marshal von Hindenburg defending his second line of defense. As a result of the shortening of the line, the von Boehn Group was discontinued. The Second Army went to the Group of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, the Eighteenth and Ninth Armies to the Group of the Crown Prince of Germany. The Ninth Army however, was immediately amalgamated with the Seventh Army.

6. OPERATIONS—THE THIRD PHASE (OCTOBER 20—NOVEMBER 4)—PENETRATION OF GERMAN SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE. *a. Plans.* (1) *Marshal von Hindenburg's plan.* Marshal von Hindenburg's plan was to hold the pivot in front of the American sector and the second line of defense on the southern face of the salient, at all costs. He planned to hold the second line of defense, on the western face of the salient, until the third line of defense could be prepared, and until material in front of the third line of defense could be sent to the rear.

(2) *Marshal Foch's plan.* Marshal Foch's plan, as given in his directive of October 19, was as follows:

(a) The southern converging operation was to be continued without change of objective. However, in order to assist the French Fourth Army (General Gouraud) to cross the Aisne, General Pershing's First Army (General Liggett) and General Petain's Fifth Army (General Berthelot) were to converge their attacks in the direction of Buzancy and Rethel, respectively, while General Gouraud should attack in the direction of Le Chesne.

(b) The King of Belgium was to continue the northern converging operation with his Group of Armies in the general direction of Brussels.

(c) The operations against the center were to continue as follows:

Marshal Haig, with the British armies, except the Second, was to make the principal effort between the Sambre and the Scarpe for the purpose of cutting the German line of communications: Namur—Charleroi, and of forcing the German troops against the impassable Ardennes Forest.

At the same time, Marshal Haig was to protect the south flank of the Group of the King of Belgium and to help him, by flank action, to cross the rivers on his front.

(d) General Petain was to support the British right, and also the left of the southern converging operations, by an effort to break the Hundig position on the line of the Serre, with the French First and Tenth Armies, respectively.

b. The northern converging blow. (1) On October 21, the King of Belgium attacked with his Group of Armies along the whole front. He penetrated the Lys position, but, on October 26, was stopped in front of the high ground between the Lys and the Scarpe Rivers, whereupon Marshal Foch requested

General Pershing to send immediately two American divisions to help the Sixth French Army (General Degoutte). General Pershing sent the 37th Division (General Farnsworth) and the 91st Division (General Wm. H. Johnston).

(2) The order of battle of the French Sixth Army from right to left was: VII Corps, XXX Corps and XXXIV Corps. The American 37th Division was assigned to the XXX Corps and placed on the right. The American 91st Division was assigned to the VII Corps and placed on the right.

(3) As a result, the French 128th Division was between the two American divisions, as was the Moroccan division between the 1st and 2d Divisions in the operation against Soissons, on July 18.

(4) The attack was resumed at 5:30 AM, October 31, and there, as at Soissons, the two American divisions at once became the spearhead of the attack. On the first day, the 37th Division captured the Cruyshautem Ridge, and the 91st Division captured the hill Spitaals Boschen with great gallantry.

(5) These two divisions, then taking the lead in the advance, drove the Germans back to the Scarpe, where the 37th Division made an effective river crossing in the face of the enemy, and the 91st captured the important town of Audenarde. They had advanced fourteen kilometers in three days, had carried the line forward with them, and, having attained all objectives, were relieved from front line duty, for rest and replacement, on the night of November 3-4.

(6) As a result of the operations of these two American divisions, King Albert's Group of Armies, by November 4, was in front of the German switch position, which extended from Holland through Ghent and along the east bank of the Scarpe to the Herman position north of Tournai. This switch position was very strong, and was defended with great vigor.

c. Operations against the German center. (1) Marshal Haig's attack proceeded vigorously along the railroad toward Charleroi, but met great resistance. However, this resistance weakened after November 1, the date of General Pershing's attack, and, November 4, Marshal Haig had penetrated the Herman position on the German second line of defense near Valenciennes, and had reached the line of the Scarpe and the Sambre.

(2) General Petain attacked with the French First and Tenth Armies, and, supporting Marshal Haig on the left,

advanced the First Army to the line of the Sambre-Oise Canal, and crossed the Serre with the Tenth Army. By November 4, he had penetrated the Hundig position in the vicinity of Guise on Marshal von Hindenburg's second line of defense.

d. Southern converging blow. (1) *Situation.* (a) Marshal von Hindenburg's defense against the southern converging attack was so strong that, except for local successes, the attack made no progress until November 1. The general description of that operation is as follows.:

(b) The converging attack of the French Fifth Army did not succeed. General Pershing's attack did succeed, so he held out a hand to General Gouraud and helped him across the Aisne.

(2) *General Pershing's attack November 1.* (a) *Situation October 31.* (i) By October 31, Marshal von Hindenburg had effected a heavy concentration of troops in front of General Pershing in order to protect his pivot and his vital line of communications through Carignan—Sedan.

(ii) For the first time, the American army was preparing for the attack under normal conditions. That is, it was to attack on a front already held. American personnel were in control of the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service. The American divisions were either on the line or close in rear.

(iii) The French artillery, aviation, and technical troops, which had previously made up the American deficiencies, had been largely replaced by American organizations; also, the army, corps, and division staffs had had sufficient experience to function without Allied aid.

(iv) Considering the obstacles to be overcome, the situation presented was somewhat similar to that before the attack of September 26. The terrain, with the Meuse on the right and the Bourgogne woods on the left, practically made a defile, though the heights of Barricourt were not as strong as those of Montfaucon.

(b) *General Pershing's plan.* (i) *General plan.* On October 21, General Pershing issued instructions that the army should prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, that would be decisive. The date was postponed to November 1, to coordinate with General Gouraud's Fourth Army on the left. General Pershing's general plan, for the operation as a

whole, was to hold with the Second Army and to attack with the First Army.

(ii) *Purpose.* Though the ultimate purpose of his whole operation remained unchanged, i.e., to cut the Carignan—Sedan—Mezieres railroad line, the immediate purpose of the November 1 attack was to help General Gouraud over the Aisne, as though the American army were a bridgehead for that French army, and to establish contact with General Gouraud's army north of the Bourgogne Woods.

(iii) *Method.* His decision, as before, was based on the idea of the capture of strong places by maneuver against the flank and rear of those places. The Bourgogne Woods and the Heights of Barricourt were exceedingly difficult obstacles, so the type of maneuver chosen by General Pershing was the single penetrating maneuver launched from a frontal attack.

(iv) *Plan of maneuver.* The plan of maneuver, to carry out this decision, provided for a frontal attack on November 1, with the corps in line from right to left as follows: III, V, and I. The left of the V Corps and the right of the I Corps were to be the spearhead of the attack. Success was to be exploited by advancing the left, where contact was to be established with General Gouraud's Fourth Army.

(v) *Order of battle.* The order of battle west of the Meuse, from right to left, was as follows:

III Corps (General J. L. Hines).
Divisions on front line:
5th (General H. E. Ely).
90th (General H. T. Allen).
Divisions in reserve:
3d (General Preston Brown).
32d (General W. G. Haan).
V Corps (General C. P. Summerall).
Divisions on front line:
89th (General W. M. Wright).
2d (General J. A. Lejeune).
Division in reserve:
1st (General Frank Parker).
I Corps (General J. T. Dickman).
Divisions on front line:
80th (General Adelbert Cronkhite).
77th (General Robert Alexander).
78th (General J. H. McRae)
Divisions in reserve:
42d (General C. T. Menoher).
Army Artillery (General E. F. McGlachlin).

(vi) *Artillery plan.* In the American sector, the whole remaining German last line of defense, west of the Meuse, was within range of the American artillery. Under the artillery

plan, the whole Kriemhilde position was to be put under neutralizing fire, beginning October 21. In order to secure maximum range, the army artillery was placed well forward. The Bourgogne Woods and the high ground east of the Meuse were to be neutralized in order to protect the attacking troops from cross fire. The advance the first day was to be protected by a heavy and deep rolling barrage. Artillery was to be displaced forward to cover the second day's advance with accurate fire. The American artillery reached its maximum efficiency in the American operation that was launched November 1, 1918.

(c) *Operations.* (i) After a two hours' violent artillery preparation, the infantry advanced on November 1, in a heavy mist, under cover of a perfectly coordinated dense barrage and of concentration and neutralizing fires. It was closely followed by accompanying guns, and, by nightfall, the V Corps had captured the heights of Barricourt and the III Corps had advanced. The advance on that day broke through the last position in the German second line of defense, captured the German artillery positions, and forced the retreat of the Germans about to be isolated in the Bourgogne Woods north of Grand Pre.

(ii) As expected, the German resistance weakened in front of General Gouraud's Fourth Army on the Aisne, so General Gouraud's Fourth Army crossed the Aisne, on November 2, and the two armies effected a junction on that day as planned.

(iii) After helping the French Fourth Army across the Aisne, General Pershing, supported by that French army, resumed the advance along the decisive strategical direction that led to the cutting of the Carignan—Sedan railroad line—the principal German line of communications.

(iv) On November 2 and 3, he sent the III and V Corps forward rapidly against severe resistance, and he sent the I Corps forward so rapidly that some pursued by motor truck.

(v) By November 3, he had attained a point from which he attempted interdiction fire with his heavy railroad artillery on that line of communications.

(vi) By the evening of November 4, he had reached La Neuville on the Meuse, opposite Stenay, had swept through the Forest of Dieulet to the outskirts of Beaumont, and, on the left, had advanced to Le Chesne.

e. Results of third phase operations. Though Germany's second line of defense had been penetrated, by other armies than the American on other parts of the front, the outstanding and decisive accomplishment of the third phase was the fact that General Pershing had penetrated the German second line of defense close to its pivot with the Antwerp—Meuse line (i.e., the third line of defense) and was in a position which took in flank and rear all the German forces west of the Antwerp—Meuse line of defense.

7. OPERATIONS—THE FOURTH PHASE (NOVEMBER 4-11). THE PURSUIT. *a. Plans.* (1) *Marshal von Hindenburg's plans.* (a) On October 25, the new German government relieved General von Ludendorff, holding him responsible for the defeat. Marshal von Hindenburg estimated, on November 4, that the strain had become almost intolerable, and that any convulsion in the army, or in Germany, would make collapse inevitable. His authority, as well as that of the German government, over the troops was much reduced because of their low morale.

(b) General Pershing's penetration of the Kriemhilde position also penetrated the German second line of defense, at the pivot. As a result, Marshal von Hindenburg practically ceased resistance in front of the Antwerp—Meuse line, i.e., the third line of defense. The only German plan deducible, amid the confusion existing in the German army, at that time, is that Marshal von Hindenburg was trying to hold General Pershing in front of his third line of defense while the German troops in France and Belgium could retreat thereto.

(2) *Marshal Foch's plan.* Marshal Foch's plan was very simple, i.e., to attack and pursue the Germans along the whole front without respite, with the idea of securing a decision.

(3) *General Pershing's plan.* General Pershing planned to make the success of the American Group of Armies the decisive blow of the war, so he gave instructions for the pursuit to be expedited. The III Corps was to turn east and cross the Meuse, while the Second Army, east of the Meuse, was to attack in the general direction of the Briey iron basin.

b. Operations. (1) *The Allied front.* Except in the American sector, the Germans were retreating as rapidly as possible to the Antwerp—Meuse line, and the Allied troops were engaged merely in pursuit.

(2) *The American front.* (a) *The First Army.* (i) The divisions on the front line advanced in an irresistible reach for victory. The III Corps (General J. L. Hines) turned to the east. The 5th Division (General H. E. Ely), in a brilliant operation, crossed the Meuse, and, on November 3-4-5, established a bridgehead on the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse. This forced a general German withdrawal from the strong positions held so long on the hills north of Verdun. The American troops thus, by November 5, had penetrated the Antwerp—Meuse line (i.e., the German third and last line of defense) and were prepared to take the whole German force in France and Belgium in reverse.

(ii) The 5th Division at once began an aggressive advance toward the Carignan—Sedan railroad line, which was the German main line of communications and had been the main objective of the Allied and American general offensive. When stopped by the armistice, the 5th Division was within artillery range of the German line of communications.

(iii) The 32d Division (General Haan) crossed the Meuse south of the 5th Division and, advancing, joined with that part of the First Army that had been operating on the east bank of the Meuse.

(iv) On the left of the 5th Division, the 90th Division (General Allen) crossed the Meuse, and, by November 11, was within artillery range of the German line of communications.

(v) The corps artillery of the III Corps (Colonel Lanza) held the German line of communications under interdiction fire after November 8.

(vi) In the V Corps, the 89th Division (General Wright), in an excellent operation planned by Colonel R. H. Allen, Infantry, and the 2d Division (General Lejeune) crossed the Meuse, and, by November 11, the V Corps also had the German line of communication within artillery range.

(vi) In the I Corps, the 77th Division (General Alexander) had the German line of communications within artillery range by the 11th.

(viii) The First Division (General Frank Parker) and the 42d Division (General Menoher) reached the heights above Sedan on November 7, and held that fortress and the railroad objective under easy fire control. At this time, the boundary between the American First Army and the French Fourth

Army was changed so that Sedan was included within the zone of action of the latter. The American 1st and 42d Divisions, therefore, were withdrawn from Sedan, in order to give the French their right of way.

(b) *The Second Army.* On the 8th, the Second Army attacked along its whole front in the direction of the Briey iron basin, and maintained the advance until stopped by the armistice.

8. THE ARMISTICE. *a. German request for armistice.* On November 6, the day after American forces had penetrated the last German line of defense and had the German main line of communications within their grasp, the German government announced that parlementaires had left to arrange terms of armistice with Marshal Foch. These parlementaires presented themselves near La Chapelle at 8:00 PM, November 7, to the advance troops of the French First Army (General Debeney). Marshal Foch received them that evening at Rethondes, east of Compiegne, dictated the terms of a proffered armistice to them at once, and gave Germany seventy-two hours, i.e., until 11:00 AM, November 11, for reply. At 5:00 AM, November 11, the parlementaires signed the armistice, and, at 11:00 AM that day, hostilities ceased.

b. Terms of the armistice. Under the terms of the armistice, Germany surrendered all her submarines and disarmed her surface men of war, which were to be interned in neutral ports or taken over by the Allies, and also surrendered great quantities of arms and transportation. She renounced the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk and also of Bucharest. She agreed to repair damage done, and to indemnify the Allies as agreed to later by negotiations, to evacuate all foreign occupied territory, and to permit a neutral zone ten kilometers deep on the east bank of the Rhine from Switzerland to Holland, with Allied and American bridgeheads at Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne, each with a radius of thirty kilometers.

c. The advance into Germany. (1) (a) The center bridgehead was assigned to the United States. Before the armistice, General Pershing had planned to create a Third Army. On November 14, he designated the Third Army (General J. T. Dickman, Commanding, Brigadier General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff) as the Army of Occupation and assigned to it the III and IV Corps staffs and troops (less artillery, except the 66th Field Artillery Brigade) and the following divisions: 1st, 2d,

3d, 4th, 32d, and 42d. Later, the VII Corps with the 5th, 89th, and 90th Divisions was added.

(b) This was truly an army organized on the march, for the advance began November 17, at 5:00 AM, only six days after the armistice, and three days after the order was issued to organize the army.

(2) All of the Allied and American troops from Holland to Switzerland moved forward simultaneously in the wake of the retreating Germans. Upon arrival at the frontier, a halt was made until December 1, when the leading elements of all Allied and American armies crossed the line into Germany.

(3) The American Third Army headquarters was established at Coblenz, and an advance general headquarters at Treves. Steps immediately were taken to organize the bridgeheads for defense, and dispositions were made to meet a possible renewal of hostilities.

(4) The advance to the Rhine required long arduous marches, through cold and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, refit, and refresh themselves after participation in the final battle. The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine state of discipline, both during the advance and throughout the period of occupation.

(5) The zone of march of the American Third Army, and its line of communication after reaching the Rhine, lay through Luxembourg. After the passage of the American Third Army, the 5th and 33d Divisions of the American Second Army were designated to occupy Luxembourg (except the city of Luxembourg) for the purpose of guarding the American lines of communications.

9. RETURN OF AMERICAN FORCES TO AMERICA. *a.* The First and Second American Armies were dissolved and returned to America after the armistice. The Army of Occupation (the Third Army), reduced from time to time, finally was returned to America in 1923, when the United States turned the Coblenz bridgehead over to France.

b. The American forces, upon return to the United States, were mustered out of the service as rapidly as possible, and the regular forces were reduced to a peace basis.

10. GENERAL PERSHING. In recognition of General Pershing's great service to his country, the United States commissioned him "General of the Armies of the United States" on

September 3, 1919, and, on September 29, 1919, presented to him "The Thanks of Congress."

11. PRINCIPLES OF WAR. *The principle of the offensive. a.* When two combatants are nearly balanced in skill in the making of war, but one of them has a decided preponderance of force, that combatant should seek to make his preponderance effective in the securing of a decision through the agency of offensive warfare. From September 25, 1918, to the end of the war, Germany operated on interior lines on the Western front and was equal to the Allies and to America in skill in making war. However, the Allies and America had a great preponderance of force on the Western front, and a vast preponderance of resources. Marshal Foch could have chosen to deliver a decisive blow along a decisive direction line while holding on all the rest of the front.

b. (1) This might have been successful. Such an offensive belongs to the *annihilating* type. It was the type of offensive that Marshal von Hindenburg used in all of his offensive operations on the Western front in 1918. It is especially well fitted for the use of a force that, on a whole front, is inferior to the enemy, but which seeks a decision through an offensive which illustrates the *principles of mass, surprise,* and *movement* at a particular time and place.

(2) If Marshal Foch had attempted to win the war with an offensive of that type, it is barely possible that Marshal von Hindenburg, operating on interior lines, might have defeated it, as he did General Nivelle's offensive in 1917.

c. (1) Under the conditions existing on the Western front on September 25, 1918, the limitation of the Allied and American effort to a blow along one or even two direction lines would not have given a sufficient opportunity to take full advantage of the Allied and American preponderance of force and resources. This is especially true as the German flanks rested on impassable obstacles.

(2) The advantage from interior lines enjoyed by the Germans could be neutralized, and the opportunity gained to use the Allied and American preponderance, by extending the offensive effort to include the whole front from Metz to the sea. That is just what Marshal Foch did.

d. By directing General Pershing to strike at the German pivot and at the German line of communications, Marshal Foch complied with the basic idea of the *offensive of annihila-*

tion. However, when he involved the whole front in the battle, he also complied with the basic idea of the *offensive of exhaustion.*

e. (1) Marshal Foch's illustration of the type of the offensive called the *offensive of exhaustion* was not limited to the Western front.

(2) Through unity of command, he illustrated that type of the offensive by the operations on all the fronts, and in a way very similar to the manner in which General Grant illustrated the offensive of exhaustion in his 1864 and 1865 operations that defeated the Confederacy by exhaustion: thus—

(a) The Allied Mesopotamian and Syrian operations, against the Central Powers' resources, corresponds to General Bank's operation against Mobile and the Confederate line of communications to that seaport.

(b) The Allied operation against the Central Powers' resources in the Balkans corresponds to General Sherman's operation against Confederate resources.

(c) The Allied operations in Italy, toward Innsbruck and toward the German line of communications to the Western front, corresponds to General Crook's operations from West Virginia against General Lee's line of communications via Lynchburg to Knoxville.

(d) The Allied and American operation on the Western front corresponds to General Grant's operation against General Lee in front of Richmond. And, in that operation, General Pershing's cutting of the German line of communications and of retreat corresponds to General Sheridan's cutting of General Lee's line of communications and retreat at Appomatox.

f. From the above, it may be deduced that, when, after a long war, one of the combatants operating on exterior lines is vastly surperior to the other in men and resources, it may be well for him not to limit his offensive operation to a single direction line, or even to two direction lines, but, instead, to take full advantage of his superiority by involving the whole force in an offensive of exhaustion.

g. It was that type of the offensive which brought the two greatest of modern wars to an end: i.e., the World War under the direction of Marshal Foch, and the American Civil War under the direction of General Grant.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA
3 0112 073211440